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This research analyses the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships in 
enhancing governance to promote sustainable peace and security. It uses a 
case study of coltan exploitation and armed conflict in the eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), where the two wars between 1996 and 2003 and 
the ongoing conflict have led to the ‘world’s worst humanitarian crisis’. The 
current body of knowledge on conflict analyses, particularly ‘resource curse’ 
theory, emphasises the natural resource endowment and weak governance 
as the main factors contributing to the DRC conflict, and has been influential 
in policy formulation.       
 
The case study is supported by the collection and analysis of qualitative data 
from multiple sources using different methods including literature reviews, 
interviews and observations. In so doing, the research seeks to examine how 
multi-stakeholder partnerships can help to enhance governance and promote 
sustainable peace and security, with a focus on the role of the multi-
stakeholder partnerships in curtailing revenues for the belligerents from coltan 
production and trade in the eastern DRC.  
 
The analysis of the conflicts and coltan exploitation revealed the intricate 
multi-layered nature of the conflicts in the DRC and their complex causalities. 
The examination of the multi-stakeholder partnerships relevant to coltan 
exploitation in the DRC identified a number of constraints for their 
implementation and concerns about adverse effects from the implementation, 
largely owing to the externally driven agenda of the partnerships, which 
neglects the local perspectives.  
 
Through the arguments presented in this thesis, the research contributes to 
knowledge in three broad areas: it contributes to ongoing academic 
discussions on conflict analyses, in particular the resource curse hypothesis 
and the economic agendas of civil war; it provides empirical analysis and data 
on the coltan industry and partnership initiatives in relation to armed conflicts 
in the eastern DRC; and it highlights the need to re-assess the concept of 
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Conflict Coltan: Local and International 





I lived and worked in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, as Country Director of an 
NGO from 2001 to 2005. There I worked with local associations, collaborating 
with them in the implementation of their initiatives while I managed the Rwanda 
office. I had access to very limited resources, working with no backing from 
local staff and no vehicle at my disposal, a rather unusual thing for an 
international NGO. My work therefore put me in close daily contact and 
interaction with locals as well as foreigners of all kinds, through whom I could 
follow events on the ground unsheltered. 
 
Rwanda was still suffering from the major destruction entailed by the 1994 
genocide. The majority of the population was living in severe poverty; 
resources, facilities and services were seriously limited and only a handful of 
viable industries were in operation. Yet there was visible affluence and wealth in 
the country. And every time I went to the bank, I had the opportunity to observe 
a few people there carrying bags full of USD100 notes. I also encountered 
business people who were flying in and out of Rwanda, not revealing the nature 
of their business; a few, however, did tell me that they made regular business 
trips to Goma, the provincial capital of North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), just across the border from Rwanda. I did not know what kind of 





I soon crossed the border to Goma myself: when the Nyiragongo volcano 
erupted on 17 January 2002, causing a population displacement there, I joined 
an emergency relief operation to assist the displaced. This volcanic region, well 
known for its mountain gorillas, is stunningly beautiful, fertile and rich in 
minerals but I noted that the majority of the population living there was very 
poor and deprived. I was struck by the arresting gap between the absolute 
poverty and great wealth of the region and made an assumption that this wealth 
was somehow linked with the ongoing conflict in the DRC. 
 
My assumption was reinforced by some business men I met in Kigali. One day I 
was approached by a few executives holding business cards representing a 
company lodged in a makeshift office; they expressed their keen interest in 
accessing the market in Japan (my country of origin) in order to sell minerals, 
specifically coltan. This was when I heard the name coltan (columbo-tantalite) 
for the first time and when the price of coltan had collapsed (during 2001) after 
a short-lived boom period. I was told by a few local people that Rwanda 
produced such minerals and that Rwanda used to be a larger place, including 
some parts of the DRC and other neighbouring countries. I also came across an 
individual who claimed to be an ex-Russian airman who was flying an aircraft 
carrying commodities in and out of the eastern DRC. He was overtly racist and 
sexist and was very open about a clandestine and lucrative trade in minerals, 
including diamonds and coltan. He recommended trading in diamonds because 
of the level of profits it generated and the relative ease with which the required 
certifications of origin could be illegitimately obtained.  
 
On reflection, I was alarmed at being approached by those individuals because 
of their probable links with the Rwandan army, the security forces and similar 
agencies. The tension in Rwandan society, both visible and invisible, was 
intense at the time. There was an overwhelming presence of many soldiers, 
self-defence forces, members of private security forces and of the police 
throughout the country. There was also a rumour that the intelligence was 




that all our communication was bugged. The rumour was probably partly true 
but the most important factor was the existing tension, which could create 
rumours and mobilise people very efficiently. 
 
I developed a keen interest in how this enormous wealth can in fact contribute 
to such massive poverty and violence, and how mineral-using industries, such 
as in Japan, could engage in business to overturn the vicious link. My interest 
has grown, especially because the suffering of the Congolese people has been 
largely neglected year after year; concrete efforts and responses are lacking, 
despite increased awareness and knowledge of the link, provided by several 
investigations, reports and campaigns. In addition, the forest in the DRC, as one 
of the earth’s lungs, is vital in our efforts to urgently address climate change. 
For this reason, I decided to conduct this piece of research as a consumer of 
mineral resources originating from the DRC, with a feeling of hope that we can 
fulfil our responsibility to much greater degree and be able to engage for the 




Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introducing the research background 
 
This thesis is a result of my journey of enquiries which took place between 
2007 and 2010. It describes how minerals, extracted from a developing 
country with abundant natural resources, contribute to our modern life based 
on high technology, yet at the same time impact negatively on the producing 
country. How can we reconcile this conspicuous disparity? Two widely held 
views are that a rich endowment of natural resources combined with weak 
governance leads to violent conflict and poverty, the ‘resource curse’ theory, 
and that multi-stakeholder partnerships, such as certification schemes, can 
have positive impacts leading to improved security and development. I dispute 
these views, or at least believe they are simplistic and probably misleading. I 
present a detailed analysis on coltan exploitation in the eastern DRC to argue 
that complex political issues – local, regional and international – are core to 
conflict and poverty in the eastern DRC. The analysis is based on specific 
case studies of the informal artisanal coltan mining and trade, coltan supply 
chains and coltan certification schemes. Partnerships and certification will 
make little positive contribution as long as these political issues are not 
addressed, not least because widespread corruption allows evasion of all 
regulation as well-established networks, including politico-military elites, are 
deeply involved in the mineral trade.  
 
This section introduces the background to my research, an overview of the 
DRC, its mining sector and the impact of the prolonged conflict since 1996, 
and the theoretical background that forms the research. The following section 
clarifies the research aims and questions, and how the achievements of those 
may contribute to knowledge. The third section provides the structure of the 





The DRC1 covers an area of more than 2 million square kilometres and 
borders nine countries, namely Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia (CIA 
2010). The population is estimated to be over 70 million (ibid.). The country is 
enormously rich in natural resources, including cobalt, copper, niobium, 
tantalum, petroleum, diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, cassiterite, 
uranium, coal, hydropower and timber (ibid.). The area holds over 1,100 
different mineral substances, mainly in four regions, namely Katanga, the two 
Kasaïs, Northeast Congo and Kivu-Maniema (World Bank 2008a). Amongst 
them, the Katanga Copper Belt contains the second richest copper reserves 
in the world, estimated to be 70 million metric tonnes, the largest known 
cobalt reserves in the world, estimated to be 5 million metric tonnes, and three 
percent of the world zinc reserves, estimated to be 6 million metric tonnes 
(ibid.). The country also possesses the world’s largest known diamond 
reserves in terms of carats, 25 percent or around 150 million carats, and 
world-class gold deposits (ibid.). While many regions have not had detailed 
explorations, unknown mineralisation is considered to exist in other regions as 
well.  
 
The mining sector in the DRC has been the main sector of the economy 
throughout history and accounted for 70 to 80 percent of export earnings and 
about 8 percent of GDP (ibid.). The sector’s contribution to the formal 
economy largely decreased in the past, owing to the decline in commodity 
prices, mismanagement of state-owned enterprises and the significant 
expansion of the artisanal mining sector and informal economy, following the 
collapse of state institutions. About 90 percent of the minerals are considered 
as being produced by the artisanal mining sector (ibid.). The World Bank 
anticipated in 2008 that the gross value of mining production would grow to 
range between USD2 billion and USD2.7 billion annually, contributing to 
between 20 and 25 percent of the country’s GDP (World Bank 2008a). The 
global financial crisis, however, severely affected most of the potential 
                                                          
1 In this thesis, both country names, Zaïre and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), are 
used to describe the current state of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The 
appellation, Zaïre, is more specifically used to refer to events or phenomenon that took place 




transmission mechanisms within the DRC economy and the GDP declined 
from 6.2 percent in 2008 to 2.7 percent in 2009 (Kalala with Cassimon 2010).   
 
During the wars between 1996 and 2003, the country’s natural resources 
were significantly plundered, which prompted the UN Security Council to 
instruct the eminent investigation by the UN Panel of Experts on ‘The Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (UNSC 2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b). The 
measurement of ability to provide security, protection of property, basic public 
services and key infrastructure scored the DRC in the position of the world’s 
6th failed state amongst 50 other failed states (Foreign Policy 2008) and the 
regulatory environment for business and investment of the country is marked 
178th out of 178 states (World Bank 2007a).   
 
The country’s predicament is frequently depicted as the ‘world’s worst 
humanitarian crisis’ by UN agencies and it was ranked 168th out of 177 
countries in the 2007/2008 Human Development Index (UNDP 2008). An 
estimated 5.4 million people have died since 1998, and 45,000 people 
continue to die every month, as a result of the conflicts and humanitarian 
crisis, according to a major mortality survey conducted by the International 
Rescue Committee in 2007 (IRC 2008). Most of these deaths were largely 
owing to the lack of access to basic health care, sanitation, adequate nutrition 
and infrastructure, especially by being displaced (Caritas Australia 2008). The 
number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has been estimated to be 1.15 
million, and 300,000 people have been refugees in neighbouring states 
(UNHCR 2008). The recurrent and continuous displacement of the population 
is termed ‘pendulum displacement’ by aid workers.2 Similarly, sexual violence 
has also been widespread (UNHCR 2008) and more than 8,000 women were 
raped in 2009.3 This pervasiveness of rape in the DRC made the UN’s 
Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margot Wallstrom, call 
                                                          
2 IRIN (2007a) ‘DRC: ‘Pendulum displacement’ in the Kivus’, IRIN news on 1 August 2007, 
available from: www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=73524 [Accessd 13 July 2009]. 
3 BBC (2010a) ‘UN official calls DR Congo “rape capital of the world”’, BBC News, 28 April 





the DRC the ‘rape capital of the world’.4 Furthermore, several UN Mission in 
Congo (MONUC) personnel have been accused of sexually abusing girls in 
the DRC5 and trading their arms with rebel groups in exchange for minerals 
from the DRC (Escobales 2008).   
 
Given the natural resource endowment and severe socio-economic 
conditions, the DRC was considered to be cursed by its natural resource 
abundance throughout its history. The two wars between 1996 and 2003 
reinforced this view and prompted responses. The resource curse literature 
draws on the analysis of econometric studies which examined whether natural 
resource dependence affects economic performance and political 
development adversely in resource-abundant countries. As the literature 
accumulated analytical evidence to establish those recurring tendencies, it 
has expanded to look into the correlation between natural resource 
abundance and civil war.  
 
This emergent field of knowledge is based on the evaluation of two broad 
variables – rebel greed and grievance. The greed hypothesis asserts that the 
greed of rebel groups in a country with weak governance and natural resource 
abundance, especially valuable, point source and lootable resources, leads to 
civil war. Political grievance within a given society is treated as a dichotomy 
with greed and is largely rejected by the econometric studies. While horizontal 
inequality and/or the weakening of the social contract in a given society is 
considered to be critical to trigger an armed conflict within the school of 
political science, it is criticised by some economists for being too political and 
lacking systematic analysis. The econometric studies are, however, overly 
reductionist in trying to establish the correlation through statistical studies 
while facing technical issues, and fail to identify the causality and explain the 
pathways leading to the violent conflict. 
 
                                                          
4 BBC (2010a) ‘UN official calls DR Congo “rape capital of the world”’, BBC News, 28 April 
2010, available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8650112.stm [Accessed 22 July 
2010]. 
5 IRIN (2006) ‘DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC): MONUC troops among the 
worst sex offenders’, 28 August 2006, available from: 




The dichotomy between greed and grievance can also be seen as a reflection 
of the variance between quantitative and qualitative studies. These different 
approaches need to complement each other to enhance the analytical rigour 
and understanding of the research subject, and to include analysis of social 
and political elements in specific contexts and external political economic 
environments. Whilst there has been an effort to consider how greed and 
grievance interact and transform into war economies over time, the greed 
hypothesis has been over-emphasised and applied to formulate policy 
responses to armed conflicts with a resource aspect as mentioned earlier. 
The policy responses so far, therefore, have focused on sanction regimes to 
prevent armed groups accessing natural resource revenues, to complement 
weak governance in a given country. It is not surprising that sanction-based 
regimes have proved ineffective in ending armed conflict, having failed to take 
into account the involvement of external actors, including neighbouring states 
and private companies, and various other issues, which shape the conditions 
conducive to armed violence, particularly political grievance within the society.  
 
The policy responses to armed conflicts associated with natural resources 
have, therefore, become increasingly global, multi-stakeholder and 
participatory, and are often manifested in a framework of co-regulation or 
partnership with the aim of overcoming the shortcomings of the country-based 
approach and the problem of weak governance in resource-producing 
countries. It also reflects the concerns of various stakeholders. The minerals 
originated from conflict areas are labelled ‘conflict minerals’ and raise urgent 
concerns for the international community, reputational risks and supply chain 
management issues for the electronics and ICT industries, and ethical issues 
for conscientious consumers. It is crucial to address the issues of ‘conflict 
minerals’, especially because the demand for these critical minerals continues 
to grow. There is, therefore, a great expectation for this new approach to 
enhance governance through increased transparency and accountability for 
natural resource trade, thereby ending or preventing armed conflict. This 
piece of research is crucial in examining the efficacy of such approach in the 
case of the eastern DRC where the mineral resources are considered to drive 





1.2. Research questions, aim and objectives 
 
The two wars in the DRC between 1996 and 2003 are often portrayed as a 
case of contemporary conflicts which emerged during the post-Cold War 
period and accelerated globalisation and market liberalisation. As such, the 
conflict in the DRC displayed the weakened state capacity to employ 
organised violence against the rebels and warfare, which targeted the civilian 
population and was financed by the state’s rich natural resources, minerals in 
particular, through the global market.  
 
Despite the official end of the conflict in 2003 and the post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts, armed struggles continue in the eastern DRC. The 
continuation of the conflict suggests the limitations of the current peace 
process based on an inclusive power-sharing arrangement and reconstruction 
instruments relying largely on economic growth through good governance and 
private sector development, manifested in the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper (PRSP). However, the self-financing aspect of the conflict has drawn 
significant attention from the international, academic and business 
communities. Resource curse theory has been highly influential in drawing 
attention to the rebel greed hypothesis, which attributes the protracted conflict 
to economic motivations and opportunity, rather than seeing grievance as the 
driver of the conflict; and the studies on war economy have explained how the 
adaptive networked structures, through their link to the global market, can 
finance and sustain the conflict.  
 
Faced with the limited success of the reconstruction efforts and other 
instruments such as sanctions, as well as the weak capacity of the post-
conflict government in preventing conflict and addressing the war economy, 
multi-stakeholder partnerships are increasingly expected to enhance 
governance of mineral production and trade in the eastern DRC in order to 
promote sustainable peace and security. More specifically, the multi-
stakeholder partnerships aspire to prevent the belligerents accessing the 




partnerships, as a new form of global governance, are expected to improve 
governance through more inclusive, transparent and accountable processes 
with higher stakeholder participation, there is a lack of empirical evidence and 
critical analysis of the process and impact of multi-stakeholder partnerships, 
especially in post-conflict/conflict situations. In addition, there is no evidence 
to support that curtailing financial resources derived from mineral resources 
for the belligerents will end or prevent the conflict in the absence of concrete 
analysis of the conflict motivations. Therefore, the main objective of this 
research is: 
 
To examine how multi-stakeholder partnerships can help in enhancing 
governance to promote sustainable peace and security and why. The 
thesis focuses specifically on the role of the multi-stakeholder partnerships 
in curtailing revenues for the belligerents from coltan production and trade 
in the eastern DRC.  
 
More specifically, the research aims to answer the following questions: 
 
1) What are the background and other causes of the conflict in the DRC, 
and how have they been influencing the trajectory of the conflict and 
been addressed? This question is chosen because the greed 
hypothesis and the studies on war economy have drawn attention to 
the economic agenda and function of the conflict in the DRC, and 
overshadowed other existing and unresolved issues which have been 
driving and sustaining the conflict. As such, reducing the finance of the 
conflict through multi-stakeholder partnerships may not produce the 
intended outcomes.  
2) How does coltan production and trade finance and drive the conflicts in 
the eastern DRC? The multi-stakeholder partnerships to delink coltan 
production and trade from the conflict are based on the view that the 
conflict is driven and financed by the revenues from coltan; however, 
the analysis of the conflict motivations is limited. Therefore, the 
research seeks to examine the current knowledge on the link between 




structured and linked to the DRC conflict, how coltan is produced and 
traded in the DRC, and the involvement of the armed groups in coltan 
production and trade.  
3) What are the perspectives of various stakeholders within the coltan 
supply chains on: whether revenues from coltan drive and finance the 
conflict; whether it is possible to identify ‘conflict coltan’; the idea to halt 
purchase of ‘conflict coltan’; the issues and challenges relating to 
coltan production and trade; and how best to address these issues and 
challenges? These questions are being asked to identify different views 
within the coltan supply chains to help evaluate to what extent the 
multi-stakeholder partnerships include these views in their strategies. 
4) What are the multi-stakeholder partnerships that have relevance to the 
coltan mining and trade in the DRC? What are the backgrounds, 
objectives and scopes, types, and progresses of the multi-stakeholder 
partnerships? Are the multi-stakeholder partnerships as inclusive, 
participatory, transparent and accountable as they have been 
promoted to be? What are the opportunities and challenges of the 
multi-stakeholder partnerships? Can the multi-stakeholder partnerships 
strengthen governance, limit the finance for the belligerents and 
improve people’s lives in the eastern DRC?  
 
I have found little evidence to support the arguments, put forward by some 
advocates, that multi-stakeholder partnerships are effective in the complex 
and protracted conflict environment of the eastern DRC. In order to focus my 
research I adopted the following hypotheses: 
1. Multi-stakeholder partnerships have not significantly improved 
governance in the region 
2. Multi-stakeholder partnerships have not demonstrated any positive 
impact in conflict prevention or conflict resolution 
3. Multi-stakeholder partnerships are inherently inadequate to address 
deep-rooted violent conflicts which have underlying political causes 
By addressing the above questions, the thesis tests the hypotheses and 
illustrates challenges the multi-stakeholder partnerships face in designing and 




limitations of the multi-stakeholder partnerships in ending and preventing the 
conflict without taking into account other underlying issues affecting the 
conflict which are largely overlooked by the greed hypothesis and the studies 
on war economy. Hence, this research envisages its contribution to 
knowledge through three broad areas as set out below.  
 
Firstly, the arguments presented in this thesis will contribute to the ongoing 
academic discussions on conflict analyses, the resource curse hypothesis and 
the economic agendas of civil war in particular. The findings of this research 
will help crystallise the view about the limitations of country-based reductionist 
approaches and their over-emphasis on the economic dimensions of armed 
conflict. However, my own analysis of the nexus between coltan exploitation 
and armed conflict in the eastern DRC has uncovered some of the more 
complex causalities of the conflicts, which traverse local, regional and 
international levels and which are critically lacking in most studies available to 
date.    
 
Secondly, this research will offer empirical analysis and data on the coltan 
industry and partnership initiatives in relation to armed conflicts in the eastern 
DRC. In so doing, it will demonstrate how the global demand for resources 
such as coltan impacts on the place of supply and how the partnership 
initiatives, which aspire for more inclusive and accountable governance, are 
almost exclusively driven by the demand side through their neglect of 
perspectives and needs associated with the upstream supplier communities, 
which tend to clash in fundamental ways with those of the demand side.    
 
By examining the multi-stakeholder partnership cases relevant to coltan 
exploitation in the eastern DRC, I will seek to elucidate a critical theoretical 
contradiction in the application of multi-stakeholder partnerships with the aim 
of addressing one of the key problems in situations marked by weak 
governance and protracted violent conflicts, due to the difficult task of 
involving the main stakeholders, a necessary step within participatory 
governance processes. I will also highlight some of the risks associated with 




In short, I will provide insights into policies on the conflict minerals’ agenda 
that are highly relevant for academics, humanitarian agencies, governments, 
industries and consumers, especially at a time when demand for minerals 
such as coltan is ever increasing.  
 
The thesis will therefore highlight the need to re-assess the concept of 
participatory governance as one of the key approaches to improving 
governance, which is its third contribution to knowledge.  
 
1.3. Structure of the thesis  
 
This thesis includes a total of eight chapters. Chapter Two reviews the 
literature in seven areas: contemporary conflicts; resource curse; war 
economy; informal economy; artisanal mining; post-conflict reconstruction; 
and partnerships. It provides the current body of knowledge on resource-
related aspects of contemporary conflict to contextualise the research subject 
and identify the research gaps.  
 
Chapter Three explains the methodology used to answer the research 
questions. A detailed table of research questions and methods used to 
address the research questions and a list of interviews are also provided.  
 
Chapter Four provides an overview of the nature and trajectory of the conflict 
in the DRC between 1996 and 2008, with a focus on the Kivu provinces in the 
east and their relationship with Rwanda. It starts with a brief review of the 
history of the DRC prior to the outbreak of the conflict and explains the 
negative context that prevailed then in the country, marked by a significant 
national economic decline, an apparent institutional collapse and a loss of 
political legitimacy for the leadership. It also identifies some of the underlying 
parameters that have significant regional value, namely the questions of 
ethnicity, citizenship and land. Through an examination of the two wars that 
the eastern DRC has experienced in its contemporary history, the peace 
processes related to them and the ongoing conflict, this chapter aims to 




their embeddedness in local, national and regional contexts. And, in the 
context of a closer examination of the DRC conflict, the chapter also tries to 
re-assess a number of conflict analyses previously reviewed as part of 
Chapter Two. 
 
In Chapter Five, there is an analysis of the relationship between the 
exploitation of coltan and the conflict in the eastern DRC (and its 
continuation), which is not tackled in earlier parts. The chapter thus opens 
with a brief review of the literature so far devoted to coltan exploitation and the 
situation of war in the country, which displays a marked bias in favour of the 
economic factors behind conflicts (as motivation and function), although this 
scholarship offers a rather limited scope with regard to the specific analysis of 
conflict motivation. The chapter proceeds with an explanation of a number of 
core issues dealing with artisanal coltan mining and, in so doing, looks at the 
applications of and markets for coltan, its background, the inadequate 
legislative environment and the negative impacts associated with artisanal 
coltan mining. This chapter also includes an examination of the complex 
coltan trade chains and some details about how they change over time. On 
the basis of these analyses, there is an attempt to demonstrate that, within the 
DRC, the exploitation of minerals in general and coltan in particular does 
contribute to financing the activities of armed groups there. In contrast, there 
is also an attempt to highlight the fact that political grievance and security, 
identified as part of these analyses (and of earlier discussions), tend to 
influence the coltan exploitation and conflict as well as the context in which 
the informal coltan extraction and trade take place.  
 
Chapter Six provides a number of useful perspectives and initiatives from 
within the coltan supply chains to give a voice to the array of views and 
concerns expressed on both sides: demand and supply. At the outset, the 
chapter introduces an emerging ‘conflict mineral’ approach based on the key 
notion that minerals drive armed conflict (already debated within Chapters 
Two and Five). While the ‘conflict mineral’ agenda has forced coltan-using 
companies to apply a human rights due diligence approach in their supply 




concrete terms, constitutes a ‘conflict mineral’ within the complex coltan 
supply chains. Furthermore, one discrepancy must be noted: local 
stakeholders from the upstream supply chains find themselves under 
increasing pressure while trying to secure a livelihood and ensuring their 
survival and safety; their predicament thus contrasts with that of the demand 
side, which faces the challenges of securing conflict-free coltan. As a result, 
they tend to view the ‘conflict minerals’ approach as being devoid of 
practicality within their local context and want to draw attention to many other 
issues affecting the state of coltan extraction and trade.  
 
Chapter Seven makes an overall assessment of the situation through an 
evaluation of the presumed efficacy of multi-stakeholder partnerships in 
curtailing revenues benefitting belligerents from coltan production and trade in 
the eastern DRC. It sets to scrutinise seven multi-stakeholder partnerships, 
including one local initiative, three coltan certification schemes and three 
standards-setting initiatives. Through their presentation, the chapter discloses 
a series of obstacles that such initiatives have encountered and points to 
some potentially adverse effects that their implementation tends to have on 
local communities, these partnerships being, in the main, externally driven, 
not inclusive enough of local perspectives, and not very mindful of people’s 
lived reality on the ground. Drawing on my analysis of the relations between 
coltan exploitation and conflicts within the eastern DRC and assessment of 
the efficacy of the multi-stakeholder partnerships, the chapter fulfils the overall 
aim of the research in analysing how multi-stakeholder partnerships can help 
in improving governance and fostering a culture of sustainable peace and 
security in the DRC. 
  
Chapter Eight sums up the findings gathered in the preceding chapters and 
draws conclusions for the overall thesis. This final chapter also offers a 
broader insight into policies linked to conflict minerals issues and an overview 
of key contributions to knowledge in the main areas covered by the thesis and 
with regard to the most significant questions raised in it. In addition, a few 





Chapter Two: Literature review  
  
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on resource-related aspects of 
contemporary armed conflict in order to locate the research subject and 
contextualise the research questions. The first three sections cover 
contemporary conflicts, resource curse and war economy to review the 
studies pertinent to the analysis of resource-related conflict, followed by two 
sections on informal economy and artisanal mining to provide views on the 
structures behind the conflict. The sixth section examines the literature on 
post-conflict reconstruction to elucidate the limitations of the current practices 
of reconstruction in addressing the economic aspects of the conflict. The last 
section looks at partnerships as a new type of global governance to fill the 
governance gap, as partnerships are expected to be able to deal with the 
economic function of the conflict, as opposed to sanctions and reconstruction 
instruments. 
 
2.1. Contemporary conflicts 
 
There was an increase in the number of armed conflicts after the end of the 
Cold War, particularly in Eastern Europe and Africa (Soeters 2005; Kaldor 
2007), while some scholars, such as Cramer (2006b), argue that the number 
decreased during the 1990s.6 These contemporary armed conflicts have been 
largely distinguished from the previous inter-state wars by conflict analysts, 
and are often called civil wars. They are differentiated in terms of scope, being 
intrastate rather than interstate; they involve combatants who are non-state 
actors instead of government actors, methods which target civilians instead of 
combatants, and finance from external sources rather than internal sources. 
In addition, they appear to have regional and global dimensions. This section 
first introduces two key concepts which attempt to encapsulate the 
characteristics of these contemporary conflicts. It then looks at various 
definitions and categorisations of civil wars, the most common label for 
contemporary conflicts, as well as the limitations of these definitions to explain 
                                                          
6 Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Fearon (2004) contend that there has been an increase of the 
number of armed conflicts, which is due to a continuing steady accumulation of civil wars 




the complex nature of the contemporary conflicts. Lastly, it discusses the 
different approaches taken to explain the contemporary conflicts, including 
economists’ analyses to be reviewed in the next section.  
 
Based on the different characteristics of the contemporary conflicts, Kaldor 
(2007) coined the term ‘new war’ for these conflicts. In essence, new wars are 
described as being ‘internal or civil wars or else as “low-intensity conflicts”’ 
and while most of them ‘are localized, they involve a myriad of transnational 
connections so that the distinction between internal and external, between 
aggression (attacks from abroad) and repression (attacks from inside the 
country), or even between local and global, are difficult to sustain’ (ibid.: 2). 
The new wars, therefore, ‘involve a blurring of the distinctions between war, 
organised crime, and large-scale violation of human rights’ (ibid.: 2).  
 
The new wars need to be located within a specific context in which both the 
end of the Cold War and globalisation have taken place (ibid.). The end of the 
Cold War is seen by many as having contributed to the occurrence of the new 
wars because of the collapse of the old superpowers’ support and that of 
socialist ideologies, the availability of surplus arms and the breakdown of 
totalitarian empires. The process of globalisation that unfolded during the 
1980s and 1990s has, for its part, also helped intensify global 
interconnectedness in terms of political, economic, military and cultural ties, 
thereby eroding the autonomy of the state which Strange (1996) describes as 
‘the retreat of the state’. This process has greatly contributed to shaping the 
character of contemporary conflicts, more particularly through the decline of 
the monopoly of organised violence, whether occurring from above through 
the transnationalisation of military force or from below through privatisation 
(Kaldor 2007). Hence, the new wars demonstrate some key aspects such as 
the privatisation of violence, which resulted from the decreased state 
revenues, the increasing spread of organised crime, the emerging force of 
paramilitary groups, and the decline of political legitimacy. However, it 
remains a difficult task to distinguish between private and public, state and 
non-state, formal and informal, economic and political motivations and factors, 





The particular context above has largely been attributed to the distinct 
characters of the new wars with regard to their goals, modes of warfare and 
finance (Kaldor 2007). For instance, some scholars consider that the goals of 
such conflicts may be linked to questions of identity politics rather than to 
geopolitical or ideological motivations. Others, however, argue that the 
conflicts express a revival of ‘ancient hatreds’ (ibid.), freed by the end of the 
Cold War during which tribal, ethnic and national rivalries were suppressed by 
strong regimes. The latter view has been criticised for being too simplistic and 
for failing to address ‘a matrix of interlocking historical, social, economic and 
cultural factors’ (Alley 2004: 213). Nonetheless, a new wave of identity politics 
appears to be both a local and global, and national and transnational 
phenomenon, which tends to employ the new electronic media for efficient 
political mobilisation.  
 
As for the mode of warfare adopted by these new wars, there seems to be a 
propensity for the use of political control rather than military confrontation to 
control territory (Kaldor 2007). The aim is to destabilise a territory with the 
spread of fear and hatred among different warring parties while targeting 
civilians to that effect. This pushes huge numbers of people to flee and 
become refugees or internally displaced persons. As a consequence, gross 
and systematic human rights abuses are experienced by civilians, the main 
casualties in armed conflict situations, and their fate has become a major 
concern for the international community (UNSC 2006). 
 
Finance for the new wars is largely decentralised and tends to rely 
significantly on a wide range of external resources, including looting, hostage-
taking, the black market, remittances from the diaspora, taxation, support from 
neighbouring countries and informal trade (Kaldor 2007). Belligerents 
continue to engage in violence to legitimate and sustain this war economy, 
which is linked to the global economy (Keen 1998; 2000; 2008; Berdal and 
Malone 2000; Duffield 2000; 2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Ballentine 
2004; Studdard 2004). Therefore these wars can perpetuate (Keen 1998; 




have the potential to recur (Alley 2004). Kaldor (2007) highlights the growing 
illegitimacy of these wars as a crucial feature that urgently requires a 
multinational political response. Duffield (2001: 14) points out that ‘market 
deregulation has deepened all forms of parallel and trans-border trade and 
allowed warring parties to forge local-global networks and shadow economies 
as a means of asset realisation and self-provisioning’. The new wars therefore 
can be perceived ‘as a form of non-territorial network war that works through 
and around states’ (ibid.).  
 
Another concept, ‘resource wars’, is also used by scholars in discussing 
contemporary conflicts, it is used by Klare (2001; 2002) in particular. It was 
initially used to report on the fears that the US used to perceive towards the 
ex-Soviet Union over its access to Middle Eastern oil and Africa’s minerals; it 
is therefore not a new concept, nor has it been specifically created to describe 
contemporary warfare (Le Billon 2004). Klare (2001; 2002) argues that the 
ideological rivalry that characterised the Cold War era has changed into an 
economic competition within contemporary international relations. Resource 
wars are derived from the concern to secure supplies of natural resources 
such as oil, timber, minerals and water, as the demand for these resources 
has recently increased in considerable proportions. He therefore rejects the 
role played by ideological politics as the underlying logic behind conflicts, and 
contends that it is the scarcity of critical natural resources that drives the 
conflicts and will increase the number of localised conflicts over access to 
those vital resources. 
 
Renner (2002: 6) supports the above view as he observes that ‘about a 
quarter of the roughly 50 wars and armed conflicts active in 2001 have a 
strong resource dimension – in the sense that legal or illegal resource 
exploitation helped trigger or exacerbate violent conflict or financed its 
continuation.’ However, such an over-emphasis on the resource dimension of 
wars has been challenged because it overlooks other critical factors such as 
the geography of resources, which also seems to play a role in determining 





Despite the distinct characteristics of the contemporary conflicts discussed 
above, the contemporary conflicts are largely described as civil wars. While 
there is a vast body of research on civil wars, civil war itself has not 
constituted an independent area of study but has been studied in numerous 
disciplines, including economics, development studies, area studies, 
international relations, conflict resolution, anthropology and environmental 
studies. Consequently, there is no set of agreed definitions on the concept of 
civil war and no consensus has been formed on the number of civil wars (King 
1997; Sambanis 2004; Human Security Centre 2005; Hanlon and 
Yanacopulos 2006). Arguably, to establish what a civil war is or is not 
becomes ‘more a matter of political perceptions than objective realities’ (King 
1997: 18). Nevertheless, it is generally agreed that around 200 wars have 
taken place since the end of the Second World War and a steady increase in 
the number of violent conflicts was witnessed during the Cold War period 
(Hanlon and Yanacopulos 2006).   
 
Without agreed definitions of civil war, a number of terms have been used to 
describe organised armed conflict occurring within the boundaries of particular 
states, including civil war, internal conflict, intrastate conflict, insurgencies, 
coups, revolutions, terrorism, small wars, limited wars and low-intensity 
conflicts. There seem to be no apparent criteria available to differentiate 
between these terms or to help establish the starting and concluding points of 
unfolding conflicts (King 1997; Alley 2004; Sambanis 2004). In reality, many 
wars do not have a clear-cut starting or concluding point (King 1997; Alley 
2004); such events are often long and protracted, lasting an average duration 
of 53 months (Alley 2004). As negotiated settlements tend to end in failure, it 
is often military victory that puts a more conclusive end to these bloody events 
(King 1997).   
 
Despite the ongoing difficulty of identifying armed conflicts, a few operational 
definitions were established to help develop statistical datasets. Most 
statistical studies thus rely on datasets of civil war defined as a conflict over 




deaths per year for civil war and 25 battle-related deaths per year for low-
intensity internal armed conflict (Salehyan 2008).  
 
One dataset (PRIO 2010)7 classifies conflicts into two groups: conflicts that 
have the minimum of 25 battle-related deaths per year and wars that have the 
minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. It also sets conflicts into four 
major groups: interstate conflict, intrastate conflict (more commonly known as 
civil war), extrastate conflict, which is ‘a conflict between a state and a non-
state group outside of the state’s own territory’, and internationalised conflict, 
which is a kind of ‘intrastate conflict in which the government, the opposition, 
or both, receive military support from another government/s, and where 
foreign troops actively participate in the conflict’ (Human Security Centre 
2005: 20).  
 
Fearon (2004: 278) uses the following criteria8 to list civil wars: ‘(1) They 
involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, 
non-state groups who sought either to take control of a government, take 
power in a region, or use violence to change government policies. (2) The 
conflict killed at least 1,000 people over its course, with a yearly average of at 
least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians 
attacked by rebels)’, excluding massacres.   
 
The above criteria were elaborated from another prominent dataset, namely 
the Correlates of War (COW) Project at the University of Michigan.9 The COW 
dataset was established as early as 1963 and is considered to be one of the 
best quality datasets available in the area of political science (Cramer 2006a). 
While the COW dataset was used in most greed hypothesis studies, it counts 
only wars resulting in an average of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year. 
                                                          
7 This dataset represents a collaborative project between Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
(UCDP) based at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and 
the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), is available 
from www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/. 
8 This criteria has been built on other criteria used by, for instance, the Correlates of War 
Project and Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
9 COW (2010) ‘COW Intra-State War Data, 1816-1997 (v3.0)’, The Correlates of War Project 
(COW), www.correlatesofwar.org/cow2%20data/WarData/IntraState/Intra-





The classifications used to compile datasets and the resulting scope related to 
existing datasets have been centres of contention, although researchers have 
insisted on the need for different research designs to use different datasets 
(Sambanis 2004; Cramer 2006a). For one critic, these datasets arguably 
‘have no official standing, are often incommensurate, are unavoidably 
inaccurate and ignore key measures of violent conflict’ (Mack 2002: 515). The 
operational definitions of civil war articulate a number of considerations in 
three main areas. Firstly, ‘the borders around the set of civil wars might be 
artificial, porous, or fuzzy’ (Cramer 2006a: 166), an evident fact within many 
contemporary armed conflicts. Of course, not all wars fit neatly into any 
particular definitional category, a typical example being the wars in the DRC 
during the 1990s and the 2000s and which constituted at the same time ‘a 
civil or intrastate war, a series of localised conflicts (e.g. in the eastern Kivu 
districts, a calamity sustained, and perhaps partly caused, by specific market 
linkages to the world economy) and a regional international war stoked by 
interventions by Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Zimbabwe’ (ibid.).  
 
Secondly, in conjunction with this first characteristic, many civil wars and 
intrastate conflicts of the post-Cold War period share a common feature: their 
global or regional connections (King 1997; Alley 2004; Salehyan 2008). Whilst 
definitions of civil war focus primarily on domestic origins, civil wars being 
largely shaped by domestic elements in pursuit of political goals, they usually 
also have international dimensions (Alley 2004). This is due to many negative 
externalities entailed by such conflicts in terms of resulting refugee flows, 
economic disruptions in neighbouring states and interventions by these 
neighbour states wanting to influence the outcome of civil wars according to 
their preferences (Salehyan 2008). There is a growing body of literature 
dealing with the issue of foreign intervention with the aim of analysing the 
causes, processes and outcomes of civil wars. There is, however, one 
element that is often overlooked in such studies: the issue of indirect 
hostilities unleashed through the use of proxies and the provision of safe 
havens or sanctuaries as a measure of intervention. This, despite the fact that, 




operations outside their countries with the type of support they receive 
significantly increasing tensions by generating security externality for 
neighbour states (ibid.). In addition, a quantitative analysis of militarised 
interstate disputes that took place since 1945 found a link between the 
provision of rebel sanctuaries across borders and other types of foreign 
support on the one hand and the incidence of the very same conflict with new 
international dimensions on the other. According to Salehyan (2008: 55–56), 
‘transnational rebels in neighboring states raise the probability of international 
conflict’, especially if neighbour states lack the capacity to expel foreign rebels 
from their territory, and disputes arisen over domestic politics often develop 
into international wars. This is well demonstrated in how ethnic conflicts 
transformed into international conflicts, ‘particularly if transnational kinship ties 
are present’ (ibid.). 
 
It has also been noted that the classifications briefly reviewed above do not 
take into consideration deaths of civilians occurring outside the battlefield or 
those resulting from the indirect effects of the conflicts, hence, do not include 
some of the conflicts (Cramer 2006a). For example, the scores of innocent 
civilians, who did not put up resistance and were massacred during the 1994 
genocide in Rwanda, were not included in those counts (Mack 2002; Cramer 
2006a). Furthermore, the particular reality of war experienced by many 
civilians as agents or victims must also be pointed out. Because, often 
enough, there are civilians who become more actively involved in events of 
unconventional armed violence launched by specific groups to either 
challenge an existing state or to separate from it and, as such, ‘risk overt 
targeting by protecting and harbouring combatants, operating inside borders 
and without sanctuaries to which they can withdraw’ (Alley 2004: 2). 
 
In addition to the definitions and categorisations above, Kalyvas (2007; 2009) 
and Kalyvas and Balcells (2010) identify three categories of civil war in terms 
of the means of fighting. They are: irregular (or guerrilla) war, ‘in which the 
strategically weaker side refuses to match the stronger side’s expectations in 
terms of the conventionally accepted basic rule of warfare’ such as ambush; 




balance of power between the two sides, in the sense that they are both 
willing to face each other conventionally, across clearly defined frontlines’; 
and symmetric non-conventional war, which is ‘often described as ‘primitive’ 
or ‘criminal’ war, and entails irregular armies on both sides in a pattern 
resembling pre-modern war’ with the capacity of the state weakened to the 
level of the rebels (Kalyvas 2007: para. 17–19). An important finding from this 
classification is that conventional and symmetric non-conventional wars are 
more dominant than irregular war, contrary to popular perception (Kalyvas 
2007; 2009; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010). The symmetric non-conventional war 
clearly demonstrates a distinct feature of the contemporary conflict which 
does not fit in the dichotomy between the irregular and conventional wars. It is 
not irregular because there is no asymmetry between state and rebels, nor is 
it conventional as both sides have only low-tech military capacity. It displays 
weakness on both sides as states are unable to establish an organised 
military against ill-equipped rebels (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).       
 
The analysis of civil war, which has increased since the mid-1990s, broadly 
comprises three different approaches and results in different explanations 
(Kalyvas 2007; 2009). Development economists attempt to identify factors 
that are critical to the experience of civil wars through econometric methods 
and have highlighted the impact of natural resources, whereas international 
relations academics have largely stressed ethnic antagonism and 
comparative politics and sociology scholars have focused on the role of the 
state capacity in civil wars. The following section looks at the conflict analysis 
focusing on the role of natural resources, often referred to as the resource 
curse hypothesis, as it has been the most influential hypothesis for the DRC 
conflict.  
 
2.2. Resource curse hypothesis 
 
The review of the resource curse hypothesis in this section involves an 
attempt to evaluate its validity as well as its implications for policy formulation 
as it has set up ways of responding to conflict, although the resulting policy 




helps us to understand the hypotheses behind a number of investigations 
carried out on the link between minerals and conflict in the eastern DRC 
(Chapter Four) and various initiatives created to respond to the protracted 
conflicts in the eastern DRC (Chapters Five and Six).   
 
The resource curse view is a highly influential thesis (Rosser 2006; Murshed 
and Tadjoeddin 2007) which suggests that countries with natural resource 
abundance tend to experience poor economic performance, demonstrating 
what is called ‘the paradox of plenty’ (Karl 1997). First used within such a 
perspective by Richard Auty in 1993 (Stevens 2003), its meaning extended to 
suggest that such countries are also likely to experience low levels of 
democracy and governance and subsequently civil war. The idea that natural 
resource abundance could lead to negative development outcomes was 
perceived to be rather radical until the late 1980s; before then natural 
resource endowment was generally considered to be advantageous to 
developing countries for economic growth and development (Rosser 2006).  
 
There has since been a growing body of literature on the idea of resource 
curse or the adverse effects of natural resource abundance. As a result, 
natural resource abundance is now widely considered to have a negative 
impact on a country’s economic, social and political development. In Africa, 
countries that are highly dependent on oil and mineral exports appear to have 
stagnant economic growth, lower living standards, and face more prevalent 
corruption and violence than those without rich natural resources (Pegg 2003). 
Evidence suggests that the World Bank’s support for liberalisation, 
privatisation and capacity building to develop a conducive environment for 
investment in resource-rich countries over the last two decades have not led 
to poverty alleviation in sub-Saharan Africa as expected (ibid.).10     
 
The literature on the resource curse hypothesis consists of three broad sub-
literatures dealing with: (1) the correlation between natural resource 
                                                          
10 A more recent study by Pegg (2006) also confirmes that the mining-led poverty alliviation 




abundance and economic performance; (2) the correlation between natural 
resource abundance and political development; and (3) the correlation 
between natural resource abundance and civil wars (ibid.), which implies that 
the social impact of natural resource abundance and the relationship between 
social and economic processes was largely overlooked (Ross 2007). The sub-
literature relating to civil wars is, however, a rather recent development which 
emerged during the late 1990s, that is, well after the hypothesis about the 
resource curse had been established (Rosser 2006).  
 
The overall observations drawn from the sizeable set of empirical studies 
related to the resource curse have demonstrated three key issues.  
 
Firstly, the fundamental problem that lies within these empirical studies is that 
their approach is overly reductionist, narrowly focusing on the task of 
establishing the correlation in question (Rosser 2006). This kind of approach 
created a great deal of debate, which concentrated on some of the conceptual 
and technical issues raised by the empirical studies and thus failed to deal 
adequately with issues of causality and the various processes involved. Major 
disagreements emerged about the best way to measure resource abundance:  
on the basis of the ratio of countries’ natural resource exports to GDP, the 
ratio of countries’ natural resource exports to total exports or resource rents 
(Lederman and Maloney 2006; Rosser 2006). Also, the databases gathered 
about different variables including civil war and types of natural resources 
have not been without contention.   
 
Secondly, these findings cannot be conclusive enough as there are indeed 
many examples of natural resource-rich countries that seem to have avoided 
a curse (Stevens 2003; Rosser 2006); the theory lacks robustness in the 
sense that it seems unable to explain the disparity in question. The findings 
merely confirm the presence of a recurring tendency rather than that of an 
iron law, failing therefore to identify any causal relationships linking natural 
resources to negative outcomes or pathways (Stevens 2003; Rosser 2006; 




consensus as to whether there is indeed such a thing as a resource curse 
(Lederman and Maloney 2006).  
 
Thirdly, the above two issues suggest a serious lack of analysis of the specific 
contexts that affect how natural resource wealth produces negative outcomes 
in each country (Arellano-Yanguas 2008). Hence, there is a need for a more 
analytical engagement with the wide range of social and political variables as 
well as some of the external political economic environments that contribute to 
shaping development outcomes (Rosser 2006). Moreover, cross-country 
analyses available to date, based on national statistical data, have also failed 
to consider critical social, economic and political contexts at a sub-national 
level as they constitute increasingly important factors in the ongoing 
decentralisation processes taking place within developing countries (Arellano-
Yanguas 2008). In addition, the extent to which economic activity in many 
African countries functions outside the visible official mechanisms (Heller 
2006) would also help to discredit some of the analyses that are more heavily 
dependent on official figures about GDP and exports, and would thus obscure 
any real development outcomes.          
 
Bearing in mind these key points above, this section first aims to review the 
sub-set of literature on the correlation between natural resource abundance 
and civil wars, known in other terms as the greed hypothesis of civil war. The 
review identifies a few key aspects that characterise these econometric 
studies such as resource dependency, types of resource and civil war onset 
and duration. It then discusses a few critiques of those studies that have 
focused on their more technical issues and, to a lesser degree, on their 
analytical limitations and weaknesses in explaining causation. A subsequent 
sub-section will review other research that has examined some of the more 
political aspects of civil war, such as governance and inequalities, to help 
explain the causality mechanisms of civil war. These studies have been 
criticised for using rather politicised perspectives and for lacking sufficient and 
systematic analyses (Collier 2007). The third sub-section discusses how the 
prominent resource curse hypothesis has influenced the policy responses for 





2.2.1. Greed hypothesis 
 
A growing awareness of the close link between natural resources and armed 
conflict triggered some interesting research and investigations. Numerous 
studies, carried out with the aim of analysing any correlation between natural 
resources and civil war, were largely inspired by one key statistical study 
presented by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). In a nutshell, these studies suggest 
the following main trends in conflict: it is a dependence on natural resource 
export rather than abundance of natural resources itself which is associated 
with civil war; natural resource wealth influences the duration of civil war 
rather than the onset of civil war; and natural resources, which are 
geographically concentrated and easy to capture, are more likely to prolong 
civil war duration. In these studies, various variables were used to analyse the 
many correlations between civil war onset, duration and intensity, types of 
conflict such as secessionist or rebellion and types of commodity, as well as 
locations and productions of commodities. These studies, largely statistical in 
scope, have prompted debates about some of the more technical questions 
raised as well as about their analytical limitations in explaining issues of 
causality.    
 
Civil war onset 
 
In 1998, Collier and Hoeffler presented their first study on the correlation 
between natural resource abundance and propensity for civil war and have 
since made further progress by developing better datasets. They selected 98 
countries and a range of 27 civil war cases as subjects of analysis. Using a 
measurement of natural resource abundance as the share of primary 
commodity exports in GDP, they found that increased natural resources do 
heighten the propensity for civil war (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Further 
studies carried out with improved datasets also confirmed that there is indeed 
a significant relation between natural resource abundance and the outbreak of 
civil war (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). In 




1960 and 1995, Collier (2000) found that dependence on primary commodity 
exports increases the likelihood of civil war by four times at least by 
comparison with the situation of countries with no primary commodity exports 
in GDP. He concludes that a combination of factors significantly increases the 
propensity for civil war: the presence of large primary commodity exports; a 
general low level of education among the population; a society with larger 
proportions of younger men; and a situation of economic decline. Collier and 
Hoeffler (2004) identify the factor of opportunity as having some explanatory 
power with regard to the occurrence of civil war.   
 
The studies reviewed above all suggest that it is natural resource dependence 
rather than natural resource abundance that influences the onset of civil war. 
However, it seems that no concrete link exists between the onset of civil war 
and natural resource abundance in cases where natural resource abundance 
is measured as the portion of natural resource stock per capita (De Soysa 
2000). Other studies that attempted to test the correlation in question using 
modified and/or different measures did not find a specific connection between 
resource wealth and civil war. For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2005), who 
used a rent-based measure of natural resource abundance to test the 
correlation, were presented with a curvilinear relationship and concluded that 
the correlation was insignificant. Similarly, after controlling a minor sampling 
frame, other studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005), could not 
establish concrete links between a situation of natural resource dependence 
and the onset of civil war. Fearon (2005) has suggested that the supposed 
relation may be supported by the high proportion of oil products among 
primary commodity exports, since oil seems to influence the likelihood of civil 
war. Moreover, the evidence available does not support the idea of a link 
between civil war and natural resources as broadly categorised (Ross 2004a). 
This confirms the outcome of a more recent study which, on the basis of new 
data, concludes that the use of a broad categorisation of natural resources 
does not show strong evidence for any particular correlation between those 
resources and the outbreak of civil war (De Soysa and Neumayer 2007).  
 





In contrast to the above argument about a rather weak correlation between 
natural resource wealth and the onset of civil war, natural resource 
abundance appears to contribute to the prolonging of civil wars once they 
break out, according to a body of statistical research. There is a curvilinear 
relation (Collier and Hoeffler 1998) or a relation with longer wars (Le Billon 
2001b; 2005; Ross 2004a). One study (Ross 2003b) suggests that lootable 
resources are more likely to protract non-separatist conflicts while non-
lootable resources tend to decrease the incidence of non-separatist conflicts. 
More precisely, it is contraband resources such as opium, diamonds or coca 
that can be used as a major finance by rebel groups and thereby prolong civil 
wars (Fearon 2004; Ross 2006), a finding confirmed by Ross (2006) using 
both a literature review and a statistical study. Other studies indeed found 
correlations with diamonds (Ross 2004a), more precisely, secondary 
diamonds or alluvial diamonds that are lootable as opposed to primary 
diamonds such as Kimberlite diamonds (Lujala et al. 2005).  
 
There are, however, many conflicting views among the research findings. For 
instance, Humphreys (2005) found that natural resource conflicts tend to be 
shorter, and diamonds and oil end conflict quickly.  
 
Overall, the above findings suggest that particular types of natural resources 
are strongly associated with the duration of civil war. They tend to be the more 
lootable and contraband kind of resources, because they are easier for rebel 
groups to appropriate and use to finance violence, although this latter view is 
far from conclusive (Le Billon 2008). A number of possible explanations as to 
how natural resource wealth serves to protract civil war have been put forward, 
among them is the idea that the availability of natural resource wealth enables 
the weaker side in a conflict to finance violence and sustain itself through 
looting (Ballentine 2003; Ross 2004b: Le Billon 2005) or through selling future 
exploitation rights known as ‘booty futures’ that they want to control (Ross 
2004a; 2004b) while receiving ‘advance payments’ (Le Billon 2005: 44). In the 
case of separatist conflicts, governments tend to disregard peace agreements 




Moreover, combatants may not be motivated enough to follow peace 
agreements (Ballentine 2003; Fearon 2004), though one study achieved 
mixed results as evidence for such a view (Ross 2004b). Several observers 
highlight the fact that a protracted conflict may have the effect of altering initial 
motives, with financial rewards becoming gradually more important than 
political objectives (Le Billon 2005), thereby contributing to the creation of ‘war 
economies’ (Keen 1998; 2000; 2008; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield 2000; 
2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Ballentine 2004; Studdard 2004), an 
issue to be discussed in a later section (2.4.). 
 
Civil war intensity 
 
There is, however, less focus in the specialised literature on the correlation 
between natural resource wealth and civil war intensity. Whilst some 
observers suggest that the availability of natural resources increases the 
number of battle-related deaths during civil wars due to fighting over resource-
rich territories amongst belligerents and harsh countermeasures by 
governments against any challenges, only insignificant evidence was found 
for this claim (Ross 2004b). One study (Ballentine 2003) even showed that 
natural resource abundance reduced the number of casualties during civil war, 
at least in some cases. The low intensity of civil war can be explained by 
collusion between combatants for resource extraction (Keen 1998; Ballentine 
2003; Ross 2004b), or ‘a “comfortable settlement” in which opposing parties 
can secure mutually beneficial deals to produce and market resources’ (Le 
Billon 2005: 48). This is likely to happen, especially when there is ‘the 
impossibility of any one side securing a full monopoly over lootable resources’ 
(Ballentine 2003: 269).  
 
Types of conflict 
 
Evidently, there are various types of civil war, although conflict over 
government or territory that involves 1,000 battle-related deaths per year 




studies. Some studies have attempted to analyse correlations with different 
types of civil war, such as secessionist or rebellion.  
 
There are two prominent findings with regard to types of conflict.  
 
Firstly, separatist conflict is associated with non-lootable natural resources, 
whereas rebellion is linked with lootable natural resources. Lootability of 
resources is determined by ‘whether it can be easily appropriated by 
individuals or small groups of unskilled workers’ (Ross 2003b: 47). Non-
lootable resources have negative implications for separatist conflicts (Ross 
2003b; 2008), which last longer because the resources can be a source of 
grievance or a source of finance if they are obstructable (Ross 2003b). 
Moreover, there are some common aspects in resource-related separatist 
conflicts: the existence of a distinct identity prior to conflict; a widespread 
perception that the wealth is being misappropriated by the central 
government; and the bearing by the local population of costs incurred by the 
extraction process (Ross 2003a). Whereas lootable resources do not 
influence separatist conflicts because they create fewer grievances, they are 
more likely to influence the incidence of non-separatist conflicts, which tend to 
be more complicated and thus last longer because they are marked by 
‘greater fragmentation and shifting alliances among the armies that control the 
resource’ (Ross 2003b: 67). In the case of the ‘new wars’, lootable resources 
can finance non-separatist conflicts through a number of mechanisms 
including direct looting and sale of resources, the sale of future exploitation 
rights or ‘booty futures’ as well as extortion and kidnapping (Ross 2003a).   
 
Secondly, it seems that point source or diffuse resources found in different 
geographical locations, that is to say, at a distance from centres of power or 
the capital, may be contributing factors triggering different types of conflict (Le 
Billion 2001a; 2001b; 2005). While point source resources are exploited in 
concentrated areas by a small number of capital-intensive operators, such as 
oil and deep-shaft mineral exploitation, and generally benefit governments, 
diffuse resources, such as alluvial gems and minerals, timber and agricultural 




small-scale operators without the use of industrial modes of production, are 
accessed by various actors, which thereby facilitates informal operations (Le 
Billion 2005). At the same time, distant resources are more difficult than 
proximate resources for the government to control, in part owing to ‘their 
location in remote territories along porous borders, or within the territory of a 
political opposition group’ (ibid.: 35). As a result, a few contrasting features 
marking the geography of resources need to be noted. For instance, point 
resources that are located close to the capital are more associated with state 
control, while point source resources that are distant from the capital are more 
likely to influence separatist conflicts; diffuse resources that are distant from 
the capital are more likely to be linked to conflicts characterised by warlordism 
while diffuse resources that are close to the capital are associated with 
rebellions and rioting (Le Billon 2001a; 2001b; 2005).   
 
In addition, a study of the problem of ethnic division and of political systems in 
civil wars found that the relationship between natural resource dependence 
and ethnic conflict was insignificant, while the association with more 
ideologically based and/or revolutionary wars was robust (Reynal-Querol 
2002). Also, a study that examined a sample of 107 countries during the 
period between 1960 and 1999 with the aim of assessing the relationship 
between oil dependence and regime durability concluded that oil wealth tends 
to be associated with lower risks of civil war and anti-state protest (Smith 
2004).  
 
Types of resource 
 
There are also many other studies that have tried to identify how particular 
types of resource and commodity influence the incidence of civil war. In a 
broad sense, distinctions are made between abundant non-renewable 
resources with a high market value and scarce renewable resources with 
lower value. However, the ‘scarce resource wars’ hypothesis does not appear 
to be robust (Le Billon 2001a; De Soysa 2000; 2002; Theisen 2008). A recent 
study (Theisen 2008) replicated earlier work in examining associations that 




scarcity and civil war; however, no conclusive significant evidence was found. 
Nevertheless, according to this particular study, a high level of land 
degradation tends to be robustly associated with the risk of civil war, while 
renewable resources may be related to low intensity conflicts. There is also a 
possibility that a country can be abundant in non-renewable resources and at 
the same time experience depletion of renewable resources (Renner 2002). 
Given the weak relationship between renewable resources and civil war, the 
literature has focused on the effect of non-renewable resources (excluding 
timber).  
 
A number of studies have tried to identify the way lootable resources become 
linked to civil war and their findings overlap with those aforementioned studies 
that discuss the effect of resources on different types of conflict. For instance, 
a study (Ross 2003b) that examined a set of twelve cases of civil war and 
three cases of minor conflicts during the period between 1990 and 2000, did 
not find any major variations in the occurrence of civil war in relation to four 
main categories of natural resources after improving the data on income per 
capita: oil and gas; minerals; food crops; and non-food crops. However, a 
significant positive link was established with drugs and diamonds. This result, 
therefore, supports the view that it is lootable resources, rather than point 
source resources, which increase the likelihood of civil war. Le Billon (2001a; 
2005) contends that point source resources, as opposed to diffuse resources, 
are easier to appropriate owing to their geographical concentration while 
explaining the correlation between mineral resource wealth and civil war (De 
Soysa 2000); such logic also seems to allude to the lootability of these 
resources. Nevertheless, one study found that rather than the mere 
availability of lootable resources, other factors do play a role in the incidence 
of civil war through influencing the capacity of rulers to maintain political 
stability in lootable resource-rich countries; they include the availability of non-
lootable resources, the taxability of resources and patterns of state spending 
(Snyder and Bhavnani 2005). In addition, notwithstanding the importance of 
available lootable or point source resources, other issues must be considered 




instance, a high degree of dependency on agricultural production may also be 
related to the incidence of civil war (Humphreys 2005).  
 
In terms of the importance given by scholars to particular types of commodity, 
both oil and diamonds appear to have attracted the most interest. The 
connection between oil wealth and the incidence of civil war is strongly 
supported by a number of studies (De Soysa 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Fearon 2005; Ross 2006; 2007; 2008; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007), 
though there are many contrasting views about their role. De Soysa (2002) 
found that the likelihood of civil war in oil-exporting countries is double that of 
other countries. A recent study (De Soysa and Neumayer 2007) found that the 
connection between oil wealth and civil war is relevant only for low-intensity 
conflicts that have 25 or fewer battle-related deaths per year rather than the 
common threshold of 1,000 deaths per year. However, other studies found 
that oil wealth reduces the incidence of civil war (Smith 2004) or that the 
correlation between oil wealth and civil war is relatively weak (Humphreys 
2005). These contrasting results are derived from different methods and data 
used in the studies in question (Ross 2006; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). 
In this respect, the measures used for oil resources have been rejected as 
weak and incomplete (Lujala et al. 2007). Other elements may equally 
influence any link. For instance, the time period is an important factor since 
the link would be more significant today than it would have been at earlier 
junctures (Ross 2006; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). The capacity of states 
appears to be a crucial factor in averting conflict (Humphreys 2005) since oil 
wealth seems to weaken the capacity of states, thereby lending itself to armed 
conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005; De Soysa and Neumayer 
2007), which highlights the political outcomes as part of the resource curse 
theory.   
 
The link between armed conflicts and diamonds appears to be even more 
unsettled and inconclusive. A few statistical studies (Humphreys 2005; Lujala 
et al. 2005) have established that countries with diamond wealth are more 
likely to experience civil war than countries without. However, other statistical 




onset (Ross 2006). These differences may arise from the lack of reliable data 
on the production and location of diamonds (Gilmore et al. 2005), the use of 
different time periods, the correlation being stronger today than in the past 
(Lujala et al. 2005; Ross 2006) and the different types of diamond considered. 
Alluvial diamonds that are easily extracted without the use of much skill or 
many resources are strongly connected to civil war, as opposed to Kimberlite 
diamonds that require capital-intensive processes for extraction (Lujala et al. 
2005). Again, some studies seem to contradict this finding: alluvial diamonds 
are said to induce peace rather than conflict (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005) and 
have weaker correlations with civil war onset than Kimberlite diamonds (Ross 
2006). However, it should be noted that a relatively limited number of violent 
conflicts have taken place in diamond-producing countries, a fact that should 
render the statistical studies about them less robust (Ross 2006; Le Billon 
2008). 
 
Validity of the correlation  
 
The above statistical studies, while producing mixed results, have 
demonstrated tendencies in the sense that certain types of natural resources 
do influence the incidence and duration of civil war. The highly influential 
greed hypothesis, established on the basis of empirical testing, has 
nonetheless been challenged for being both arbitrary and unconvincing.  
Concern was thus expressed about the lack of analytical input within the 
theory in question, mainly over some of the technical issues raised – a 
weakness that can undermine the validity of the presumed link between 
resources and wars, leading to flawed causations. With regard to the technical 
issues which were problematic, they dealt with the adequacy of both the data 
and the proxies.  
 
Firstly, the small number of civil war cases, a rather infrequent event, raises 
an immediate analytical concern over the validity of statistical analysis as it 
becomes more sensitive to the minor changes within the data (Ross 2006). 
This problem has become crucial within the trend of statistical studies that 




era. While the effect that the availability of resources such as oil (Ross 2006) 
and diamonds (Lujala et al. 2005) tends to have on the likely possibility of an 
outbreak of conflict appears to be certain in the post-Cold War by comparison 
with earlier periods, the relatively small number of such conflicts undermines 
the validity of the statistical studies conducted, a problem that is not shared by 
the ‘new wars’ thesis that emphasises the role played by resources.    
 
Secondly, the quality of the data used by these econometrical studies has 
largely been contested by scholars such as Humphreys (2005), who found the 
data on natural resource wealth to be of low quality. As a result, other 
researchers in more recent work have started developing more carefully 
designed qualitative and comparative studies (e.g. Snyder 2006) as well as 
improved datasets, more specifically on diamonds (Gilmore et al. 2005), on oil 
(Lujala et al. 2007) and on natural resource rents (De Soysa and Neumayer 
2007).   
 
The data on civil wars is also problematic with respect to key questions such 
as how to codify civil wars and identify their beginning and ending, given the 
absence of an agreed definition of civil war as mentioned earlier (2.1.). The 
civil war datasets used by Collier and Hoeffler were rejected for being ‘biased 
in a way that overstates the impact of primary commodities’ (Ross 2004a: 
342), a point of criticism confirmed by another set of studies that used 
different coding rules and, as a result, found no necessary correlation existing 
between natural resource dependence and the onset of civil wars (Ross 
2004a; Sambanis 2004). Moreover, the commonly used operational definition 
of civil war as a conflict over government or territory, which relies on the use 
of a threshold of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, does not represent a 
well-defined concept of a civil war. Such narrow definitions of civil war fail to 
take into account the many forms and dynamics that violence takes and which 
are carried out around and through the exploitation and regulation of 
resources as well as the relation with the broader context, including the global 





More importantly, the fact that many such studies rely on official statistics or 
datasets available in the public domain severely undermines the credibility of 
their findings, owing to the problematic aspect of accessibility and reliability of 
statistical datasets drawn from countries already affected by conflict (Cramer 
2002; MacGinty 2004). In addition, the reliability of statistics has definitely 
become an issue to be addressed, given the extensive informal economy 
within the countries studied (Mwanasali 2000). 
 
Thirdly, these studies have inevitably used proxies in carrying out empirical 
testing. The question that arises in this respect is about these proxies and 
whether they measure what they set out to measure. However, the proxies 
used do not seem, according to some critics, to be ‘conceptually or 
substantially equivalent to the thing they are meant to represent’ (Cramer 
2002: 1850). Therefore, there is an inconsistent use of proxies that are 
conceptually and empirically vague, a situation which Cramer translates as 
‘an instance of the more general problem of the empirical weakness, arbitrary 
prioritization of particular variables, and manipulation of technique over and 




Despite their numerous analytical limitations, these macro-quantitative studies 
remain useful in helping to identify some general trends (Salehyan 2008), 
while the resulting probabilistic theories may also have some value even if 
they present many cases of exception (Mack 2002). Their aim is not to 
describe any causal relationships as part of the findings (Salehyan 2008), a 
task which requires more detailed explanations provided by the use of case 
studies in order to complement the more probabilistic arguments (Mack 2002). 
Nonetheless, these statistical studies still propose a set of causalities to 
support the idea of a link between war and resources, although these were 
criticised as being essentially flawed and unconvincing (Cramer 2002; Cater 
2003) as well as overly reductionist (Cramer 2002; 2006b). The prominent 
causal argument that natural resources cause violence has been consistently 




(2004b; 2006), who argues that the increasing instability that a country faces 
due to the onset of a conflict may lead its non-extractive industries, such as 
manufacturing and services, to relocate into safer areas while the extractive 
industries remain owing to their specific nature. In this case, the proportion of 
primary commodity exports to GDP, a commonly used measure of resource 
abundance, increases considerably. Consequently, it may be concluded that it 
is the reality of conflict that forces the factor of resource dependency into the 
link in question.  
 
Despite any critique of existing work on causality, the greed hypothesis, 
stating that availability of natural resources does influence the incidence of 
civil war with rebel groups benefitting from economic motivations and 
opportunity provided by the lootability of such resources, remains a key part of 
the prevalent causality thesis. However, considering associations of the term 
lootability with rational actor perspectives (Rosser 2006), the motivation 
behind looting is assumed to be purely economic whilst factors explaining the 
complex dynamics at play in conflict situations and the various rationales for 
looting tend to be neglected. MacGinty (2004: 866–868) makes distinctions 
between several types of looting: economic looting to gain profit; symbolic 
looting to obtain non-material advantages; strategic looting as ‘part of a wider 
politico-military project’; and selective looting for target selection. Regardless 
of such attempts at more specification, there has been a general tendency 
amongst researchers to rely heavily on the notion of lootability narrowly 
defined in economic terms alone without adequately exploring or clearly 
conceptualising the concept; therefore the hypothesis put forward is 
fundamentally weakened (ibid.).  
 
Given the feeble argument given to explain the perceived linear correlation, 
some scholars have proposed a few other explanations. For instance, Ross 
(2004b) argues that resource wealth and incidence of civil war are not linked 
by a single mechanism as there may be a third variable at stake (Ross 2004a) 
or even a variety of mechanisms (Ross 2004b). The leading argument has 
outlined the role of governance as the most crucial variable in explaining the 




Cater 2003; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2003a; Fearon 2005; Humphreys 
2005; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). This view is based on a state-centric 
theory which contends that natural resource dependence leads to a weak and 
unaccountable government which tends, as a result, to create in turn 
particular conditions conducive for the incidence of civil war (De Soysa 2000; 
Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2003a; Fearon 2005; De Soysa and Neumayer 
2007),11 such as the trend for corruption to be found in patrimonial regimes 
(Le Billon 2003a), a view already tested by a number of academic studies. For 
example, Snyder (2006) found that high-value lootable resources can be 
associated with political order, through the institutions of extraction and the 
degree of control rulers have over the resource revenues created by these 
institutions. In examining how rebel leaders in sub-Saharan Africa motivate 
followers to fight, Herbst (2000) found that most rebel leaders use economic 
incentives as well as political indoctrination, ethnic mobilisation and coercion; 
he also suggests that the viability and form of a rebel movement may be 
established in relation to the capacity of the state as it faces such internal 
challenges. This led him to the conclusion that ‘rebellions motivated by 
                                                          
11 State-centric perspectives suggest that weak state institutions, supported by resource rents, 
impact adversely on economic development and democracy. Whilst how resource rents 
weaken state capacity can be explained by a combination of cognitive, historic-structuralist, 
and institutional theories, the most predominant approach has been theories of rentier state 
(Ross 1999). Cognitive theories suggest that in countries endowed with natural resource 
abundance, the behaviour of political elites becomes altered in both rational and irrational 
ways, affecting on the type of governance practiced in these regions, and the best known 
rational behaviour model of political elites is rent-seeking, that is to say, resource rents being 
relatively easy to capture and as a result lead to bribes, distortions in public policies and a 
shift of labour to public favour seeking (Leite and Weidmann 1999; Torvik 2002). By contrast, 
a historic-structuralist perspective advocates that natural resource abundance negatively 
affects the level of democracy of a country because it hampers the social and cultural 
changes that help to foster democratisation, and focuses analytically on the role of social 
forces in shaping developmental outcomes. A number of scholars applying the historic-
structuralist perspective assume that natural resource abundance leads to a formation of the 
powerful business class and/or middle class wanting to exercise power to influence 
government policies for its own interests (Ross 1999), and hinders a modernisation effect, 
whereby ‘the failure of the population to move into industrial and service sector jobs renders 
them less likely to push for democracy’ (Ross 2001: 357). With regard to rentier state theories, 
a rentier state is ‘characterized by a high dependence on external rents produced by a few 
economic actors’, and rents are ‘typically generated from the exploitation of natural resources, 
not from production (labor), investment (interest), or management of risk (profit). Rentier 
states tend to be autonomous, because states with large natural resource endowments are 
‘more detached and less accountable thus they do not levy taxes’ (Jensen and Wantchekon 
2004: 3). There are a number of scholars, who support the rentier theories and explain the 
low levels of democracy or authoritarian regimes with the theories (Karl 1997; 2007; Ross 
2001; Luong 2004; Alayli 2005). For more discussions on rentier states, see for example: 




coercion and looting are on the rise because states have become weaker’, 
which was not the case for former colonial states, who had overwhelming 
physical control (ibid.: 286). 
 
Numerous other variables and views on causation were presented by another 
group of scholars, among them the following explanations are the most 
notable. Theisen (2008) sees poverty and dysfunctional institutions as the real 
motivation behind the outbreak of conflict. Similarly, Ross (2003a) explains 
that complex sets of events, including poverty, ethnic or religious grievances 
and unstable government may influence the incidence of civil war. Auty (2004: 
30) identifies a two-stage process to explain causation. The early stage is 
based on ‘the staple trap model of resource-driven economic development to 
explain growth collapses in resource-abundant countries, which appear to be 
a necessary pre-condition for civil strife’. This process is further facilitated by a 
second stage in which ‘two basic properties of natural resources related to 
civil strife, namely the pattern of socio-economic linkages produced by the 
commodity and the mobility … of the resource rent’ play a role. One study, 
which focused on the causal mechanisms behind thirteen recent civil war 
cases (Ross 2004b), found that more than one key mechanism appears to 
link resource wealth to a subsequent outbreak of conflict: resource wealth 
may increase the danger that a foreign state would intervene on behalf of a 
nascent rebel movement; the sale of ‘booty futures’ may either initiate or 
prolong a conflict; and the state may engage in pre-emptive repression. In a 
later study, Ross (2008) highlights an important contradiction: the mineral-
based inequality trap represented by violent conflict is initially due to the 
problem of mineral-based inequality and prevents investment to enhance 
mineral resource dependence. Ross also identifies a set of tractable structural 
factors as additional problems that lead to war, namely poverty, mountainous 
terrains, peripheries, prior regional identities, political institutions and types of 
mineral in terms of their lootability. Furthermore, in an effort to analyse the 
effects of mineral wealth on vertical and horizontal inequality, Ross (2007) 
found that the link between vertical inequality and mineral wealth cannot be 




mineral-rich countries, while the effect of horizontal inequality on violent 
conflict, particularly on secessionist conflict, has been identified.   
 
There appears to be a need for a micro-level analysis of conflict and 
violence,12 including an examination of the role played by various social 
forces not reduced to ethnic and religious terms (Rosser 2006) and for the 
use of fine-grained information not limited to the structural determinants of 
conflict alone, so that a more systematic look at a variety of other factors is 
allowed, among them, ‘the geographic spread of civil war, the variation in the 
incidence of civil war over time, and the characteristics of civil war violence’ 
(Weinstein 2007: 366). As a matter of illustration, the findings of an 
ethnographical study of rebel movements in Uganda, Mozambique and Peru 
(Weinstein 2007) is worth mentioning; it set out to examine the behaviour of 
rebel groups and their members through interpretations of stories and 
testimonies produced by various individuals involved in conflict about 
themselves and their reasons for joining or staying out of fighting groups. This 
study has thus revealed that the nature and availability of resource 
endowments seem to have considerable effect on behavioural patterns 
displayed by both individuals and movements. For instance, rebellious bands 
enjoying easier access to finance through exploitation of resources and/or 
through external support appear more likely to use indiscriminate violence, 
while rebellious groups that tend to rely on social rather than economic 
endowments resort to a more selective use of violence and seek to appeal to 
civilians for their support. However, in a case study on Sierra Leone 
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), the findings did not suggest the presence 
of a deterministic link between resource endowments and individuals’ 
motivation to enrol in fighting. According to the authors of the study, various 
other factors explain why particular individuals joined in fighting; these 
reasons included ‘an individual’s relative social and economic position, the 
costs and benefits of joining, and the social pressures that emanate from 
friends and community members’ (ibid.: 452).  
                                                          
12 Whilst there is a new emerging body of work on micro-level analyses of violent violence, 
‘micro-level empirical evidence on the relationship between violent conflict and poverty has 
been scarce and at times contradictory’, largely owing to the absence of sufficient data 





2.2.2. Grievance hypothesis  
 
There are several other statistical studies that have attempted to test the 
correlation between civil war onset and grievance in terms of vertical 
inequality (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 2004). The most eminent 
model proxied grievance on the basis of a series of measurements, including 
that of economic stagnation through a calculation of GDP growth prior to civil 
strife, of repression through an assessment of political rights indices, of 
inequality through the use of the Gini coefficient and, last but not least, of 
ethnic tension assessed by the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index. And the 
measure of grievance produced by these proxies did not appear sufficient 
enough to increase the risk of civil war (Collier 2000). But these objective 
proxies were criticised for being inadequate tools (Mack 2002), although some 
other proxies, such as the average levels of schooling in the case of individual 
fighters as well as the general ratio of young men within the total population, 
used in the statistical studies to establish the greed hypothesis are seen to be 
more firmly related to grievance sources (Ballentine and Sherman 2003; 
Cramer 2006a). However, Collier (2007) still rejects grievance as a source of 
civil war since it is a feature shared by all societies and does not necessarily 
lead to armed violence. His view has been strongly criticised by other scholars 
as it appears to demonstrate ‘the long colonial tradition of dismissing rebellion 
as criminal’ and illegitimate violent protest (Duffield 2001; Keen 2008: 29). For 
Ross (2007), it is important to bear in mind the fact that the lack of data on 
income inequality within mineral-rich countries makes it quite difficult to 
assess with any robustness the correlation between vertical inequality and 
mineral wealth.   
 
In contrast to the studies just referred to above, there is another trend within 
statistical studies that supports the grievance hypothesis. Luckham et al. 
(2001) found that poverty and inequality remain key factors within sources of 
conflict. According to Ross (2004b; 2008), mineral-based inequality can 
trigger violent conflict and horizontal inequality arising between mineral-rich 




also a claim that natural resource exploitation induces various types of 
grievance including ‘insufficiently compensated land expropriation, 
environmental degradation, inadequate job opportunities, and labour 
migration’ (Rosser 2006: 17).  
 
Critiques levelled against these econometric studies find the selection of 
proxies for grievance ‘dubious’ (Keen 2008). Moreover, while some of the 
statistical studies attempted to measure grievance by the means of objective 
proxies, they have not directly measured ‘the emotions … that may affect the 
propensity of people to resort to violence’ (Mack 2002: 522). According to one 
particular study on factors motivating individuals to take part in violent conflict 
(Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), issues related to the belligerents’ various 
experiences and emotions may constitute a crucial source of violence through 
the critical impact they have on them as they develop ‘a sense of having been 
humiliated’ (Keen 2008: 50). Furthermore, this sense of having been 
humiliated is critical ‘not only in explaining important dynamics deepening 
violence during civil war, but also in explaining the patterns of violence that 
emerge in the aftermath of a war’ (ibid.: 69).  
 
Proponents of the greed hypothesis, economists for the large part, have been 
critical of the grievance hypothesis, rejecting it for being politicised and lacking 
systematic analysis (Collier 2007). Nevertheless, there is a long-standing 
body of knowledge within the discipline of political science that argues in 
favour of the grievance factor and its active role in these terms: grievance 
derived from relative deprivation fuels internal conflict, in which identity serves 
to help group formulation to assume collective action (Cater 2003; Murshed 
and Tadjoeddin 2007). While some researchers attribute civil war to state 
failure due to declining legitimacy and weak capacity of governments (Cater 
2003) or a weakening of social contract13 (Addison and Murshed 2006; 
                                                          
13 According to Addison and Murshed (2006: 137), a social contract is ‘the set of rules, formal 
and informal, that guide the behaviour of citizens, entrepreneurs and governments and allow 
conflict to be expressed and resolved peacefully rather than violently’, and is not ‘purely 
internal affairs, but can have strong international dimensions, both in cause and effect’. In this 
argument, greed or grievance is not sufficient to initiate such large-scale violence but a failure 
of the social contract, which is ‘similar to the weak state capacity, and by implication poor 




Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007), it is the concept of horizontal inequality 
advanced by Stewart (2000; 2003) that has been increasingly influential within 
the grievance literature during the last decade14 (Cater 2003; Murshed and 
Tadjoeddin 2007). The concept of horizontal inequality relates to ‘the 
existence of severe inequalities between culturally defined groups’ and 
includes multidimensional effects, whether political, economic or social. By 
contrast, vertical inequality ‘lines individuals or households up vertically and 
measures inequality over the range of individuals’ (Stewart 2003: 3).  
 
The concept presents some potential for the task of differentiating between 
aspects of group mobilisation in the context of rebellion (Cater 2003), yet it 
remains inadequate in measuring such inequalities due to the absence of a 
theoretical agreement on what metric should be used for measurement and 
what groups should be targeted by the study (e.g. ethnic, linguistic, tribal or 
religious) and to the dearth of data on the other hand (Murshed and 
Tadjoeddin 2007). Nonetheless, this tentative hypothesis appears to have 
offered a more positive method, well illustrated through an analysis of conflict 
undertaken within nine case studies. The extensive research found that there 
is indeed ‘an interaction between economic, political and cultural factors 
(normally historically formed) being enhanced by sharp group differentiation in 
political participation, economic assets and income and social access and 
well-being’ behind most of conflicts (Stewart 2000: 260). Murshed and 
Tadjoeddin (2007) also confirm that, despite rather scarce data, horizontal 
inequality is correlated to the onset of civil war in a cross-section of countries.    
 
Two other key theoretical views on grievance relate to concerns over 
deprivation and polarisation (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007). Relative 
deprivation articulates perceptions based on ‘the disparity between 
aspirations and achievements’ suggested to constitute ‘the micro-foundation 
for conflict’ (ibid.: 16), while polarisation emerges ‘when two groups exhibit 
                                                          
14 An approach developed at the United Nations University WIDER, Helsinki, proposes that 
civil war occurs when there is horizontal inequality and a breakdown of social contract 




great inter-group heterogeneity combined with intra-group homogeneity’, 
overlapping with the concept of horizontal inequality (ibid.: 17).    
  
2.2.3. Implications for policy   
 
The analysis of the causes, duration, intensity and dynamics of civil war 
reviewed in the preceding sub-sections has contributed to the development of 
the resource curse discourse and has served in shaping policies and forging a 
range of instruments required in attempts to end and prevent resource-related 
armed conflicts. Many policy responses have thus largely relied on the 
resource curse hypothesis. The most relevant to the resource-related conflicts, 
such as the DRC conflict, is the view that says economic motivations and 
opportunity provided by the abundance of natural resources and weak 
governance influence the incidence of civil war. Therefore, most of these 
responses have been focusing on curtailing resource revenues for 
belligerents (Ballentine 2004).  
 
The reason behind the policy dependence on the rebel greed hypothesis can 
be that policymakers ‘have neither the time nor the expertise to choose 
between competing explanations themselves’ whilst there remain fundamental 
disagreements amongst academics over the causes of civil war (Mack 2002: 
515). Also the limited interdisciplinary and interdepartmental collaboration 
within both the academic and policy communities hinders the formulation of 
policies to respond to the growing consensus around the idea that civil war is 
caused by interrelationships between development, governance and security. 
As the economic dimensions of civil war have been generally acknowledged, 
it appears that there is a policy bias focusing on the greed hypothesis (Le 
Billon 2008). Although Collier (2007) claims that the greed hypothesis is 
based on statistical studies and is less politicised, thus allowing its findings to 
reach the policy world, Le Billon (2008) argues that oversimplified 
interpretations of resource wars have created the policy bias and the 
consequent mixed results (Cater 2003). Ballentine (2004) argues that, without 




sustain conflict, brutal predation, corruption and criminal activities would 
continue even after the official settlement of conflict.  
 
Those policies, largely developed with the aim of terminating resource-related 
armed conflicts, concentrate on the task of curtailing finances linked to rebels 
by proposing the following key types of instrument: (1) capturing resource 
areas away from rebel forces, which may work as a quick fix but often fails to 
bring about a stable peace; (2) sharing revenues between belligerents, a 
condition which is often part of conflict settlements but rarely helps to create a 
stable peace; and (3) imposing economic sanctions, a tradition with a poor 
overall record in terms of its implementation over the past fifteen years, 
although it does seem to contribute to a lasting peace (Le Billon 2005).  
 
Le Billon and Nicholls (2007) conducted a study to examine the outcomes of 
these three sets of instruments based on a sample of around twenty-six 
conflict cases that erupted over a period between 1989 and 2006. The 
findings showed that military intervention and revenue sharing appear to have 
been implemented more successfully than economic sanctions, while 
economic sanctions and sharing agreements seem more likely to lead to a 
lasting peace than military interventions alone. The findings have also shown 
how economic sanctions and military interventions often have an adverse 
impact on the general population and how revenue sharing raises an ethical 
dilemma with the possibility of it being perceived as a reward for violence and 
an attempt at buying peace. This last point in particular has critical value in 
negotiations over conflict settlements, as the action of granting control over 
resource-rich areas or allocating revenue shares, businesses and government 
positions, projected as positive incentives, is not without danger as it may 
provoke new conflicts in the future (Tull and Mehler 2005; Le Billon and 
Nicholls 2007; De Koning 2008). 
 
Furthermore, these different instruments seem to correlate with particular 
types of resource (Le Billon and Nicholls 2007). Conflicts related mainly to 
illegal lootable resources tend to be addressed more efficiently by revenue 




challenge since ‘sharing arrangements are rarely an official option for 
governments and even less so for conflict responding countries’ (ibid.: 629). 
Also, military interventions may be able to address the problem of non-
lootable resources while economic sanctions can be effective in dealing with 
legal lootable resources (ibid.). 
 
Sanctions are imposed by a number of bodies, including the UN Security 
Council, regional associations of states or individual governments, business 
associations and NGOs; they ‘seek to prohibit the import of resources under 
the control of the sanctioned party, an alternative being restricting investment 
for, or export of production technology to, the sanctioned party’ (ibid.: 616). 
Notably, there has been a considerable increase in the number of UN 
sanctions implemented and a rise in their effectiveness since the late 1990s 
(ibid.). The present section focuses on the UN sanctions regimes. The UN 
Security Council ‘may impose restrictions on economic relations by UN 
members with targeted countries or groups’ under Article 41 of the UN 
Charter (Le Billon 2005: 58). 
 
Because comprehensive sanctions have often proved to be counterproductive 
as well as inefficient, owing largely to their insufficient enforcement, an 
increasing number of targeted or smart sanctions have been employed since 
the early 1990s with the aim of maximising their effect whilst reducing their 
negative impact on the general population (Cater 2003; Le Billon and Nicholls 
2007). Targeted sanctions are favoured within UN circles as they do help to 
maintain ‘the institution’s public stance of impartiality or incurring the risks and 
costs associated with alternative forms of intervention’ (Carter 2003: 38) such 
as controversial military interventions (Le Billon 2008).  
 
In addition, the creation of the UN Panel of Experts by the UN Security 
Council may be seen as an innovative effort to enhance the effectiveness of 
the sanctions through monitoring and investigation of commodity-related 
sanction-busting and illicit economic activities (Ballentine 2004; Le Billon 
2005; Le Billon and Nicholls 2007). The UN Panel of Experts plays this crucial 




implementation of the sanctions by imposing secondary sanctions on 
sanction-busting states (Le Billon 2005; Le Billon and Nicholls 2007), although 
secondary sanctions do not generally represent the preferred option (Le Billon 
2005).  
 
Overall, sanctions are not effective in the short term and enforcement by 
national authorities continues to be weak (Le Billon 2005). There have been a 
few cases though when the finance resources of targeted groups were 
effectively curtailed (Le Billon and Nicholls 2007), thereby altering their 
military balance (Ballentine 2004; Le Billon 2005) and contributing to the 
ending of conflict (Ballentine 2004; Le Billon 2005). On the whole, sanctions 
regimes have also had some unintended adverse effects: by raising additional 
regulatory burdens, they have encouraged sanction-busting (Le Billon 2005) 
and, more importantly, they often had a negative impact on the livelihood of 
the general population (Ballentine 2004; Le Billon 2005).  However, sanctions 
on extractive industries are seen as justified on the basis of a general 
assumption that extractive industries hardly constitute a major source of 
employment for the local population (Le Billon 2005). It must also be pointed 
out that sanctions regimes often fail to change the behaviour and/or incentives 
of targeted groups (Ballentine 2004; Le Billon 2005; Le Billon and Nicholls 
2007).  
 
The UN Panel of Experts is equipped with the resources to carry out detailed 
investigations without being impeded by ‘diplomatic protocol’, as independent 
experts are, although their work is not without its difficulties due to the fact 
that they ‘do not work under cover and rely on voluntary testimonies’ (Le 
Billon 2005: 61–62), which has produced mixed results. Often their work is 
hindered by problems such as issues of partiality and ambiguity in their 
mandates, the standards of evidence, and procedures for listing and delisting 
sanction targets (RAID 2004; Ballentine 2004), as well as inadequate 
communication and coordination between panels (Ballentine 2004). Besides, 
the ‘naming and shaming’ strategy has proved to be effective in improving 
compliance, mainly of those with reputational risk, and empowering civil 




(Ballentine 2004; Le Billon 2005). This means that it is a limited tool for those 
without reputational risk or necessity to obtain legitimacy (Ballentine 2004) as 
it has no enforcement mechanisms (Nitzschke 2003). Whilst ‘naming people 
without shame’ is seen as useless (Le Billon 2005: 62), in light of the 
continued sanction-busting (Nitzschke 2003) the International Criminal Court 
have, ‘for the most part, abandoned the idea of prosecuting the business 
accomplices of war criminals, in part due to corporate pressure’ (Le Billon 
2005: 73) and the judicial prosecution of sanction-busters, especially on the 
supply side, remains nascent (Cater 2003; Le Billon 2005). 
 
Improved efficiency allowed by the creation of the UN Panel of Experts and 
advent of targeted sanctions meant that the effectiveness of the sanctions 
regimes in terminating conflicts has been over-emphasised, in contrast to the 
impact left by the much criticised and controversial military operations (Le 
Billon 2005). This is despite the fact that the sanctions regimes remain 
‘marked by vested commercial interests and widespread abuses’ (Le Billon 
2008: 364).  
 
However, the fundamental problem with the sanctions regimes lies in their 
bias, which is their tendency to curtail financial resources for rebel groups, 
based on their belief in the rebel greed hypothesis. Thereby, this attitude 
criminalises rebel groups, dismisses any legitimate grievances they may have 
(Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; Cater 2003) and, at the same time, 
legitimates state actors because of considerations about state sovereignty 
(Ballentine 2004), despite their part in the conflict (Ballentine and Nitzschke 
2003; Ballentine 2004). In other words, sanctions regimes imposed the end of 
‘any pretense of impartiality’, implicitly call for the military defeat of the rebels 
by the government, remove diplomatic channels for negotiated solution 
(Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; Cater 2003) and lead to ‘de facto UN 
involvement in fighting wars, rather than solving them peacefully’ (Cater 2003: 
40). Sanctions regimes, therefore, have to be understood as ‘a highly coercive 






In addition, shifting military balance in favour of states through sanctions 
regimes does not fundamentally change the war economies established 
during the conflict, particularly with the involvement of neighbouring countries, 
criminal networks and business actors, but can in fact strengthen the war 
economies (Nitzschke 2003; Studdard 2004), through which the general 
population may be even more adversely affected (Ballentine and Nitzschke 
2003). 
 
Policy responses shaped by the greed rebel hypothesis, which propose 
limiting finance for rebel groups as a solution, raise a number of issues as 
indicated in the above discussion. Their lack of appropriateness is clearly 
evident in the frequent recurrence of conflicts noted even after successful 
interventions (Le Billon and Nicholls 2007). It is generally understood that 
resource revenues can be used to finance armed conflicts; however, policies 
which aim at limiting those resource revenues would have some effect only in 
cases when their availability had motivated the belligerents’ actions 
(Ballentine 2004; Le Billon and Nicholls 2007; Wennmann 2007).  
 
With this in mind, a new approach aiming to deal with post-conflict settings 
suggests the need to implement better resource governance15 through 
sectoral reforms. The aim is ‘to address the resource curse and to reduce 
grievances, conflicts, and violence … vulnerability and risk’ (Le Billon 2008: 
363). However, sectoral reforms have often helped strengthen central 
authorities and re-enforce foreign industrial mining companies, thereby driving 
out artisanal mining as an undesirable undertaking, regardless of the negative 
impact that industrial mining has on local livelihoods and at the expense of 
whole communities (De Koning 2008; Le Billon 2008).  
 
Given the inadequacy of these largely state-centred policy responses in 
addressing the nature of war economies and the extent to which they involve 
a wide range of national, regional and global actors, new proposals have been 
increasingly employed as policy tools in resolving some of the problems 
                                                          




posed by war economies (Ballentine 2004; De Koning 2008). These policies 
include voluntary self-regulation and co-regulation through partnerships to 
impede the trade in what are often called conflict commodities. However, self-
/co-regulations have many limitations, which include the risk of confusion and 
fatigue from an overwhelming number of existing codes and regulations, the 
absence of monitoring and enforcement as well as rather incomplete and 
incoherent standards, owing, in large part, to the difficulty in distinguishing in 
clear terms between legitimate and ethical activities on the one hand and 
illegitimate, unethical and unacceptable activities on the other (Ballentine 
2004). These weaknesses may indeed provide smokescreens for continuing 
illegal and predatory activities (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; Ballentine 
2004; Le Billon 2005), ironically by emphasising the economic dimension of 
war and neglecting political grievances amongst belligerents (Keen 2000; De 
Koning 2008). 
 
The growth of self-/co-regulations, despite their limitations above, is also 
supported by the view that weak governance or governance failure, in addition 
to natural resource dependence, produces enabling structures that trigger 
armed conflicts, and improving resource governance is increasingly 
considered to be a key to address resource-related conflicts (Ballentine 2004; 
Le Billon 2005; OSAA 2006; EADI 2008).16 As the governance deficit exists at 
local, regional and global levels (Ballentine 2004), ‘broader engagement by 
external actors, more transparent and accountable management of resource 
sectors, and the imposition of specific measures for tackling the role of 
resource revenue in fuelling war’ is necessary (Le Billon 2005: 52). However, 
Ballentine (2004) underlines the fact that there is ‘as yet no normative 
consensus … as to which activities should be regulated and in what ways’ in 
states where there is no effective regulation in place but they face 
complicated issues of sovereignty, which renders the conduct of sovereign 
agents more obscure. She therefore asserts that the action of what should be 
                                                          
16 For instance, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) analysed the role of 
governance with regard to resource revenues, in order to test the hypothesis that a high 
resource governance, defined as ‘the way in which governments regulate and manage the 
use of natural resources and revenues deriving from those resources and the redistribution of 
costs resources’, leads to increased stability and long-lasting peace, with a correlation found 




an effective and impartial multilateral form of global governance is required in 
order to address the problem with such technical and political complexity, 
increasingly framed as participatory governance17 which is discussed later 
(section 6.1.).  
 
2.3. War economy 
 
The preceding section on the resource curse hypothesis has crystallised one 
basic dichotomy, which is that of greed and grievance, and foregrounded the 
importance of this dual hypothesis in the debate on civil war incidence and its 
causes. In addition to the analytical shortcomings carried by each hypothesis 
and the subject of much criticism, this is also an oversimplified either/or 
explanation about the motivation for war which has been widely contested 
(Cater 2003). For instance, Cramer (2006a: 166) describes in explicit terms 
the problem of using classification in scientific analysis: ‘most classification 
systems impose artificial discontinuities onto a reality that is more of a 
continuum.’ This is exemplified in the coding rules for civil war, as detailed in 
the first section (2.1.). Furthermore, most economic analysis ‘tends to assume 
selfish behaviour’ to be rational without examining what selfishness entails 
(Keen 2008: 30). Thus, the almost exclusive focus on ‘rebel greed’ neglects 
wider societal problems and external factors through the process of ‘othering’; 
thereby ‘the most fundamental problems are said to lie with an abusive 
“other”’, precluding in this way the responsibility of the West (ibid.: 25).    
         
                                                          
17 Schneider (1999: 522-523) coined the term, participatory governance (PG), because of the 
lack of operational relevance he perceived in the concept of ‘good governance’ in its totality 
within policy debate and analysis relating to the poverty reduction strategies during the 1990s. 
Participatory governance embraces information and agency as crucial aspects for 
governance that were missing in the conventional definition of governance: ‘the execution of 
authority and control in a society in relation to the management of its resources for social and 
economic development’. Therefore, its aim is to improve outcome ‘by introducing maximum 
transparency and sharing of information in a process that includes all stakeholders … and 
leads to joint decision making wherever feasible’ since ‘information is asymmetric, unevenly 
shared among different levels’ in practice. Participatory governance processes increase the 
ownership and commitment to the outcomes by participants, therefore, ‘the chances of 
sustainability of the results of the process are enhanced’. In other words, participatory 
governance ‘represents a paradigm shift based on the trilogy of empowerment, accountability 





Keen (1998; 2000; 2008) argues that it is necessary to depart from such an 
oversimplified dichotomy on the role of greed and grievance and examine how 
they both interact in order to understand why a civil war happens and why it 
persists. While the economic function of violence18 is crucial in sustaining 
wars, as there may be ‘more to war than winning’, he insists that grievance in 
contemporary conflicts is a continually important factor (Keen 2000: 26). 
Hence, grievance and political goals of rebellion do not disappear even after 
they are transformed or compromised to an extent as a war proceeds (Keen 
2008). Cramer (2006b: 195) argues that ‘[t]he means of paying for war should 
not be conflated with the causes of war’ as ‘where there’s a will there’s a way’. 
It is also necessary to understand the role of individual parts in relation to the 
whole, as systems thinking suggests (Capra 1997).  
 
The important departure from the overly flawed and insular greed and 
grievance hypotheses has also transpired in a number of other attempts made 
to take thinking beyond greed and grievance, hence the emphasis on the 
economic agendas or economic functions in civil wars, or on war economies. 
These new systems, which emerge from the process of civil war, often persist 
even after formal settlements of conflict and have a huge impact on post-
conflict societies (Keen 1998; 2000; 2008; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield 
2000; 2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Nitzschke 2003; Ballentine 2004; 
Studdard 2004). There has been therefore a growing number of studies 
conducted on the war economies, as discussed in this section. 
 
According to Kaldor (2007: 95), conventional war economies entail ‘a system 
which is centralized, totalizing and autarchic’ with ‘[t]he main aim of the war 
effort’ being ‘to maximize the use of force so as to engage and defeat the 
enemy in battle’. By contrast, new war economies are rather globalised and 
tend to rely heavily on control of local assets and external support rather than 
domestic production (Duffield 2000; Kaldor 2007). Keen (2008) insists on 
including all economic activities taking place during an armed conflict as part 
of the war economy. Profits may arise from pillage, protection money and 
                                                          





ransoms as well as from attempts at controlling trade, exploiting labour and 
gaining access to land or appropriating aid. Salaries and corrupt benefits 
accruing to military personnel are also important in this respect in addition to 
remittances received from allied diaspora communities. Therefore, new war 
economies present a crucial characteristic feature: they are adaptive 
networked structures connected to global markets (Duffield 2000) and, as 
such, can change over time (Keen 1998; Cater 2003); the violence they 
exercise yields ‘different functions at different points throughout the duration 
of the conflict’ (Cater 2003: 28). As a result, it is not possible to analyse these 
processes through the use of static models (ibid.). 
 
As the new war thesis claims, new war economies need to be situated in the 
context of the post-Cold War era and an accelerating globalisation (Keen 
2008). The end of the Cold War meant that external support and sponsorships 
were no longer available; this pushed warring parties to seek their own 
financial resourcing (Dietrich 2000; Duffield 2000; Cramer 2006b) and to 
realise it through wider economic networks provided by globalisation (Duffield 
2000). Hence, market liberalisation in the globalised world has facilitated all 
forms of trans-border activity, including informal and illicit activities as part of 
most of these war economies, to an extent that the realisation of local assets 
and of all forms of basic supplies has come to depend on external markets 
(Duffield 2000; Ballentine and Sherman 2003). As a result, war economies 
have become so well integrated into the existing social relations that their 
relations and structures have become similar to those of more conventional 
global economies and of peace economies within the region concerned.  
 
One particular programme, the Program on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars 
(EACW),19 which was run between 2000 and 2004, conducted extensive 
research with the aim of achieving ‘a systematic understanding of the 
economic dimensions of contemporary civil wars’ to contribute to conflict 
prevention and formulation of resolution policy (Ballentine 2004: 1). The 
                                                          
19 The programme was hosted at the then International Peace Academy and is now based at 




programme led to the publication of several papers and one book20 which 
dealt with a review of civil wars in a number of developing countries, including 
some resource-rich ones and re-affirmed the fact that motivations for strife in 
resource-abundant countries tend to include, to varying degrees, a 
combination of greed and grievance rather any single set of causes 
(Ballentine 2003).  
 
The study thus rejects the notion of resource wars and states that economic 
considerations tend not to constitute the primary cause behind most armed 
conflicts, although it is not an easy task in research to distinguish economic 
reasons from other factors; this is mainly due to methodological difficulties 
faced within the studies themselves but also the nature of the subject itself 
because of ‘the fluid nature of conflict dynamics over time’ (Ballentine 2004: 4). 
However, an interaction of economic motivations with various other factors 
that include ‘socioeconomic and political grievances, interethnic disputes, and 
security dilemmas’ appears to facilitate the outbreak of warfare (Ballentine 
2003: 260). In the process, it seems that access to economic resources can 
provide an enabling opportunity structure, allowing the financing of warfare, as 
it also tends to influence the duration, intensity and character of conflict (ibid.). 
As a result, economic agendas appear to be ‘consequential to the character 
and duration of civil war and complicate efforts at conflict resolution’ 
(Ballentine 2004: 4). 
 
The impact that different types of resources have on the dynamics of civil war 
has also been confirmed by the study. For instance, more lootable resources 
are often associated with rebellions and tend to weaken battle discipline and 
benefit wider actors, thereby increasing the number of peace spoilers and the 
risk of secondary conflicts over resources (Ballentine 2004). More importantly, 
they do not greatly impact on the political goals of the belligerents, despite the 
fact that access to lucrative lootable resources may present them with 
opportunities for resource predation and the concomitant risk of carrying out 
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more systematic forms of criminality (ibid.). By contrast, non-lootable 
resources are more likely to cause conflicts of the separatist kind (ibid.). 
 
The study in question has also verified the correlation between dependence 
on primary commodity exports and the incidence of civil war. As most civil 
wars occur in developing countries, there appear to be a number of variables 
that shape the opportunity structure to trigger civil wars, including weak 
governance, military, economic and political weakness in states, corruption, 
prevalent informal and shadow economies, undeveloped manufacturing 
sectors, the nature of existing social and kinship bonds and the presence of 
regional allies (ibid.). Rebellions are likely to occur ‘at moments when the 
legitimacy and military capacity of the state [becomes] severely diminished by 
a combination of external shocks and internal corruption and decay, thereby 
[contributing] to both grievance and opportunity for rebellion’ (ibid.: 4).  
 
The research carried out by the EACW has also recommended that war 
economies be situated within the internal opportunity structure examined 
above as well as within the broader political economy, which also counts for 
‘inadequate global regulation of commodity and financial markets’ in 
liberalised international trade and commerce (Ballentine 2004: 3). And, as 
stated in the earlier section on contemporary conflicts (2.1.), the fact that war 
economies are assisted by regional and global linkages makes it difficult to 
categorise them as being intra-state, internal or civil wars (King 1997; Alley 
2004; Salehyan 2008). These war economies also tend to involve numerous 
actors, among them various war profiteers and peace spoilers who contribute 
to transforming strife into protracted conflicts by multiplying the points of 
conflict (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; Ballentine 2004). Some of the 
regional economic dimensions thus involve negative externalities and 
interventions by neighbouring states (Salehyan 2008). The study confirms that 
‘the most entrenched conflict economies are those that are embedded in 
regional conflict formations … Taking advantage of traditional informal trade 
and commercial networks and the absence of state control in peripheral 
borderlands, combatants have established elaborate systems of cross-border 




shadow economic activities thrive in marginalized borderlands, creating 
havens for peace spoilers’ (Ballentine 2004: 6). This is a crucial dimension of 
conflicts developing within regional settings and involving the availability of 
sanctuaries for the use of rebels, a point further confirmed by the later work of 
Salehyan (2008).21  
 
The more state-centric approaches have thus put forward a number of 
explanations as to how the existence of internal opportunity structures induce 
civil war and war economies and how they become developed. It seems that 
internal opportunity structures are largely shaped by the effect of weak 
governance and state weakness (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; Ballentine 
2004) or state failure, defined as ‘a declining state capacity or desire to 
provide public goods and an increasing erosion of legitimacy’ (Cater 2003: 41). 
 
For instance, Reno (1998; 2000) has shown how a systematic diversion of 
state economic resources through patronage networks can lead to the 
creation of a ‘shadow state’. And, in such a shadow state, rulers bound 
‘potential rivals to them in exchange for largesse without the need to create 
strong bureaucracies they feared would heighten independent tendencies 
among elites’ (Reno 1998: 2), a much feared consequence. However, the end 
of the Cold War sponsorships and the advent of liberalisation reform have 
reduced the amount of resources available to rulers, leading to the 
fragmentation of shadow states and the rise of warlords; in other words, a 
favourable opportunity structure to armed conflict emerges. Moreover, 
national militaries, having lost their old patronage networks and in need of 
continued financing, come to be identified with an increasing trend of ‘military 
commercialism’ (Dietrich 2000). More specifically, they become ‘effectively a 
third tier of privatised security, whereby a ruler of a stronger African state 
deploys the national military to a neighbouring country, supporting either the 
sovereign or the rebels, in exchange for access to profits’ (Dietrich 2000). This 
new trend ‘brings external resources under the control of the deploying 
country’s patrimonial network, allowing for redistribution to protect the 
                                                          




domestic regime’, whilst it also increases warlordism, decreases high risk 
military activity, prolongs the conflict and complicates entry/exit strategies for 
the belligerent groups (ibid.).      
 
However, the state-centric approaches have generally presented a number of 
limitations, namely the great emphasis laid on natural resource abundance 
within a given state at the expense of a more thorough examination of the 
effects left by both globalisation and market liberalisation (Keen 2000; Duffield 
2000; Cater 2003), which have contributed to the erosion of authority or 
retreat of the state (Strange 1996). Indeed, these effects and the role of 
foreign states have not been systematically analysed (Keen 2000; 2008; 
Duffield 2000). A case study of Sierra Leone (Keen 2008: 47) illustrates this 
point. An examination of its policies of liberalisation, promoted by the IMF and 
subjected to considerable US influence as well as interventions from other 
states, contributed to fuelling the conflict from various sides: ‘by encouraging 
inflation, drastic devaluation, and the creation of private oligopolies when state 
enterprises were privatized, by reducing key state services (which fuelled 
grievances), by fuelling corruption as real state salaries were cut, by taking 
attention away from soldiers’ abuses under the military government.’ Other 
factors relate to the huge vested interests held by the five UN permanent 
member countries and their arms manufacturing industries, their roles in 
supplying arms and loose banking regulations for money laundering amongst 
other offences also created such effects (ibid.).   
 
Cramer (2006b: 198) confirms the above view and states that ‘much of the 
violence in the world may represent the consequences of and reactions to the 
failures and choices of government policies, including those policies of 
wholesale liberalisation and deregulation encouraged by international financial 
institutions’. It is therefore an essential task to analyse how those ‘policies 
aimed at privatization, foreign direct investment, and deregulated markets 
may have debilitating effects on peacebuilding’ in war-affected states 
(Studdard 2004: 2), which will be discussed in the later section on post-





2.4. Informal economy 
 
The preceding two sections have reviewed the literature on resource curse 
hypothesis and war economies, which have been prominent in explaining the 
case of the DRC. That is to say, economic motivations and opportunity 
provided by the availability of natural resources as well as the internal 
structures and external links to the global market motivate and sustain the 
armed conflict. In case of the DRC, the internal opportunity structures are 
embedded largely in artisanal extraction and trade in minerals, which take 
place within the informal economy and are often linked to war economies. In 
order to contextualise the discussion on the nexus between the armed 
conflicts and coltan production and trade in the eastern DRC in this thesis, 
this section briefly examines the study on informal economy and the 
subsequent section reviews the study on artisanal mining. 
 
Economic activity which is not accounted for by governments is described 
using different terms, including informal, shadow, hidden, black, underground, 
clandestine, illegal and parallel, implying ‘conscious efforts to avoid official 
detection’ (Fleming et al. 2000: 387). This thesis uses the term ‘informal 
economy’ for consistency. The informal economy includes hugely diverse 
economic activities, which can be illicit, legal with or without an illicit 
component, or merely unregulated. Its significant impact on the formal 
economy and observed expansion around the world are widely 
acknowledged,22 and a vast literature on the informal economy exists to 
analyse the underlying causes and impacts, to theorise the activity, and to 
identify methods to measure the scale. However, the informal economy is 
diverse and nuanced and develops constantly to adjust to changing 
circumstances (Schneider 2002). There are no agreements on the definition 
or a theory of informal economy, and no methods to estimate the scale of 
these activities or how these activities affect the wider economy.23  
 
                                                          
22 See for example, Schneider (2002) and UNRISD (2010). 
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Fleming et al. (2000) identified that there have been two approaches to try to 
define the informal economy, namely the definitional approach, which views 
the informal economy as unrecorded economic activity, and the behavioural 
approach, which frames the informal economy in terms of behavioural 
characteristics. For example, Schneider (2002: 3) defines the informal 
economy as the economic activity which ‘includes unreported income from the 
production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter 
transactions – hence all economic activities which would generally be taxable 
were they reported to the state (tax) authorities’. According to his definition, 
the informal economy does not include criminal activities, which are irregular 
by nature. Fleming et al. (2000) agrees with the exclusion of crime as it has 
no regulated counterpart against which it can be compared.  
 
In reference to the DRC, MacGaffey (1991: 12), in her anthropological study 
on the Congolese informal economy, which she termed ‘real economy’, she 
defined the informal economy as ‘economic activities that are unmeasured, 
unrecorded and, in varying degrees, illegal’ as they are outside state 
regulation. These economic activities are carried out openly, with illegal 
implications, and overlap with the official economy in various ways; hence, 
actors often participate in both formal and informal transactions and 
commodities move between the two economies, even within a single 
transaction.    
 
The lack of a clear definition of the informal economy and reliable statistics 
makes it difficult to measure the sector, and has promoted numerous studies 
on how best to measure the scale of informal economy and attempts to 
measure the size of the informal economy. While qualitative approaches, 
including participant observation, interviews and surveys, are considered to 
be useful as a starting point for research and developing contextual data (de 
Soto 1989), Fleming et al. (2000) argue that these data do not provide a 
broader understanding of the size of the informal economy. According to a 
recent study on the size of the informal economy in 110 developing, transition 
and OECD countries by Schneider (2002), the average size of the informal 




estimated to be 41% in developing countries, 38% in transition countries and 
18% in OECD countries. The informal economy therefore appears to exist in 
all economic systems.  
 
Most analyses of drivers for the informal economy point out inappropriate or 
inefficient economic policies in the country. For instance, oppressive, 
burdensome or complex tax and regulatory regimes are believed to make 
people seek informal economies (Loayza 1997; Fleming et al. 2000; 
Schneider and Enste 2000; Schneider 2002). Also, there exists another view 
that links the growth of the informal economy with globalisation and economic 
liberalisation, which have increased subcontracts to decrease costs (UNRISD 
2010).  
 
However, these views are not sufficient to account for the existence and scale 
of the informal economy in the DRC. In order to explain the context in which 
the informal economy has been so significant in the DRC, the distinct nature 
of the DRC state needs to be highlighted. While the DRC state is often 
regarded as weak and corrupt, the state under Mobutu promoted 
‘informalisation and privatisation of public and economic life’ through a ‘fend-
for-yourself’ attitude (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2008: 49). The economic 
crisis and conflict have eventually given a rise to ‘a more commodified, 
indirect form of statehood that drives the middle ground between formal and 
informal, state and non-state spheres of authority and regulation’ (ibid.: 51). 
Similarly, Trefon (2009) describes the DRC state as an ‘ambiguous, arbitrary 
and hybrid’ state, in which negotiation is the means of operation at all levels. 
The informal economy in the DRC, hence, needs to be explained in the 
context of the informality of the state itself. 
 
The informal economy is considered to produce both positive and negative 
impacts. De Soto (1989) contends that the informal economy may be simply 
more efficient than the existing official economy, although it may appear to be 
undesirable as it is given terms such as ‘shadow’ and ‘hidden’ and some 
activities are illicit. It is widely acknowledged that the informal economy can 




al. 2000). The informal economy can also facilitate the transition to market 
economies (Fleming et al. 2000) and compensate the official economy by 
offering a functional distribution system for both marketing and trading in 
commodities (MacGaffey 1991; Fleming et al. 2000). The study on the DRC’s 
informal economy indicates that the informal economy can facilitate 
development through providing employment, goods and services to improve 
people’s lives and can enable social mobilisation with few resources and little 
technology (MacGaffey 1991). The same study also suggests that the 
informal economy represents local solutions to local problems and returns the 
state resources to society through different paths, as some of the public 
services are provided by the informal economy in terms of provision of health 
care, building hospitals, dispensaries and schools, and road maintenance 
where the state is not able to offer such provision (Vwakyanakazi 1991). 
 
In contrast to those positive aspects above, the informal economy diminishes 
the size of tax revenue, which weakens the capacity of the state to provide 
public goods, resulting in reduced incentives to pay tax and a further 
expansion of the informal economy (MacGaffey 1991; Vwakyanakazi 1991; 
Fleming et al. 2000). While how the informal economy influences growth and 
development is contentious, there is a strong argument that the informal 
economy prevents economic development rather than promoting it (de Soto 
1989) and undermines macroeconomic stability as the state is less able to 
manage the economy and maintain the rule of law (Fleming et al. 2000). The 
informal economy can also be exploitative and repressive, and widen the gap 
between rich and poor (MacGaffey 1991),24 since it does not distribute 
resources fairly amongst actors or offer equal opportunities to participants, 
especially in the absence of legal protection (MacGaffey 1991; Kisangani 
1998). Even though some public services are offered in the informal economy, 
these public services are more expensive and irregular, hence resulting in 
uneven development (MacGaffey 1991).  
 
2.5. Artisanal mining 
                                                          






Artisanal and small-scale mining is widely viewed as an important activity in 
many developing countries; the International Labour Office estimated in 1998 
that the sector provides employment to almost 13 million people in 55 
countries and livelihood for 80–100 million people globally (ILO 1999a). 
Moreover, the number of people who engage in artisanal and small-scale 
mining is increasing. There has been growing research on and policy 
engagement with the sector since the significant economic impact of the 
sector in developing countries was first highlighted in an UN report in 197225 
(Hilson 2009).26 
 
Owing to the diversity of activities and various criteria used to classify it, there 
is no universally agreed definition of artisanal and small-scale mining 
(Hentschel et al. 2002; 2003; UNECA 2002; Hilson 2003; Centre for 
Development Studies 2004: CASM 2009). The terms artisanal mining and 
small-scale mining are often used interchangeably and this thesis uses 
artisanal mining for consistency. The sector is broadly understood as ‘the 
most rudimentary branches of the mining sector’ (Hilson 2003: xxi) and most 
artisanal mining is carried out informally.27 Artisanal mining can be legal or 
illegal and formal or informal with different scales; it is associated with labour 
intensive and hazardous conditions derived from a lack of long-term planning 
and use of rudimentary techniques (Hinton et al. 2003a).  
 
Initially, artisanal mining was considered to be driven by entrepreneurship; 
however, it is increasingly perceived as poverty-driven activity for the last two 
decades, based on the growth of the sector amongst vulnerable groups in 
developing countries, sub-Saharan Africa in particular (Hilson 2009). The 
growing research on artisanal mining mainly examines the underlying causes 
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of the existence and impact of artisanal mining in various regions as well as 
evaluating the responses to improve the impact.  
 
The significant economic contribution brought about by artisanal mining 
includes employment opportunities for the population and foreign exchange 
earnings for the state. As artisanal mining provides a vital livelihood for the 
population and low barriers to entry, especially in rural areas where there are 
no alternative livelihoods, it is considered to have the potential to reduce 
poverty by donors such as the DFID, ILO, UN and World Bank. Kambani 
(2000) contends that appropriate policies and measures, based on the 
understanding of the particular needs of the sector, are necessary for the 
sector to be able to enhance those positive impacts.    
 
In contrast to its economic potential, artisanal mining creates considerable 
adverse impact on socio-economic and environmental situations, and the 
measures taken to address the negative impact of the artisanal mining have 
been the focus of numerous studies conducted by scholars and donors. 
Examples of the issues studied include pollution, land degradation,28 health 
and safety, HIV/AIDS, child labour,29 land conflict, migration, and social 
problems including drugs, alcohol and prostitution. Amongst these issues, 
pollution and health damage derived from mercury used for metal 
amalgamation have been studied extensively.30 These studies highlight the 
problem of inappropriate measures applied to this largely informal sector, in 
which poverty-stricken artisanal miners use rudimentary techniques (Hinton et 
al. 2003a; Hilson 2006; Hilson and Pardie 2006; Hilson et al. 2007; Spiegel 
2009b). Whilst this problem is largely attributed to inappropriate regulations 
and the degree of informality of the sector, Hinton et al. (2003b; 2003c) 
suggest a gender-sensitive approach to improve the conditions within the 
artisanal mining sector because an estimated 30% of artisanal miners in the 
world are women who tend to play different roles from men in mining activities.     
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30 See for example Hinton et al. 2003a; Hilson 2006; Hilson and Pardie 2006; Hilson et al. 




In order to yield the economic potential of artisanal mining for poverty 
reduction and to address the hazardous impacts mentioned above, 
formalisation of the artisanal mining sector has been the focus of much 
discussion. Several studies analysed the implementation of policy instruments, 
such as licensing of artisanal mining, demarcating land with mineral prospects 
and improving the technologies used, and revealed the difficulty of formalising 
the artisanal mining sector. They point out the inadequacy of those policies 
applied to effectively formalise the artisanal mining, and explain some 
underlying causes, discussed below, to show the inappropriateness of the 
formalisation instruments. 
 
Firstly of all, many studies point out a lack of understanding of the dynamics 
of the artisanal mining sector. There is a need to enhance the understanding 
of the socio-economic dynamics of the sector (Dondeyne et al. 2009), 
supported by geographical data and anthropological data with a focus on 
demographic structure (Hilson and Maponga 2004) as well as migration 
patterns in the mining sector (Nyame et al. 2009). There are suggestions such 
as creating census data (Hilson 2005) and including all stakeholders in 
developing better resource policies (Spiegel 2009a). Without adequate data, 
the importance of the livelihood provided by artisanal mining has been 
underestimated by donors (Tschakert 2009). 
 
As a consequence of the lack of sufficient information shown above, the 
provisions for the artisanal mining sector have been inappropriate, including 
the selection of demarcated land for artisanal mining, industrial services for 
artisanal mining (Hilson and Potter 2003; Hilson and Maponga 2004), and 
necessary capital for the artisanal miners to transform to more sustainable 
mining (Siegel and Veiga 2009).  
 
Moreover, Banchirigah (2006) explains that the reluctance of artisanal miners 
to be regulated is owing to the excessive bureaucratic procedures and the 
lack of other employment opportunities. Banchirigah (2006) and Hilson and 
Yakovleva (2007) highlight an important contradiction between the 




programmes and national mining sector reform programmes. Through the 
privatisation of state-owned mining companies and the promotion of foreign-
owned large industrial mining projects, these reforms neglect the needs of the 
local populations and reduce employment opportunities, hence encouraging 
informal artisanal mining rather than formalising the sector. 
 
2.6. Post-conflict reconstruction 
 
States emerging from armed conflict are subject to reconstruction efforts with 
the support of the donor community. A growing number of actors are involved 
in the post-conflict reconstruction and have established special programmes 
and units for their initiatives since the observed arrival of contemporary armed 
conflict in the 1990s, such as the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit 
by the World Bank,31 the Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Conflict and 
Humanitarian Affairs Department by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID). There is a vast literature covering the theories and 
practices of post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building of a state 
emerging from armed conflict, often described as weak, fragile, failed or 
collapsed as the state is perceived to be unable or unwilling to have authority 
over its territory and population, to provide basic public goods, and to enforce 
law and order.32 This section succinctly reviews the literature on post-conflict 
reconstruction with a focus on the reconstruction instruments in Africa and 
highlights the shortcomings of these instruments. By doing so, it highlights the 
limitations of the post-conflict reconstruction instruments in transforming the 
structures that sustain the armed conflict in the DRC, such as war economies 
created around the existing informal economy and artisanal mining sector. 
  
The complex interface between security and development, based on the fact 
that most of the poorest twenty states have gone through armed conflict 
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(intra-state) in the post-Cold War era, has been shaping the theories and 
practices of post-conflict reconstruction (Evans with Coyle and Curran 2003; 
Neethling 2005: Colliers 2006). The contemporary post-conflict reconstruction 
has, therefore, become integrated with peacebuilding approaches, comprising 
programmes in broad areas of security, governance, justice and economic 
development (Tschirgi 2003).  
 
Terms such as post-conflict reconstruction, nation/state-building, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding are often used to describe those integrated 
peacebuilding approaches by international and national actors to build and 
reconstruct a state emerging from armed conflict. The African Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction Framework, developed by the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NEPAD), defines post-conflict reconstruction as ‘a complex 
system that provides for simultaneous short-, medium- and long-term 
programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, to avoid a relapse into 
violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace by 
‘[addressing] the root causes of a conflict and [laying] the foundations for 
social justice and sustainable peace’ (NEPAD 2005: iv).   
 
Generally, the post-conflict reconstruction period starts when hostilities end, 
which is manifested by a ceasefire agreement or peace agreement. The post-
conflict reconstruction programmes ‘proceed through three broad phases, 
namely the emergency phase, the transition phase and the development 
phase’, while there are no clear boundaries between these three phases 
(NEPAD 2005: iv).  
 
Identical to the aforementioned four broad programmes on security, 
governance, justice and economic development of the integrated 
peacebuilding approaches, the African Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Framework comprises four dimensions: security; political transition, 
governance and participation; socio-economic development; and human 
rights, justice and reconciliation (NEPAD 2005). In addition, the framework 
includes coordination, management and resource mobilisation as the fifth 




through coordination is crucial for multidimensional and multilateral post-
conflict reconstruction instruments to be efficient (ibid.). As there is no 
consensus on the system of coordination, the framework contends that a 
clearly articulated overall strategy at country level, which is linked to a 
monitoring and evaluation system, is necessary (ibid.).  
 
Despite the integrated approaches embraced in the post-conflict 
reconstruction instruments, the extensive literature on post-conflict 
reconstruction has revealed that those efforts are failing or are producing 
mixed results at best. The analysis of failures of the post-conflict 
reconstruction instruments, particularly in Africa, highlights various issues and 
challenges to successful post-conflict reconstruction. The difficulty in 
reconstructing those states or rebuilding peace can be largely attributed to the 
nature of contemporary conflict and its impacts (Luckham 2007), discussed in 
the previous section on the contemporary armed conflicts. As the 
contemporary conflict is a result of a weakened or collapsed state to varying 
degrees, the political, social and economic factors contributing to and 
sustaining the conflict remain and create the new political reality, often leading 
to the continuation of violence even after ceasefire. Thus, Luckham (2007) 
and Thompson and Bell (2007) argue that post-conflict reconstruction cannot 
merely reconstruct the pre-conflict state as it is likely to result in another 
conflict.      
 
There is also a fundamental problem with the post-conflict construction efforts 
by international actors. By examining the role of international actors in their 
efforts to rebuild states after war through macroeconomic stability and 
economic expansion, Luckham (2007) contends that interventions by Western 
countries to stabilise developing countries are based on their concerns over 
the global security and agendas for the expansion of global markets. In other 
words, these interventions aim at ‘directly transforming political and 
administrative institutions under the rubric of good governance, so as to 
ensure a supportive institutional framework for market-based development’ 
(Luckham 2007: 14), rather than addressing the needs of those post-conflict 




which aim at privatisation, foreign direct investment and deregulated markets, 
may have adverse effects on peacebuilding. A study that examined the role of 
finance in conflict and reconstruction (Addison et al. 2001) also identifies the 
propensity that financial liberalisation during reconstruction fosters economic 
instability and thereby endangers peace. 
 
Another useful explanation for the failures of the post-conflict reconstruction 
efforts in Africa is given by Englebert and Tull (2008). They assert that 
international efforts for post-conflict reconstruction are based on three flawed 
assumptions that: ‘Western state institutions can be successfully transferred 
to Africa’, leading to a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ resisted by African 
governments; donors and African leaders share the diagnosis of failure and 
the objectives of reconstruction, while African elites ‘seek to maximize the 
benefits accruing to them from these policies, as well as from ongoing political 
instability’; and ‘donors will be able to harness the material, military, and 
symbolic resources necessary for long-term state reconstruction in Africa’ 
although donors do not have political will ‘to sustain the long-term costly 
efforts’ and are perceived to be driven by their own agendas in African 
societies (ibid.: 110–111). Moreover, Hesselbein et al. (2006) argues that the 
idea of state-making being best pursued through modern liberal democracy is 
not appropriate in Africa, and introducing political competition can threaten 
fragile stability in post-conflict states.  
         
The above views reflect the donor-driven nature of the post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts and the lack of local ownership has been brought to 
attention by some studies such as NEPAD (2005), Colliers (2006) and 
Englebert and Tull (2008). The donor-driven approach of the post-conflict 
reconstruction instruments partly emanates from the means of engagement 
between donors and recipient countries of aid, i.e. the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSPs). A case study of Sierra Leone by Obwona and 
Guloba (2009) criticises the use of the PRSPs as the single comprehensive 
means of engagement for post-conflict countries through which governments 
express their strategies for growth and poverty reduction. It points out 




implementing an effective PRSP, including weak institutions, limited capacity, 
lack of adequate data, lack of public participation in the process, and hence 
lack of ownership of the PRSP process. Furthermore, while donors may 
prioritise funding of consumption/social service sectors, post-conflict countries 
may need to prioritise investing in productive sectors and conflict prevention 
and peacebuilding needs.  
 
Similarly, Marysse et al. (2006) examined aid flows in the Great Lakes Region 
and identified that aid selectivity through the PRSP, as a new modality of 
conditionality by donors, largely depends on the performance of governments 
in specific areas of good governance, such as control of corruption and rule of 
law.33 This criterion is based on the assumption that these areas of 
governance can ensure aid effectiveness. However, it shelves other areas of 
governance such as ‘voice and accountability’, which are crucial to 
sustainable peace.        
 
Moreover, there are a number of potential negative effects of aid on post-
conflict countries. For example, aid may make a future crisis more likely by 
removing the pressure to develop internal revenue (Hesselbein et al. 2006) 
and can encourage similar rent-seeking attitudes to natural resource 
dependence, hence leading to violent conflict (Boyce 2007). Contrary to the 
above view by Marysse et al. (2006), Doig and Tisne (2009) assert that rapid 
and comprehensive reconstruction instruments through aid have not given 
sufficient importance to corruption and will institutionalise the corruption, 
thereby damaging public confidence in governments. 
 
The above examinations of the theories and practices of the post-conflict 
reconstruction expose the shortcomings of these instruments in addressing 
the political, economic and social structures which can reactivate violent 
conflict, such as in the DRC. Identical to other post-conflict countries, the DRC 
developed its PRSP, Document de la Stratégie de Croissance et de 
Réduction de la Pauvreté (DSCRP), based on a donor-funded participatory 
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poverty diagnosis, and presented it to the donor community in July 2006. The 
DSCRP includes five pillars: good governance and consolidation of peace 
through strengthened institutions; macroeconomic performance and economic 
growth through economic diversification and private sector development; 
provision of social services and reduction of vulnerability; improvement to 
health care including fighting HIV/AIDS; and support for communities (IMF 
2010). Decentralisation is also promoted in order to enhance transparency 
and share revenues derived from provincial resources.  
 
These reconstruction instruments, based on economic growth and poverty 
reduction through privatisation, foreign direct investment and market 
deregulation, clearly demonstrate deficiencies in transforming the political, 
economic and social structures, war economy, informal economy and 
governance, and insecurity that are all interconnected.34 According to a 
comparative analysis of Nicaragua and Mozambique (Bruck et al. 2000), the 
legacy of a war economy hinders the economic growth of the post-conflict 
countries as some factors, including the damaged commercial networks, the 
loss of trust and the weakening of market institutions, are not included in the 
post-conflict instruments. The war economy is interconnected to the informal 
economy which reduces the revenues of the state and hence weakens the 
state capacity to deliver basic public goods, as the previous section on the 
informal economy discussed. Hesselbein et al. (2006) reiterates this view by 
stating that the informal economy undermines the very existence of the state 
and prevents the re-establishment of basic state functions during the post-
conflict reconstruction period.  
 
Thompson and Bell (2007) also assert that the presence of the informal 
economy, combined with the parallel systems of formal and informal 
governance in the DRC, hinders broad-based growth and leaves a large 
proportion of the population outside decision-making processes. These 
                                                          
34 Madlala-Routedge and Liebenberg (2004) suggest addressing war economies and starting 
other development related programmes before the official end of conflict, in order to make 
reconstruction programmes more efficient under the label of ‘developmental peacekeeping’. 
Also, Galtung and Tisné (2009) put forward community-driven accountability. The community-
driven accountability can exploit the social accountability system existing within post-conflict 




existing multiple authorities within the DRC may resist the government-
defined policy reforms through aid (ibid.). The resistance to change within the 
post-conflict society has been underlined by other scholars as well. According 
to Cramer and Goodhand (2002) and Nitzschke (2003), the actors who 
benefitted from accumulation through violence and social relations during the 
conflict tend to resist central interference and control, which may lead to 
violence. Similarly, Englebert and Tull (2008) explain the resistance to change 
of African governments by the existence of informal political institutions which 
may be dysfunctional but are useful for local elites. 
 
The continuing presence of multiple authorities also poses a challenge to 
decentralisation processes, while many donor agencies have placed a strong 
emphasis on decentralisation as part of their post-war reconstruction efforts. 
While Beswick (2009) suggests an approach recognising multiple 
sovereignties or focusing on decentralisation is appropriate in the DRC based 
on the presence of warlords and the influence of their supporters in the 
eastern DRC, Jackson (2005) illustrates the challenges associated with the 
establishment of local governance systems in Sierra Leone. These challenges 
are linked to the traditional chief system which controlled land and mineral 
extraction.35 He highlights the need to analyse the complex interaction 
between the traditional chiefs, modern local government and the illegal 
commodity trade. Kaiser (2008) also highlights the practical difficulties of 
decentralisation as well as allocating accountability to reduce corruption.  
 
Given the above limitations of the post-conflict reconstruction framework in 
addressing the war economy, security sector reform faces challenges 
including resource manipulation, weapon proliferation and the diverse 
contexts of wartorn societies, despite becoming more comprehensive (Cooper 
and Pugh 2002). Thompson and Bell (2007) argue that, without transforming 
the structures of the war economies, demobilised soldiers would be integrated 
into the same context that triggered the conflict in the first place. An analysis 
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of the security sector reform in the DRC (Marriage 2007) explains that the 
demobilisation programmes in the DRC have failed to provide sustainable 
incentives to combatants and to address underlying insecurity, without 
adequate understanding of the processes of the informalisation of politics and 
the economy, the exercise of power through violence, and the multiple crises 
people are facing in the society. There is also an observed difference between 
donors’ objectives and domestic needs and perceptions for the security sector 
reform (Boshoff et al. 2010; Roue and Willems 2010). Moreover, Roue and 
Willems (2010) point out the lack of follow-up after demobilisation, broken 
promises of assistance, and the inability of the national security forces to deal 
with the continuing insecurity. 
 
These reconstruction reforms appear to assume that pursuing economic 
growth for poverty reduction through private sector investment encouraged by 
good governance will automatically integrate existing large-scale informal 
economies and eliminate war economies. However, evidence shows that, 
without addressing the existing structures of informal economy and 
governance, based on the divides within which the war economy continues to 
function, the reforms not only fail to achieve broad-based economic growth 
but also fail to prevent the relapse of armed conflict. There is a growing 
expectation for partnerships, as a new type of global governance, to fill the 
governance gap in weak governance situations, and hence to help delink 
mineral production and trade from armed conflict in the DRC war economy. 
The following section provides a concise literature review on partnerships and 




Over the past two decades, partnerships between business and government, 
multilateral organisations and civil society have mushroomed, as partnerships 
are seen as a more effective and efficient mechanism to address complex 
issues, such as sustainable development, climate change and human security 
(Hemmati 2002; Reed and Reed 2009). While there is a growing number of 




partnerships and inter-organisational collaboration (Murphy and Bendell 
1999), they are often policy and practice oriented. Theoretical work on 
partnerships has been incredibly limited since it is difficult to theorise the 
concept as partnerships are highly diverse owing to their context specific 
nature (ibid.). Given the diversity, the concept has become considerably 
flexible and lacks even an agreed definition (Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007). The 
following presents one of the most commonly quoted definitions on 
partnerships: 
 
Partnerships are defined as voluntary and collaborative relationships 
between various parties, both State and non-State, in which all 
participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or 
undertake a specific task and to share risks and responsibilities, 
resources and benefits (UN 2005: para. 8). 
 
The literature on partnerships is, nonetheless, rooted in two main broad fields 
of governance and development with an overlap, as governance ‘goes 
beyond the discussion of public management to a more fundamental question 
of how the processes of democracy (citizen involvement, decision-making 
procedures and administrative functions) can be adapted to … resolve the 
complex public issues’ (Lovan et al. 2004: xv) such as development.  
 
Studies that frame partnerships as a form and/or process to advance 
governance seek to appraise whether partnerships fill governance gaps. 
Broadly speaking, there are studies in two areas. Firstly, there are studies that 
look into accountability and governance in development partnerships. They 
include a study by AccountAbility36 (Litovsky and MacGillivray 2007), which 
identifies the weak evidence that development partnerships are more 
accountable, owing to the difficulty in evaluation and the lack of understanding 
in how to create ‘collaborative governance’ effectively. AccountAbility 
elaborated the findings in a further study (Rochlin et al. 2008). The Friedrich-
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Ebert-Stiftung37 study examined global partnerships between the UN and 
private actors as a paradigm shift in international politics, and pointed out the 
challenge for a ‘democratic multilateralism’ (Martens 2007). In addition, much 
of the literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) treats the partnership 
paradigm as a strategy or management tool for corporate citizenship in order 
to pursue sustainable development goals (Warhurst 2001; Rajak 2006). Whilst 
a business case for partnerships is supported, Bendell (2001) and Rajak 
(2006) observe the inherent power imbalance within partnerships when 
employed in developing countries.   
 
Secondly, there are studies that examine partnerships as a new form of global 
governance to remedy the democratic governance deficit resulting from 
unfettered and unaccountable economic globalisation (Bendell 2000). While 
governance lacks an exact definition, it is ‘about processes of making 
decisions … is concerned with processes focusing on the distribution of public 
responsibility across multiple stakeholders’ (Lovan et al. 2004: xvi) that 
partnerships are designed for. This represents a paradigm shift in governance 
and Bendell (2000: 245) perceives that ‘the place of politics’ has departed 
from ‘the concept of state sovereignty and government’ and expanded to 
include non-state actors as agents. Similarly, Dodds (2005) observes a 
change from representative democracy to participatory democracy for more 
democratic governance. Hemmati (2002: 2) frames this new paradigm as 
‘multi-stakeholder processes’, which ‘describes processes which aim to bring 
together all major stakeholders in a new form of communication, decision-
finding (and possibly decision-making) on a particular issue’. Schneider (1999: 
523) coined the term ‘participatory governance’, that is to say ‘by introducing 
maximum transparency and sharing of information in a process that includes 
all stakeholders … [which] leads to joint decision making wherever possible’.       
 
The new form of global governance is also meeting the demand from NGOs 
equipped with consumer politics (Bendell 2000) and the Southern 
governments and citizens (Reed and Reed 2009) to regulate corporate 
                                                          




practice, particularly in conflict zones (Le Billon 2003b; Böge et al. 2006). In 
the light of regulating business through the new governance paradigm, there 
has been a discourse on the efficacy of self-regulation as opposed to 
mandatory regulation and a shift towards co-regulation (Utting 2005; Böge et 
al. 2006). Le Billon (2003b) examined the efficacy of regulatory and voluntary 
instruments in the trade of conflict resources. Others discussed the shift from 
self-regulation to social control (Utting 2005), or ‘civil regulation’ with civil 
society as the agent (Bendell 2000). Critics of self-regulation and voluntary 
approaches argue that they are driven by the interests of business (Reed and 
Reed 2009) and they are not efficient in a context characterised by weak 
governance and limited law enforcement since they need to be supported by 
home country regulation (ECCJ 2009).     
 
Other studies that focus on partnerships in the broad development arena are 
numerous, and attempt to verify whether partnerships fulfil expectations after 
being hailed a new approach to overcome market failure (World Economic 
Forum 2005) and the previous single-sector approach (Findlay-Brooks et al. 
2007). For example, Schneider (1999) examined a paradigm shift to 
participatory governance based on empowerment, accountability and capacity 
building in poverty reduction. Based on the analysis of development 
partnerships, namely the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), Abrahamsen (2004) views 
development partnerships as a form of advanced liberal rule with the clear 
commitment to the self-government and agency of recipient states. Rein et al. 
(2005) examined development partnerships in southern Africa and call for 
more research on partnership models. The World Economic Forum (2005) 
advocates for development partnerships within the private sector by 
presenting their potential and the business case for them. Reed and Reed 
(2009) examined business engagement in development partnerships based 
on the degree of stakeholder influence or social control. 
 
Overall, the literature on partnerships embraces the notion of a paradigm shift 
in governance towards more inclusive, transparent and accountable 




perceived lack of empirical evidence to validate the outcomes of participatory 
governance as a new form of governance and critical analyses of its impact 
(Rein et al. 2005; Litovski and MacGillvray 2007; Rochlin et al. 2008), to which 
this thesis attempts to contribute.   
 
An overview of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
 
A crucial event that triggered the endorsement and expansion of partnerships 
was the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio 
de Janeiro in 1992; commonly referred to as the Earth Summit,38it illuminated 
scores of interconnected global issues and the role of NGOs (Murphy and 
Bendell 1997; UNED Forum c2001). The idea of multi-stakeholder processes 
was developed during the follow-up process of the Earth Summit (Martens 
2007), and was supported in other crucial international summits, including the 
2002 World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (Rein et 
al. 2005; Reed and Reed 2009) and the G8 Summit in 2008.  
 
The number and application of multi-stakeholder partnerships have grown 
significantly to echo the support and expectation referred to above. Reflecting 
the diversity of the partnerships, various terms are used interchangeably to 
describe these partnerships, including collaboration, alliance, cooperation, 
multi-stakeholder partnership, multi-sector partnership, cross-sector 
partnership, tri-sector partnership, inter-sectoral partnership, social 
partnership, strategic alliance, and public private partnership (PPP). In 
addition to the above definition by Hemmati (2002: 2), multi-stakeholder 
processes are: 
 
based on democratic principles of transparency and participation, and 
aim to develop partnerships and strengthened networks among 
stakeholders …They can comprise dialogues on policy or grow to 
include consensus-building, decision-making and implementation of 
practical solutions … [they] are not a universal tool or a panacea for all 
                                                          




kinds of issues, problems and situations. They are akin to a new 
species in the eco-system of decision finding and governance structure 
and processes (ibid. 2–3).   
 
The rest of this section outlines drivers, expectations and issues of 
partnerships, drawing on the general research over the past decade on 
partnerships, though ‘context’ is critical in partnerships (Rein et al. 2005). 
Partnership participants are chiefly seeking added value through working 
together (Rein et al. 2005). Other incentives include: finance (Acutt et al. 
2001; Hemmati 2002; Rein et al. 2005; Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007); skills 
sharing (Acutt et al. 2001; Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007); networking (Acutt et al. 
2001); protecting reputation and brand (World Economic Forum 2005; 
Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007); implementing CSR activities (World Economic 
Forum 2005; Jack 2007); building trust with shareholders (Jack 2007); use of 
influence and economic power of partner (Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007); and 
gaining legitimacy (Rajak 2006; Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007). 
 
Partnerships are expected to achieve in three broad areas. Firstly, they drive 
innovation (Rein et al. 2005; World Economic Forum 2005; Rochlin et al. 
2008). Secondly, they can improve governance and accountability (Dodds 
2005; World Economic Forum 2005; Rochlin et al. 2008) through including 
voices of marginalised or disadvantaged groups, who do not usually have 
opportunities to express their needs or problems (Rein et al. 2005). Thirdly, 
they can tackle complex issues more effectively and efficiently through 
supplementing skills and resources (Acutt et al. 2001; World Economic Forum 
2005; Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007), especially where there is a limitation in 
government capacity or resource (Rein et al. 2005).   
 
A number of challenges and issues of the partnerships at an operational level 
and more fundamental level are revealed by several studies. At an operational 
level, there are issues of: additional costs and the difficulty of setting up and 
sustaining a partnership (Acutt et al. 2001; Rein et al. 2005; World Economic 
Forum 2005; Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007); sluggish progress caused by lack of 




of skills and capacities (World Economic Forum 2005); hidden agendas that 
are different from the objectives of the partnership (Rajak 2006; Findlay-
Brooks et al. 2007); and evaluating the outcomes of the partnership (Findlay-
Brooks et al. 2007). 
 
The key issues of the partnerships are accountability and governance 
(Findlay-Brooks et al. 2007), contrary to the claim that partnerships improve 
accountability and governance. Accountability will not be improved when there 
is an existing unaccountability amongst the participants (Litovsky and 
MacGillivray 2007: 5), and it can be compromised through distributing 
accountability amongst the participants (Rajak 2006). What are often 
overlooked are power differences in a partnership, which significantly affect 
the accountability and governance of the partnership (Rajak 2006; Findlay-
Brooks et al. 2007). While the inclusion of disadvantaged groups in 
partnerships is promoted, the power differences persist in the partnerships, 
and working explicitly towards a truly level playing field is necessary 
(Edmunds and Wollenberg 2002). Partnerships risk legitimacy (Findlay-
Brooks et al. 2007; Litovsky and MacGillivray 2007) when power differences 
and vested interests are embedded in a partnership (Rajak 2006; Rochlin et al. 
2008), such as when companies use the partnership to deceive stakeholders 
(Rajak 2006; Litovsky and MacGillivray 2007). When partnerships operate in 
states with limited capacity, indifference and corruption (Findlay-Brooks et al. 
2007; Warhurst and Franklin 2007), they not only risk their legitimacy but can 
also undermine the function of the state (Rajak 2006; Litovsky and 
MacGillivray 2007).  
 
2.8. Chapter summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter reviewed the literature on seven areas that are relevant to the 
research subject, namely contemporary conflicts, resource curse, war 






The contemporary conflicts that have taken place in the post-Cold War period 
display distinct features in terms of scope, actors, methods of warfare and 
finance. The absence of superpowers’ support following the end of the Cold 
War as well as the acceleration of globalisation and market deregulation 
appear to have weakened the state monopoly of organised violence, eroded 
the autonomy of state, and expanded the regional and global networks 
thereby enabling self-financing of the conflicts.  
 
Amongst various perspectives on the contemporary conflicts, the resource 
curse thesis has been highly influential in the analysis of resource-related 
conflicts despite being criticised for a number of analytical limitations including 
coding issues, an overly reductionist approach, cross-country analysis without 
micro- and regional-level analysis, and a lack of causal explanation. The 
greed hypothesis explains that economic motivations and opportunity created 
by abundant natural resources (valuable, lootable, diffuse and distant 
resources in particular) and weak governance trigger and sustain armed 
conflict, while dismissing grievance as the motivation of armed conflict.  
 
A strand of recent study on the economic agendas of war or war economy 
explains the features of the contemporary war economy as adaptive 
networked structures connected to the global market. The contemporary war 
economy is hence decentralised, situated in the internal opportunity structure 
and broader political economy, and well integrated into the existing 
economies. While grievance is acknowledged as a continually important factor 
in the contemporary conflicts, the economic dimensions of war have largely 
dominated the policy formulation for ending and preventing conflict by 
curtailing finances linked to rebels, manifested by sanctions. The limitation of 
these instruments in transforming the war economy highlights the importance 
of the internal structures as well as the broader political economy. 
 
In the case of the DRC conflict, informal economy and artisanal mining are 
crucial areas of the internal structures sustaining the conflict and war 
economy. The informal economy, economic activity which is not accounted for 




diversity. While inappropriate or inefficient economic policies are considered 
to be the key driver of the informal economy around the world, the gradual 
informalisation and privatisation of the state function in the DRC has to be 
taken into account in the case of the DRC. The informal economy can be 
positive in providing a survival mechanism to the population and facilitating 
development; however, it can also be exploitative and repressive and 
undermines the state capacity to collect tax revenues, provide public goods 
and control the macroeconomy.    
 
Artisanal mining constitutes one of the crucial activities in the DRC informal 
economy. It is a prevalent activity in developing countries owing to a lack of 
other livelihoods; however, it lacks a universally agreed definition because of 
the diversity of the sector. Though it has a significant economic impact, it also 
has an inverse effect on the environment and socio-economic conditions as 
most of the operations take place illegally and informally. Given the potential 
of the artisanal mining for poverty reduction and the need to reduce the 
negative impacts, formalising the artisanal mining is viewed as the way 
forward in theory. However, attempts to formalise the artisanal mining in 
various countries have not seen any success, and most studies attribute the 
failure of formalisation to inappropriate polices and services provided to the 
sector because of the lack of understanding of the dynamics of the sector. 
There is also a view that it is the reforms, such as structural adjustment 
programmes and market liberalisation, which have created unemployment 
and poverty, thereby expanding informal artisanal mining activity in the first 
place, and therefore legalising artisanal mining conflicts with these reforms 
which encourage large private industry-based mining operations through 
foreign direct investment in an effort to increase the state revenue. The study 
of artisanal mining can suggest that the formalisation of artisanal mining in 
post-conflict/conflict situations, such as in the DRC, faces obstacles because 
of the post-conflict reconstruction instruments.  
 
Post-conflict reconstruction, which states emerging from armed conflict are 
subject to, usually consists of programmes in security, governance, justice 




and there are extensive studies and discussions within both policy and 
academic circles, ranging from the nature and capacity of African states to 
donors’ agendas. Nonetheless, the crucial shortcoming of this common post-
conflict reconstruction framework for the DRC appears to be its inability to 
transform the existing internal structures including the informal economy and 
multiple governance in which war economy thrives and the reforms are 
resisted, thereby conflict continues. Given the weak capacity of the state to 
control the economic activity and the connection between the war economy 
and the global market, global governance processes through multi-
stakeholder partnerships are expected to fill the governance gap to help 
delink the war economy and the global market. However, there is a lack of 
empirical evidence to support the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships in 





Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
This chapter briefly summarises the methodology of this research to examine 
how multi-stakeholder partnerships can help in enhancing governance to 
promote sustainable peace and security and why, with a particular focus on 
how they can curtail revenues for the belligerents from coltan production and 
trade in the eastern DRC. It includes details about the approach, data 
collection and analysis methods as well as an indication about the limitations 
of the methodology.  
 
The research is founded on a constructivist epistemology, which allows a 
consideration of different understandings and perspectives around the 
research question, namely the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships as 
participatory governance in promoting sustainable peace and security by 
addressing the issues of ‘conflict coltan’ in the eastern DRC. While other 
approaches may lead to their own unique insights (Oliver 2008), I find the 
constructive approach to be a more useful model of inquiry for realities that 
are multiple and both ‘socially and societally embedded’ but also ‘existing 
within the mind’ (Grbich 2007: 8). In the context of this research, the concern 
is to frame ideas and any findings as situated knowledges (Haraway 1988) as 
‘there is no objective knowledge independent of thinking’ (Grbich 2007: 8). 
Indeed, my experience of living and working in the Great Lakes Region 
(mentioned in the foreword) has made me more aware of the fact that multiple 
realities may be expressed by different people as they tend to live such 
realities differently (Grbich 2007: 8) depending on their ethnic and cultural 
affiliations.  
 
The research employs case studies of informal artisanal coltan mining and 
trade, coltan supply chains and coltan certification schemes in the eastern 
DRC, which are supported by inductive, qualitative methods. According to Yin 
(2003: 10–14), a case study is ‘a distinctive form of empirical inquiry’ to 
‘investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 




evident’. In addition, the case study inquiry ‘copes with the technically 
distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than 
data points, and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence, with 
data needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another resolute 
benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data 
collection and analysis’. I selected the case study method because through 
this research I seek to answer how multi-stakeholder partnerships can help in 
enhancing governance to promote sustainable peace and security in the 
eastern DRC and why. The case study method is suitable when ‘a “how” and 
“why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which 
the investigator has little or no control’ (ibid.) and allows a better 
understanding of ‘complex social phenomena’ (ibid.: 2). It is also useful in 
dealing with a range of evidence including documents, artefacts, interviews 
and observations. 
 
By pursuing the case study method, I did not seek to make statistical 
generalisations but hoped to demonstrate the complexity and importance of 
the contexts in order to expand theories. Similarly, I did not seek 
representativeness or validation in data collection since I anticipated 
limitations and restrictions in conducting PhD research on the subject. The 
constraints envisaged were linked to the available time and financial 
resources, logistics and terrains in the DRC as well as the clandestine and 
illicit nature of the activities in question. I employed triangulation in methods 
and materials used in the research to be able to pursue in-depth 
understanding of the phenomenon (Flick 2002). In so doing, ‘rigor, breadth, 
complexity, richness, and depth’ are added to the inquiry (Denzin and Lincoln 
2005: 5).  
 
I therefore attempted to use a broad range of materials for the inquiry: 
secondary data, which included academic writing, reports, documents, 
websites, news bulletins, and audio and visual resources in English; and 
primary data, which consisted of semi-structured interviews and 
correspondence with a range of stakeholders as well as observation. Broadly, 




the professed realities of the topic under study or the main research issues. In 
contrast, the primary data through interviews were sought after in order to 
explore multiple realities constructed and expressed by various stakeholders 
that are not always articulated in official or public domains.  
 
In conducting the semi-structured interviews, I used a self-styled ‘romantic’ 
approach which is believed to support ‘a more “genuine” human interaction as 
well as help establish rapport, trust and commitment between interviewer and 
interviewee in the interview situation … to explore the inner world (meaning, 
ideas, feelings, intentions) or experienced social reality of the interviewee’ 
(Alvesson 2002: 108–109). By engaging in a ‘real’ conversation, the ‘romantic’ 
approach can also reduce ‘the risks of the interviewees talking what the 
interviewer wants to hear’ and it can ‘make the interviews more honest, 
morally sound, and reliable’ (ibid.).  
 
I am, however, aware that ‘an interview is an empirical situation’ which 
‘informs us how people behave in the interview situation’ and about the social 
process, requiring that local conditions be appreciated as interviewees may 
have ‘a political interest in how socially significant issues are represented’ 
(ibid.: 110–113). Similarly, it is important to note that I (the interviewer) as an 
outsider have my ‘own interests, preferences and preconceptions’ and choose 
what to perceive (Chambers 1983: 4). I also have my own particular interests 
at stake which, in this case, relate to my attempt to identify gaps and 
limitations within the ongoing academic debates, policy responses and NGO 
activism linked to the significant issue of ‘conflict coltan’.  
 
In analysing the interview data, I looked for common patterns of meaning 
through a preliminary data analysis and through subsequent thematic 
analysis. The thematic analysis is a useful tool, allowing comparisons 
between diverse perspectives owned by a variety of groups (Flick 2002). 
Special attention was paid to the categorised data segments in referring them 
to other secondary materials with the aim of identifying discrepancies between 
academic debates, policy responses and NGO activism, as was mentioned 




being debated; however, I have also been driven into adopting a micro-
approach (as highlighted by Grbich 2007). which may reflect one of the 
limitations of constructivism.  
 
In total, the data collection entailed a document search through the library and 
the Internet, collecting accounts from media and conferences, and semi-
structured interviews and informal conversations, thirteen of which were 
conducted in England between 2009 and 2010, backed up by different 
communication technologies, such as email, phone and Skype, and thirteen of 
which were carried out during a two-week fieldwork trip to Rwanda in June 
2009.  
 
With regard to the fieldwork, I had intended to conduct research in the eastern 
DRC in order to collect direct accounts from a range of respondents, including 
miners, middlemen, traders, international traders, civil society members, 
officials, aid agencies and various other social actors. However, the 
deteriorating security conditions in the eastern DRC during 2008 meant that 
the planned fieldwork encountered a few difficulties: I was in the process of 
securing an ethics approval for the research and financial support from the 
funding body, Coventry University. In order to obtain the ethics approval and 
financial support from the university, I changed the location of my fieldwork 
from the eastern DRC to its neighbouring country, Rwanda, a place where I 
had lived and worked until 2005 and where I still had connections. In an 
attempt to interview some Congolese stakeholders, I had asked them to cross 
the border into Rwanda to meet up with me there. In the end, it proved difficult 
to make the arrangements owing to the logistics, communication and the short 
period allowed for the fieldwork, so only one Congolese person made it to the 
interview in Rwanda.  
 
When I conducted fieldwork in Rwanda in June 2009, I carried out ten semi-
structured interviews and three informal conversations with mainly Rwanda-
based Congolese, Rwandese and foreigners. I also carried out observations 
of an artisanal coltan mining site and the operation of two international coltan 




determined by their involvement in the extraction of coltan, its trade and 
knowledge of it. Therefore, the key questions centred on the situation of the 
coltan extraction and trade, the respondents’ perceptions of the difficulties 
they faced, their ideas about ways of improving the situation in the eastern 
DRC and their views about the conflict coltan approach. The selection of the 
fieldwork participants was also determined by the condition of their own 
availability and my access to them. Through a previous network, I was able to 
employ a Rwandese-Congolese research assistant who spoke English, 
French, Kiswahili and Kinyarwanda, with connections both in Rwanda and the 
DRC and who was acquainted with a large number of people involved in 
minerals extraction and trade. Access to the research participants was largely 
facilitated by this research assistant through his knowledge and networks. In 
terms of my own representation, I benefitted from the fact that, as a Japanese 
national, I did not suffer from negative associations due to some historical 
legacy in the eyes of any Congolese or Rwandese I met. A few even 
approached me inquiring about funding opportunities. But, on the whole, 
international actors were reluctant to engage with a researcher.  
 
During the interviews conducted, I started by presenting all respondents with 
a participant information sheet and a consent form in English; however, these 
documents clearly discouraged the participants and, in most cases, I 
proceeded through a verbal method of agreement instead. Most interviews 
were conducted in French, Kiswahili and Kinyarwanda via translation provided 
by the research assistant but were not audio-recorded as this would have 
caused concerns for the research participants. There may have been a 
degree of inaccuracy in the research data derived from the interpretation work 
and note-taking, which I tried to palliate with my own fieldwork notes. 
 
Regarding the other thirteen semi-structured interviews and communications 
carried out in England, I tried to collect various perspectives within coltan 
supply chains as well as multi-stakeholder partnerships on ideas about 
conflict coltan and initiatives by the multi-stakeholder partnerships. I 
developed three focus areas for data collection as the research progressed. 




coltan certification schemes have become the key initiative with regard to 
coltan issues. Secondly, actors engaged in the Durban Process were pursued 
because the Durban Process was the only Congolese multi-stakeholder 
partnership working on the coltan issues in the eastern DRC. Thirdly, a 
German coltan processor, H.C. Starck, was an object of focus as it is the 
previous key buyer of Congolese coltan and has been involved in a coltan 
certification scheme as well as the Durban Process. The limited number of 
interviews/communications conducted was due to the difficulty in identifying 
specific individuals (coltan certification schemes), gaining access to the 
research respondents, especially business stakeholders, and the absence of 
information (the information on the Durban Process was not accessible for a 
considerable period of time as its website subscription had run out). Most of 
the interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed.     
 
The table below explains the objectives and methods to achieve the 
objectives in more detail.  
     
Table 1: Data collection 
Objectives Methods of data collection to achieve the 
objectives 
Chapter Four 
To identify the background and 
causes rather than the economic 
motivations for the continuing conflict 
in the eastern DRC. 
Secondary data from sources including 
academic writing, reports, documents, news, 
and audio and visual resources.  
Chapter Five 
To analyse how coltan production and 
trade finance and drive the conflict in 
the eastern DRC based on the 
following:  
• The current knowledge on the 
link between the conflict and 
coltan; 
• How the coltan market and 
industry are structured and 
linked to the DRC conflict; 
• How coltan is produced and 
traded in the DRC; and 
• The involvement of the armed 
groups in the coltan 
production and trade.  
Secondary data from sources including 
academic writing, reports, government 
documents, industry news, news, company 
websites, and audio and visual resources. 
 






To examine different perspectives of 
stakeholders within the coltan supply 
chains on: 
• Whether revenues from 
coltan drive and finance the 
conflict; 
• Whether it is possible to 
identify ‘conflict coltan’; 
• The idea of halting the 
purchase of ‘conflict coltan’; 
• The issues and challenges 
relating to coltan production 
and trade; and 
• How best to address these 






For end-users (electronics companies 
including NOKIA, Motorola, Samsung, 
Sony Ericsson, LG Electronics, Vodafone, 
SONY, Intel and Hewlett Packard): 
Secondary data from sources including 
company statements, letters, policies from 
websites, interviews with spokespersons in 
industry news/media and NGO reports. 
 
For mid-users (capacitor manufacturers 
and tantalum processors including Kemet 
Electronics Corporation, Ningxia Non-
ferrous Metals Smeltery, Cabot 
Corporation and H.C. Starck):  
Secondary data from sources including 
company statements, letters, policies from 
websites, interviews with spokespersons in 
industry news/media, and NGO and UN 
reports. 
Primary data for H.C. Starck from the email 
communication with Buetefisch (2009) and 
the interview with Roethe (2009).   
 
For International traders (including Eagle 
Wings Resources, Thailand Smelting and 
Refining Company 
(THAISARCO)/Amalgamated Metal 
Corporation (AMC), Traxys and Refractory 
Metals Mining Company (RMMC)):  
Secondary data from sources including 
company statements and interviews with 
spokespersons in industry news/media and 
NGO reports, and NGO and UN reports. 
 
Actors in the DRC and Rwanda (including 
mineral trading houses and their 
employees, middlemen, miners, NGO 
staff, government officials and a 
researcher):   
Secondary data from sources including 
interviews with the actors in media, and NGO 
and UN reports. 
Primary data from interviews with mineral 
trading house employees, middlemen, 
miners, NGO staff, government officials 
(Rwanda Geology and Mines Authority 
(OGMR)), the telephone interview with 






To analyse the role of the multi-
stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) in 
enhancing governance, limit the 
finance for the belligerents, and 
improve people’s life in the eastern 
DRC by examining the following: 
• The background, objectives 
and scope, type, and progress 
of the multi-stakeholder 
partnerships; 
• Whether they are inclusive, 
participatory, transparent and 
accountable; and 




For eight multi-stakeholder partnerships 
including the Durban Process, KPCS, 
CTC, ICGLR, GeSI & EICC Joint Working 
Group, OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights, and EITI: 
Secondary data from sources including 
websites, reports, conference proceedings, 
statements of the MSPs and organisations in 
media/reports, NGO reports, and media. 
Primary data for Durban Process from the 
interviews with Bucknell (2009) and D’Souza 
(2009), the telephone interview with Levin 
(2010) and the email communication with 
Buetefisch (2009). 
Primary data for CTC from the interviews with 
D’Souza (2009) and Roethe (2009), the 
telephone interview with Levin (2010), and 
the email communications with Hamuli (2010) 
and Franken (2010a; 2010b).  
Primary data for ICGLR from conference 
presentations, and the email communications 
with Franken (2010a) and Hamuli (2010). 
 
 
In the last stage of the research, consulting the research participants about 
the final draft of the thesis should constitute an important ethical process. 
However, in this case, it has not been achievable for two reasons. The first 
relates to a problem of logistics and the second lies in the very concept of a 
consultation following research where many of the respondents may have 
been politically motivated in expressing their particular views (Alvesson 2002), 
as already stated. Most of the research participants did not wish to remain 
anonymous, including foreign participants who may be easily identified from 
their positions. However, I chose to omit the names of local participants as a 
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Chapter Four: Conflicts in the DRC between 1996 and 2008  
 
This chapter provides an analysis of the trajectories and nature of the 
protracted conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), from the first 
Congo War (1996 to 1997) through the second Congo War (1998 to 2003) to 
the ongoing conflict up to 2008, with a focus on the relationship with Rwanda 
because of its central role in the conflict as well as in coltan exploitation. In so 
doing, it intends to identify the background and causes rather than the 
economic motivations for the continuing conflict in the eastern DRC in order to 
address the first research question set out in the introduction.  
 
The analysis demonstrates that the conflict has not been a single conflict but 
a convergence of several conflicts, which occurred broadly at local, national 
and regional levels, involved numerous actors (Cramer 2006a; Grignon 2006; 
Wake 2008), and were exacerbated by their interactions. This ‘complex 
hybrid’ conflict (Carayannis 2003) or a ‘multi-layered’ conflict (Prunier 2009) 
unfolded in the context of a significant economic decline, an apparent 
institutional collapse and a loss of political legitimacy, particularly since the 
early 1990s. The chapter also highlights the importance of the local context, 
prior to the outbreak of the conflict, in which historical, social, economic, 
political and cultural relations in the region are embedded.  
 
Violent conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since 1996 has 
been largely explained as a means to fulfil economic interests through the 
exploitation of natural resources and control over trade. The exclusive focus 
on the economic agendas of belligerents and the economic functions of the 
conflict in the DRC was often justified by ‘the low-intensity nature’ of the 
conflict, the fragmentation of the belligerent groups and the cross-border 
networks of illegal trade involving the belligerents and criminal elements 
(UNSC 2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b).  
 
Both academic writing (Carayannis 2003) and media coverage (Hawkins 
2008) on the DRC conflict have been limited, despite the scale and the 
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humanitarian impact, and it is only recently that the volume of publications has 
increased somewhat. A major challenge in analysing the complexity of the 
DRC conflict is posed by the existing theoretical divide. The sections on 
contemporary conflicts, resource curse and war economy in the literature 
review chapter suggest the inappropriateness of treating the DRC conflict as a 
civil war (King 1997), or characterising it as a ‘new war’ (Kaldor 2007) or a 
resource war (Klare 2001; 2002), with analytical focus on the state and state 
actors employed by the international relations scholarship. At the same time, 
explaining the DRC conflict in terms of a rational choice approach in the 
context of resource abundance and weak governance based on statistical 
analysis39 also reveals limitations as it does not adequately allow for 
causation. There has been, nonetheless, considerable growth in study within 
both academia and the policy community, focusing exclusively on the 
economic agendas and the political economies of the DRC conflict. Some 
have been conducted by the International Peace Academy,40 the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI),41 the UN,42 and various NGOs such as the 
International Peace Information Service (IPIS).43  
 
A focus on the war economy, or the functions of the war paradigm, however, 
may overlook political grievances held by the belligerents and local contexts in 
which those grievances were constructed and transformed into violence. 
While the nature of the DRC state is largely accounted for as a continuation of 
predatory governance following on from Mobutu’s regime (Rackley 2006) or a 
shadow state where warlords prevail (Reno 1998; 2000), and although 
various analyses on the DRC state collapse are offered within the political 
science literature (Young and Turner 1985; Lemarchand 1997; 2003; McNulty 
1999; Zeilig 2009), Sangmpam (1994) contests these views derived from the 
weak governance paradigm as inadequate in understanding the nature of 
                                                          
39 The most influential work has been provided by Collier (2000) and Collier and Hoeffler 
(2004). 
40 Berdal, M. and Malone, D. M. (eds.) (2000) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in 
Civil Wars, Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Nest, M. W. with Grignon, F. and Kisangani, E. F. (2006) 
The Democratic Republic of Congo: economic dimensions of war and peace, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner. 
41 Jackson (2003). 
42 UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b). 
43 Cuvelier and Raeymaekers (2002a; 2002b); Raeymaekers (2002) 
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governance in the DRC. Comprehensive analyses on the DRC conflict have 
been recently offered by historians, from a focus on the role of Rwanda 
(Prunier 2009) to a criticism of the rational choice approach (Turner 2007). 
Mwanasali (2000) contends that local level and context-specific analyses and 
‘the view from below’ are critical in understanding the political grievances and 
context. In this light, crucial insights have been offered by Mamdani (1998; 
2001), Vlassenroot (2002), Jackson (2007) and Turner (2007) on ethnicity and 
citizenship issues, and MacGaffey et al. (1991) and Raeymaekers (2009) on 
the informal cross-border trade, while economic analysis of the DRC state 
over the past decade is largely missing.44   
 
Having the above points in mind, this chapter sets out to analyse the nature of 
the conflict in the DRC since 1996, with a focus on the Kivu provinces in the 
east. The two wars in the DRC are ‘complex hybrid wars combining civil war, 
inter-state war, and cross-border insurgencies’ and arose from the 1994 
Rwandan genocide (Carayannis 2003: 232). They are closely related to the 
historical events of its neighbouring countries, particularly those of Rwanda, 
and this chapter provides a brief chronology of events between 1996 and 
2008 with a focus on North and South Kivu, in relation primarily to Rwanda. 
Before reviewing the two wars, the chapter also presents a brief history of the 
DRC prior to the conflict and introduces several underlying issues in this 
region: ethnicity, identity, migration and citizenship, and how these elements 
have been associated with access to local resources, specifically land, rights 
and security for the people in the region. These elements, which have been 
shaped throughout history, have created a complex context in which the 
conflict in the DRC can be understood. Subsequently, the chapter examines 
the two wars: the first ‘war of liberation’ from 1996 to 1997, and the second 
war from 1998 to 2003, and the continuing conflict thereafter in the eastern 
DRC resulting from the failure of the peace process.  
 
                                                          
44 However, there exists a substantial study of the economy of the colonial period by 
Hochschild (1999) and of the Mobutu era by Young and Turner (1985). Some economic 
analyses are available from the policy community such as the international financial 
institutions, the UN and NGOs, as national statistics from the DRC state have been largely 
unavailable for more than a decade (Putzel et al. 2008).   
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Accounts on the history and events of the DRC are always conflicting and 
contentious, reflecting strong vested interests and different world views held 
by various actors. By following events in the eastern DRC, this chapter 
illuminates the overriding context at the local level that is embedded in 
historical, social, economic, political and cultural relations in the region. In so 
doing, the chapter examines various conflicting interpretations of events and 
perspectives rather than reconciling these different views.  
  
4.1. Brief history prior to 1965  
 
The history of the DRC has been largely shaped by external interests and 
intervention. The DRC45 experienced a brutal rule and exploitation of its 
natural resources, particularly that of rubber, through forced labour of the 
indigenous population, by King Léopold II of Belgium after 1885 (Hochschild 
1999; Bate 2004). When international pressure intensified against unfolding 
atrocities in what was his personal property, known as the Congo Free State, 
the state was annexed to Belgium in 1908 (Hochschild 1999). It is estimated 
that 10 million people, half of the population in the country, died during King 
Léopold’s rule (ibid.).  
 
The colonial administration by the Belgian state was no better than King 
Léopold’s rule and employed an extremely discriminative system, based on 
race. The Belgian Congo was governed by the infamous colonial trinity of the 
state, the Catholic Church and large corporations, particularly the mining 
companies (Martelli 1962; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). In 1916, Belgium first 
occupied, then in 1921, took over the administration of Ruanda-Urundi 
(present Rwanda and Burundi) of German East Africa through a League of 
Nations mandate, after Germany’s defeat in the First World War (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002). The Belgian administration governed the Belgian Congo and 
Ruanda-Urundi together, as Le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi, with a 
single army and a single governor-general in Kinshasa. It applied the 
                                                          
45 The Kingdom of Kongo (1400 - 1914), which at its peak was the largest state in western 
Central Africa, covered what are now northern Angola, part of the DRC and part of the 
Republic of Congo (BBC n.d.). See 
www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/10chapter2.shtml.  
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aforementioned colonial trinity to this entity to seek ‘to impose its hegemony 
through paternalism, white supremacy and administratively enforced ethnic 
divisions among Africans’, and thereby built the basis of ethnic identity politics 
in Rwanda and Burundi (ibid: 217).  
 
In the Kivus, peasantisation and peripheralisation were imposed throughout 
the colonial period, by creating plantations in fertile areas without developing 
infrastructures to connect the region to the rest of the country (Sosne 1979). A 
framework for exploitation of the peasants was established through this 
process in which local traditional authorities, as intermediaries for the colonial 




The DRC received independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, following 
the upsurge of a continent-wide anti-colonial movement, and held its first 
parliamentary elections. The Belgian rule had largely excluded Congolese 
from administrative roles and did not try to develop a capable political class 
amongst the Congolese.46 In addition, owing to the highly discriminative 
system used during the Belgian rule, the number of Congolese with university 
degrees at the time of independence was only nine. Allegedly, Belgium 
deliberately granted independence hastily to ensure the failure of the newly 
independent country (Pare 2000) and allowed only six months for them to 
prepare for independence, in contrast to the ten years given to Nigeria 
(Davidson 1984). In the newly formed government, represented by Joseph 
Kasavubu as the first president and Patrice Lumumba as the first prime 
minister, only three out of thirty-two cabinet members had university degrees 
(ibid.). 
 
Within two weeks of independence, the country went through nationwide 
armed rebellions and secessionist movements in Katanga and South Kasai. 
The Katangan secessionist movement led, by Moise Tshombe in September 
                                                          
46 See BBC (2010b) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/10449507.stm. 
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1960, triggered the so-called Congo Crisis. The new Congolese state 
immediately requested the UN to intervene to re-establish the sovereign state. 
The UN responded with the deployment of troops, which numbered up to 
20,000 by the time of its withdrawal in 1964 (ICG n.d.). At the same time, in 
the Cold War context and in a country of such size, wealth and geopolitical 
importance, the West feared that Lumumba would seek support from the 
Soviet Union (Young and Turner 1985; Pare 2000; Peck 2000; Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002; ISS c2008; ICG n.d.), as he was perceived to be communist 
despite his denial (Pare 2000; Peck 2000). Consequently, Patrice Lumumba 
was arrested by the army and eventually assassinated in 1961, allegedly with 
the involvement of the CIA, Belgian soldiers and Moise Tshombe (Pare 2000; 
Peck 2000; ISS c2008). During this crisis, the then UN Secretary General, 
Dag Hammarskjöld, was killed in a plane crash. 
 
4.2. Rise and fall of Mobutu 
 
Colonel Joseph Mobutu was a political creation of the USA. He was seen ‘as 
a reliable client in a state which was key to Western Cold War strategy in 
Africa’, and was supported chiefly by the USA, France and Belgium (McNulty 
1999: 58). Taking advantage of the extreme instability in the country, Mobutu 
initiated a successful coup in November 1965, with the support of a CIA agent, 
who was also implicated in the assassination of Lumumba (Young and Turner 
1985; Pare 2000; Peck 2000; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Mobutu established a 
centralised administration system based on horizontal elite networks and 
attempted to reduce the power of local networks and traditional authorities, 
who had gained power during the colonial period (Young and Turner 1985; 
Putzel et al. 2008). In creating his networks, he selected representatives of 
ethnic groups that he could take advantage of due to their vulnerable political 
and social status as minorities (Jackson 2007). In relation to the eastern DRC, 
he chose the Congolese Tutsi minority for his elite networks (ibid.).     
 
Mobutu implemented some major reforms during his time. In 1966, Mobutu 
passed the Bakajika Law to transfer the ownership of all land and mineral 
rights to the state, in order to solve intrinsic conflicts between the land law 
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system based on individual land ownership that was established during the 
colonial period and the customary system of land tenure (Meditz and Merrill 
1993). In 1971, Mobutu introduced an authenticity campaign, Authenticité, 
reflecting the African nationalism of the day, whereby the country was 
renamed Zaïre and Mobutu became Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu wa Za 
Banga (‘the all-powerful warrior who, because of his endurance and inflexible 
will to win, will go from conquest to conquest, leaving fire in his wake’) 
(History.com n.d.). Land was also nationalised to underpin the 1966 Bakajika 
Law mentioned above, which sent a ‘strong signal to traditional authorities 
who presided over rural lands through customary rights’ (Putzel et al. 2008: 
v). 
 
In 1973, Mobutu initiated a Zairianisation campaign, Radicalisation or 
Zairianisation, thereby nationalising all foreign-owned businesses. This 
process appeared to have helped Mobutu and his political elite patrons to gain 
control of the nationalised businesses for their benefit (Young and Turner 
1985) and to personalise both private and public funds, resulting in a 
notorious kleptocracy (ISS c2008). A new land law, the General Property Law, 
was also enacted to enable purchases of individual land rights from the state, 
which officially owned all lands (Meditz and Merrill 1993).47 The 1971 and 
1973 laws, nevertheless, did not abolish the indigenous customary law; and 
individual land rights could be obtained from the state or through the 
customary land rights, but the future status of ownership of the land remained 
unclear (ibid.). The 1973 Zairianisation and the land law were tools for 
consolidating Mobutu’s patronage system by ‘constantly converting economic 
assets into a stock of political resources for distribution against political loyalty’ 
(Van Acker 2005: 88). During these periods, Mobutu made significant 
achievements in delivering public goods, including the provision of education 
and primary health care. 
 
4.2.1. Economic collapse 
                                                          
47 See Van Acker (2005) for a detailed analysis on the impact of the 1973 Land Law in the 
eastern DRC and the section 3.3. Ethnicity, citizenship and land in this thesis, which shows 
how this law is associated with the issue of ethnicity and citizenship.      




Zaïre went through an economic crisis and was in a constant state of decline 
after 1974, when there was a price collapse for copper, which was the 
country’s main source of income (Young and Turner 1985; Putzel et al. 2008). 
The decreased copper price affected state revenues directly, through 
nationalised mining companies, and impacted economic and social 
development thereafter (Nest 2006b). The country defaulted on debt 
payments to the international financial institutions and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) commissioned a report in 1981 which critically pointed 
out widespread corruption and Mobutu’s inability to distinguish between 
personal property and state property (Young and Turner 1985). Consequently, 
foreign investment was invited back into the country. However, the country 
continued to default on debt payments and the economy continued to decline 
(ISS c2008). As in other developing countries, Zaïre was also forced to 
implement reforms in order to overcome the budget deficits through structural 
adjustment programmes prescribed by the IMF (Zeilig 2009). Mobutu partially 
implemented the reforms, by cutting expenditure in ‘non-productive’ sectors 
such as health and education (ibid.).  
 
The effect of the economic collapse was, hence, significant (Zeilig 2009). The 
country’s infrastructure almost entirely disintegrated, which also negatively 
affected agricultural production. The civil servants and soldiers were poorly 
and irregularly paid. A large number of professionals and skilled workers, who 
had lost jobs, left the country and emigrated to South Africa. Moreover, 
inflation dramatically reduced the value of the meagre earnings of the 
population. The population was increasingly living at subsistence level, and 
the informal economy expanded as the formal economy collapsed. 
 
Given the shrinking national budgets, Mobutu was forced to abandon the 
horizontal elite networks and instead formed ‘vertical networks based on 
ethnic and regional affiliation’ to maintain his power (Putzel et al. 2008: vi). 
This shift in his strategy eventually gave rise to regional strongmen or 
‘warlords’ in the context of a growing informal economy, who gained control 
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over production and trade through their connection with Mobutu and control of 
coercive forces (Nest 2006b; Reno 1998).  
 
4.2.2. The end of the Cold War and the failed democratic transition    
 
Mobutu was previously supported by France, Belgium and the USA as a 
guarantor of stability (McNulty 1999). Amongst them, France had been a 
strong military supporter of Zaïre for more than two decades, especially during 
the 1970s when competition between the superpowers over the 
decolonisation of Angola, Mozambique, and white-ruled Rhodesia and South 
Africa was intense (McNulty 1999). Mobutu strategically used this backdrop to 
make himself indispensable (Young and Turner 1985). The end of the Cold 
War, however, resulted in major changes in the treatment of Africa, and saw 
the withdrawal of financial and diplomatic support by the superpowers in the 
early 1990s. In this context, France and Belgium changed their stance and 
urged Mobuto to step down, while the USA still considered Mobuto as being 
able to maintain national unity in Zaïre (McNulty 1999).  
 
This significant change in international relations, combined with growing 
pressure for multi-party democracy from both the international community and 
domestically through riots and protests, pushed Mobutu to accept multi-party 
democracy in 1990 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Following a round of ‘popular 
consultations’ throughout the country that resulted in blunt calls for the end of 
the Mobutu regime, Mobutu announced the end of the Second Republic to 
begin a transitional phase on 24 April 1990. For this transitional phase, he 
pledged to introduce: a multi-party system with three parties including his own 
party; a separation of the party and state; a transitional government for one 
year; the drafting of a new constitution; and the revival of the three-tiered 
traditional authorities,48 leading to democratic elections at all levels.       
 
This also signalled the beginning of political turmoil and crisis, or the failed 
democratic transition, owing to the problem of leadership in the opposition 
                                                          
48 See the structure of traditional authorities in the section 4.3. Ethnicity, citizenship and land. 
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(Zeilig 2009) and Mobutu’s manipulation to weaken the opposition (Lanotte 
2010). The USA, with the belief that Mobutu would be able to maintain 
national unity, asserted that the opposition must agree to share power with 
Mobutu and facilitated the process for democratic elections through the 
Conférence Nationale Souveraine (CNS, Sovereign National Conference) 
(McNulty 1999). Mobutu, being favoured, made every attempt to sabotage the 
transition by manipulating the existing divisions (Jackson 2007) and the CNS. 
He also maintained significant powers, including control of the security 
systems and central ministries, through his divide-and-rule strategies (Wrong 
2001; Zeilig 2009). Furthermore, he suppressed protests with violent means, 
including the Lubumbashi massacre in 1990.49   
 
After some upheavals, Étienne Tshisekedi, the leader of the main opposition 
party, Union Sacrée, was elected transitional prime minister and appointed a 
transitional Government of National Unity in August 1992 (Zeilig 2009). 
Mobutu unsuccessfully attempted to suspend the Tshisekedi government 
(ibid.) and the international community, particularly the USA and France, 
rejected the democratically elected government and supported Mobutu 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). The international community, hence, did ‘not 
recognis[e] these decisions as sovereign and binding on all parties’ and 
ignored the outcomes of the CNS (ibid.: 1). When the momentum for the 
democratic transition was lost, partly owing to the serious leadership problem 
and disorientation of the political class and social forces, the country went into 
a deeper crisis (Zeilig 2009). There was, thus, no viable political opposition by 
1996 but there remained poverty and insecurity for the population (ibid.).  
 
The subsequent rebellion by Laurent Kabila between 1996 and 1997 was 
welcomed within this context, and was made possible with the political and 
military backing of Rwanda, Uganda and Angola, rather than by his political 
competence (Lemarchand 1997). Furthermore, ethnic conflict started in North 
Kivu in 1993, which was exacerbated by the aftermath of the 1994 Rwanda 
                                                          
49 Dozens of students at the University of Lubumbashi, who were demonstrating against the 
continuing dictatorship by Mobutu, were killed by security forces on 11 May 1990, and their 
bodies disappeared (Zeilig 2009). This provoked economic sanctions internationally and 
facilitated the economic collapse of the Mobutu regime (Takeuchi 1997).    
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genocide. It is essential to review this local conflict and its context which have 
been the underlying issues behind the protracted conflict in the eastern DRC. 
Before proceeding to examine the two Congo Wars, the next section sheds 
light on the critical link between ethnicity, citizenship and land, which 
produced marginalisation, inequality and insecurity, leading to the unfolding 
conflict in the eastern DRC.          
 
4.3. Ethnicity, citizenship and land   
  
Ethnicity has been politically manipulated in the DRC, through its relation to 
citizenship, in civic terms, ‘as a consequence of membership of the central 
state’ as well as in ethnic terms, ‘as a result of membership in the Native 
Authority’ (Mamdani 1998: 2–4).50 While many studies recognise ethnicity as 
a critical element behind the conflict in the eastern DRC (e.g. Mamdani 2001; 
Vlassenroot 2002; Armstrong and Rubin 2005; Jackson 2007; Clark 2008), it 
is vital to explore how the Banyarwanda,51 people of Rwandan origin, became 
deprived of both their civic and ethnic citizenship (Mamdani 1998; 2001).52 
Moreover, it is even more pertinent to appreciate the profound issue of access 
to land through citizenship. Land is a vital source of livelihood in the densely 
populated areas in the eastern DRC (Sosne 1979; Van Acker 2005: Turner 
2007) and hence, is ‘the single most important local economic resource’ 
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2005: 9). The commodification of land 
through the 1973 land law led to a shifting pattern of inequality and distortion 
of the existing patrimonial systems (Van Acker 2005).  
 
                                                          
50 According to Mamdani (1998), these parallel citizenships derive from the two legal regimes 
of the colonial period: racialised civic authority and ethnicised customary Native Authority. 
While the civic authority was de-racialised at independence, the Native Authority became 
further embedded within the ethnic context and remained as a means to control the majority 
of the rural population, even when the state was perceived to have collapsed. See also 
Mamdani (2001). 
51 The prefix, ‘banya’ means literally ‘people from’ (Clark 2008).  
52 Turner (2007) provides detailed accounts on local politics and identity in the eastern DRC. 
Clark (2008) illustrates a similar fate of refugees and migrants from Rwanda in Uganda. Their 
citizenship status was precarious and vulnerable, and influenced by political developments in 
Uganda. The attack on Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which resulted in the 
Rwandan civil war in 1990, was initially formed by the Rwandan refugees in Uganda and is 
considered to have been triggered by the passage of the 1990 land bill that prohibited land 
ownership by non-citizens, specifically by Rwandan refugees and their children.  
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Map 1: Population density map for year 200053 
 
 
Civic citizenship is deeply associated with issues, including migration, access 
to land, resources, and entitlements and security, whereas ethnic citizenship 
has been intricately connected to changing relationships under the Native 
Authority system, which profoundly shapes the local socio-political context 
(Mamdani 1998; 2001). The three-tiered Native Authority in Kivu consists of a 
chief of the locality at the lowest level, the Chef de Groupement and the 
Mwami of the Collectivité at the highest level (Mamdani 1998: 9). ‘Non-
indigenous’ people generally have only the chief of the locality from amongst 
their own ranks, whereas ‘indigenous’ people have the right to a Chef de 
Groupement and a Mwami of the Collectivité from their own ranks. This 
difference in the entitlement to the Native Authority has been crucial as only 
                                                          
53 United Nations Environment Programme /Global Resource Information Database 
(UNEP/GRID) and Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN), 
Columbia University NY, available from: http://na.unep.net/globalpop/africa/Appendix_6e.html 
[Accessed 23 June 2010]. 
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the Chef de Groupement and the Mwami of the Collectivité have the 
customary authority in administration and to verify ethnic belonging, issue 
identity cards, distribute customary land for livelihood and deliver customary 
justice.  
 
Similarly, ethnicity has been used deliberately to manipulate fear and support 
in Rwanda and Burundi, leading to violent conflict and refugee flows to 
neighbouring states (Evans 1997; Mamdani 2001).54 Each violent event 
associated with political development in Rwanda and Burundi, both very small 
poor countries with some of the highest population densities in Africa, created 
new refugee flows to neighbouring countries, thereby influencing political 
developments in host countries and provoking a chain of violence, 
accompanied by impunity (Evans 1997; Takeuchi 2006). Turning points in the 
region included: the ‘social revolution’ of the Hutu, led by Grégoire Kayibanda 
in Rwanda between 1959 and 1962; the assassination of Prince Rwagasore 
in Burundi in 1961; the massacres and purges of the Hutu middle class in 
1972 after which Tutsi became dominant in Burundi; the killing of Tutsi 
following the coup by Juvénal Habyarimana in Rwanda in 1973; and the brutal 
crushing of a Hutu uprising in Burundi in 1988 (Evans 1997; Lemarchand 
1997). As a result, about half of the Tutsi population, or some 480,000 
Rwandan Tutsi had become refugees in neighbouring countries by the 1980s, 
and 240,000 Hutu had left Burundi (Evans 1997). The presence of these 
refugees in the host countries lead to rumour, violence and reprisal (ibid.). 
 
This section primarily focuses on people of Rwandan origin, given their 
influence on the subsequent conflict in eastern the DRC. The population in the 
eastern DRC broadly consists of two groups: the autochtones or often-called 
the ‘indigenous’, ‘who trace their lineage to groups which lie entirely within the 
territorial domain of present day’ DRC and the Banyarwanda or the 
Rwandophone, whose heritage traces back to Rwanda (Reed 1998: 143). The 
Banyarwanda are ‘first and foremost a cultural identity, speakers of a common 
                                                          
54 ‘Conventional wisdom in Goma and Bukavu [the provincial capital of North Kivu and South 
Kivu respectively] has it that Kivu Province in the eastern DRC is where losers in Rwanda 
traditionally end up, and it is from Kivu that they prepare to return to power in Rwanda’ 
(Mamdani 2001: 234).  
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language, Kinyarwanda’ (Mamdani 2002: 494).55 Since independence, 
citizenship law, ‘although theoretically “national” and “objective”, was, in fact, 
completely political and driven by the need to deal with the Rwandophone 
population of the east’ (Prunier 2009: 457). Given the politically sensitive 
nature of citizenship for the Banyarwanda and different identities that are 
socially constructed, accounts of the origin of the Banyarwanda vary 
depending on the source (Clark 2008). While there have been successive 
waves of migration in the region throughout history, they are not well recorded, 
and different groups remember, interpret and re-imagine their collective 
history in different ways (Vlassenroot 2002; Clark 2008).  
 
Generally, the Banyarwanda consist of those who migrated to the DRC long 
before the colonial period (Lemarchand 1997), those who belong to the DRC 
because of colonial division (Mamdani 1998; 2001),56 as labour supply to the 
agricultural plantations and mining centres through colonial promotion 
(Lemarchand 1997; Mamdani 1998; 2001; Huggins et al. 2005),57 and those 
who arrived as refugees from the political violence in Rwanda in the early 
1960s (Lemarchand 1997). The time when the first settlers from Rwanda 
arrived in the eastern DRC has been debated widely and controversially; 
however, some Rwandan pastoralists, who arrived in South Kivu in the end of 
the 19th century, are generally thought to be the first settlers (Mamdani 2001; 
Vlassenroot 2002).58 The early pastoralist migrants had settled in the high 
plains and received permission from the colonial administration to occupy 
further south of the high plateau (Mamdani 2001). The colonial labour 
migrants had settled in urban areas, and the refugees settled in refugee 
camps (ibid.). 
                                                          
55 Kinyarwanda is ‘a language spoken by the Banyarwanda tribe, and exactly the same 
whether spoken by Hutu or Tutsi’ (Prunier 2009: 368) and some scholars depict these people, 
who speak Kinyarwanda, Rwandophone. Mamdani (1998) states that although they were 
historically divided into three groups based on territories, the division between Hutu and Tusti 
was not essential until about 1996.  
56 Jackson (2007: 483 - 484) claims that the borders between the eastern DRC, Burundi and 
Rwanda are not as artificial as many other borders in Africa and ‘roughly follows what was 
once one amongst several “African frontiers”.’ However, there was the westward expansion of 
Rwanda prior to colonial period though being partial and tentative. 
57The colonial administration ‘was aware it risked upsetting the delicate intercommunal 
balance’ by supplying labour from Rwanda and was, at the same time, reducing the 
demographic pressure in Rwanda (Jackson 2007: 484).  
58 Jackson (2007) claims it was by the middle of the 19th century.  




There were also three generally distinct groups based on territories amongst 
the Banyarwanda: the Banyaruchuru and the Banyamasisi in North Kivu, and 
the Banyamulenge in South Kivu (Mamdani 1998; 2001). While the 
Banyaruchuru and the Banyamasisi were mostly Hutu, the Banyamulenge 
were Tutsi. In addition, the Hutu of Ruchuru had their own Native Authority as 
they were classified as ‘indigenous’, whereas the ‘indigenous’ status of the 
Hutu of Masisi had been contested and the Tutsi of Mulenge never had their 
own Native Authority (ibid.). The Banyamulenge were called ‘Pastoralists of 
Itombwe’ or ‘Tutsi of Itombwe’ from the name of the place they had settled, or 
‘Banyaruanda’ during the colonial period (Jackson 2007). They changed their 
name to ‘Banyamulenge’ around the 1960s/1970s in order to claim indigenous 
status to qualify for social and political entitlements by distinguishing 
themselves from Rwanda (Vlassenroot 2002) and the latecomers (Jackson 
2007). However, this strategy of shifting their identity from ethnicity 
(Rwandan) to the territory (the hill of Mulenge), hence making them 
indigenous, backfired against them in their claim for citizenship following the 
exclusive citizenship law in 1981 (Jackson 2007), mentioned later. It also 
created suspicions and perceptions within the ‘indigenous’ communities about 
the Banyamulenge that they had been trying to cover their real identity 
(Vlassenroot 2002) with a ‘counterfeit identity’, making for ‘doubtful nationality’ 
in the foreseeable future (Jackson 2007).      
 
The autochtones formed the majority of the population throughout the eastern 
DRC, apart from some parts in North Kivu, particularly Masisi, although the 
Banyarwanda in Masisi were still subject to pay customary tribute to the 
Native Authority, the indigenous local chiefs (Reed 1998). This caused the 
first major rebellion against the local chiefs at independence, the Guerre des 
Kinyarwanda in North Kivu, marking the start of local conflict (Huggins et al. 
2005). While the Banyarwanda were accepted as Congolese at 
independence,59 the citizenship of the minority Banyarwanda became very 
                                                          
59 The Banyarwanda were allowed to participate in the provincial and municipal elections both 
as voters and candidates in 1960, and this suggests that they were accepted as Congolese at 
independence (Mamdani 1998).    
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sensitive after this event and their status was not determined in the 
Fundamental Law60 (Mamdani 1998).  
 
There were three essential decisions on citizenship during the Mobutu regime, 
in 1972, 1981 and 1991, explained in the following sections. When massacres 
and purges of the Hutu middle class occurred in Burundi in 1972, thousands 
of Burundian refugees flooded into eastern Zaïre. This new arrival of a large 
number of refugees created fear amongst the ‘indigenous’ Congolese, and 
they responded by pressuring the existing Banyarwanda minority (Mamdani 
1998; 2001). In response, Mobutu enacted a citizenship decree in 1972 to 
secure the status of the Banyarwanda minority. The 1972 citizenship decree 
extended citizenship to the Banyarwanda population, who had come as 
refugees from Rwanda in 1959–60.  
 
Mobutu used this decree to marginalise traditional authorities in order to 
consolidate the centralised horizontal networks of elites, which strategically 
included the vulnerable Tutsi Banyarwanda minority (Putzel et al. 2008). 
However, the decree was considered to be signed under the influence of 
Bisengimana, a Chef de Cabinet, one of the 1959 Rwandan Tutsi refugees 
(Mamdani 1998: 2001). The decision was, therefore, perceived as 
representing a rise in power of the Tutsi Banyarwanda minority by the 
‘indigenous’ Congolese and the other Banyarwanda population, who had 
arrived earlier than 1959 and were mainly Hutu, and this led to division 
between Hutu and Tutsi in the Banyarwanda communities in eastern Zaïre 
(ibid.). 
 
During this period, a critical decision to commodify land was made in 1973, as 
mentioned in the previous section. The 1973 land law introduced individual 
land ownership, by removing the existing customary ownership of land, and 
permitted the purchase of any land that was not titled (Huggins et al. 2005). 
Notwithstanding the official ownership of all the lands by the state, pre-
existing customary land rights were still valid on the ground; and individual 
                                                          
60 The Fundamental Law states that ‘the Congolese people will themselves decide this issue’ 
(Mamdani 1998: 5). 
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land rights could also be attained through indigenous customary law while the 
future land tenure was not assured (Meditz and Merrill 1993). Moreover, 
registration of privately owned land was mostly incomplete, which caused land 
disputes largely from uncertain land tenures (ibid.). Following the enactment 
of this law, ‘indigenous’ ‘peasants rushed to register small family plots to 
secure their tenancy’ through which the Native Authorities profited from 
customary duties (Sosne 1979: 199), whereas the Banyarwanda started 
buying land on the market since they were denied equal access to land as a 
customary right (Mamdani 1998; Reed 1998; Huggins et al. 2005). An 
analysis of the impact of the 1973 land law in the eastern DRC (Van Acker 
2005) highlights the fact that the introduction of this modern law destroyed the 
traditional patrimonial system that provided social cohesion and public goods 
and hence changed the social structure to allow marginalisation and 
inequality.   
 
The Banyarwanda had acquired large parts of former colonial estates, 
enabled by the 1973 land law, and became prominent in the local economy 
(Huggins et al. 2005; Van Acker 2005; Jackson 2007).61 They were also 
‘rewarded with ministerial posts and newly armed with Zairian citizenship’ 
from the 1972 citizenship decree (Huggins et al. 2005: 2); however, they still 
had to pay customary tributes for the land they owned to the local chiefs of the 
groups to which they did not belong (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Huggins et al. 
2005), without being allowed to have local chiefs of their own (Mamdani 1998; 
2001). Land alienation by the Banyarwanda, however, provoked resentment 
of the ‘indigenous’ population against them, as the Banyarwanda had 
acquired vast land (Jackson 2007). This situation made the Banyarwanda 
make every effort to attain representation in both local and national politics, 
and the ‘indigenous’ population became afraid of the Banyarwanda becoming 
too powerful, and thus opposed citizenship for the Banyarwanda minority 
groups (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Huggins et al. 2005). Under these 
circumstances, the Banyarwanda, especially the Banyamulenge, attempted to 
                                                          
61 For example, in ‘fertile highland areas of Masisi and Rutshuru [in North Kivu], they acquired 
more than 90 per cent of the colonial plantations and some of the biggest ranches’, and this 
action provoked tensions leading to inter-ethnic conflict in Masisi and Rutshuru in 1993 (Van 
Acker 2005: 88).  
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improve their status by linking with international human rights NGOs and, 
although this was seen as expansionist by the ‘indigenous’ population 
(Vlassenroot 2002), sought to access the state organs, particularly in the 
security sector (Huggins et al. 2005).   
 
Given the growing prominence of the Banyarwanda, the ‘indigenous’ majority 
Congolese became aware of the possibility that the Banyarwanda minority 
would gain political power during the legislative elections that took place in 
1977 (Mamdani 1998; 2001). This was also the time when the country’s 
economy had dramatically declined and Mobutu shifted his strategy from a 
centralised administration based on horizontal networks of elites to vertical 
networks of power by strengthening traditional authorities, his divide-and-rule 
strategy (Putzel et al. 2008). In this changing political context, a new exclusive 
citizenship law was passed in 1981 by the parliament which was elected in 
1977 (Mamdani 1998; 2001). The 1981 citizenship law stipulated that 
individuals that could prove that their ancestors had resided in Zaïre prior to 
the colonial partition in 1885 would be eligible to be citizens of Zaïre.  
 
The 1981 citizenship law was decisive for all the Banyarwanda communities, 
as they became treated as a single group despite the different time periods 
and circumstances in which they had come to Zaïre, in part owing to the 
difficulty of finding proof of their heritage (Reed 1998). However, as Prunier 
(2009) pointed out, the citizenship law intended to remove from the 
Banyarwanda the rights to vote and to buy land (Lemarchand 2003). The 
Banyarwanda were only allowed to vote in the 1985 provincial assembly 
elections, but were not permitted to run for office, due to their ambiguous 
status (Mamdani 1998; 2001). North and South Kivu did not see any 
assemblies elected, as a consequence of a physical boycott by the 
Banyarwanda population, particularly by the Tutsi (ibid.).   
 
Based on the 1981 citizenship law, a Mission d'Identification de Zairois au 
Kivu, authorised by Mobutu in 1989, had removed citizenship from many of 
the Tutsi Banyarwanda population (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Vlassenroot 2002), 
or the Banyamulenge, as they were considered to have counterfeited their 
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identity as members of the indigenous population without being able to prove 
it (Jackson 2007). This prompted many young Tutsi Banyarwanda to join the 
Tutsi-dominated rebel group based in Uganda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF) when the RPF began attacking the Hutu-governed Rwanda during the 
Rwandan civil war which started in October 1990.62 Thus, when the CNS 
started in 1991, citizenship had already been a hugely contentious issue 
(Mamdani 1998). The Banyarwanda were, nonetheless, excluded from the 
CNS and were facing possible further marginalisation by losing their 
citizenship status. The Hutu Banyarwanda communities responded to this 
crisis by forming organisations to oppose marginalisation, for example, the 
Mutuelle des Agriculteurs et Eleveurs du Virunga (Magrivi, Farmers and 
Livestock Raisers Cooperative of Virunga) (Reed 1998). Magrivi protested 
their exclusion from the 1991 CNS and proposed the suspension of 
customary tributes to local chiefs. In responding to the requests of the 
delegates from North and South Kivu to review the 1981 citizenship law, the 
CNS discussed the citizenship issue and adopted a resolution to endorse the 
1981 citizenship law (Mamdani 1998).  
 
This resolution by the CNS had a significant impact on polarisation between 
the ‘indigenous’ majority and the ‘non-indigenous’ Banyarwanda minority 
(ibid.). In 1993, roughly half of the population of about 3.5 million in North Kivu 
were considered to be Banyarwanda, consisting of 80 percent Hutu and 20 
percent Tutsi (Lemarchand 2003). The ‘indigenous’ majority felt threatened by 
the increase of the ‘non-indigenous’ Banyarwanda minority through 
successive flows of refugees, and the ‘non-indigenous’ Banyarwanda feared 
being marginalised by the ‘indigenous’ majority (Mamdani 1998). Amongst the 
‘non-indigenous’ Banyarwanda minority, the Tutsi Banyarwanda were 
increasingly seen as one single group and the term ‘Banyamulenge’ became 
‘a generic term for all Congolese Tutsi’, which made the Tutsi Banyarwanda 
                                                          
62 The Rwandan civil war was a conflict between the Rwandan government led by a Hutu 
president, Habyarimana, and the rebel group, the RPF. It started on 1 October 1990 when the 
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA, the military arm of the RPF) invaded Rwanda, and officially 
ended on 4 August 1993 when the Arusha Accords were signed. For more details, see 
Prunier (1995) and Clark (2008) for example. 
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population aware of the similar situation for all Tutsi despite their different 
backgrounds (ibid.: 8).     
 
Mobutu’s shifting strategy (favouring and empowering the Banyarwanda and 
then marginalising them through the manipulation of citizenship and 
commodification of land) shaped the issues around land in this highly 
populated and land-scarce region (Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern DRC) 
(Mamdani 1998). After the 1973 land law, there were two ways of acquiring 
land: through a market transaction (for those who had resources) and through 
‘asserting one’s “customary” rights as a member of a Native Authority’ (ibid.: 
14). The latter was political, and was the only option for the poor. The socio-
political impact from Mobutu’s strategy eventually led to conflict in Masisi, 
North Kivu, in 1993. The conflict was initially over access to land between 
poor Hutu and rich Hutu, and then turned into an inter-ethnic war in Masisi 
and Walikale, over ‘who was entitled to customary rights to land through a 
customary authority’ between the ‘indigenous’ Bahunde and Banyanga and 
the ‘non-indigenous’ Banyarwanda (Lemarchand 1997; 2003; Mamdani 1998; 
2001; Reed 1998).63 The conflict killed about 10,000 and displaced some 
250,000 within six months (Lemarchand 1997);64 and the violence was halted 
by troops sent by Mobutu (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Reed 1998).  
 
It is within this context that about 50,000 Burundian refugees from the 
Burundian Civil War arrived mainly in South Kivu in late 1993 and roughly one 
million Hutu refugees moved in following the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The 
arrival of the Hutu refugees from the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the 
formation of the armed refugee camps in the area significantly transformed 
the nature of this ethnic crisis in the eastern DRC, by adding the division 
between Hutu and Tutsi amongst the Banyarwanda to the inter-ethnic conflict 
between the Banyarwanda and the ‘indigenous’ population (Reed 1998). The 
                                                          
63 As the Native Authorities played a key role in the sale of land, they appear to have shifted 
the focus of the conflict to ethnic discourse, in order to avoid blame for selling land to ‘non-
indigenous’ population (Huggins et al. 2005).  
64 The estimates vary depending on the source. For example, Reed (1998) estimates 
between 14,000 and 40,000 deaths and the displacement of 350,000 in 1993 alone.  
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subsequent section highlights this process by examining the impact of the 
1994 genocide in Rwanda. 
 
4.4. Rwandan genocide and its impact  
 
The 1994 genocide in Rwanda was the ‘defining moment in the history of the 
region during the 1990s’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 216). This event was ‘a 
logical outcome of an ideology and a politics of exclusion that had generated 
earlier episodes of large-scale massacres and the flight of Rwandans of Tutsi 
origin into exile’ and was rooted in ‘the history of ethnic identity construction 
and mobilization under colonial rule’ (ibid.).65 For Mobutu, who was barely 
clinging to power after losing importance in Cold War terms, the event was an 
opportunity to show his supporters the strategic importance of Zaïre, 
particularly France (McNulty 1999), which continued to support Mobutu 
through his personal relationship with the Mitterand family (ISS c2008). 
Consequently, France and Zaïre played a critical role in supporting the former 
Rwandan government, led by the Hutu president, Habyarimana, to fight the 
RPF and to re-establish themselves in eastern Zaïre through two interventions 
during the Rwandan civil war.  
 
The first intervention occurred in 1990, when Mobutu provided his forces, 
Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ, Zairian Armed Forces), for the French-led 
intervention in Rwanda, Opération Noroît, in order to defend the Habyarimana 
government from the RPF attacks. However, Habyarimana asked Mobutu to 
withdraw his forces because the FAZ was causing chaos by looting and 
raping Rwandan civilians rather than defending them (Reed 1998; McNulty 
1999). French troops were also sent to Rwanda, supposedly to train the 
Rwandan army, Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR, Rwandese Armed 
Forces), and protect foreign nationals, but they were accused of being directly 
involved in the fighting and supporting the FAR (Reed 1998). 
 
                                                          
65 A similar interpretation is offered by several scholars, including Lemarchand (1997). 
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In Opération Turquoise in 1994, France intervened in the nearly completed 
genocide in Rwanda through eastern Zaïre, assisted by Mobutu, and 
ostensibly aimed to stop the genocide, protect refugees and hand them over 
to the UN, following accordance with the French-drafted UN mandate 
(McNulty 1999). Despite the Arusha Accords signed in 199366 and a 
comprehensive arms embargo,67 France continued to equip the former 
Rwandan government (Reed 1998). This intervention, however, did not 
achieve the objective of France, which was to prevent the RPF victory and 
force the RPF to share power with the former Rwandan government (McNulty 
1999). France, instead, facilitated the movement of the defeated FAR and 
Interahamwe,68 often called the génocidaires,69 into a safe humanitarian zone 
that they had created, and helped them move into exile in eastern Zaïre 
together with portions of the Rwandese population (Prunier 1995; McNutly 
1999). They also helped the former Rwandan government maintain their well-
equipped troops and key command structure, and allegedly re-armed them in 
refugee camps if they had been disarmed (Reed 1998). France has lost 
credibility for its interventions from this operation (McNulty 1999). 
 
Estimates of the number of Rwandan refugees who flooded into eastern Zaïre 
in 1994 and remained there vary depending on the source, in part because 
their presence was highly political (Lemarchand 1997). They range from 
800,000 (Reuters AlertNet n.d.) to 1.7 million (Prunier 1998). Over half a 
million refugees also escaped to Tanzania but the former Rwandan 
government was less influential there owing to more effective control of the 
camps by Tanzanian authorities (Reed 1998). The Rwandan refugees 
                                                          
66 The Arusha Accords (or the Arusha Peace Agreement, or the Arusha negotiations) to bring 
an end to the Rwandan civil war were signed in Arusha, Tanzania, on 4 August 1993 by the 
Rwandan government, led by President Habyarimana, and the RPF, as a result of talks 
between 12 July 1992 and 24 June 1993, with the support of the USA, France and the 
Organization of African Unity. It included a set of five protocols. See UN Peacemaker (1993). 
67 UN Security Council Resolution 918 (1994) was applied to both the Rwandan government 
and the RPF. See UNSC (1994). 
68 The Rwandan government, led by president Habyarimana, described the youth movement 
of his single party, Interahamwe, as ‘[t]hose who work together’ (Prunier 1995: 367-368). 
Interahamwe was ‘the first civilian militia, officially created for tasks of social interest’, and was 
‘later the main perpetrators of the genocide’ (ibid.). 
69 The French word, génocidaires, was initially merely descriptive to mean ‘[t]hose who 
committed the genocide’, but has attained political connotation to suggest ‘people who had 
not taken part in the genocide but who were considered hostile to the new regime’ (Prunier 
2009: xxi).  
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arguably took virtually everything from Rwanda when they fled, including the 
military capacity as mentioned earlier, skilled and educated human resources, 
and state-owned assets that were located both domestically and abroad (ibid.).  
 
The former Rwandan authorities effectively controlled the refugee camps in 
eastern Zaïre, which were located along the border with Rwanda and Burundi 
(Prunier 1998; Reed 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Moreover, they continued 
to promote the genocidal ideology and organised cross-border attacks on 
Rwanda (ibid.), in order to reconquer Rwanda and complete the genocide 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). In addition to the full state treasury and the entire 
military capacity brought from Rwanda, they controlled the movement of 
goods and services in the camps, including information and humanitarian 
assistance, and established a military structure of about 50,000 soldiers under 
the command of political leaders by early 1995 (Reed 1998). 
 
This creation of a mini state of the former Rwandan government within 
eastern Zaïre provided strategic importance to Mobutu, who had lost 
importance in Cold War terms (Reed 1998). Zaïre became a key for the 
international community in its effort to address regional instability caused by 
the former Rwandan government in eastern Zaïre. At the same time, Mobutu 
could strengthen his influence through the long-established relationship with 
the former Rwandan authority in eastern Zaïre, where there had been a 
strong opposition to the Zairian state and economic autonomy (ibid.). Zaïre 
therefore played a pivotal role in assisting the former Rwandan government in 
its territory, by ensuring secure passage into and out of its territory, 
guaranteeing residence, and allowing the establishment of military training 
camps (ibid.). Moreover, Zaïre allegedly assisted with supplying the former 
Rwandan government with arms (Evans 1997; Reed 1998). While unpaid 
Zairian soldiers were often involved in arms trafficking for their own survival, 
Zaïre was accused of having facilitated large-scale arms sales through an 
international network of dealers from Britain, China and South Africa. 
 
With this assistance from Zaïre, the former Rwandan government was able to 
pursue a policy of insurgency in Rwanda (Reed 1998). The cross-border 
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attacks from the armed Rwandan refugee camps, which had started in 
October 1994, escalated to several attacks along and distant from the border, 
including the capital, Kigali, and the second largest city, Butare, in 1995. The 
intention of the former Rwandan government to carry out a full-scale invasion 
of Rwanda was revealed, which provoked the new Rwandan regime to fight 
against the former Rwandan government in eastern Zaïre (Evans 1997; Reed 
1998).  
 
The former Rwandan government realised that a quick triumph was not likely 
and shifted its strategy to destabilising the newly formed Rwandan 
government and securing its long-term presence in eastern Zaïre, by linking 
with other forces in the region70 (Reed 1998). More importantly for North Kivu, 
they also decided to use the aforementioned existing local ethnic conflict, 
which had erupted in 1993 between the ‘indigenous’ Congolese population 
and the Banyarwanda, and started attacking the Tutsi Banyarwanda in 
collaboration with the Hutu Banyarwanda, rather than focusing on the 
‘indigenous’ Congolese (ibid.). The violence also increased the tension 
between the Tutsi Banyarwanda and other groups, who feared attacks from 
those Hutu militias from the refugee camps (ibid.). In the face of escalating 
tension, the Native Authority in Kivus started to create their own militia, 
including Mayi Mayi militia71 (Mamdani 1998). Attacks upon the Tutsi 
Banyarwanda escalated further and were joined by those local militias by 
1995 (Lemarchand 1997; Reed 1998; Lanotte 2010) and by the poorly paid 
FAZ troops who allied with the well-resourced former Rwandan government 
(ibid.). The former Rwandan government eventually expanded its operations 
into South Kivu, causing massacres of the Banyamulenge there (Reed 1998), 
and local authorities appropriated property owned by the Banyamulenge in 
the valley (Mamdani 2001). 
 
                                                          
70 For example, the Hutu militia in Burundi, Milton Obote and the northern rebel movements in 
Uganda, and the Sudanese government (Reed 1998). 
71 The name derives from the word ‘Maji (pronounced Mayi in Kivu)’, and means water in 
Kiswahili, referring to ‘the powers claimed for ritually blessed water to render all those on 
whom it is sprinkled immune to the life-destroying effect of bullets’ (Mamdani 2001: 340). The 
Mayi Mayi militia was considered to be based in Masisi and Walikale, consisting of the 
Bahunde and the Batembo, however, ‘Mayi Mayi’ ‘became a generic term for all militias in 
Kivu provinces linked to “indigenous” Native Authorities’ (ibid.: 258).    
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In addition, the Parliament of Transition made a judgement that the 
Banyamulenge and Hutu Banyarwanda were recent refugees and should be 
expelled (Mamdani 2001). The tension reached its peak between March and 
May 1996 when the remaining Banyamulenge from Masisi and Ruchuru were 
identified and taken to the border to Rwanda to move into refugee camps in 
Gisenyi, the border town in Rwanda, following the decision by the parliament 
(Mamdani 1998). By the summer of 1996, the situation had grown 
increasingly serious, as anti-Tutsi violence by the FAZ, the Interahamwe, ex-
FAR and local Hutu militia groups intensified (Prunier 2009) and caused the 
displacement of between 100,000 and 250,000 individuals in Zaïre (Reed 
1998). Many of those had fled to Rwanda and more Banyamulenge joined the 
RPF, which fuelled perceptions amongst the ‘indigenous’ population that they 
were Rwandese (Mamdani 1998). As a result, the entire Tutsi population had 
been displaced from North Kivu by September 1996 (Reed 1998) and 
militarisation of the Banyamulenge and retaliatory offensives increasingly 
ensued (Prunier 2009).  
 
Given that the Zairian state was not functional by this time, the responsibility 
to disarm the Rwandan refugee camps in the Kivus and separate the 
génocidaires from civilians lay with the international community, particularly 
France and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
(Mamdani 1998). There was, however, no political will or policies within the 
international community (Reed 1998).72 The Tutsi population in the DRC were 
particularly dissatisfied with France since they had sent the Rwandan Hutu 
refugees to the eastern DRC but did not disarm them (Sawada 1997). 
Consequently, Zaïre and Rwanda made an agreement to repatriate all 
Rwandan refugees to Rwanda unconditionally and close the refugee camps in 
eastern Zaïre (Reed 1998). For the transitional government of Rwanda, it 
reached the point when it felt it had to take decisive action against the Hutu 
armed refugee camps in the eastern DRC, in the face of the failure of the 
international community to act (Prunier 2009). The crisis eventually resulted in 
the attacking of the refugee camps in October 1996 and the emergence of 
                                                          
72 The international community provided assistance to the armed Hutu refugee camps on 
humanitarian grounds, which in not related to the peace building policies (Shinoda 2006). 
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Laurent Kabila (Lemarchand 1997) to spearhead the first Congo War, which is 
detailed in the following section.    
 
4.5. The first ‘war of liberation’: the rise of Laurent Kabila and the AFDL 
 
The 1996 rebellion led by Laurent Kabila was able to successfully remove 
Mobutu within six months in a ‘war of liberation’, in the context illustrated in 
the previous section. Most importantly, the Mobutu state was faced with 
declining legitimacy and was going through apparent institutional collapse 
(Raeymaekers 2007; Vlassenroot 2008), resulting from failed democratic 
transition and the loss of international support, in addition to economic 
collapse. While the political system had persisted, it was filled by various non-
state actors as ‘state sovereignty had been undergoing a gradual process of 
“informal privatization”’ since the 1980s (Vlassenroot 2008: 2). In this process, 
a ‘fend for yourself attitude’ served as social pact between state and society; 
and ‘de-bureaucratized patrimonialism’ (ibid.: 3) led to increasing autonomy of 
local strongmen (Reno 1998). The state was increasingly governed by those 
informal social and economic networks, which relied on the state to 
consolidate their system of control and distribution (Vlassenroot 2008). This 
became particularly evident in the periphery, such as in the Kivus, where 
various actors could control local resources and trade and challenge the state 
(ibid.). 
 
The suffering of the population from the impact of the economic and 
institutional collapse was devastating. The population was suffering an 
extreme level of poverty, especially at the eastern border, and were surviving 
largely through an informal economy in which they played shifting roles 
(Raeymaekers 2009a). Although the data on the livelihood of the population 
during this time is scarce,73 fieldwork in the eastern DRC (Sawada 1997) 
noted the destructive impact of the state’s decline. For instance: faced with 
the economic collapse and the hyperinflation, teachers at school were not 
paid but were provided with small amounts of cash and palm oil from the 
                                                          
73 Funao (2006) provides accounts on the life of the population in the eastern DRC during his 
research on the Pygmy in 1998. 
Conflicts in the DRC between 1996 and 2008 
115 
 
parents; medical care was only available from some churches; and 
maintenance of roads had stopped in 1993 and many roads became passable 
only by bicycles. The situation was made worse with the insecurity caused by 
the heightened tensions and violence from the citizenship and land issues 
since 1993, which were exacerbated by the rapid militarisation of the area, 
following the formation of the armed Rwandan refugee camps in 1994 and the 
absence of intervention by the international community. Furthermore, tensions 
between Tutsi and Hutu were escalating in the region, owing to the 
Banyamulenge crisis since 1996 and ‘the Burundi factor’ in which many Tutsi 
were massacred during the Burundi Civil War (Prunier 2009).74  
 
The rise of Laurent Kabila and the AFDL 
 
In response to the 1996 Banyamulenge crisis, the RPF veteran 
Banyamulenge started attacks in South Kivu in September 1996, and the 
South Kivu governor asked all Tutsi to leave Zaïre within a week on 7 October 
1996 (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). A full-scale attack began on 13 
October 1996, marking the start of the first Congo War (Reed 1998; 
Lemarchand 2003).  
 
The Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo (AFDL, 
Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo) was formed in 
South Kivu on 18 October 1996. It was a coalition of a group of the 
Banyamulenge, the Alliance Démocratique des Peuples (ADP, Democratic 
Alliance of Peoples),75 an alliance Kabila made with other opposition groups, 
the Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Zaïre, and a small Lumumbist 
guerrilla group in eastern Zaïre, the Conseil National de Résistance pour la 
Démocratie (McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a 
Lumumbist and Marxist from Shaba province, spearheaded the AFDL (Reed 
1998; McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002).  
                                                          
74 The Burundi Civil War was triggered by the assassination of the first democratically elected 
Hutu president, Melchoir Ndadaye, on 22 October 1993. The war prompted violence between 
Tutsi and Hutu, and continued until 2005.  
75 This group, which was created by some ‘Banyamulenge who had returned to Rwanda after 
1994, together with Tutsi from North Kivu in Kigali’, was headed by Déogratias Bugera and 
closely linked to the RPF (Vlassenroot 2002: 509).   




Prior to the formation of the AFDL, Kabila spent most of his time engaging in 
business, including the gold trade in Tanzania, as his previous movement 
through the Marxist People’s Revolutionary Party was unsuccessful and 
dormant (Reed 1998). Kabila appeared to have financed the war effort 
through gold from eastern Zaïre and made contacts and contracts with mining 
and resource companies (Nest 2006b), including De Beers and American 
Mineral Fields (AMF) (Reed 1998). Based on the mining contracts made with 
junior companies such as the AMF, Takeuchi (1997) suggests that the 
rebellion should be considered in terms of a regional dynamism rather than 
interventions by the USA or France. These contacts with commercial 
companies, nonetheless, gave him a label of a typical African warlord rather 
than a revolutionary guerrilla leader (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002).  
 
The AFDL movement quickly and brutally dismantled the Hutu armed refugee 
camps; more than half a million refugees returned to Rwanda (Reed 1998; 
McNulty 1999), while those who were considered to have led the violence fled 
further into Zaïre (Reed 1998). The unpaid and undisciplined FAZ troops, 
allied with the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe, collapsed quickly (McNulty 
1999). The arrival of the AFDL improved the security situation dramatically in 
eastern Zaïre, as the looting by the FAZ had significantly decreased, and was 
welcomed and supported by the majority of the population (Sawada 1997). 
The AFDL swiftly moved westwards to Kinshasa, meeting very little resistance, 
and entered Kinshasa on 17 May 1997 (Nest 2006b). Mobutu had fled just 
before and died in exile in Morocco in September (ibid.). Kabila declared 
himself president and renamed Zaïre the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC).   
 
The AFDL strategically attempted to portray itself as a Congolese rebellion to 
overthrow the dictator Mobutu, which was welcomed by much of the 
population (Reed 1998; McNulty 1999; Mwanasali 2000), despite the fact that 
it was armed, trained and directed chiefly by Rwanda (Reed 1998; McNulty 
1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Lemarchand 2003). Rwanda expressed its 
motivation to take action as its urgent need to address the security threat 
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posed by the Hutu armed refugee camps, and considered that its actions 
were consistent with the goals of Congolese nationalism and the regionally 
shared need to overthrow Mobutu (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). The AFDL 
rebellion, thus, managed to receive support from other countries based on 
regional security imperatives (McNulty 1999).  
 
First of all, Uganda quickly joined the RPF and sent its army, the Uganda 
People’s Defence Force (UPDF) into Zaïre. The Ugandan president, Yoweri 
Museveni, was keen to get rid of Mobutu because Mobutu had allowed 
Ugandan opposition groups to launch attacks on the UPDF from Zairian 
territory. Museveni was also a close ally of senior Rwandan leaders, most of 
whom had served in the UPDF while being in exile from Rwanda (Nest 
2006b).  
 
Secondly, the Angolan government had long been a foe of Mobutu, since 
Mobutu had been allowing the forces of a rebel group, Uniao Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), which was fighting with the ruling 
party in Angola, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do 
Trabalho (MPLA), to operate from bases in Zaïre (Nest 2006b). The bases 
functioned as a conduit for weapons and diamonds and helped the UNITA 
sustain its fight against the Angolan government. The Angolan government 
therefore allowed the AFDL to enter Zaïre from its territories and sent in its 
troops (Reed 1998). In contrast, the UNITA allegedly supported Mobutu in 
order to protect their bases and supply routes in Zaïre from the AFDL 
(McNulty 1999).  
 
In addition to Uganda and Angola, Burundi also had concerns to secure its 
borders to prevent attacks from Zaïre (Reed 1998). Zambia was also claimed 
to have allowed the AFDL to enter Zaïre from its territories, and Zimbabwe 
supplied military goods (ibid.). 
 
The DRC finally removed the Mobutu regime through the AFDL rebellion, 
which was long overdue, considering the state of the country (McNulty 1999). 
The strategy by Mobutu to ethnically divide and rule the country backfired, 
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since the Banyamulenge, as the scapegoat, this time had received military 
support from neighbouring countries, particularly from Rwanda and Uganda 
(ibid.). This critical support, however, especially that from Rwanda, had a 
decisive long-term impact, for two key reasons. Whilst the rebellion had been 
promoted and perceived as ‘the war of liberation’ to an extent, ‘the Rwandan 
army turned into an army of occupation’ in the eyes of the Congolese 
population as its commanders filled senior positions in the Congolese national 
army (Mamdani 1998: 17).  
 
Secondly, this army of occupation started to intervene in Congolese affairs, 
most notably on the issue of the Banyamulenge (ibid.).76 This was perceived 
as reflecting an expansionist aspiration of Rwanda (McNulty 1999), and the 
perception was reinforced by the dependence on Rwanda, the overwhelming 
presence of Rwandans and the massacres committed during the rebellion, 
especially in eastern Zaïre (Reed 1998). Mamdani (2002) argues, however, 
that the post-genocide Rwandan government, largely led by the Tutsi 
refugees that had returned from Uganda, held two convictions: the need for 
the protection of all Tutsi, and Tutsi power as a prerequisite for the survival of 
Tutsi.        
 
The Banyamulenge achieved their needs to reclaim their citizenship and to 
protect their community and gained strong military and political positions with 
the help of the RPF, although most of the older Banyamulenge had been 
opposing the recruitment of young Banyamulenge into the RPF (Vlassenroot 
2002). For the Banyamulenge community, their coalition with the RPF had 
considerable consequences and posed dilemmas (ibid.). Firstly, their 
citizenship status was not recovered in spite of Kabila’s verbal promise during 
his visit to Bukavu in February 1998. In order for them to be accepted as full 
Congolese, they needed to cut their ties with the RPF to gain confidence 
amongst other Congolese yet, at the same time, they were dependent on the 
RPF support for their security.  
 
                                                          
76 For instance, the Banyamulenge received a separate Native Authority in South Kivu, and a 
Tutsi replaced the Hutu Native Authority in Ruchuru, in North Kivu (Mamdani 1998).    
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Secondly, the objectives of the Banyamulenge and the RPF appeared to be 
radically different. The RPF had attempted to persuade the Banyamulenge 
and the Tutsi in the DRC to migrate to Rwanda,77 something the 
Banyamulenge strongly resisted. At the same time, the Banyamulenge found 
themselves increasingly rejected and detested by the rest of the population, 
as the AFDL became to be perceived as an expansionist aspiration of the 
Tutsi; they had acquired privileged positions (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 
2003) and the AFDL rebellion committed killings and torture (Mamdani 2001). 
While the Mayi Mayi had joined the first rebellion, they opposed the AFDL 
when it came to power as it appeared to have turned into a Rwandese 
occupation (ibid.). The ethnic situation in the Kivus thus deteriorated as the rift 
between the Banyamulenge and the rest of the population grew.  
 
4.6. The second Congo War 
 
4.6.1 The breakout of the second Congo War 
 
Prior to the second Congo War, the economic conditions the Kabila regime 
inherited from the Mobutu era deteriorated further and saw drastic declines in 
GDP, which were accompanied by collapses in all sectors except mining 
(Nest 2006b; Putzel et al. 2008; Prunier 2009). Economic transactions were 
increasingly controlled informally by the regional strongmen and concentrated 
around the borders (Nest 2006b; Putzel et al. 2008). The size of the informal 
economy was estimated to be three times the value of the official GDP by the 
1990s (Putzel et al. 2008).  
 
Upon taking power, Laurent Kabila attempted to reform political, social and 
economic configurations through increasing state revenues, particularly from 
mining concessions and rebuilding state capacity. His attempt to consolidate 
his authority over the territory and increase legitimacy, however, did not bring 
                                                          
77 The motivation behind this idea of migration is not clear, although, some explanations have 
been offered (Vlassenroot 2002): the idea possessed by the Tutsi refugees who had grown 
up in Uganda that Tutsi diasporas should return their homeland; ensuring security of the Tutsi 
by increasing their number in Rwanda; and increasing Rwandan control of Kivu by sending 
the returned Banyamulenge back to Kivu.   
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much success; Kabila turned out to be another dictator, not much different 
from his predecessor, in the eyes of many observers (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 
2006b; Putzel et al. 2008; Prunier 2009).  
 
Kabila’s regime was faced with legitimacy dilemmas borne from the fact that 
he had achieved his military victory chiefly through the support of the RPF, by 
which numerous Rwandese refugees and civilians in the eastern DRC were 
allegedly massacred (Prunier 2009).78 To clear himself from the allegations of 
crimes against humanity, Kabila had to jeopardise his legitimacy by admitting 
that the military campaign was not under his control. His initial attempt to 
follow the agenda of Rwanda in arresting and disarming the Interahamwe and 
the ex-FAR, who continued to attack Rwanda, had also resulted in 
confrontation with local populations hosting them and a growth of Mayi Mayi 
militias (Prunier 2009). Consequently, Kabila became increasingly 
independent, refusing to cooperate with Rwanda in providing security at the 
borders (Nest 2006b) and thus greatly disappointing his backer, Rwanda 
(McNulty 1999).79 The more pressing need for Kabila to detach himself from 
Rwanda, however, was linked to internal division and domestic resistance in 
Kinshasa against the overwhelming presence of the Banyamulenge and the 
Tutsi in key positions within the military and political circles of his regime 
(Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Putzel et al. 2008; Prunier 2009).  
 
In the Kivus, the antipathy towards the presence of the Tutsi was even more 
compelling as the Banyamulenge had been given a separate Native Authority 
in South Kivu and several local authorities were replaced with Tutsi (Mamdani 
1998). Moreover, numerous Tutsi pastoralists had also moved into the Masisi-
Walikale area with their cattle (Prunier 2009). These expansions of the Tutsi 
led to an escalation of violent attacks on the Banyamulenge and successive 
insurgencies against each other (ibid.).  
                                                          
78 The UN investigation over the alleged human rights abuses, including massacres, during 
and after the first Congo War  (ECOSOC 1999) was hampered by the DRC and Rwanda, and 
the international aid for the DRC was blocked (Prunier 2009). Takeuchi (1997) predicted such 
a measure would have made the country’s economic recovery significantly difficult, as the 
economic sanctions following the massacre of students at the University of Lubumbashi in 
1990 had led to the complete economic collapse for Mobutu’s regime.   
79 He also enraged Uganda by accusing Ugandan officials of profit seeking in their 
intervention in the DRC (McNulty 1999). 




Confronted with both domestic and regional discontent, Kabila had chosen his 
strategy with a view to gathering support within the country by manipulating 
and intensifying anti-Tutsi feelings (McNulty 1999; Lemarchand 2003; Reuters 
AlertNet n.d.). Kabila announced that the foreign troops had to leave on 27 
July 1998 and the Rwandan troops left the following day. This decision 
eventually prompted Rwanda, along with Uganda, to attack the DRC in order 
to oust Kabila (Vlassenroot 2002). It also led the Banyamulenge to seek 
security from the RPF despite their frustration and discontent over the 
dominance of the RPF.  
  
Clashes between Tutsi and non-Tutsi in barracks on 2 August 1998 prompted 
a second rebellion, spreading from the eastern DRC across the country (Nest 
2006b; ICG 1998). Towns in the east were quickly seized by the anti-
government forces. While this rebellion was presented as the ‘second 
Banyamulenge revolt, its impetus came from Kigali’ (Vlassenroot 2002: 511). 
In retaliation, hundreds of Tutsi residents in Kinshasa were either massacred 
or fled (Lemarchand 2003). On 16 August 1998, Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Démocratie (RCD, Rally for Congolese Democracy), backed by 
Rwanda, was officially formed and announced its uprising.  
 
Whilst the RCD included a number of Banyamulenge leaders as well as 
soldiers, the Banyamulenge community was divided, in part owing to the lack 
of leadership within the community and also because of the dilemmas 
between achieving autonomy and receiving protection and support from the 
RPF (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). As such, some Banyamulenge 
resisted being used or ‘instrumentalised’ by Rwanda and chose to fight 
against Rwandan expansionism, based on a strong sense of mistrust against 
Rwandans (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). They thus sought support 
from others, including Burundi, joined other militias (Vlassenroot 2002), and 
formed a movement, Forces Républicaines Féderalistes (FRF, Federalistic 
Republican Forces)80 (Lemarchand 2003), which led to some armed 
                                                          
80 The FRF was formed in Uvira in January 2000, in response to the double threat faced by 
the Congolese Tutsi (Lemarchand 2003). They feared persecution by the government and 
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confrontation with the RCD and the RPA (Vlassenroot 2002). This 
fragmentation demonstrates the increasingly complex nature of the 
Banyamulenge politics (Lemarchand 2003).    
 
The rebellion rapidly took control of several towns and advanced to Kinshasa 
on 26 August 1998; but was repelled by the government with the support of 
the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) and the Angolan army (Nest 2006b; 
Prunier 2009). As Kabila’s force was largely made up of soldiers from his 
previous backers, and he had weak control over them, Kabila sought help 
from other ethno-regional groups, the Mayi Mayi, the Interahamwe, and 
foreign supporters including Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Putzel et al. 
2008; Prunier 2009). Rwandan and Ugandan forces re-launched their 
offensive against the DRC government from the east and attempted to 
advance on Kinshasa in late August. In this way, the second Congo War 
involved several countries and numerous rebel groups, some of which were 
backed by their foreign allies. Battles continued until the war reached a 
military stalemate and Laurent Kabila finally agreed to sign the Lusaka Peace 
Agreement in August 1999 (Grignon 2006; Nest 2006b; Prunier 2009). 
Consequently, the country was divided roughly into two territories by the 
fractured frontline, the south-west was controlled by pro-government forces 
and the north-east by the anti-government forces (Grignon 2006).  
 
On the pro-government side, the main countries supporting Forces Armées 
Congolaises (FAC, Congolese Armed Forces), created by Laurent Kabila, 
were Angola and Zimbabwe. Angola needed Kabila’s support to destroy the 
UNITA’s rear base in the DRC, especially when they discovered that the 
UNITA was approaching Rwanda and Uganda, supposedly to establish new 
military supply networks (Lemarchand 2003). Also, strategically, Angola 
appeared to have allied with Kabila because of the ease with which they 
thought they could influence him as the head of the DRC (Prunier 2009). It 
also allied with Zimbabwe with a view to preventing South Africa’s domination 
in southern Africa (ibid.). Zimbabwe sought to limit South African influence 
                                                                                                                                                                      
instrumentalisation by Rwanda, and aspired to negotiate a peace agreement between the 
Congolese Tutsi and their neighbours (ibid.). 
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with Angola and Namibia for the same strategic reason, but officially 
intervened in the DRC to respect a collective security chapter of the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). 
While Zimbabwe did not have security or economic stakes in the DRC, they 
wanted to ensure that they could recover their loans to the DRC government 
by maintaining Kabila as the head of the country (Lemarchand 2003). Namibia 
appeared to have allied with Angola in facing the UNITA infiltration in its 
territory, in addition to other shared strategic objectives (Nest 2006c; Prunier 
2009). Although Sudan never admitted their involvement in the DRC, they 
sided with the DRC based on their confrontation with Uganda (Prunier 2009). 
Chad and Libya also supported Kabila for a short while, though Libya did not 
acknowledge its involvement in the DRC (ibid.).      
 
In addition to those countries, there were several militias that supported the 
FAC. They included the domestic Mayi Mayi militias,81 a Hutu rebel force from 
Burundi, Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie (FDD, Forces for the 
Defense of Democracy),82 and the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, many of whom 
established a rebel force called the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du 
Rwanda (FDLR, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) in 
2000.83 Kabila dissolved the AFDL in 1999 (Lemarchand 2003).  
 
Lemarchand (2003: 31) pointed out that ‘the only glue holding together this 
disparate group of counterinsurgents was their common hatred of the 
Rwandan occupying forces and their local allies’. The RPA and RCD were 
most disliked by the population because of their use of extremely brutal 
                                                          
81 Various community-based, self-styled civil defence units became known as Mayi Mayi 
collectively (IRIN 2007b). They initially aimed at protecting villages from the Rwandan 
invasion and became prominent during the second Congo War (ibid.). However, once they 
had gained a certain level of political and economic power, they became a threat rather than a 
source of protection to the local population (Vlassenroot 2008). Those individuals within the 
militias were also faced with poverty, unemployment and social exclusion (Nest 2006c).  
82 Burundi never admitted the presence of the FDD in the DRC (Prunier 2009). 
83 There are different accounts on the formation of the FDLR (see details in Prunier (2009) 
and ICG (2003)). It is, nonetheless, considered that a militant group of the Interahamwe and 
the ex-FAR in the eastern DRC, the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALIR, the Army for the 
Liberation of Rwanda, also known by its political wing, Peuple Armé pour la Libération du 
Rwanda, PALIR, the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda) merged with the Hutu resistance 
movement in Kinshasa to form the FDLR in September 2000.  
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violence against civilians, probably because they faced stronger resistance 
(Prunier 2009). 
 
The anti-government movement largely included three forces, with strong 
support from their backers.84 The RCD was initially supported by Uganda and 
Rwanda. Rwanda also had its own troops on Congolese soil because of its 
urgent concern for survival as a regime (Nest 2006c). For that reason, it felt it 
needed to prevent ethnic-based killings and infiltrations by the Interahamwe 
and the ex-FAR from the DRC (Nest 2006c), which had escalated since the 
end of 1997 (Prunier 2009). The RCD split into two groups in May 1999, 
following a disagreement between Rwanda and Uganda over the leadership 
of the RCD (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). Rassemblement Congolais 
pour la Démocratie- Goma (RCD-Goma, Rally for Congolese Democracy - 
Goma) was based in Goma and backed by Rwanda,85 and Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML, Rally for 
Congolese Democracy – Liberation Movement) was initially based in 
Kisangani and later in Bunia and allied with Uganda. The third force was 
Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC, Congolese Liberation Movement). 
The MLC was created and headed by a wealthy influential businessman from 
the north, Jean-Pierre Bemba, in order to resist government oppression, and 
received support from the UPDF. The motivation of Uganda to move into the 
DRC is often interpreted to be its close ties with the RPF and the possible 
effect of the defeat of the RPA and RCD on its borders (Nest 2006c). The 
main reason, however, appeared to be national security, as it had been during 
the first Congo War, which had been threatened by several Ugandan militant 
groups operating in Sudan and north-eastern DRC, supported by Sudan 
(Clark 2001).86 In addition to those major actors, the Burundian national army 
                                                          
84 In addition to these major parties, there were also indirect connections with some other 
countries, which did not clearly take sides (Prunier 2009). For example, some individuals in 
Zambia were supporting the UNITA, refugees and rebels in Tanzania, Burundi, the Republic 
of Congo and Central African Republic were recruited to fight in the DRC, and leading 
politicians from the former Rwandan government, who were accommodated in Kenya, 
influenced the Kenyan government’s position (Prunier 2009).      
85 The UN Panel of Experts (UNSC 2001b: 23) states that the RCD-Goma was ‘the creation of 
the Rwandan State’, and that it depended ‘financially, politically and militarily on Kigali’. 
86 Sudan was supporting several Ugandan militant groups, including the Allied Democratic 
Forces (ADF) and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), possibly to destabilise the region to spread 
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was collaborating with the RPA and the UPDF and, though Burundi never 
admitted its presence officially, Burundi felt it needed to mind ‘its back door’ 
where the Hutu rebel group, the FDD, could enter (Prunier 2009: 198).  
 
Despite fragmenting and shifting coalitions and alliances amongst rebel 
groups and their supporters, three key anti-government coalitions prevailed 
during the second Congo War and largely controlled three broad areas (Nest 
2006b; Prunier 2009). The MLC with its Ugandan backers was located in 
north and north-western DRC, the RCD-ML with its Ugandan backers 
occupied the north-west DRC, and the RCD-Goma with its Rwandan backers 
controlled the central-eastern DRC. They eventually shifted their focus from 
overthrowing Kabila to being recognised in the government as they met a 
strong military resistance by the supporters of Laurent Kabila, leading to a 
military stalemate (Nest 2006b). 
 
The consolidation of the frontlines occurred not only from the stalemate of the 
war, but also from the peace process that took place during the course of the 
war, as discussed in the following section.  
 
4.6.2. The peace process 
 
Following a series of difficult negotiations between Laurent Kabila, the RCD 
and the MLC, the Lusaka Peace Agreement was signed in Lusaka, Zambia, in 
1999.87 The DRC and five countries, namely Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, 
Rwanda and Uganda, signed in July 1999.88 The MLC signed on 1 August 
1999 and the RCD signed on 31 August 1999. Behind the slow progress of 
the negotiations leading to the agreement, there was a strong reluctance by 
Kabila for democratic transition (Prunier 2009). There were also different 
interpretations of what the war was about within the international community, 
with some seeing the war as a rebellion to oust Laurent Kabila and others as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Islamic fundamentalism, using the territories in Sudan as well as in north-eastern DRC (Clark 
2001). 
87 ICG (1999) provides a detailed analysis of the negotiations leading to the Lusaka Peace 
Agreement. 
88 Burundi attended as an observer since it was not recognised as a belligerent party. 
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an invasion by Rwanda and Uganda (ibid.). The military stalemate eventually 
allowed the peace process to move forward (Grignon 2006; Prunier 2009).  
 
The Lusaka Peace Agreement was primarily a ceasefire agreement and 
became the foundation of the peace process in the DRC. It stipulated the 
withdrawal of foreign troops, the disarmament of ‘negative forces’, including 
the FDLR, ADF and FDD, and the organisation of an Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue (ICD) in order to establish a new political system. In order to monitor 
the ceasefire, the UN peacekeeping force, Mission de l'Organisation des 
Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo (MONUC, United 
Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo), was 
deployed by February 2000. However, fighting continued between rebels and 
government forces, and between Rwandan and Ugandan forces, including 
heavy fighting between Uganda and Rwanda in Kisangani in August 1999, 
and May and June 2000. The MONUC, with a mere 5,537 troops and a weak 
mandate failed to stop fighting between rebel and government forces (Reuters 
AlertNet n.d.).  
 
The Lusaka Peace Agreement did not stop the war, but ‘froze the military 
frontline … and allowed Laurent Kabila to consolidate the FAC’s defences in 
the face of a threatened RPA advance’ (Grignon 2006: 71).89 By signing the 
Lusaka Peace Agreement, Kabila strategically bought time to strengthen his 
military position (ibid.). The peace agreement, however, meant a serious 
political defeat for Kabila as the peace process required him to share political 
power with four opponents, namely the RCD factions, the MLC, opposition 
political parties and civil society representatives (Grignon 2006). Kabila was 
also forced to acknowledge that he had lost control over half of the territory of 
the country (ICG 1999). The Lusaka Peace Agreement, in essence, ‘legalized 
the partition of the country into three distinct zones and enabled the rebels to 
legitimately claim that they both officially represented their part of the country 
and had the authority to administer and exploit their zone’ (Grignon 2006: 71). 
 
                                                          
89 The RPA launched a large offensive and advanced on Mbuji-Mayi, the diamond town, 
located between Lubumbashi in Katanga and Kinshasa (Grignon 2006). 
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The tension between Rwanda and Uganda had grown when the RCD had 
split into two groups over a leadership struggle, prior to the signing of the 
Lusaka Peace Agreement (ICG 1999). It reached a breaking point in early 
August 1999 as the UPDF and the RPA clashed in Kisangani (ibid.). Both 
parties blamed each other for breaking the ceasefire (Lemarchand 2003). The 
peace process eventually came to a halt when Rwanda and Uganda refused 
to participate unless the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR were dealt with; the 
Angolans and Zimbabweans, as a response, refused to leave the DRC until 
the Rwandans and Ugandans withdrew. This was followed with more violent 
clashes, and by 2004 it was estimated that 3.8 million people had died as a 
result of the conflict.  
 
Given the undesirable political implications of the Lusaka Peace Agreement, 
Kabila put all his efforts into preventing genuine power-sharing (ICG 2000; 
Grignon 2006) and any dealings with the economic dimensions of the conflict 
(ICG 2000; Lemarchand 2003; Grignon 2006). He resisted negotiating with 
other parties for power-sharing through the ICD (Lemarchand 2003). The 
implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement only progressed after the 
assassination of Kabila in January 2001,90 as Kabila had represented a major 
obstacle to the democratic transition (ICG 2000; Lemarchand 2003; Grignon 
2006). 
 
Joseph Kabila, Laurent Kabila’s son, succeeded his father as president, 
without facing major objections. Despite early scepticism about his ability to 
lead the country in a difficult transition, he made significant progress 
(Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b). He managed to improve the country’s 
relations with international financial institutions and donor governments, 
facilitated the implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreement (Nest 2006b), 
and strategically kept his distance from the old allies of Laurent Kabila and 
Angola (Lemarchand 2003). As a result, interstate fighting came to an end; 
Uganda and Rwanda began pulling troops back from the front line in February 
                                                          
90 Laurent Kabila was shot by a bodyguard, who was killed on the spot, on 16 January 2001 
and died two days later. The exact reason for the assassination is uncertain.   
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and the ICD restarted discussions on the formation of a Government of 
National Unity. 
 
The ICD was facilitated by the former Botswanan head of state, Sir Ketumile 
Masire, to create a new political dispensation for the DRC in Sun City, South 
Africa, between February and April 2002. Despite wranglings over the 
composition of the ICD delegations,91 the Sun City Agreement was signed on 
19 April 2002. It specified a framework for establishing a unified multi-party 
government and a timeline for democratic elections. The agreement also 
confirmed Joseph Kabila as the president of the DRC and Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, the leader of the MLC, as prime minister for the transitional period. 
Kabila would share power with four vice-presidents: one from each of the two 
main armed opposition groups, one from the government and one from the 
unarmed political opposition. However, the agreement was partial and did not 
cover issues regarding the unification of the army. Moreover, the RCD-Goma 
and some other unarmed political opposition parties did not sign the 
agreement. This opposition, as well as the dispute between the government 
and the prime minister, resulted in the collapse of the agreement (Grignon 
2006).  
 
Rwanda and the DRC held peace talks in Pretoria, South Africa, on two 
issues: the withdrawal of the estimated 20,000 Rwandan soldiers in the DRC 
and the rounding up of the ex-FAR and dismantling of the Interahamwe. They 
signed a security protocol, known as the Pretoria Accord, on 30 July 2002. 
Uganda and the DRC also formalised a similar deal, known as the Luanda 
Agreement, on 6 September 2002, on the withdrawal of Ugandan troops from 
Bunia and improving relations between the two countries. These two peace 
negotiations resulted in the withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan troops 
beginning in late 2002 (ICG n.d.). 
 
Following the last ICD to finalise a power-sharing arrangement for the period 
of political transition, the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement on the 
                                                          
91 See details in ICG (2002). 
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transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo was finally signed in Pretoria 
on 17 December 2002.92 Joseph Kabila remained as interim president and 
four vice presidents were to represent the government, the RCD-Goma, the 
MLC, and civil society. The agreement laid down a framework for the 
transitional government, including legislative and presidential elections within 
two years. Although this agreement marked the end of the war, it was 
criticised for disregarding the questionable political legitimacy of the former 
rebels that had committed serious crimes against the population and the 
ethnic and regional balance (Prunier 2009).      
 
Lastly, a transitional constitution and a protocol on security sector reform were 
agreed upon and were ratified in the concluding session of the ICD held in 
Sun City on 2 April 2003. A Government of National Unity and Transition, the 
transitional government, was formed on 30 June 2003, marking an official end 
of the conflict and the beginning of the transitional period.  
 
4.7. The continuation of the conflict in the eastern DRC  
 
4.7.1. The transitional period  
 
The transitional government progressed in steps toward democratic transition, 
while the transitional period saw continued political struggles and sporadic 
conflict, despite the existence of the power-sharing agreement.  
 
As a vital step towards holding general elections, a new law on nationality was 
adopted by the transitional government on 12 November 2004 (Jackson 2007). 
The new nationality law was regarded as necessary also on the normative 
grounds that the exclusion of the Banyarwanda from the citizenship was 
‘unlawful under both international customary law and the international 
conventions’ and on security grounds given that the Banyarwanda ‘“nationality 
question” has acted as a prime incendiary igniting successive regional 
conflicts’, including the outbreak of the second Congo War (ibid.: 489). The 
                                                          
92 This Congolese process rejected external interference ‘in the management of the transition 
and in the implementation of the agreement’ (Grignon 2006).  
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2004 nationality law grants nationality by origin or by acquisition to ‘all people 
and their descendents who were resident in the DRC on or before 
independence on 30 June 1960’, but it does not permit dual citizenship (Clark 
2008: 6).  
 
Despite the fact that this law officially granted citizenship to the Banyarwanda, 
it did not change the perception of the Banyarwanda as ‘non-indigenous’ 
amongst the ‘indigenous’ Congolese, or reduce the tensions between them 
(ibid.). More importantly, the new nationality law posed three key concerns: 
the law did ‘not seem likely to eliminate many ambiguities concerning the 
national status of’ the Banyarwanda; the enforcement of the law was likely to 
be ineffective; and ‘the political relationship between the individual and the 
state’ for the Banyamulenge was not likely to be improved through this law 
(Jackson 2007: 481). The nature of the political relationship, essential in 
providing the sense of being a full citizen, encompasses ‘local rights and 
obligations between the individual and customary authority, with implications 
for land allocation and other vital entitlements; and the ethnically vital, lived 
sense of belonging and existential security for the individual within society as 
a whole’ (ibid.). These had been denied to the Banyarwanda and were not 
likely to be changed through this law (ibid.)    
 
In May 2005, parliament approved a new constitution which introduced power-
sharing between the president and prime minister and a two-term presidential 
limit.93 The constitution was approved by referendum in December 2005 and 
promulgated on 18 February 2006. 
 
The presidential and legislative elections were held on 30 July 2006, with 
more than 17 million voters, after a slow candidate registration and continued 
political struggle. In this first round vote, none of the candidates won the 
majority, as president Joseph Kabila received 44.81 percent and his main 
rival, vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba, won around 20 percent. Kabila won 
58 percent of the vote and Bemba received 42 percent in the second round 
                                                          
93For details of the elements of the constitution, see UNSC (2005a). 
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vote on 29 October 2006. Kabila’s coalition also won a majority in national 
and provincial assemblies. Joseph Kabila became the first democratically 
elected president of the DRC in forty years. Although Bemba contested the 
result, it was upheld by the Supreme Court, and Bemba accepted his position 
as vice-president. Kabila was sworn in as president in December 2006, and a 
new government was named in February 2007. 
 
The results of the elections were disastrous for the RCD-Goma and the 
Congolese Tutsi communities, as they could not secure adequate political 
representation. During the election period, other political leaders provoked 
anti-Tutsi sentiment (Human Rights Watch 2007). The presidential candidate 
of the RCD-Goma, Azarias Ruberwa, who was one of the four vice-presidents 
during the transitional period and the leader of the rebel group, received only 
2 percent of the vote (Prunier 2009). Similarly, the RCD-Goma gained only 15 
seats (3 percent) in the legislative elections (ibid.). Because the 
Banyamulenge were perceived as Rwandans and therefore resented (ibid.), 
the RCD-Goma lost political significance in the democratically elected 
government, despite the fact that its predecessor the RCD was one of the four 
political forces in the transitional government (Human Rights Watch 2007). As 
such, the RCD-Goma was politically liquidated (ICG 2007b). Moreover, at the 
provincial level, the territory of Minembwe, where the Banyamulenge were the 
majority population, was not recognised as a territory by the government; 
hence, the Banyamulenge were prevented from having local administrative 
control or representation in the provincial and national assemblies (Human 
Rights Watch 2007). This decision by the government was perceived as a 
deliberate strategy to marginalise the Banyamulenge and it alarmed the 
Banyamulenge communities (ibid.).    
 
In spite of the progress made during the transitional period, the Kabila 
government was faced with growing criticism both at national and international 
levels (ICG n.d.). The new Congolese army, Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC, Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo), formed in July 2003, was constantly being accused of committing 
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human rights abuses and being undisciplined.94 The lack of transparent 
resource management, corruption and lack of infrastructure and basic 
services was also criticised. Moreover, there was a growing level of political 
repression,95 especially against Bemba’s supporters and in peripheral regions, 
such as in the east. While the international community blamed the weak 
governance of the regime for these problems, ‘violent coercion was 
increasingly adopted as a government technique’ (Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers 2009: 477). The government also tried to gain control over 
strategic natural resources in the Kivus through privatised and violent forms of 
governance, resulting in ‘a disparate and fragmented control’ over the 
territories (ibid.). The tension between Kabila and Bemba supporters reached 
a point where Bemba fled the country to Portugal after seeking refuge in the 
South African embassy in Kinshasa in 2007.  
 
The implementation of army integration, agreed in the Global and All-Inclusive 
Peace Agreement of 2002, was ineffective during the transitional period 
(Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2007b). The process of integrating former 
rebel groups and the former government troops, estimated to be around 
330,000 combatants (Amnesty International 2007), into the new national 
army, FARDC, and the demobilisation of soldiers not necessary for the 
FARDC, was significantly delayed, and the elections were held before the 
completion of the process (Human Rights Watch 2007; Turner 2007). This 
process for integrating the former troops into the national army, called 
brassage, ‘required soldiers to be trained for 45 days and then to be deployed 
in a region other than that in which they had previously fought’ (Human Rights 
Watch 2007: 10). Soldiers also had an option to be demobilised to return to 
civilian life during the process (ibid.). There was, however, a strong resistance 
                                                          
94 MONUC warned the government that it would withdraw from the joint operations in the east 
unless the FARDC ended human rights violations (Reuters AlertNet n.d.).  
95 The nature of the human rights abuses include unlawful killings in the Kivu provinces, 
violence against women, child soldiers, torture, persecution of human rights activists, political 
violence between Kabila and Bemba supporters as well as other factions and limited access 
to proper justice (Amnesty International 2006). MONUC (2006) also published a special report 
on the human rights situation. A brutal military crackdown on political-cultural movement 
Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) in Bas-Congo, which aimed at reviving the pre-colonial Kongo 
kingdom, was also reported in January 2007 (Reuters AlertNet n.d.). Human Rights Watch 
(2008) provides an analysis of the political violence between Kabila and Bemba supporters 
and against the BDK.   
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to the process amongst the various armed forces, most notably from 
Banyarwanda officers, caused by fears for their security and the loss of their 
power base (Turner 2007), but also from the Mayi Mayi militias and the FDLR 
rebels (ICG 2007b). The brassage process was not transparent, in terms of 
the size of the units or identification of soldiers, and did not establish human 
rights standards (Turner 2007).  
 
The national programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration 
(DDR) intended to integrate 130,000 soldiers into the FARDC and demobilise 
another 200,000 soldiers (Marriage 2007). The DDR programme was not 
supported, however, by viable security or development agendas and largely 
failed to assist the former combatants to address their grievances or to earn a 
living without using violence (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008). Soldiers who had 
integrated into the FARDC were largely dissatisfied with the salaries of 
USD10 a month (if they were paid at all) and soldiers who had chosen to be 
demobilised were also disillusioned by the absence of measures to assist 
them to integrate into civilian life, while local economic and social grievances 
remained (Baaz and Stern 2008). The failure of the DDR programme was in 
part conceptual, as the demobilisation was perceived to be a simple technical 
issue and implementation responsibilities were not allocated (Marriage 2007). 
It was also structural, reflecting the increasingly informal and predatory nature 
of political and economic life, normalisation of a systematic use of violence to 
acquire and retain power, and continuing inter-related conflicts on the ground 
(ibid.).    
 
4.7.2. The continuing violence in the Kivus   
 
Despite the expectations that the peace process and resulting political 
arrangements would end the violence affecting civilians, many of the armed 
forces were not disarmed but have instead consolidated their authority and 
increased armed conflict and brutal attacks on civilians (Human Rights Watch 
2007). The Kivu provinces have been plagued by insecurity since 2003 and 
North Kivu’s security conditions turned into large-scale violence after the 
presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections in 2006, through which the 
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Banyamulenge felt sidelined and threatened by losing political significance 
(ibid.). In addition, they had been dispossessed of the economic privileges 
that they had and, in terms of political positions, other ‘indigenous’ groups in 
the community had replaced the Banyamulenge (ICG 2007b).    
 
The brassage process, through shuffling of commands and of units, had 
adversely affected the security situations in the Kivus (ICG 2007b), contrary to 
the government’s assertion that it would enable the pacification of the east by 
integrating all armed groups into the national army (IRIN 2007). In the 
brassage process, a commander from Kabila’s troops was appointed to South 
Kivu, replacing the serving RCD commander, while the RCD retained North 
Kivu (ICG 2007b). In response, an increasing number of RCD officers, 
including Laurent Nkunda, refused to recognise the authority of the 
government and to go through brassage because they feared ethnic 
persecution and revenge for their acts during the wars, and so formed a 
network (Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2007b; Prunier 2009; Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers 2009). According to Human Rights Watch (2007), there 
had been some incidents of imprisonment, torture and killing of Tutsi soldiers 
between 2004 and 2006. Nkunda also accused the government of not doing 
enough to dismantle the FDLR (IRIN 2007). 
 
A dispute between commanders eventually led to a full-blown battle in June 
2004, in which a dissident faction led by Colonel Jules Mutebutsi, supported 
by Laurent Nkunda, occupied Bukavu, South Kivu. This uprising was put 
down by the government after one week. In December 2005, dissident 
soldiers belonging to the RCD-Goma fought off the FARDC in Kanyabayonga 
and captured several towns in North Kivu, thereby creating tensions in the 
relationship between the RCD-Goma leadership and other parties in the 
transitional government (Grignon 2006). In July 2006, during the elections, 
Nkunda formed a political movement, Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple (CNDP, National Congress for the Defence of the People), which was 
mainly composed of Congolese Tutsi from the RCD-Goma but also of other 
ethnic communities. Nkunda was able to attract numerous opponents who 
had been dissatisfied with the democratisation process (Vlassenroot and 
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Raeymaekers 2009). According to Nkunda, the CNDP was established for the 
purpose of ‘preventing the exclusion of Tutsi from national political life, 
assuring the security of Tutsi soldiers in the national army, eliminating the 
presence of the FDLR in the DRC, and assuring the return of Congolese 
refugees now in Rwanda’ (Human Rights Watch 2007: 64).     
 
The CNDP frequently clashed with the FARDC and secured their continued 
autonomy without being integrated into the national army (Human Rights 
Watch 2007). When they rebelled again in November 2006, they attacked 
Goma, presumably to hold it to make their position advantageous in any 
future negotiations with the government (Prunier 2009). The CNDP thus 
became the most serious threat to the government by the end of 2006 
(Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). In order to prevent further clashes, 
Kabila and Kagame negotiated with Nkunda in December 2006 to mix the 
CNDP troops into the FARDC through a limited integration process called 
mixage (Human Right Watch 2007; ICG 2007b; Prunier 2009). In mixage, 
various troops serve in the same units without the original units being 
dissolved (Prunier 2009) and, allowing for concerns about security, the troops 
would not have to leave their province, as they would with brassage (ICG 
2007b). During the negotiations, Nkunda demanded that several political 
grievances were addressed, ‘including the return of 45,000 Banyarwanda 
refugees from Rwanda, the liberation of political prisoners and military 
operations against the FDLR’ (ICG 2007a).  
 
In February 2007, the CNDP began integrating its troops into the FARDC 
through mixage. The mixage was beneficial for Nkunda, as he increased the 
number of troops under his command (Human Rights Watch 2007; Turner 
2007; Prunier 2009), and became stronger both politically and militarily 
(Human Rights Watch 2007). Nkunda used his units to crackdown on the 
FDLR in North Kivu and also started recruiting widely from demobilised troops 
who were unemployed, and unemployed Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi 
amongst others (Prunier 2009). The FARDC also launched military operations 
against the FDLR without much success, displacing more of the civilian 
population. These military operations prompted the creation of the Patriotes 
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Résistant Congolais (PARECO, Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance) 
by the Mayi Mayi96 (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). While the 
PARECO stated that its objectives were to suppress Nkunda’s rebellion and 
bring peace in the east, the political objectives of the PARECO were 
ambiguous (IRIN 2007), like the Mayi Mayi, which resisted any authority and 
kept changing allies (Prunier 2009).        
 
The reinforcement of the CNDP through the mixage process therefore 
increased ethnic tensions in the Kivus, as it had ‘kick-started the FDLR back 
into life and reopened all the scores of the east’ (Prunier 2009: 324). The 
FDLR took advantage of the tensions to demonstrate their usefulness to the 
government; a group of the FDLR, called Rastas, carried out massacres in 
South Kivu in May 2007 (ICG 2007b). As a result, ‘the whole region 
experienced a sudden return to a state of tension previously forgotten’ 
(Prunier 2009: 324). In addition to several uncontrolled armed elements, 
including the Mayi Mayi, warlords and the FDLR (Prunier 2009), some armed 
groups, supposedly overseen by the government, such as the CNDP and the 
FARDC, had all been committing crimes that were not being investigated 
(Human Rights Watch 2007). The mixage process eventually failed in May 
2007, owing to the opposition by some hardliners in both the FARDC and 
CNDP (Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2007b).  
 
Following the collapse of the mixage arrangement, the government decided to 
crack down on the CNDP, leading to heavy fighting between the CNDP and 
the national army in August 200797 without success, owing to the weakness of 
the FARDC (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). In November 2007, the 
governments of Rwanda and the DRC reached an agreement in Nairobi to 
repatriate the FDLR, which became known as the Nairobi Agreement.  
 
                                                          
96 PARECO also includes some Hutu CNDP deserters (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009).  
97 This was supposedly triggered by a failed negotiation for brassage (Human Rights Watch 
2007). The fighting also involved the FDLR and the Mayi Mayi and displaced more than 
170,000 people, in addition to 200,000 people internally displaced since the end of 2006 and 
322,000 refugees hosted in neighbouring countries (Amnesty International 2008). 
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In January 2008, a ‘Conference on Peace, Security, and Development in the 
Kivus’, broadly known as the ‘Amani’98 process, was held in Goma. As a 
result, a comprehensive peace agreement, Actes d’Engagement, for a 
ceasefire and voluntary demobilisation and integration in the east was signed 
on 23 January 2008. The participants of the Goma conference included 
members of the different Congolese armed groups,99 government 
representatives, civil society leaders and international observers. While the 
Amani process was praised as having moved things forward by addressing 
fundamental issues (Prunier 2009), its focus on a ceasefire and voluntary 
demobilisation contradicted the forceful demobilisation of the FDLR agreed 
upon in the preceding Nairobi agreement of 2007 (Boshoff 2008).  
 
The peace process did not progress and the security situation did not improve 
after the agreement in Goma (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). The 
FARDC resumed an attack on the CNDP; and renewed fighting erupted in 
August 2008 between the CNDP and FARDC, who often allied themselves 
with the FDLR and PARECO. In October, the CNDP captured large areas of 
North Kivu and advanced to within a few kilometres of Goma, the provincial 
capital. As a result, the FARDC fled and went on sprees of killing, raping and 
looting, leaving the FDLR and PARECO to battle with the CNDP. This 
renewed hostility affected the relationship between the DRC and Rwanda, 
with both accusing of each other of supporting non-state armed forces: the 
FDLR and the CNDP respectively.100 Several international diplomatic efforts 
were made in an attempt to settle the crisis, in line with the 2007 Nairobi 
agreement and 2008 Goma agreement, essentially to repatriate the FDLR 
and to integrate the armed groups into the national army. The situation, 
however, remained volatile and fighting continued.    
 
4.7.3. Failures of the peace process 
                                                          
98 ‘Amani’ literally means ‘peace’ in the Swahili language (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 
2009). 
99 Twenty-two Congolese Kivu-based armed groups, including those who had ceased 
operations, were invited in order to ensure equal treatment (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 
2009).  
100 These allegations were largely verified by the investigation by the UN Group of Experts 
(UNSC 2008a) that Rwanda discreetly supported the CNDP and the FARDC officers 
extensively collaborated with the FDLR. 




Analysts have offered three broad explanations for the successive failures of 
these peace agreements and the resulting conflict in the eastern DRC. These 
peace agreements were essentially inclusive power-sharing agreements. 
They are based on a consociational model which considers that incorporation 
is the key to conflict solution, as it believes exclusion, as opposed to greed 
alone, to be the key factor behind most conflicts in Africa.101 Firstly, Tull and 
Mehler (2005) contend that these inclusive power-sharing arrangements 
might have provided negative incentives for the belligerents to ignite 
insurgencies in order to be included in the arrangements. The power-sharing 
arrangements appear to be ‘co-option, directed by expediency’ (Lemarchand 
2006: 4) by the Western donors (Tull and Mehler 2005). According to this view, 
a recurrent pattern in which ‘every negotiated peace deal in the DRC has 
been followed by the proliferation and fragmentation of armed groups’ was 
because ‘each want a portion of existing power arrangements’ (Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers 2005: 476). An analysis of the 2008 Amani process verifies 
this point as the proliferation of armed groups was observed following the 
Amani process (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009: 480). It contends that 
the Amani process ‘had introduced a logic of warfare into the peace process’, 
by providing negative incentives to be armed, enhancing recognition or 
access to resources.  
 
Secondly, the failures of the peace agreements can be attributed to the failure 
to include potential spoilers in the power-sharing arrangements because of 
their economic and security interests (Grignon 2006). This is particularly the 
case considering the fluid nature of the belligerents in the DRC and the 
involvement of regional actors who were not part of the peace agreements 
and who might gain from continuing fighting (ibid.). The case of the 2002 
Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement demonstrates the failure to include 
potential spoilers as ‘the ICD [based on the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement] 
was frozen in a system of power relations hat has changed considerably over 
the course of the conflict’ (Grignon 2006: 76). This arrangement meant that 
                                                          
101 The consociational model was formulated by Lijphart in 1970s and has been a 
predominant theory in thinking of democratic governance. See Lemarchand (2006: 1-2).  
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powerful domestic actors operating in the eastern DRC, namely the FDLR, 
RCD-Goma (though its predecessor, RCD, was included in the peace 
process) and Mayi Mayi were not included in the transitional government. In 
both the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement and the 2002 Global and All-
Inclusive Peace Agreement, only the formal international aspects of the 
conflict were addressed, leaving other aspects of the war unresolved (Grignon 
2006). 
 
The above two explanations (negative incentives and peace spoilers), 
however, only deal with the outcomes rather than the underlying issues and 
contexts that drive this behaviour. Lemarchand (2006) suggests that the 
socio-political context determines the outcomes of power-sharing 
arrangements, based on his comparative assessment of trajectories of power 
sharing in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC. The background behind the 
fragmentation of the belligerent groups, particularly the RCD, in terms of both 
intra- and inter-ethnic conflict, serves to support this point (ibid.).  
 
From this standpoint, inclusive power-sharing arrangements might have 
provided negative incentives to the belligerent groups who could otherwise 
achieve meaningful political representation through non-violent means within 
the existing socio-political system. This outcome therefore highlights the 
nature of the socio-political system in the DRC. Behind the RCD’s 
continuance, while splitting a number of times (including the emergence of the 
CNDP), lies their weak position to achieve political representation as they 
represent ethnic minority groups whose citizenship has been politically 
manipulated and who have been largely supported by Rwanda. Their efforts 
to display the symbols of the state, trademarks and their attachment to the 
state administration framework (Tull 2003), as well as to secure social control 
over local resources (Vlassenroot and Romkema 2002), can also be seen as 
a way in which they try to increase political credibility and their presence.   
 
The same socio-political system might also have motivated some actors to 
‘spoil’ the negotiated peace since they were either not represented (included) 
or their agendas were not addressed in the negotiated peace. Two factions 
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that were not included in those peace agreements are the Mayi Mayi and the 
FDLR. Mayi Mayi militias have been fragmented and it has proved very 
difficult to comprehend their objectives. As they have fought against any 
authority (Prunier 2009), their participation in peace agreements has been a 
genuine political problem (Grignon 2006). As for the FDLR, all the peace 
arrangements aim to disarm and repatriate the FDLR forces. Nevertheless, 
the FDLR seems to be determined to return to power in Rwanda through a 
political dialogue with the current Rwandan government rather than having a 
war (Fessy and Doyle 2009) and, on its website, it claims to have aims to 
‘establish a regime based on universal principles, promote moral values, end 
wars and establish peace in Rwanda and in the region’ (Chatham House 
2009: 6). The disarmament and repatriation of the FDLR forces is expected to 
be difficult because of the limited political space under the current Rwandan 
regime and assimilation of the FDLR members into communities after more 
than a decade of residence in the DRC (Chatham House 2009).      
 
Despite peace agreements aimed at disarming and repatriating the FDLR 
forces, the government has been failing to dismantle them and has allowed 
them to consolidate their position in the Kivus (ICG 2005; 2010). In this sense, 
the government is also spoiling the negotiated peace (Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers 2009), partly owing to a lack of capacity. The attempt by 
Rwanda to increase its influence in the Kivus can be seen as a response to 
this unfulfilled agreement (Grignon 2006). Rwanda has not only been 
controlling the area effectively through its allies but has also transferred its 
troops to the eastern DRC (ibid.: 79). In addition, it has given Hutu 
Banyarwanda leaders senior positions in the provincial administration ‘to 
reduce their temptation to join’ the FDLR (ibid.). Furthermore, these actions by 
Rwanda appear to be linked to its economic interests to re-start cattle 
ranching in the eastern DRC, although economic agendas have not been 
addressed by those peace agreements (ibid.).  
 
For example, during the ICD, civil society groups were able to raise the issue 
of illicit exploitation of natural resources (Ballentine 2004), established by the 
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UN Panel of Experts’ investigations,102 but the ICD did not adequately 
address the economic aspects of the conflict and refused to identify any 
responsibility for the illegal exploitation of natural resources (Grignon 2006). 
While the belligerent groups were able to access the mineral resources from 
the land they occupied (Lemarchand 2003) and several clashes over control 
of the key mineral producing and trading towns occurred103 (Nest 2006b; 
Prunier 2009), Rwanda and Uganda strongly denied their economic 
motivations and engagement in the exploitation of Congolese natural 
resources (Prunier 2009). Nonetheless, some analysts have dismissed their 
security imperatives as a justification to invade the DRC for their ‘long-
standing interest … in plundering the Congo’s riches’ in the power vacuum 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 215), or have suggested that there was a change in 
focus after these countries made huge profits from the plunder of natural 
resources during the first Congo War (UNSC 2001a; Lemarchand 2003). 
 
While the economic agendas above have been largely treated as examples of 
greed, analyses on the economic agendas of the belligerent groups suggest 
that economic interests ‘emerged as a function of war’ in order to make a 
necessary cash flow for their military campaigns through capitalising limited 
means (Nest 2006c; Prunier 2009), while some became aware of the 
economic opportunities available and pursued personal economic gain (Nest 
2006c). Owing to the significant economic decline,104 destruction of 
infrastructure, an apparent decrease in agricultural outputs, fluctuations in 
mining outputs, high costs of business operation, increasing poverty and a 
growing informal economy in the DRC, the belligerent groups sought quick 
returns and minimum investment (Nest 2006c). They, for instance, controlled 
points of access to tax on trade (Nest 2006c; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 
2005), made preferential trade agreements with local traders, and provided 
protection for local businesses (Vlassenroot 2008). The economic interests 
had become crucial when the belligerent groups faced the military stalemate 
                                                          
102 See UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b). 
103 For example, the UPDF and the RPA clashed for control of Kisangani in August 1999 and 
May 2000. 
104 Per capita income decreased to 25 percent of 1970 levels by 2000 (Nest 2006c). 
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in mid-1999 (Nest 2006c) and, hence, the low-intensity conflict (Vlassenroot 
and Raeymaekers 2005).  
 
The function of war was essential for all the belligerent parties, including the 
DRC government (Nest 2006c: 38). In addition to the declining economy, the 
government ‘had lost control of half of its territory along with commerce within 
it’ as well as ‘one of the most important and historical dependable sources of 
funding for the state, foreign aid’.105 The military campaign by Rwanda was 
understandably self-funding as Rwanda was trying to recover from the total 
destruction left by the civil war and genocide in the early 1990s. Uganda also 
needed to fund the military campaigns as the country was pressured on its 
oversized budget by the donors (Prunier 2009).    
 
In addition, the failure of the DDR process, which significantly hindered 
progress towards the negotiated peace, can be blamed partly on the socio-
economic conditions in the DRC. The absence of viable livelihoods as well as 
the inadequate DDR programme106 meant that combatants could not be 
persuaded to demobilise and the integrated soldiers, receiving meagre and 
irregular payments, often had to earn by looting and plundering.       
 
Moreover, Grignon (2006) pointed out that external actors also attempted to 
influence the peace processes in pursuit of their economic agendas, though 
this has not been rigorously analysed. It has been suggested, for example, 
that the economic interests of the official peacemakers, namely South Africa, 
threatened other countries in the region and thereby drove them to spoil the 
arrangements made (ibid.). Other external actors who were sidelined during 
the development of the peace agreements because of the strong influence of 
Western countries with a close relationship with the Congolese government, 
such as Belgium, France and the USA, might have become spoilers (ibid.).   
 
                                                          
105 The foreign aid for the DRC reached its lowest point in 1998 since Laurent Kabila appear 
to have created antagonism with the major donors by being ‘resentful at pressure to pay 
debts accumulated under Mobutu and increasingly bellicose in its diplomacy’ (Nest 2006c: 
38). 
106 The lack of financial means and agreement between the government and the armed 
groups is discussed by Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2009). 
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Explanations for the failures of the peace process in the DRC, therefore, need 
to take the local contexts into account. While both negative incentives and 
peace spoilers may exist and hinder the peace process, analyses on the 
socio-political context illuminate various economic and security imperatives for 
the warring parties and their backers that have not been recognised or 
addressed in the peace arrangements.  
 
4.8. Chapter summary and conclusions 
  
This chapter has examined the trajectories and nature of the conflict in the 
DRC between 1996 and 2008, with a focus on the relationship with Rwanda. 
The continuing conflict in the DRC, from the first Congo War between 1996 
and 1997, through the second Congo War from 1998 to 2003, to the ongoing 
conflict, has been depicted as a ‘complex hybrid’ conflict (Carayannis 2003) or 
a ‘multi-layered’ conflict (Prunier 2009). It was not a conflict but rather several 
conflicts, which occurred at various levels with different players, broadly at 
local, national and regional levels (Cramer 2006a; Grignon 2006; Wake 2008), 
and which were intensified and complicated by their interactions. The analysis 
has demonstrated that the conflicts unfolded in the context of a significant 
economic decline, an apparent institutional collapse and a loss of political 
legitimacy. It has also highlighted the importance of the local context, prior to 
the outbreak of the conflicts, in which historical, social, economic, political and 
cultural relations in the region are embedded.  
 
At the local level, the issues behind the conflicts have a long historical 
standing. Waves of Rwandan migrants and refugees, who moved into the 
densely populated eastern DRC, have been subjected to political 
manipulation (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). The 
Banyarwanda were largely denied customary rights, including access to land, 
through the traditional authority, as they are ethnically ‘non-indigenous’ 
(Mamdani 1998; 2001). They had, however, become prominent by being 
favoured in Mobutu’s strategy to govern the country through horizontal elite 
networks (Putzel et al. 2008), being equipped with citizenship through the 
1972 citizenship decree, and acquiring vast land following the 1973 land law 
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(Huggins et al. 2005; Van Acker 2005; Jackson 2007). When the sharp 
economic decline after 1974 disabled Mobutu’s patronage system, in which 
economic assets were distributed for political support, and the prominence of 
the Banyarwanda became resented, citizenship was removed from the 
Banyarwanda by the 1981 citizenship law. Local actors were privileged in new 
vertical networks, replacing the previous patronage system (Putzel et al. 
2008), and became increasingly autonomous (Nest 2006b) through informal 
privatisation of the state (Vlassenroot 2008). The attempted democratic 
transition in early 1990s did not solve the highly contested issue of citizenship 
but excluded the Banyarwanda from the process, thereby intensifying the 
situation and militarising the Banyamulenge (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009).  
 
The commodification of land through the 1973 land law meant ‘the 
transformation of land from a social resource into a capital asset’ and brought 
about ‘an increasing socio-economic exclusion of large segments of the 
population’ (Tull 2003: 437) and distortion of the traditional patrimonial system 
(ibid.; Van Acker 2005). The incomplete land reform had also created a 
parallel structure of land ownerships (Meditz and Merrill 1993) through 
customary rights and the market (Mamdani 1998). It had a significant impact 
on the Kivus, as land is the most critical local resource in this land-scarce and 
densely populated region (Sosne 1979; Mamdani 1998; Van Acker 2005; 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2005; Turner 2007). It eventually led to an 
ethnic conflict over land in 1993, which was exacerbated by the influx of the 
Hutu refugees from the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Reed 1998) and the 
subsequent first Congo War in 1996. While the local conflict took the form of 
an ethnic conflict over land, it was about ‘defining access to land’ (Mamdani 
2002) and political exclusion (Lemarchand 1997) based on ethnicity and 
citizenship.      
 
During the first Congo War, the rebellion by the Banyamulenge, in alliance 
with Rwanda, was successful in allowing the former to regain its position. The 
alliance with Rwanda, however, presented dilemmas for the Banyamulenge 
community, as the rift between them and the other communities had widened, 
and their autonomy had been threatened in return for the security provided by 
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Rwanda (Vlassenroot 2002); mistrust and resentment against the Rwandans 
had increased due to a belief that they had been used (Vlassenroot 2002; 
Lemarchand 2003). Although the Banyamulenge were heavily involved in the 
second Congo War, owing to their alliance with Rwanda, and became part of 
the power-sharing transitional government at the end of the war, they were 
marginalised and threatened with the loss of their political significance 
following defeat in the 2006 elections (Prunier 2009). Faced with the 
outcomes of a majority-driven political system (Mamdani 2002), which 
marginalised the ethnic minorities, the CNDP was formed and this led to 
intensified conflict in the Kivus (Autesserre 2008).           
 
Nationally, there was a struggle against internal dictatorship and for 
democratic transition. While the first ‘war of liberation’, driven by regional 
security interests, managed to overthrow Mobutu, the struggle had failed in 
terms of the democratisation process, partly owing to internal divisions and 
the lack of legitimacy of the new government due to its dependence on and 
association with Rwanda (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Putzel et al. 2008; 
Prunier 2009), which had become an occupying force and had strengthened 
the Banyamulenge community. The attempt to gain legitimacy by cutting off 
the association with Rwanda had a significant effect on the regional and local 
aspects of the conflict. It gave Rwanda a reason to return to deal with the 
FDLR element (Rwanda’s security imperative) and to remove Laurent Kabila 
(Vlassenroot 2002), and it revived the anti-Banyamulenge campaign (McNulty 
1999; Lemarchand 2003; Reuters AlertNet n.d.). When it eventually triggered 
the second Congo War, the war brought in numerous regional players 
because of their own regional security concerns.  
 
Despite the signing of the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement, Laurent Kabila 
was reluctant to move towards democratic transition. The process for a 
negotiated peace was only moved forward when Joseph Kabila succeeded 
Laurent Kabila following the latter’s assassination in 2001. Nonetheless, the 
principle of power-sharing, through the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreement and 
the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement, did not unite the 
fragmented country or solve the local aspects of the conflicts in the eastern 
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DRC. The transition to democracy through elections instead intensified the 
conflict in the eastern DRC and led to increased political oppression by 
Joseph Kabila (Amnesty International 2006; MONUC 2006; Human Rights 
Watch 2008; Reuters AlertNet n.d.) 
 
Regional actors played a significant role in the conflicts in the DRC, as both 
wars were triggered by external interventions. Regional security interests 
were high in the DRC since the DRC hosted sanctuaries for several foreign 
rebel groups (Salehyan 2008) and numerous ‘refugees as vectors of violence’ 
(Lemarchand 1997) from neighbouring countries.107 This has been particularly 
so for Rwanda, owing to the threat from the armed Hutu refugees in the Kivus 
from the 1994 genocide, who later formed the FDLR, and the politically 
excluded Banyamulenge community in the eastern DRC, causing a ‘Kin 
country syndrome’ (Lemarchand 1997).108 Rwandan interventions greatly 
affected the local conflicts in the eastern DRC as they increased the anti-Tutsi 
feelings.  
 
The above examination of the multi-layered nature of the DRC conflict has 
identified the background and underlying causes of the continuing conflict in 
the eastern DRC. Firstly, there was the declining political legitimacy of Mobutu 
regime, along with institutional collapse and economic collapse, which led to 
the informal privatisation in the 1980s. This informal governance by social and 
economic networks was particularly apparent in the Kivus and has been 
consolidated through the wars and power-sharing arrangement followed 
during the peace process. Secondly, the local context in the Kivus was 
significantly affected by the issues around ethnicity, citizenship and land as 
underlying causes of the conflict as these issues were manipulated for 
political exclusion. Although ‘defining access to land’ (Mamdani 2002) was a 
key for the ethnic conflict in the Kivus, the state legislation remains 
inadequate in regulating land ownerships because of the existing traditional 
                                                          
107 Local settlement, as the preferred policy for refugees by the international community until 
the 1980s, did not bring about a desirable impact as some of those refugees had turned into 
armed rebels (Takeuchi 2006).   
108 According to Lemarchand (1997), ‘where ethnic fault-line cut across national boundaries, 
conflict tends to spill-over from one area to the next, transforming kin solidarities into a 
powerful vector of transnational violence.’ 
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authority and rebel authority in the area. Thirdly, how the international 
community responded to the Rwandan refugees who flooded into the DRC 
following the 1994 genocide significantly affected the occurrence and 
trajectory of the conflict in the DRC. The failure to disarm and separate 
génocidaires from civilians in the Rwandan refugee camps has consequently 
militarised the eastern DRC and created an urgent security threat for Rwanda 
to take action.  
 
More importantly, the peace process to achieve ceasefire and inclusive 
power-sharing agreements and the reconstruction process during the 
transitional period have failed to address these issues and the context 
adequately.  
 
Based on the examination of the peace process in this chapter, the state-
centric, inclusive power-sharing approach did not address the local socio-
political context in which various economic and security imperatives remain, 
and displayed its inability to address negative incentives and peace spoilers. 
Hence, the eastern DRC continues to be governed by informal social and 
economic networks which control the local resources and trade outside the 
state authority, and remain militarised. Within this context, players such as the 
FDLR are left outside the power-sharing arrangement. While the only option 
provided to the FDLR is to demobilise and repatriate, the FDLR maintain their 
economic and security interests and resist firmly by demanding political 
dialogue with the Rwandan government. Similarly, the members of the RDC-
Goma confront antagonism within the local community because of their 
relations with Rwanda and continue to be armed.  
 
Likewise, the reconstruction process during the transitional period suffered 
from some of the limitations of the post-conflict reconstruction instruments 
reviewed in Chapter Two. The majority-driven political system that was 
established through the 2006 elections significantly sidelined the RCD-Goma 
as an ethnic minority as well as maintaining the rift with the local community. 
The struggle against political exclusion by the Banyamulenge resulted in the 
formation of the CNDP and relapse of the armed conflict; as Hesselbein et al. 
Conflicts in the DRC between 1996 and 2008 
148 
 
(2006) point out, this is a risk of pursuing modern liberal democracy in post-
conflict African states. Another key issue is the failure of the process to 
integrate the army and demilitarise the area. As stated in the literature, the 
DDR programme overlooks distinct and complex structures embedded in the 
local context, and is unable to provide adequate assistance to former 
combatants and security to both former and integrated combatants.   
 
This chapter has highlighted that the above unsolved issues are crucial to be 
taken into account in any efforts to cease and prevent conflict in the eastern 
DRC. It therefore suggests some weaknesses of the analysis of contemporary 
conflicts – resource curse theory in particular. For example, the conflict in the 
DRC challenges the categorisation of civil war and inter-state war by 
presenting a multi-layered and hybrid nature. It also suggests the existence of 
a compelling link between scarcity in renewable natural resources and armed 
conflict in the DRC, as opposed to the abundance in non-renewable natural 
resources being a critical factor, since defining access to land appeared to be 
critical in understanding the local-level conflicts in the eastern DRC. 
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Chapter Five: Links between coltan and conflict in the eastern 
DRC 
 
This chapter explores how coltan production and trade finance and drive the 
conflicts in the eastern DRC. These armed conflicts are frequently explained 
by the ‘greed’ or the ‘economic functions of war’ hypotheses in the prevailing 
conflict analyses (Chapter Two). However my previous chapter, which 
examined the trajectories and nature of the DRC conflicts, has demonstrated 
the complex context which triggered conflicts at multiple levels and which still 
sustains some of them. By examining the system of coltan exploitation in the 
eastern DRC and how it has changed over time, this chapter seeks to identify 
the ways in which coltan exploitation is related to the conflict in the eastern 
DRC, an analysis that complements the preceding chapter.  
 
The chapter begins with a brief literature review on the links between coltan 
exploitation and conflict in the eastern DRC. The second section gives an 
overview of coltan applications and the market. The subsequent section 
examines artisanal coltan mining and its background and legislative 
environment, followed by the impact on the socio-economic and 
environmental conditions to identify core issues of coltan extraction. The 
fourth section begins by analysing the coltan trade chain from the perspective 
of the history of informal cross-border trade in the DRC. It then examines the 
coltan trade chain and the involvement of armed groups during the second 
Congo War and the post-war period as the coltan trade has evolved over time.   
    
5.1. Studies on the nexus between coltan exploitation and conflicts in the 
DRC   
 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the relationship between mineral 
resources and conflict in the eastern DRC since 2000. The UN Security 
Council commissioned a Panel of Experts109 to study the illegal exploitation of 
resources in the DRC in 2000, which prompted many other studies. The Panel 
                                                          
109 The Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
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published five reports between 2001 and 2003.110 The first report (UNSC 
2001a) identifies the pervasive link through which the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources financed and sustained the second Congo War. This report 
was significant in highlighting the role played by private companies, supported 
by their home countries and international financial institutions (Khan 2008), 
and provoked diplomatic pressure from some Western governments (Lasker 
2008). The second report (UNSC 2001b) also suggests that the exploitation of 
natural resources has become a ‘primary motive’ for Rwanda and Uganda, 
although they initially invaded the DRC for security reasons (UNSC 2001b), 
and the system of natural resource exploitation through ‘elite networks’ 
(UNSC 2002b) was established during the second Congo War (UNSC 2002a). 
While the study lists 85 companies as being in breach of the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and stressed the responsibility of the 
home governments (UNSC 2002b), the natural resource and conflict link has 
been supported by the influential rational choice theory and the economic 
functions of the war paradigm reviewed in Chapter Two.  
 
A study by the International Peace Information Service (IPIS) also suggests 
that there was a change in the motivation for conflict from political to 
economic (Raeymaekers 2002). The study uses the term ‘network war’ to 
depict privatised networks of army officers, armed groups and international 
companies, linking the local war economy with global economic networks to 
plunder resources for personal enrichment and to finance the conflict. In the 
emerging political economy from this ‘network war’, state boundaries, state 
sovereignty or the distinction between legal and illegal economy are not 
relevant. As such, the situation can be understood as ‘emerging complexes’, 
according to Duffield (2001).   
 
The view, which states that coltan exploitation motivates and finances armed 
groups, has been supported in particular by NGOs, which call for action by 
private companies.111 The business partnership between military and private 
companies, which assist to exploit, transport and market coltan from the DRC, 
                                                          
110 UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003b).  
111 For example, Hayes and Burge (2003); Global Witness (2004); Enough (2009a). 
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is described as ‘military commercialism’ in some studies.112 Within this 
‘military commercialism’, ‘the maintenance of insecurity has become a primary 
source of enrichment’ and strategy (Raeymaekers 2002: 9). 
 
Other studies, whilst agreeing with the above view, point out issues that have 
not been considered by the above studies, with the exclusive focus on the link 
between coltan exploitation and conflict. One piece of research, using an 
ethnographic approach, demonstrates that coltan mining has become the 
most important means for local people to survive (Jackson 2003). A 
Congolese NGO in Goma, the Pole Institute, has revealed how coltan mining 
changed the life of the population within the context of state collapse and 
successive wars (Tegera et al. 2002). Furthermore, by examining the mining 
policy of the transitional government, the Pole Institute elucidated, firstly, a 
general structural problem of the DRC that lies in the collapse of the state 
institutions and formal economy and, secondly, the inability of the transitional 
government to address the struggles over mining ownership that arose from 
inconsistent legislation (Johnson and Tegera 2005). The NGO also provided a 
detailed analysis of the informal cross-border trade in North Kivu which 
explains the existing commercial rivalry between different communities for 
survival (Tegera and Johnson 2007). While there are some studies that focus 
on the informal cross-border trade in the region,113 in-depth studies are 
limited.114 As explained in the previous chapters (Chapters Two and Four), 
some studies emphasise the nature of the state and governance, such as the 
‘predatory governance’ (Rackley 2006) and warlord politics (Reno 1998; 
2000). 
 
Studies conducted more recently identify that all key parties to the conflicts, 
namely the FDLR, the CNDP, the Mayi Mayi and the FARDC, raise funding 
from mineral exploitation and taxations (UNSC 2008a; Global Witness 2009c; 
Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 2009b). While the continuation of the natural 
                                                          
112 They include Dietrich (2000); Cuvelier and Raeymaekers (2002a); Raeymaekers (2002); 
Amnesty International (2003). 
113 Examples include DFID (2007); INICA (2007a; 2007b); Garrett and Mitchell (2009a; 
2009b). 
114 Examples include MacGaffey et al. (1991); Kisangani (1998); Raeymaekers (2009a; 
2009b). 
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resource exploitation by the armed groups in the eastern DRC can be viewed 
as a symptom of insecurity and governance failure (Garrett and Mitchell 
2009a; 2009b), or the complexities of war economies (Garrett et al. 2009), an 
analysis of the conflict motivation using qualitative geographical methodology 
uncovered grievance and security as being important motivations (Spittaels 
and Hilgert 2008; 2009b).  
 
The above literature review clearly shows remarkably little analysis of the 
motivation for the conflicts. There is also a limited attempt to join together the 
various issues related to natural resource exploitation in order to achieve 
more comprehensive understanding of the nature of the link between the 
coltan exploitation and conflict, which constitutes the aim of the rest of this 
chapter.   
 
5.2. Coltan  
 
Coltan is the local name of columbo-tantalite or columbite-tantalite in central 
Africa (TIC 2009). As the name suggests, coltan contains two kinds of ores, 
namely, tantalite and columbite. A metallic element called tantalum is 
extracted from tantalite and, similarly, niobium is extracted from columbite 
(ibid.). Tantalum is highly resistant to heat and corrosion, and has a particular 
ability to store and release electrical energy (Mining Journal 2007). It is 
tantalite that has been considered to be one of the conflict minerals from the 
eastern DRC, since the demand for tantalum has increased over the past ten 
years.    
 
5.2.1. Application  
 
Given its ability to store and release electrical energy, about 60 percent of the 
tantalum consumed each year is made into powder or wire form to 
manufacture capacitors (Mining Journal 2007; TIC 2009). Despite efforts to 
find a substitute material for the production of capacitors, other materials 
cannot achieve the same performance as tantalum (Ruffini 2008). Tantalum 
capacitors are very small and lose less power, and are therefore used in 
Links between coltan and conflict in the eastern DRC 
153 
 
various devices in telecommunications, data storage and implantable medical 
devices (Mining Journal 2007). As tantalum capacitors are able to miniaturise 
handsets and prolong battery life, they have become essential elements for 
the telecommunications industry, whose demands of which take up about 18 
percent of production (Hayes and Burge 2003). A typical mobile phone 
handset with camera and video function contains 22 or 23 tantalum capacitors 
(TIC 2004). In addition, tantalum has a wide range of other applications, 
including: cutting tools made of tantalum carbide; X-ray films, camera lenses 
and inkjet printers made from tantalum oxide; and jet engines made with 
tantalum sheets, rods and wires (TIC 2009). 
 
For those various applications above, primary tantalum processors purchase 
tantalum bearing mineral concentrate, extract and purify tantalum, and 
transform tantalum into powders, wires and other forms (Talison 2008a). This 
is a highly sophisticated process, which requires a considerable amount of 
investment for factories and facilities (Ruffini 2008), the use of highly 
dangerous chemicals and, hence, adherence to various regulations (TIC 
2004). Owing to the above requirements, as well as the highly specialised 
market for tantalum products, there are only limited numbers of tantalum 
processors in the world.115 Germany’s H.C. Starck,116 the Cabot Corporation 
based in the US,117 and China’s Ningxia Non-ferrous Metals Smeltery 
(NNMS)118 are the three principal tantalum processors in the world and 
consume 70 percent (Mineweb 2008) to 80 percent of the global tantalum 
supply (Ruffini 2008).119   
 
5.2.2. Demand and price 
 
Global demand for capacitor-grade tantalum has continued to grow at 6 
percent a year on average for the past 15 years, and totalled approximately 5 
                                                          
115 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 




119 These three companies are detailed in the section 6.3., and the involvement of H.C. Starck 
in the Durban Process is also reviewed in the section 7.1. 
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million pounds in weight per year (Ruffini 2008). The growth has been smaller 
than expected because of the development of smaller capacitors (ibid.).   
 
Figure 1: Tantalum historical market demand (Talison Minerals 2008a) 
 
The price of tantalum is determined by the tantalum oxide (Ta2O5) content, 
which ranges from 10 percent to over 60 percent (TIC 2009). The price is 
usually negotiated between buyers and sellers with long-term contracts 
without being published; however, a spot market for tantalum exists, 
especially when the demand is high or supply is low (Mining Journal 2007). 
Although the price soared from between USD18 and USD20 per pound in 
1998 to USD300 per pound in 2000, due to the ‘IT tech bubble’ (Ruffini 2008), 
which caused a ‘coltan boom’ between November 2000 and March 2001 in 
the DRC, it shrank to normal level of USD30 to USD40 per pound in October 
2001 (Hayes and Burge 2003). This price drop is explained by both an 
increase in supply and a decrease in demand. The increased supply came 
from additional outputs in Australia and a sale of tantalum stockpiles by the 
US Defence Logistics Agency (DLA), which operates under the US Ministry of 
Defence, in December 2000 (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002b).120 Many 
coltan-using companies suspended purchases of tantalum from the DRC 
                                                          
120 The US DLA was selling its tantalum stockpiles from the Cold War period at 500,000 
pounds a year, however, it had stopped the sale when the stockpiles run out in 2006 
(Miningmx 2007; Ruffini 2008). 
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around the time when the UN Panel of Experts’ reports were released 
between 2001 and 2002,121 as discussed in more detail in Chapter Six. The 
‘coltan boom’ (Redmond 2001) was thus short lived, and the tantalum price 
had remained stable at around USD50 per pound since the ‘coltan boom’. 
     
5.2.3. Supply 
 
The major sources of tantalum include areas in Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
China, Ethiopia and central and southern Africa (Mining Journal 2007). 
Talison Minerals Pty Ltd, formally Sons of Gwalia Ltd, in Western Australia, 
was the world’s largest tantalum concentrate supplier and supplied about a 
third of the tantalum in the world (Mineweb 2008). The company suspended 
its operations in the Wodgina mine on 26 November 2008, due to weak 
demand caused by the global financial crisis and a continuing tendency for 
cost reduction in the electronics supply chain, which could be served by low-
cost tantalum from the DRC (Talison Minerals 2008b). According to an 
industry expert (Roskill 2009), the reason behind the suspension was a failed 
attempt in negotiation to increase the contract price with its clients, who were 
facing a weakened demand and a cheap supply available from central Africa 
and large raw material stocks. In addition, Noventa’s Marropino mine in 
Mozambique was suspended (Noventa 2009) in May 2009, owing to a lack of 
investment (Biesheuvel 2009), as well as Tanco’s mine in Canada (Mineweb 
2009). Altogether, almost 40 percent of primary tantalum supply has been 
reduced (Roskill 2009).   
 
                                                          
121 UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b).  
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Figure 2: Tantalum primary production in 2008(f) (Talison Minerals 2008a)
 
There is a claim that cheap raw materials from artisanal production in the 
eastern DRC have been fulfilling the need for various electronic goods over 
the last ten years (Mantz 2008: 44), particularly because the DRC is 
considered to possess 80 percent of the world’s coltan reserve.122 There are 
different estimates of the coltan supply from the DRC, owing to the absence of 
reliable or accurate records from the DRC. The US Geological Survey (USGS 
2009b) estimates that 70,548 pounds of tantalum content were supplied from 
the DRC in 2007. Another source estimates that the supply of 259,000 
pounds per year came from small artisanal mining operations in Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, the DRC, Nigeria and Namibia (Ruffini 2008). Because there 
are no reliable or accurate statistics on tantalum production or supply from the 
                                                          
122 This figure appears in a book chapter by Moyroud and Katunga (2002: 159) and has been 
quoted in numerous studies, however, the original source of this figure is unknown. The 
German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) estimates that 25-65 
percent of the world’s coltan reserve is in the DRC, stretching into Rwanda and Uganda 
(Garrett 2007). These figures are, nonetheless, not likely to be accurate because of the lack 
of modern geological surveying in the DRC (ibid.; D’Souza 2009).   
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DRC, all figures relating to tantalum supply from the DRC are 
‘guesstimates’.123     
 
Figure 3: Tantalum ore production in Africa (Franken 2009: 7) 
 
 
There are also other sources of tantalum including scrap and recycled 
tantalum, surpluses and tin slag. Whilst tantalum processors try to obtain 
tantalum from scrap and other secondary sources due to the abovementioned 
decrease in primary tantalum supply (Roskill 2009), tantalum supply from 
scrap and recycling is also declining, owing to the difficulty in extracting 
tantalum from extremely small circuit board chips (Ruffini 2008). There is, 
therefore, a likelihood of an acute supply shortage in the near future when 
demand recovers (Mineweb 2009; Minor Metals 2009). The challenge for 
primary tantalum suppliers will be the increasing mining operation costs and 
the stagnant tantalum price imposed by the cost reduction strategies of the 
electronics supply chain (Talison Minerals 2008a). 
     
Figure 4: Tantalum supply sources in 2008 (Source: Talison Minerals 2008a) 
 
                                                          
123 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 




5.3. Artisanal coltan mining in the eastern DRC 
 
The World Bank published a report on the mining sector in the DRC in 2008. 
According to the report (World Bank 2008a), 90 percent of the mineral 
production is considered to be mined by artisanal miners in the DRC, who are 
estimated to number between 500,000 and 2,000,000. The artisanal mining 
sector in the DRC thus provides a livelihood for 14–16 percent of the total 
population. The report sums up that the artisanal mining in the DRC is:  
 
the largest segment of the DRC mining sector and the one that has the 
highest impact in terms of production as well as persons involved. This 
sector is dominated by a number of problem areas, including relations 
between artisans and large-scale miners; exploitation of vulnerable 
populations; extortion by government officials and criminal elements; 
lack of health, safety, and environment protection; and inadequate 
legal protection and government assistance for the miners.  
(ibid.: 56) 
 
The rest of this section examines artisanal coltan mining in the eastern DRC, 
in terms of its method, background, legislative environment and impacts. 




5.3.1. Artisanal coltan mining in the eastern DRC 
 
Coltan deposits exist in the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, 
Orientale and Katanga in the DRC (Fetherston 2004, cited in USGS 2009b), 
often together with or close to deposits of cassiterite (tin) and wolframite 
(tungsten) (USGS 2009a). According to a recent interactive map of mines in 
the eastern DRC, created by the International Peace Information Service 
(IPIS 2009), there are approximately 200 mines for various minerals in the 
Kivus, of which 13 are major mines.124 Whilst the DRC is believed to have 
more deposits and greater potential, these areas have not undergone modern 
geological exploration, largely owing to the wars and conflict, and thus exact 
potential deposits are unknown (Enough 2009b).125   
 
Artisanal coltan mining occurs in rivers, open cast or underground, and in soft 
rock deposits (Redmond 2001; Levin 2008d; Garrett 2009). The process 
includes removing vegetation and surface, digging up stones and rocks 
containing coltan, and crushing and washing them in water in order to remove 
impurity (Redmond 2001; Hayes and Burge 2003; Jackson 2003; Levin 
2008d). Most of the mines in these areas are only suitable for artisanal mining 
because of soft rocks (Garrett 2009; Garrett and Mitchell 2009a). 
 
The hazardous and exploitative nature of artisanal mining in the eastern DRC 
has been highlighted by various media and reports.126 They convey typical 
stories of miners (creuseurs) who scratch inside fragile narrow pits or in a 
river in inhumane conditions, without any sanitation systems or protection, 
and earn a meagre income after being extorted by armed groups, the national 
                                                          
124 Amongst the thirteen major mines, twelve mines are under the control of armed groups. 
The major mines are identified as Minembwe, Misisi, Mpofi, Bisie, Gakombe, Bwina, Benzia, 
Wamiti, Lugushwa, Kinyinya Millimani, Ihana group, Bibatama – River Gauche, and 
Mugerero, and there are more than 500 workers at each mine site. The interactive map of 
militarised mining areas in the Kivus (August 2009) can be viewed online at 
http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/MiMiKi/Areas/web/index.html.     
125 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
126 For example, Channel 4 (2008); Guardian Weekly (2008); World Bank (2008a); Global 
Witness (2009c). 
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army and government officials surrounding the mines. The income of artisanal 
miners in the Kivus is estimated to be much smaller than those in other 
provinces, ranging from between USD2 and USD10 per day (INICA 2007a) to 
USD800 per year, owing to extortion by numerous actors and the smaller 
value of minerals produced in the Kivus (World Bank 2008a).   
 
5.3.2. Historical background of artisanal coltan mining  
 
Coltan was originally found in the Kivus in 1910, but was only extracted as a 
minor by-product of cassiterite until the 1990s (Amnesty International 2003; 
World Bank 2008a). Based on this, some assume that artisanal coltan mining 
began in the area in the1990s.127 This partly explains the historical events 
relevant for artisanal coltan mining in the eastern DRC, which overlap with the 
previous chapter on the DRC conflict.   
 
The 1966 Bakajika Law to change the ownership of all land and mineral rights 
to the Zairian state, mentioned in the previous chapter (section 4.2.), was 
followed by the nationalisation of a Belgian-owned private mining company, 
the UMHK (Union Minière du Haut-Katanga) in 1967, turning it into a 100 
percent state-owned mining company, Gécamines (Générale des carriers et 
des mines). Whilst there was a period of economic growth and high copper 
prices between 1968 and 1974, the country then entered an economic crisis, 
following the 1973 Zairianisation of all foreign-owned businesses, a decline of 
copper prices in 1974, unsuccessful public investments, a rise in the price of 
oil, and a disruption of mineral exports owing to the Angolan civil war 
(MacGaffey 1991). As the country went into a deeper economic crisis in the 
1980s, despite various efforts being made, government capacity had also 
deteriorated, and fiscal and liberalisation reforms were introduced (ibid.). In 
1983, artisanal mining was officially permitted in order to legalise artisanal 
mining by the Zairian state, which ‘was increasingly powerless to control the 
circuits of mineral production in the informal economy’ and under pressure 
                                                          
127 Jackson (2003) mentions it was in 1996. Global Witness (2004) assumes it was when the 
refugees from the 1994 Rwandan genocide arrived, after the cease of production in the end of 
Mobutu era.    
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from the IMF (Zeilig 2009: 226). The informal cross-border trade in minerals 
as a means of survival expanded considerably throughout the 1980s and 
1990s (Johnson and Tegera 2005; Custers et al. 2009), as detailed in the 
subsequent section. It is important to note that the cessation of large-scale 
industrial mining production has transformed the mining sector into artisanal 
mining production over the three decades (Garrett 2007).   
 
Prior to the first Congo War, there were two key mining companies operating 
in the Kivus. Firstly, a Belgian-Zairian mining company, SOMINKI (Société 
Minière et Industrielle du Kivu), was established in 1976, through a merger of 
several Belgian mining companies which had existed since colonial times 
(Tegera et al. 2002). SOMINKI owned most of the significant mining 
concessions in eastern Zaïre for gold, cassiterite and coltan. It permitted 
controlled artisanal mining in its mining concessions when it was forced to 
close its industrial mining operations during the economic crisis in the 1980s. 
 
SOMINKI went through an upheaval, including several changes of ownership 
and a state collapse and was eventually liquidated on 29 March 1997 when its 
shares were largely owned by SAKIMA (Societé Aurifère de Kivu et Maniema), 
a subsidiary of the Canadian Banro Group. Banro and the Congolese 
government, headed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila, had legal disputes over the 
ownership of SOMINKI since the AFDL, led by Kabila, was controlling 
SOMINKI concessions. Kabila, however, cancelled a deal made with Banro 
and set up a state company called SOMICO (Société Minière du Congo), 
headed by a Kivu traditional ruler, to take over the former SOMINKI. 
Subsequently, the second Congo War began, and the RCD-Goma seized 
power in the eastern DRC in 1998. The RCD-Goma received support from 
subsidiaries of Banro and took control of mining concessions belonging to 
SOMINKI and a traditional ruler in the area. The RCD-Goma considered 
SOMINKI as abandoned property, since 42 of the 47 concession titles had 
expired between 1998 and 2000, and granted the concessions to the Congo 
Holding Development Company and MEDIVAL.   
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In 2001, the Congolese government acknowledged that Banro, through its 
subsidiary SAKIMA, had legal ownership of SOMINKI’s former concessions. 
While the disputes over the ownership of SOMINKI’s former concessions 
were settled legally, the geographical area, where these concessions were 
located, was under the authority of the RCD-Goma, and the expired titles 
reverted to the RCD-Goma authorities.  
 
Secondly, a company called SOMIKIVU (Societé Minière du Kivu) was 
established in 1982 (Johnson and Tegera 2005), with the ownership of a 
German company GfE, which was 100 percent owned by a US firm, 
Metallurg, the Zairian government and SOMINKI. SOMIKIVU’s key operation 
was the mining of niobium, a metallic element extracted from columbite in 
coltan (columbite-tantalite), in the Luheshe mine in North Kivu. Although GfE 
handed over its shares to a local German director, Karl-Heinz Albers, in 1993, 
Albers left GfE and set up his own trading firm called Masingiro in 1996, in 
order to export coltan and niobium from North Kivu. Laurent Kabila’s 
government decided to liberate the Luheshe mine and dissolve SOMIKIVU in 
1998. The RCD-Goma, nonetheless, started a mining operation under the 
management of Albers in 1999 after it took control of the eastern DRC in 
August 1998. The RCD-Goma provided armed protection for the operation of 
the Luheshe mine, in return for economic support. Coltan produced in the 
Luheshe mine was handled by the aforementioned Masingiro and exported 
through a trading company, GBC. GBC purportedly exported around 50 
percent of coltan from the eastern DRC in 2000 to clients abroad, including 
H.C. Starck, the Cabot Corporation and the NNMS (Tegera et al. 2002). At the 
same time, Laurent Kabila’s government cancelled all the SOMIKIVU 
concessions and granted them to an Australian firm in 1999.   
 
The above two cases of SOMINKI and SOMKIVU illustrate the conflicts over 
mine ownership, involving the government, rebel groups and private 
companies. These conflicts occurred largely because of the duplications of 
mine ownership since the area was not controlled by the central government, 
and mining legislation was not adequate. The following sub-section examines 
mining legislation in the DRC in relation to artisanal mining.  




5.3.3. Legislative environment for artisanal mining 
 
Artisanal mining was by and large neglected in the previous mining legislation 
(INICA 2007b), despite having been permitted by the Mobutu government in 
1983.128 New mining legislation governing mineral extraction and trading, the 
Mining Code of 11 July 2002129 and the Mining Regulation of 26 March 
2003,130 were developed by the Ministry of Mines and Hydrocarbons with the 
support of the World Bank. It aimed ‘to create a stable investment 
environment for companies investing in the DRC, providing them with security 
of title and certainty of process’ in order to increase state revenues to rebuild 
the country (INICA 2007b: 33). 
 
The Mining Code was created after Joseph Kabila became the head of 
Kinshasa government, following the assassination of Laurent-Désiré Kabila in 
January 2001 (Johnson and Tegera 2005). The Mining Code was drafted by 
World Bank consultants within the framework of an economic reform 
programme, the Programme Intérimaire Renforcé (PIR), which the Kinshasa 
government started in 2001. On completion, the PIR was replaced by the 
Programme Économique du Gouverment (PEG) for 2002–2005, and the 
Kinshasa government restored international cooperation in 2002. As all these 
events, including the enactment of the Mining Code, took place before the 
peace agreements were signed,131 and when half of the country was 
controlled by various rebel groups, they were not initiatives of the transitional 
government that was formed in 2003. 
 
                                                          
128 For details, see the section 5.3.2.. 
129 Official Document of the Democratic Republic of Congo, LAW No. 007/2002 of JULY 11, 
2002 RELATING TO THE MINING CODE, downloaded from 
www.unites.uqam.ca/grama/pdf/DRC2002.pdf on 12/11/2009. 
130 Decree No. 038/2003 of 26 March 2003 or DECRET N°038/2003 DU 26 mars 2003 
PORTANT REGLEMENT MINIER, downloaded from http://www.droit-
afrique.com/images/textes/RDC/RDC%20-%20R%E9glement%20minier%202003.pdf on 
12/11/2009. 
131 These peace agreements include the Sun City Agreement of 19 April 2002, the Pretoria 
Accord of 30 July 2002, the Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002 and the Global and All-
Inclusive Agreement of 17 December 2002, prior to the formation of the transitional 
government in 18 July 2003. Chapter Four details those peace agreements.   
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According to the 2002 Mining Code, it is the state that possesses all deposits 
of minerals and can grant mining and exploration rights, and holders of mining 
or exploration rights obtain the ownership of products for sale.132 Mining and 
exploration rights must be distinguished from surface rights, which are 
regulated by the land law133 as follows: 
 
[T]he state has the exclusive, inalienable and imprescriptible property 
of the land. The state can grant surface rights to private or public 
parties … Surface rights do not entail the right to exploit the mineral 
substances of the soil or subsoil and, inversely, a mining right does not 
entail any surface occupation right over the surface (André-Dumont 
and Carbonez 2009: 45).  
 
These two different laws create confusions and conflicts, as more than one 
party can claim the ownership of the same land, in addition to the land 
ownership through the customary land tenure system134 on the ground 
(Garrett 2007). 
  
The 2002 Mining Code states that: the president has jurisdiction over the 
classification of mineral substances and the designation of areas out of 
bounds for mining;135 the Mining Minister is tasked with granting mining rights, 
authorising trading and export, and creating artisanal mining zones136; the 
Provincial Governor issues traders’ cards for artisanal mining products; and 
the Provincial Mining Division issues artisanal miners’ cards.137 
 
The 2002 Mining Code is distinct from the previous mining legislation in 
providing a clear division between industrial and artisanal mining (Johnson 
and Tegera 2005). The code states that a ‘mining perimeter covered by a 
valid mining title cannot be transformed into an artisanal mining area … As 
long as an artisanal mining area exists, no mining titles can be granted over 
                                                          
132 Article 3. 
133 Law No. 73-021 of July 1973. 
134 For details on the customary land tenure system see the section 4.3.. 
135 Article 9. 
136 Article 10. 
137 Article 12. 
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the area, except for an exploration licence applied for by a group of artisanal 
miners who are working in the area’.138 Whilst artisanal miners do not have 
legal mining rights, artisanal miners, who are Congolese nationals, can pay 
USD25 to receive a one-year Artisanal Exploitation Card (carte de creseur) 
from the Provincial Mining Division and mine within a designated zone for 
artisanal exploitation (INICA 2007b). Similarly, Congolese nationals can apply 
to the Provincial Governor for a traders’ card in order to purchase artisanal 
mining products.139 
 
As such, the code intends to regulate mineral extraction and trading in order 
to formalise the informal economy in artisanal mining, as one of the key 
elements of the transitional government’s mining policy (Johnson and Tegera 
2005). The mining policy also attempts to create legal security and necessary 
conditions for investors through reviewing existing mining contracts and 
concessions, restructuring existing parastatals in the mining sector, and 
certifying mineral exports from the DRC through the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme (KPCS)140 for diamonds and adaptations of the KPCS 
for other minerals (ibid.).   
 
In reality, the 2002 Mining Code does not appear to be effective for the 
artisanal mining sector in the DRC for three reasons. Firstly, provisions for the 
artisanal mining sector are not practical. For example, few artisanal miners 
possess an Artisanal Exploitation Card, mainly because of the obstacles they 
face in obtaining the card, including fees, a written exam to pass, a 
requirement to undertake training and various obligations with which to  
comply141 (INICA 2007b). Moreover, designated artisanal mining areas have 
not been established in the Kivus, despite requests made by artisanal and 
small-scale miners (ibid.). The government (Ministry of Mines) is not likely to 
provide artisanal mining areas because the area has not had a modern 
                                                          
138 Article 109. 
139 Article 116-120. 
140 For details on the KPCS, see the section 7.2.. 
141 These obligations include protecting and restoring the environment and ensuring health 
and safety (INICA 2007b).  
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exploration and there could be deposits to attract large mining investments.142 
Secondly, the code does not clarify how to address the issue of ongoing 
artisanal mining in industrial mining areas, or how to settle disputes over mine 
ownership (Johnson and Tegera 2005). Lastly, there is a serious problem in 
the enforcement of the code, and the timetable for the application of the 
Mining Code has not been followed (ibid.). Although the code clarifies that the 
military does not play a role in providing security in mining areas143 and the 
authority assured to address insecurity caused by military personnel in mining 
areas (IPIS 2007), the military remains largely present in those areas. In 
addition, as artisanal mining activities often occur in isolated and remote 
areas, they tend to remain informal and subsidiary (INICA 2007b). The 
underlying issue for the lack of enforcement is that the code has been set up 
by the central government located in the western DRC without understanding 
the reality in the eastern DRC, providing judicial and financial means to 
enforce the code, or addressing its contradictions with other legislation 
(Jonson and Tegera 2005).  
 
Consequently, the 2002 Mining Code has been criticised for being unrealistic 
and encouraging fraud (Johnson and Tegera 2005; Garrett 2007; INICA 
2007b). The inadequate provisions for the artisanal mining sector make 
artisanal mining illegal and unregulated and do not provide any legal 
protection for artisanal mining communities (Garrett 2007). While the code’s 
‘international best standard’ (IPIS 2007) made the acquisition of mining rights 
‘laughably easy’ for industry mining, it does not improve natural resource 
management (Johnson and Tegera 2005: 57) and artisanal mining 
communities are largely neglected in the design of the code (Johnson and 
Tegera 2005)144 as they are considered to be trivial in terms of their economic 
output (Johnson and Tegera 2005) despite the fact that 90 percent of minerals 
in the DRC are produced by the artisanal mining sector (World Bank 2008a). 
Above all, the code does not provide solutions to conflicts over mine 
                                                          
142 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
143 Article 16. 
144 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
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ownership, or confusions with other contradicting legislation, hence it does not 
improve security in mining areas. 
 
5.3.4. Impact of artisanal coltan mining    
 
The last two sub-sections have explained why illegal, unregulated and 
dangerous artisanal coltan mining has been widespread in the eastern DRC. 
In sum, there is a lack of alternative livelihood, owing to the collapse of the 
formal economy since the economic crisis in 1970s and the ongoing conflict 
and insecurity since 1996. Moreover, the inadequate legislation leaves the 
artisanal mining sector largely illegal and unregulated and hence creates 
considerable negative impacts. This sub-section identifies the impact of 
artisanal coltan mining in the eastern DRC.   
 
Firstly, the environmental impact in the area has been considerable 
(Redmond 2001; Moyroud and Katunga 2002; Garrett 2009), especially in the 
Kahuzi-Biega National Park, where 75 percent of the coltan deposits are 
located (Levin 2008d). Forest clearance for mining, making mining camps and 
tools and cooking, the pollution of streams from washing minerals and tailing, 
especially with mercury and other toxins, and miners eating bush meat have 
caused a significant change in the biodiversity. In addition, the unprotected 
land surface has caused landslides. 
 
Artisanal coltan mining has also produced an incalculable socio-economic 
impact in the area (Redmond 2001; Tegera et al. 2002; Amnesty International 
2003; Jackson 2003). Agricultural production has dramatically declined and 
caused a food crisis since a significant number of the local population, 
including children, have left agriculture and moved to mining, or have been 
forced to mine in some cases, especially during the coltan boom (Tegera et al. 
2002; Amnesty International 2003; Jackson 2003). The influx of people to the 
mining areas has caused conflicts with the local population and inflation in the 
area (Garrett 2007). According to an estimate, about 40 percent of the people 
around mines are children and about 20 percent are women (World Bank 
2008a). Inevitably, school attendance has declined, and livelihoods have 
Links between coltan and conflict in the eastern DRC 
168 
 
changed. Health and safety issues are the main concern in the mining areas 
because of accidents and respiratory illness from the dust. Social problems 
such as drinking, drugs, crimes, prostitution, sexual abuse, HIV/AIDS and 
sexually transmitted diseases have also increased in the mining areas. In 
addition, radioactivity from coltan is considered to have caused respiratory 
problems and led to deformed or stillborn babies being born in the mining 
communities (Amnesty International 2003); however, the issue of radioactivity 
has been largely neglected in the recent research.   
 
In addition to the environmental and socio-economic issues above, there is a 
security concern posed by the presence and involvement of various armed 
groups and the national army in artisanal coltan mining (UNSC 2001a; 2001b; 
2002a; 2002b; Raeymaekers 2002; Amnesty International 2003; Jackson 
2003; Global Witness 2004; 2009c; World Bank 2008a; Garrett and Mitchell 
2009b). This affects the artisanal mining communities severely, in particular 
because artisanal miners are not protected legally under the current Mining 
Code, as examined in the previous section. Various illegal taxes are often 
extorted from poor artisanal miners, and they are ‘kept to [their] little hole’ 
without having access to markets or trading houses (Johnson and Tegera 
2005: 24). It is often the traders who benefit from having access to the 
international market and buyers; the local population, especially artisanal 
mining communities, do not benefit significantly from artisanal coltan mining 
and trade (Tegera et al. 2002; Johnson and Tegera 2005; Garrett and Mitchell 
2009a) but suffer from environmental damage, socio-economic problems and 
insecurity (Johnson and Tegera 2005). Despite the considerable negative 
impact, artisanal mining can provide a quick or the only livelihood without any 
capital or education for the local population in an insecure and unstable 
environment (Durban Process 2006b). The engagement of the local 
population in dangerous artisanal mining manifests the human insecurity in 
the eastern DRC, as artisanal mining is the ‘industry of last resort’ (Material 
World 2005).   
 
5.4. Coltan trade in the eastern DRC and beyond 
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This section begins by contextualising the coltan trade chain in the history of 
informal economy in the DRC, cross-border trade in particular. It then 
examines the coltan trade chain and the involvement of armed groups during 
the second Congo War and the post-war period.   
 
5.4.1. Informal cross-border trade in the region 
 
The size of the informal economy in the DRC has been significant, and the 
anthropological study on the Congolese ‘real economy’ by MacGaffey (1991) 
estimated the size to be as high as three times the size of the official GDP. 
Similarly, a recent study on the natural resource trade in the Great Lakes 
Region (DFID 2007) estimates that more than half of exports from the DRC 
are not officially recorded, owing to under-declared exports for tax evasion 
and the lack of capacity and weak governance within the state institutions in 
the DRC. The tax gap in 2005, resulting from the ongoing informal cross-
border trade in minerals, is considered to amount to USD35 million or nearly 
USD170 million if mining taxes are included (World Bank 2007b cited in IPIS 
2007: 2).145 The degree of informality within the mining and trade sectors 
encourages illegal operations, since formal operations are more difficult to 
carry out (ibid). This corresponds to the ‘Doing Business’ ranking, mentioned 
in the introduction of this thesis, which rated the DRC 178th out of 178 states 
for its regulatory environment for business and investment (World Bank 
2007a).  
 
The extent of informal cross-border trade in the DRC is, however, not a new 
phenomenon (MacGaffey 1991; Putzel et al 2008; Raeymaekers 2009). As 
the preceding chapter (section 4.2.1.) has explained, the collapse of the 
formal economy in the 1970s facilitated the expansion of the informal 
economy in the DRC. Moreover, the Congolese population has been taking 
matters into their own hands throughout the colonial and post-colonial period 
                                                          
145 World Bank (2007b) ‘DRC, Growth with Governance in the Mining Sector’ is an action plan 
for the DRC mining sector, and was presented at the ‘World Bank and DR Congo, Mining 
Session’ meeting in Paris on 30 November 2007.  
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(MacGaffey 1991; Vwakyanakazi 1991; Johnson and Tegera 2005; IPIS 2009; 
Raeymaekers 2009b). In De Soto’s words (1989: 55): 
 
[P]eople are capable of violating a system which does not accept them, 
not so that they can live in anarchy but so that they can build a different 
system which respects a minimum of essential rights. 
 
However, informal cross-border trade in the DRC is understudied,146 partly 
owing to the difficulties of conducting research on second economy activities 
and in the DRC (MacGaffey 1991).   
 
Historically, the exchange of different resources between natural regions had 
developed trade routes throughout Africa, and the trade continued despite 
restrictions imposed by colonial administrations (MacGaffey 1991). The 
peasantisation and peripheralisation policies that were enforced by the 
Belgian administration in the Kivus147 meant that the area was brought into a 
capitalist world system, merely to provide food to mining areas and cities and 
labour to plantations (Sosne 1979). After independence in 1960, faced with no 
possibility of marketing or uprooting the tea and coffee introduced for the 
plantations,148 the local population started selling tea and coffee to Rwandan 
traders clandestinely (ibid.). Two studies on the informal cross-border trade 
from North Kivu are introduced in the following sections to illustrate the long-
standing structure of informal cross-border trade.        
 
According to a study on the territories of Beni and Lubero in North Kivu, 
bordering with Uganda (Raeymaekers 2009b), some Nande inhabitants 
became petty traders during the colonial period, and started to sell local 
                                                          
146 Studies that are conducted on the informal cross-border trade in the eastern DRC are 
limited. This research identified: MacGaffey et al. (1991); Kisangani (1998); DFID (2007); 
INICA (2007a; 2007b); Raeymaekers (2009a; 2009b). 
147 Throughout the colonial period, no investment was committed to infrastructure 
development, including roads, ports, storages, electricity and water, and forced labours were 
barely paid, in order to secure profits for the planters through peasantisation of the 
populations (Sosne 1979). Concomitantly, the area was cut off from the Congo exchange 
network and the rest of the world, to be peripheralised (ibid.).   
148 The capacity to process tea and coffee domestically was insufficient, but peasants were 
prohibited to kill the tea bushes and coffee trees or market tea and coffee legally (Sosne 
1979).  
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agricultural products to urban areas. Their position resembled local chiefs, 
and they benefitted from the colonial peasantisation and peripheralisation 
policies in the economic and political exploitation of the rural populations 
(MacGaffey 1987; 1991; Raeymaekers 2009b). When state control declined 
after independence, those traders expanded their activities, which resulted in 
a real smuggling economy reaching Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Kenya, 
Tanzania and east Asia during the 1970s and 1980s (Raeymaekers 2009b).    
 
Another study was conducted in the towns of Goma, Butembo and Beni in 
1987 (Vwakyanakazi 1991), which, while being unable to collect complete 
statistics, confirmed that the main trade routes from North Kivu covers 
Uganda, Sudan, Rwanda, Kenya and the Indian Ocean, though only big 
traders were able to smuggle to foreign countries. There are a number of 
border crossings in North Kivu, and the populations on both sides are 
associated linguistically and culturally. It is difficult to identify all the 
commodities that are exported informally, but gold, ivory, coffee, papain, tea 
and cinchona were listed as the key commodities, amongst which ivory was 
the most valuable. In Beni and Lubero, the main commodities were gold, 
cassiterite and wolframite, although the UN Panel of Experts claimed that 
informal cross-border trade in this region had been exercised for exchanges in 
consumer goods and petroleum products rather than minerals (UNSC 2001b). 
The trade in gold, often with Nairobi, enabled the traders to bring in scarce 
products that were not obtainable in these isolated areas.  
 
As such, the Kivus have been eminent as one of the primary regions for 
smuggling in the DRC (Vwakyanakazi 1991). This is because: the Kivus have 
rich mineral resources and agricultural products available in the area; the 
geographical location of the Kivus is linked more closely to the neighbouring 
countries, namely Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Sudan and Tanzania, 
rather than the rest of the country; and the Kivus enjoy certain political and 
economic autonomy from Kinshasa, which is 2,000km away (MacGaffey 
1991; Vlassenroot and Romkema 2002). While this type of economy 
flourishes in ‘a troubled socio-economic environment’ (Vwakyanakazi 1991: 
65), the informal cross-border trade is conditioned by supply and demand, 
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local and international transportation, and political and economic conditions in 
neighbouring countries (MacGaffey 1991). The local population engages in 
informal cross-border trade because of insufficient wages, unemployment and 
the inefficiency of the formal system (MacGaffey 1987). 
 
The informal cross-border trade depends on the complicity of officials 
(MacGaffey 1991; Vwakyanakazi 1991; Raeymaekers 2009b) and a reliance 
on personal ties (MacGaffey 1991; Kisangani 1998). Personal ties provide 
mutual trust and obligation in transactions (Kisangani 1998) to compensate for 
the reliability and predictability that are absent in the unofficial system 
(MacGaffey 1991). They can be based on patron-client, family, kinship or 
ethnic ties, but ethnicity and knowledge of local language facilitate access to 
smuggling chains (MacGaffey 1991). Moreover, it is often observed that 
people switch their roles between official and unofficial (Raeymaekers 2009b), 
which results in a trade chain comprising a varying degree of both formality 
and illegality (MacGaffey 1991; Vwakyanakazi 1991). 
 
The significant development of the informal economy has contributed to the 
creation of a new local capitalist class amongst government officials at all 
levels in the DRC (MacGaffey 1991). This dominant class tends to serve its 
own interests and deprives opportunities for others (MacGaffey 1991; 
Kisangani 1998). Huge vested interests within this dominant class prevent any 
efforts for reforms, as the 1983 liberalisation reforms and deregulation of 
some businesses had failed to reduce the informal economy, particularly in 
smuggling of minerals (MacGaffey 1991; Vwakyanakazi 1991; Kisangani 
1998). This failure was more evident in rural areas that are far from the capital 
(MacGaffey 1991). In this way, the informal economy efficiently decreases the 
state capacity to control the economy through applying regulations, taxation 
and border controls (MacGaffey 1991). Furthermore, this type of economy is 
governed by politics rather than markets, as the dominant class often secures 
its position by being able to provide its services, supports and opportunities in 
various manners (MacGaffey 1991). This situation can be described as 
pseudo-capitalism (Sangmpam 1994), or mercantilism (MacGaffey 1991), in 
which political status is often maintained through the distribution of resources.  




5.4.2. The coltan trade chain during the second Congo War 
 
The trade chain  
 
Numerous studies conducted during the second Congo War established that 
the coltan trade chain in the DRC was highly complex with a large number of 
actors involved.149 This is partly explained by the remoteness of mines from 
trading cities and the lack of infrastructure, including roads (Jackson 2003). 
 
In a simplified coltan trade chain, coltan-bearing ores, which are mined by 
diggers with artisanal methods, as explained in the previous section, were 
brought to local markets by porters (ibid.). Middlemen, or négotiants, 
purchased the ores from the local markets and arranged transport of the ores 
for trading houses, or comptoirs, based in large cities, such as Goma, Bukavu 
or Kigali, the Rwandan capital (ibid.). A frequent traffic of small aircraft, 
carrying minerals from the airstrips in mining areas to airports, was observed 
during the second Congo War (Redmond 2001; Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 
2002a; Jackson 2003). When the coltan ores reached those large cities, the 
comptoirs pre-concentrated the ores, and exported them abroad using 
international cargo, even without an export licence (Cuvelier and 
Raeymaekers 2002a; Amnesty International 2003; Hayes and Burge 2003; 
Jackson 2003; Global Witness 2004).  
 
The main trade route for coltan during the second Congo War was by air from 
Kigali to Europe, primarily Ostende and Antwerp (Belgium), or from Kigali to 
Mombasa (Kenya) or Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), and then to Ostende and 
Antwerp by sea (UNSC 2001b). Whilst a large amount of coltan was 
transported from there to Hamburg in Germany, some was transported further 
to a tantalum processing plant in Kazakhstan (ibid.).150 Another study 
suggests that destinations included Malaysia, Germany, Switzerland, the 
                                                          
149 Some examples include Hayes and Burge (2003) and Jackson (2003). 
150 Details of this ‘Kazakh Connection’ are explained in Raeymaekers (2002). 
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Netherlands, Belgium, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan, the United States 
and Russia (Global Witness 2004).   
 
The involvement of armed groups 
 
A key issue of the coltan trade chain was identified to be the involvement of 
armed groups, who financed their war effort and violence with and profited 
from the coltan trade, especially from the remarkable increase in the coltan 
price after 2000. The first Congo War in 1996 appeared to have led to the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources by foreigners with Congolese support, 
and brought in ‘a first wave of “new businessmen”’, who spoke only English, 
Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili, in the eastern DRC, where the AFDL took control 
(UNSC 2001a: 6–7). This operation is, therefore, considered as having given 
‘a strong sense of the potential’ in the eastern DRC to Uganda and Rwanda 
prior to the second Congo War in 1998, and motivated them, particularly 
Uganda, to invade the DRC again (ibid.). Rwanda, however, entered the DRC 
for security reasons; whether it had predetermined economic motivation from 
the experience of the first Congo War has not been verified (UNSC 2001b). 
 
The UN Panel of Experts (UNSC 2002b: 16) stated in 2002 that ‘no coltan 
exits from the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo without benefitting 
either the rebel group or foreign armies’ (UNSC 2002b: 16). Whilst various 
armed groups and troops, both foreign and Congolese, occupied different 
parts of the country throughout the second Congo War, the RCD (or the RCD-
Goma after May 1999) and the Rwandan army controlled a large part of  the 
Kivus since the RCD took power in the eastern DRC in August 1998, as 
detailed in the preceding chapter. The actors linked to Rwanda and the 
RCD/RCD-Goma thus largely controlled the coltan exploitation and trade in 
the Kivus during this period (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002a; Amnesty 
International 2003; Jackson 2003).  
 
Although the warring parties sometimes fought to capture mineral rich areas 
in order to deprive their opponent (UNSC 2001a; 2002a), the objectives of the 
warring parties were considered to have shifted from the political to the 
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economic (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002b) as the profits from the 
resources became a ‘prime motive’ for self-financing military campaigns and 
self-enrichment (UNSC 2001b). The UN Panel of Experts thus concluded that 
there is a link between the persistence of the conflict and the resource 
exploitation (ibid.). This view is supported by the facts, including the huge 
profits from the resources (UNSC 2001b; Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002b) 
and the collaboration between apparent military enemies (Amnesty 
International 2003; Jackson 2003).   
 
According to some studies, these actors, linked to Rwanda, were involved in 
the confiscation of production, the operation of mining concessions, imposing 
monopolies and price-fixing, and the use of child labour and forced labour 
(UNSC 2001a; Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002a; Amnesty International 
2003; Hayes and Burge 2003; Jackson 2003), even including prisoners 
(UNSC 2001a; Amnesty International 2003). At the outset, the Rwandan 
occupying force looted seven years’ worth of coltan stock from the 
aforementioned mining company, SOMINKI, before starting extraction of 
coltan in the area (UNSC 2001a). It then developed a structure of ‘systematic 
and systemic exploitation’, resulting in ‘unprecedented control of the economy’ 
of the eastern DRC (UNSC 2001a: 13). The pre-existing traditional trade 
chain, which was ‘through locally based Congolese, mostly civilian-managed, 
business operation’ (UNSC 2001a: 6), was completely changed to a new 
power structure, following the occupation by the AFDL in 1996. Accordingly, 
means of the transportation of goods were changed from roads and lakes to 
aircraft, operated by emerging transportation companies, during the second 
Congo War (UNSC 2001a).        
      
The core of the above business structure was an administrative unit, known 
as the Congo Desk, established within the Department of External Relations 
of the RPA (UNSC 2001a). The Congo Desk controlled the exploitation and 
taxation, granted permission for monopoly operations in the RCD-Goma 
occupied area, and networked with clients in Europe (UNSC 2001a). The 
comptoirs in the occupied area, namely Grands Lacs Metals and Rwanda 
Metals, appeared to have direct connections with the RPA, and exported 
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coltan directly through the Congo Desk (UNSC 2001a; Amnesty International 
2003). During the coltan boom,151 the RCD-Goma and Rwandan authorities 
attempted to centralise their monopoly operations. In November 2000, the 
RCD-Goma granted an export monopoly to a comptoir, called SOMIGL 
(Societé des Mines des Grands Lacs, Great Lakes Mining Company), in 
exchange for a monthly payment of USD1 million, until this was cancelled in 
April 2001 (UNSC 2001a; Amnesty International 2003; Jackson 2003). 
According to the RCD-Goma mining minister, the RCD-Goma adopted a 
monopoly strategy and withdrew export rights from all nineteen operating 
coltan trading companies, since most of them, though they were well-
established and dominating the coltan trade, underestimated the quantity and 
value of coltan mined and traded for tax evasion (Tegera et al. 2002).    
 
From the coltan sales, the RPA made between USD40 million (Cuvelier and 
Raeymaekers 2002b) and USD250 million (UNSC 2001a) over a period of 18 
months, between late 1999 and mid-2001. It was enough to re-invest between 
60 and 70 percent of the revenues (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002b) in 
order to finance their war effort (UNSC 2001a; 2001b). The military monopoly 
of the coltan trade was enabled by the support of businesses. One study 
(Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002a) illustrated the role of European 
companies in supporting this military monopoly to sell coltan to international 
markets. According to the study, the RCD-Goma received USD600,000 in 
December 2000 alone from some Belgian companies through the SOMIGL 
monopoly, and more than USD3 million from a German company after the 
end of SOMIGL. There were also a number of joint ventures between 
European trading companies and senior Rwandan officials through the 
abovementioned Rwanda Metals and Grands Lacs Metals. Although the 
revenues from the coltan exploitation could support the RCD-Goma’s military 
operations during the coltan boom (Global Witness 2004), they are 
considered to have benefitted the RPA and others, while depriving the RCD-
Goma (Amnesty International 2003). When Rwanda attempted to increase its 
revenues by ending the coltan trade monopoly through the SOMIGL by force 
                                                          
151 Between November 2000 and March 2001. 
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in April 2001, the RCD-Goma was further deprived of tax revenues (UNSC 
2002b).    
 
The pre-existing private comptoirs operated underground during the coltan 
boom, and smuggled coltan to international markets to spoil the Rwandese 
monopoly (Amnesty International 2003; Hayes and Burge 2003; Jackson 
2003). They were, however, forced out of business, following the steep price 
drop at the end of the coltan boom (Jackson 2003) and the withdrawal of the 
majority of the international coltan trading companies from the DRC (Cuvelier 
and Raeymaekers 2002b). Consequently, the lower ranks of the armed 
groups took over the place of those comptoirs, which consolidated the 
‘politico-military presence at all levels of the chain’ (Jackson 2003: 29). 
Simultaneously, the RPA switched over their coltan traders to Congolese 
operators and moved some of their comptoirs from Bukavu and Goma in the 
Kivus to Cyangugu and Gisenyi in Rwanda, upon the release of the first UN 
Panel of Experts’ report in April 2001 (UNSC 2001b).  
 
The above consolidation of the politico-military trade structure during the war 
has made it possible for the Rwandan actors to continue the coltan trade 
(UNSC 2002a). This structure was not only maintained after the withdrawal of 
the Rwandan troops in late 2002152 but also transformed to set up economic 
control mechanisms without a visible presence of the RPA, which was their 
new strategy (UNSC 2002b). More specifically, Rwanda: changed the 
Congolese directors of the parastatals to businessmen from Rwanda; 
switched the Congolese currency to the Rwandan currency; kept specially 
organised RPA brigades in civilian clothes in mining activities in place; 
reorganised the RCD-Goma forces in order to accommodate a large number 
of RPA soldiers in their army; and repatriated a large number of Congolese 
Tutsi refugees from Rwanda (ibid.).   
 
                                                          
152 The withdrawal of the Rwandan troops was as a result of the security protocol between 
Rwanda and the DRC, the Pretoria Accord, signed on 30 July 2002, as detailed in the 
preceding section 4.6.2.. 
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The politico-military structure, therefore, established ‘control over a range of 
commercial activities involving the exploitation of natural resources, diversion 
of taxes and other revenue generation activities’ and was identified as one of 
the ‘elite networks’ in the DRC by the UN Panel of Experts (UNSC 2002b: 6–
7). The elite network typically ‘consist[s] of a small core of political and military 
elites and business persons’, such as rebel leaders and officials (ibid.). They 
develop front enterprises, use rebel administrations, conduct a variety of 
criminal activities, collude with transnational criminal groups, and monopolise 
violence and means of production, trade and finance, in order to generate 
profits (ibid.). In Rwanda, the functions of their ‘elite network’ are managed 
centrally from the aforementioned Congo Desk to coordinate business and 
military activities (ibid.). Some other studies also recognised this structure and 
it was depicted, for example, as ‘the emergence of a mafia economy’ (Tegera 
et al. 2002).  
 
The second Congo War, therefore, transformed the structure of the informal 
cross-border trade in minerals (Jackson 2003), which existed in the Kivus 
prior to the war.153 It brought in new foreign actors with physical power at a 
significant level and confounded the existing informal economy (Tegera et al. 
2002). It has also created conflict in the area with the legislative environment, 
which is conducive to confusions and conflicts over mine ownership (Tegera 
et al. 2002).154 This new-found informal cross-border trade, nonetheless, has 
been providing critical livelihoods for the local population to survive since the 
beginning of the second Congo War (Vlassenroot and Romkema 2002) and 
lucrative commercial opportunities for certain people at the same time 
(Jackson 2003).   
 
5.4.3. The coltan trade chain after the second Congo War 
 
The official end of the second Congo War and formulation of the transitional 
government in June 2003, based on the power-sharing agreement signed in 
                                                          
153 See details in the preceding section (5.4.1.). 
154 See details of the legislative environment for artisanal mining in the previous section 
(5.3.3.). 
Links between coltan and conflict in the eastern DRC 
179 
 
Pretoria in December 2002,155 signified a harmonisation of legislation and 
regulations for the DRC mining sector. In theory, the 2002 Mining Code, 
detailed in the earlier section (5.3.3.), was applied to the entire country to 
resolve any conflicts or contradictions between various authorities. In the case 
of the eastern DRC, where the rebel groups had established themselves and 
their own administrative system, the politico-military structure created during 
the second Congo War remained intact in spite of the unification of the 
country (Johnson and Tegera 2005).  
 
There were, however, changes in market conditions. The coltan boom had 
finished by the time the second Congo War ended, and both demand and 
prices for coltan decreased dramatically. Coltan mining, however, did not stop 
but continued alongside the fluctuating coltan market at a lower level, in the 
same fashion as during the coltan boom (Jackson 2003; Johnson and Tegera 
2005). An analysis of the impact of the coltan price (Jackson 2003: 1) 
explained that the price crash intensified the control of ‘war entrepreneurs’ 
while the armed groups ‘turned inwards to the territory they control, 
capitalising – personally as well as collectively – on the rich resources 
available’ when the war arrived at a deadlock. The coltan price started to rise 
again in 2005, leading to a slight increase in coltan exports from North Kivu 
and the ‘Grand Nord’ of North Kivu (Beni/Butembo), although there are no 
reliable statistics to quantify the unrecorded trade (Johnson and Tegera 2005). 
It should be noted that there was a cassiterite boom between 2003 and 
2004156 and many miners moved on to mine cassiterite, in more or less the 
same areas as the coltan mines in North Kivu (ibid.)   
 
The trade chain 
 
                                                          
155 See details in the preceding section (4.6.2.). 
156 The hike in cassiterite price is considered to have been prompted by China’s economic 
growth (Johnson and Tegera 2005) and the adaptation of the Directive on the restriction of 
the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment (2002/95/EC), 
known as the Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive (RoHS) by the European Union 
in February 2003. The RoHS restricts the use of lead, mercury, cadmium, hexavalent 
chromium, polybrominated biphenyls, and polybrominated diphenyl ether in the production of 
electronic and electrical equipment. As a result, cassiterite is largely replacing lead for 
manufacturing solder.   
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According to a recent study (Custers et al. 2009), the most important coltan 
mines are located in the territories of Kalehe, Mwenga, Shabunda and Masisi, 
while there is a large cassiterite mine in Walikale. The official statistics from 
2008 show that coltan is largely exported from Bukavu, the provincial capital 
of South Kivu (ibid.). If not directly exported from trading posts in Goma or 
Bukavu, coltan often crosses borders into Rwanda, namely from Goma to 
Gisenyi (the western province of Rwanda) and from Bukavu to Cyangugu (the 
south-western province of Rwanda), and is brought to Kigali, the capital of 
Rwanda, from where it is exported outside Africa, chiefly through Mombasa 
(Kenya) or Dar es Salaam (Tanzania).157  
 
Map 2: Major trade routes of coltan from the eastern DRC (INICA 2007b) 
                                                          
157 These trading routes are also identified by other studies, including DFID (2007); INICA 
(2007a); Garrett and Mitchell (2009a; 2009b); Global Witness (2009c). Whilst Uganda and 
Burundi are also transit countries, Rwanda appears to be the major transit country for coltan 
(DFID 2007; Enough 2009b). 





A key issue in the above trade chain is the degree of unrecorded mineral 
exports, which is estimated to be over 50 percent (DFID 2007; Tegera and 
Johnson 2007). It is alleged that minerals are smuggled out from Goma to 
Gisenyi by night when the border is closed (Johnson and Tegera 2005), while 
the scale of coltan trafficking through the Bukavu-Cyangugu route is even 
bigger (INICA 2007a).158 This significant size of the unrecorded trade is often 
attributed to under-declaration for tax evasion159 and the lack of capacity and 
weak governance within the DRC state institutions (DFID 2007). The absence 
                                                          
158 Both routes were also mentioned by traders based in Rwanda during the interviews by the 
author in June 2009. 
159 In some cases, coltan is declared as cassiterite in order to lower the export value (DFID 
2007).  
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of tax harmonisation in the region is also blamed for encouraging informal 
cross-border trade as the DRC imposes higher export tax than its 
neighbouring countries (Tegera and Johnson 2007; Custers et al. 2009). State 
officials are deeply complicit in the system of the informal cross-border trade 
and charge various illegal fees (MacGaffey 1991; Vwakyanakazi 1991; 
Tegera and Johnson 2007; Raeymaekers 2009b) ‘all along the [trade] chain’, 
and it is not possible to conduct trade outside this system (Tegera and 
Johnson 2007: 7; World Bank 2007b cited in IPIS 2007).  
 
Moreover, a stipulation in the 2002 Mining Code to restrict the export of raw 
materials160 and a decision by the Centre d’Evaluation, Expertise et 
Certification (CEEC) to export only semi-processed tantalum concentrate in 
February 2005 have further facilitated the informal cross-border trade 
(Johnson and Tegera 2005). Most of the coltan produced in the eastern DRC 
is brought to Rwanda, recorded as transit goods on the Rwanda side, and 
concentrated in Rwanda before being exported abroad (Garrett and Mitchell 
2009a; 2009b)161 as the eastern DRC lacks processing facilities and 
investments for such facilities (Global Witness 2007c; INICA 2007a).  
 
While a large portion of coltan is exported informally, some exports are 
conducted officially by paying taxes to the Congolese authorities (Enough 
2009b; Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 2009b; Global Witness 2009c). Rwanda 
has, nevertheless, become a crucial trade route and processing centre for 
Congolese minerals and has achieved a considerable economic growth from 
the mining sector (Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 2009b; Global Witness 
2009c).162 The growth of Rwanda’s mining sector can also be attributed to an 
improved organisation of the mining sector and a growth of private investment 
                                                          
160 Article 85. 
161 According to an interview with an artisanal mining expert (D’Souza 2009), this process is 
called pre-concentration to remove impurity, and a more sophisticated processing takes place 
at advanced processing plants, such as the H.C. Starck. He is concerned that processing 
coltan in the eastern DRC would cause serious problems, such as pollution and health hazard 
without appropriate systems and standards in place.  
162 Revenues from mineral exports have increased from USD38 million in 2005 to USD130 
million in 2008 (Global Witness 2009c). Other source quotes USD94 million revenue in 2008, 
of which USD43 million is earned from re-exporting minerals, based on a Rwandan central 
bank report (Holland 2009).   
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in the mining sector since 2006 (Global Witness 2009c; Rwirahira 2009) 
because of the political stability, unlike the situation in the DRC (Holland 
2009). As more than 50 percent of coltan exported from Kigali is allegedly of 
DRC origin (INICA 2007a),163 Rwanda has been criticised for being ‘a channel 
for “conflict minerals”’ from the eastern DRC and financing the warring parties 
(Global Witness 2009c: 71).  
 
The involvement of the armed groups 
 
Recent studies conducted on mining and trade in the eastern DRC observed 
that the system of informal natural resource exploitation, which was 
established during the second Congo War, persists (Garrett et al. 2009; 
Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 2009b; Global Witness 2009c). All key actors in 
the continuing conflict, the FDLR, the CNDP, the Mayi Mayi and the 
FARDC,164 generate revenues from mineral exploitation and various 
taxations, albeit to varying degrees (UNSC 2008a; Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 
2009b; Global Witness 2009c; Spittaels and Hilgert 2008; 2009b). According 
to the UN Group of Experts (UNSC 2008a), the FDLR and the FARDC 85th 
brigade largely depend on income from the mines they control and from illegal 
mineral trade and taxation, and the CNDP largely finances itself from land, 
cows and external funding while it also profits from protection money and 
controlling a customs post.  
 
Given the revenues from the mineral exploitation and trade above, the mineral 
resources are considered to be a key driver for the continuing conflict (UNSC 
2008a; Global Witness 2009c). Global Witness (2009c) views that the 
revenues from the mineral resources ‘overtake political or ethnic grievance as 
the primary motivation’ for the conflict (Global Witness 2009c: 16). De Koning 
(2009), however, rejects the economic motivation and asserts that the mineral 
                                                          
163 While the Minister of Mines quoted approximately a quarter of mineral exports in 2008 to 
be originated from the DRC, the customs declarations in 2008 show that almost half of the 
mineral exports by weight were re-exports (Global Witness 2009c). The Rwanda Investment 
and Export Promotion Agency (RIEPA) states that a sizable mineral exports from Rwanda are 
transit goods and only 20 percent of coltan and wolframite exports are produced within 
Rwanda (RIEPA 2008).   
164 For details of the players and the recent conflict, see the section 4.7..  
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resources prolong the conflict as access to resources prevents military defeat 
and obstructs military integration. Garrett and Mitchell (2009a; 2009b), while 
accepting the link between the mineral resources and conflict, contend that 
the mineral exploitation by the armed groups is a consequence of insecurity 
and governance failure in the DRC, especially because the DRC state is 
unable to control the monopoly of violence and protect its citizens.  
 
One analysis focusing on the conflict motivation, however, arrived at different 
conclusions from the above views (Spittaels and Hilgert 2008; 2009b). The 
research considered four different conflict motivations, namely profit (greed), 
grievance, survival and power, by employing a qualitative geographical 
methodology.165 It concludes that ‘it would be wrong to assert that minerals 
constitute the core issue of the current conflict dynamics’, as the behaviour 
and determination of the warring parties are shaped by other factors, ‘such as 
personal security issues, ethno-economic grievances, and the protection of 
individual business interests’ (Spittaels and Hilgert 2009b: 54). The research 
found that the fighting is not concentrated around mines, and the rebel groups 
do not control important mines. In the case of the FDLR, ‘the large majority of 
them are in fact hiding themselves and surviving’ in the jungles and villages, 
while engaging in illegal mining and taxation and drug trafficking (ibid.: 57). Its 
grievances against the current Rwandan government thus appear to be ‘a 
plausible explanation for their behaviour in the field’ (Spittaels and Hilgert 
2008: 35). The CNDP seems to protect the interests of the Tutsi communities 
as well as the economic interests of some of its members and supporters, 
hence its behaviour corresponds to its grievances to a degree (Spittaels and 
Hilgert 2008; 2009b). The study suggests a need to focus more on grievance 
and security as the conflict motivations and how motivations transform over 
time (ibid.). 
 
Another study on the informal cross-border trade in North Kivu (Tegera and 
Johnson 2007) provides an insight into the relationship between the conflicts 
                                                          
165 The research used a geographical information system software to map the locations of the 
armed groups, incidents of human rights abuse, natural resources, trade routes, ethnic 
groups, Tutsi refugees amongst others, during the period of between August 2007 and 
January 2008 (Spittaels and Hilgert 2008; 2009b). 
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and mineral trade. It illustrates an existing commercial rivalry between the 
Banyarwanda trading elites controlling trades around Goma and the Nande 
trading elites in the Beni/Butembo areas in North Kivu. The Nande traders 
established their own advantageous trading rules, whereas the Banyarwanda 
traders countered with military power during the second Congo War and the 
conflict between them has not been resolved. The study states that: 
 
Political and military power struggles in Eastern Congo are in part an 
expression of commercial rivalry, but commercial rivalry in turn is an 
expression of competition around means of ensuring one’s own and 
one’s community’s physical survival in an area of profound and 
prolonged conflict (ibid.: 6). 
 
Traders need to have connections with the authorities in the area of operation, 
such as government institutions and armed groups, and when the ruling group 
changes, traders also change (Tegera and Johnson 2005). They are ‘powerful 
businessmen in Goma or Bukavu, with strong political connections inside the 
DRC and in neighbouring countries’ (Global Witness 2009c: 55). In some 
cases, comptoirs (trading houses) are directly or indirectly controlled by 
armed groups, who try to access international markets (Spittaels and Hilgert 
2009b). Comptoirs are also considered as being ‘a critical point in the supply 
chain’ (Global Witness 2009c: 56) as they:  
 
[O]perate at the interface between the local and the international 
mineral business … act as intermediaries between, on the one hand, 
Congolese négociants who enter the mines to do business with the 
diggers, and, on the other hand, international traders who sell the 
minerals to processing plants in different parts of the world. Thanks to 
their intermediate position between the local level and the international 
level, the comptoirs have the advantage of being well informed about 
the latest developments on the global commodity market as well as 
about the political and economic situation in North and South Kivu 
(Custers et al. 2009: 11).   
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In addition, comptoirs are also involved in the struggles over the ownership of 
SOMINKI and SOMIKIVU concessions that were key factors of the second 
Congo War (Johnson and Tegera 2005), as reviewed in the previous section 
(5.3.2.). These ownership disputes continued even after the transitional 
government was formed and the new Mining Code had been enforced 
(ibid.).166 In the ownership conflict over SOMINKI concessions, there were 
three parties: Banro, through its subsidiary SAKIMA (the legal owner); 
SOMICO (the state company recognised by Laurent Kabila); and the RCD-
Goma (controlling the mines). SOMICO appears to have support from the 
FDLR; a new trading house, Mining Processing Congo (MPC), seems to have 
unofficial support from the previous RCD and pro-Rwandan forces on the 
ground; and Banro is supposed to be protected by the Congolese army 
FARDC since it has the legal status. MPC is a main buyer of artisanally mined 
ores in Kivu and a subsidiary of a new company in Gisenyi (Rwanda), the 
Metal Processing Association (MPA).167 The MPA was established in 2001 
and processes the majority of cassiterite arriving in Goma to export to South 
Africa.168  
 
With regard to the ownership dispute over the Lueshe mine of SOMIKIVU, 
despite legal ownership by SOMIKIVU, the management of the Lueshe mine 
and SOMIKIVU have ended up in the hands of an elite business man in Goma, 
who is associated with the local RCD leadership (Johnson and Tegera 2005). 
Although administrative acts by rebels for the areas they control have been 
agreed to be legitimate in the peace negotiations, this does not apply to 
mining concessions. The DRC state, however, has not been able to settle the 
issue of duplicated ownership through judicial means and hence confusion 
over mining concessions creates new conflict and resolution through military 
means becomes even more important.   
 
                                                          
166 See more details of the struggle relating to the MPA and MPC in Barouski (2008). 
167 The author observed the MPA factory in June 2009. The factory stands along the main 
road connected from the border to the DRC (Goma).  
168 The MPA’s operation in exporting cassiterite and tantalite to South Africa was announced 
in August 2002, by Hochschild partners, an arm of the French steel giant Arcelor, and began 
trading in the DRC in December 2002 (Pole Institute 2005). The MPA and MPC are both 
subsidiaries of Kivu Resources, registered in Mauritius, but owned by South African, 
according to Kivu Resources (2009). 
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The state transition after the war also complicated the ongoing struggle over 
mining rights and concessions because the actors in the struggle were 
integrated into the same state institutions, namely in the government and the 
national army, FARDC, through the process of brassage (Johnson and 
Tegera 2005). It is, therefore, even more difficult to distinguish between state 
and non-state actors or legal and illegal operations (Global Witness 2009c).     
 
5.5. Chapter summary and conclusions  
 
This chapter has examined how coltan production and trade finance and drive 
the ongoing conflicts in the eastern DRC, and has identified some underlying 
issues as discussed below. 
 
There has been a remarkable increase both in demand for and the price of 
tantalum in the global market, albeit fluctuating, as tantalum extracted from 
coltan has a wide range of applications, especially in the telecommunications 
industry. This increasing demand for tantalum in the global market has 
influenced the artisanal mining sector in the DRC. The demand for cheaper 
tantalum within the global market favours artisanally mined tantalum from the 
DRC over tantalum produced by large industry operations with high 
standards; the Congolese tantalum seems to be filling supply shortages in the 
spot market caused by the growth of the high-tech electronics industries. The 
‘coltan boom’ in the eastern DRC and the recent closure of tantalum mining 
operations by large established mining companies serve this point. 
 
Artisanal coltan mining in the eastern DRC has to be considered within the 
broader context presented in the literature review chapter. In developing 
countries, artisanal mining is a prevailing activity largely driven by poverty and 
a lack of employment opportunities, yet it is difficult to regulate and causes 
severe environmental and socio-economic problems. The expansion of the 
artisanal mining sector in the DRC is, however, unprecedented, as 90 percent 
of the minerals are produced by the artisanal mining sector. This can be 
explained by the insecurity caused by the successive conflicts in addition to 
the long-term economic crisis and institutional collapse, which began in the 
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1970s. While the insecurity in the eastern DRC drives more people to engage 
in artisanal mining, the militarisation in the mining areas also aggravates the 
conditions in the artisanal mining community and makes 
regulation/formalisation of the sector more challenging owing to the lack of 
state authority in the eastern DRC. 
 
The examination of informal artisanal coltan mining has illustrated that conflict 
over mine ownership as one of the key dynamics of the DRC conflict, in 
addition to the underlying causes of the DRC conflict identified in the previous 
chapter. Although the mine ownership conflict amongst the state, rebel groups 
and companies was as a result of the first Congo War, during which the rebel 
groups controlled the mines in the areas they occupied, the ownership conflict 
has continued even after the wars. The continuation of the mine ownership 
conflict can be attributed to the failures of the peace process and 
reconstruction policy to address the mine ownership conflict and informality in 
the DRC.  
 
Firstly, the negotiated peace process based on the inclusive power-sharing 
agreement allowed the rebel groups to remain in their occupied area and 
control the area though the mines were not supposed to be under their control. 
This created the duplication of authority in the area, which maintained the 
conflict and contributed to the informality in the area.  
 
Secondly, the reform of the mining sector through the 2002 Mining Code has 
been ineffective in addressing both the mine ownership conflict and the 
informality of the sector. The code has not clarified the contradiction between 
the mining and exploration rights ruled by the Mining Code and the surface 
rights governed by the Land Law, or the customary land tenure system 
exercised on the ground. Although the Mining Code intends to encourage 
investment in the DRC mining sector by building a stable operational 
environment and regulating artisanal mining and trade to formalise the 
informal economy in the sector, the provisions and their implementation have 
been inadequate and facilitate fraud and informality within the sector, thereby 
making artisanal mining illegal, unregulated and unprotected.  




Lastly, the unsuccessful DDR programme and army integration, discussed in 
the previous chapter, failed to improve the security in the eastern DRC. As a 
consequence, the area remains militarised, and military means have been 
important in settling conflict in the absence of the judicial means and capacity 
to do so. This is evident in the mine ownership conflict as the armed groups 
and army in the area continue to be involved in the conflict    
 
The analysis of the coltan trade in and from the eastern DRC also possesses 
the dynamics of an informal economy. While the long-existing, significant 
scale of the informal economy in the DRC is owing to the inefficient policies as 
well as the informality distinct to the Congolese state, as explained in the 
literature review chapter, this chapter displayed that the wars have 
transformed the structure of the informal economy. Throughout the wars, the 
highly complex and largely informal coltan trade financed the war effort and 
consolidated the new politico-military structure, in which powerful trading 
houses are closely connected with the authorities in the area. The politico-
military structure that financed the war effort currently remains. 
 
The reasons for the continuation of the above structure can be considered 
here. As with the maintenance of the mine ownership conflict, the power-
sharing agreement kept the same actors on the ground who have vested 
interests in preventing the reforms. The maintenance of the informal economy 
supported by those actors significantly decreases the state capacity in 
managing the economy or implementing any policies. It has also become 
difficult to distinguish state/non-state actors and legal/illegal operations as the 
actors have integrated into the same institution in theory. In other words, it is 
incredibly difficult to differentiate the war economy and the peace economy.  
 
An important element in looking at the coltan production and trade as part of 
the war economy and conflict dynamics is the motivation of the warring parties. 
However, the review in this chapter has demonstrated that there is only 
limited analysis on the conflict motivations. The view that political motivations 
have shifted to economic motivations has been predominant, whereas a 
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recent study highlighted the importance of grievance and security as 
motivations for the conflict. Nonetheless, it is not easy to separate these 
motivations because they are all linked, as pointed out by the studies on war 
economy. The study on the informal cross-border trade in North Kivu (Tegera 
and Johnson 2007) illustrated this point based on the commercial rivalry 
which is about competition over means of ensuring survival in an extremely 
conflict-prone area where informality and military means prevail. Coltan 
production and trade provides one of the means of survival within the war 
economy. However, the boundary between the war economy and the peace 
economy cannot be clearly set. 
 
It is therefore possible to attribute blame to coltan production and trade for 
financing and driving the conflict in the eastern DRC. However, it is impossible 
to determine to what extent the coltan production and trade or other 
commodities actually drive the conflict. More attention should be paid to the 
context in which the use of military means has been dominant and normalised.                     
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Chapter Six: Perspectives and initiatives within the coltan 
supply chains 
 
The preceding chapter demonstrated that coltan supply chains are highly 
complex and tend to encompass a large number of actors and locations in 
which the cheap, artisanally mined coltan fills supply shortages on the spot 
market. The chapter included some evidence supporting the claim that the 
armed groups and army troops operating in the eastern DRC have financially 
benefitted from the informal coltan exploitation and trade, which has 
expanded considerably. While the evidence to support economic reasons 
being the prime motivation of the conflicts remains weak, the chapter also 
illustrated how military methods have been used as a way of solving conflicts 
and grievances, including struggles over mine ownership, in the absence of 
any adequate judicial means and control by central governments over the 
disputed areas.  
 
This chapter presents perspectives from within the coltan supply chains. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, coltan, which is mined by artisanal miners, 
brought to local markets by porters and traded by négociants, is generally pre-
concentrated by trading houses, comptoirs, to be exported to Europe, Asia 
and the USA through Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania. Coltan becomes, 
therefore, mixed from various sources along the supply chains. Tantalum 
bearing mineral concentrate is then processed and transformed into powders, 
wires and other forms by primary tantalum processors. Whilst the application 
of tantalum is extensive, this thesis focuses mainly on the supply chains of the 
consumer electronics industries, as the growth of these industries multiplied 
demand for tantalum capacitors and prompted the 2000 coltan boom in the 
DRC during the second Congo War.  
 
Figure 5: Supply chain model from mines to consumer electronics (Nokia n.d.) 





To distinguish the different challenges and perspectives that various stages of 
the coltan supply chains possess, this chapter is organised into five sections. 
At the outset, the chapter illuminates a growing scrutiny and pressure on the 
coltan supply chains to clean up ‘conflict coltan’ by applying human rights due 
diligence, which is addressed in terms of traceability and accountability of raw 
material sources. The subsequent section examines the downstream supply 
chain, end-user companies of coltan, including mobile phone and computer 
manufacturers. The third section focuses on middle-user companies of coltan, 
such as capacitor manufacturers and tantalum processors. The fourth section 
displays views from international traders, and the final section presents 
perceptions of actors from the upstream supply chains within the DRC and its 
neighbouring country, Rwanda. 
 
My examination of the coltan supply chains displays the clearly different 
perspectives of the demand and supply sides of the supply chains, depending 
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on the challenges they face. The demand side is driven by its need to secure 
coltan supply without damaging their reputation by being implicated in the 
‘conflict coltan’ issues. Firstly, the end-users of coltan are facing with 
reputational risks for their brands posed by the ‘conflict coltan’ from very 
distant supply chains. Although they are pressured to apply enhanced human 
rights due diligence on their source of raw materials, they are not solely able 
to achieve full traceability and accountability, and are seeking collaborative 
initiatives. Secondly, amongst the middle-users of coltan, tantalum processors 
are considered to be a key pressure point in the supply chains, owing to their 
dominance in the global market and their influence on the conflict. Whilst two 
major tantalum processors claim that they do not purchase tantalum from the 
DRC ‘knowingly’, this chapter focuses on H.C. Starck, as a company that has 
responded more proactively, including its engagement in a multi-stakeholder 
initiative, the Durban Process,169 following severe criticism made against the 
company. The company admits its vulnerability to reputational risks as a listed 
company but also draws attention to the partial actions by the international 
community. Thirdly, international traders, being blamed for fuelling the conflict 
through their mineral purchase from the eastern DRC, maintain that their 
operation is lawful and provides valuable livelihoods to the local population, 
yet are being forced to suspend their mineral purchase on reputational 
grounds. They require clear guidance on the ‘conflict coltan’ issue since the 
situation on the ground is ‘confusing’.      
 
On the contrary, the actors from the upstream supply chains, including miners, 
middle-men and trading houses, need to capitalise available resources for 
their livelihood, survival and security, and present different views. The trading 
houses oppose the assumption that they can know the origin of coltan ores 
and advocate the application of due diligence. The actors from the upstream 
supply chains generally criticise the due diligence approach imposed by the 
West as being impractical and as not taking into account the complex 
relations on the ground. They distinguish various conflicts, such as those 
related to mining and trade and political issues, and identify the problems as 
                                                          
169 See details in the section 7.1. 
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the lack of control, structures and livelihoods, inappropriate legislation, and 
poverty. These different perspectives illuminate a critical question on how to 
define the ‘conflict coltan’ and the lack of involvement of local actors in the 
discussion on the ‘human rights due diligence’ agenda. 
 
6.1. The ‘conflict mineral’ agenda 
 
This section sets out to elucidate an emergent response to the ‘conflict coltan’ 
issue through applying ‘human rights due diligence’, as it is gaining a 
momentum to pressure the stakeholders in the coltan supply chains to act and 
shape the debate around the ‘conflict coltan’ issues for the DRC. The 
response is based on the understanding that the informal exploitation and 
trade of coltan finance the armed groups and army troops, as detailed earlier 
in Chapter Five. This ‘conflict coltan’ view corresponds to the prominent 
resource curse thesis reviewed in Chapter Two. It also reveals a major 
concern for consumers of coltan products, and has led to the response aiming 
to cut off the financial source from the belligerents by applying ‘human rights 
due diligence’ to the supply chains, which is also recommended by the UN.170 
The following briefs the background of a ‘conflict mineral’ view and its 
implication for companies. It then outlines an emerging ‘human rights due 
diligence’ agenda as a response to the ‘conflict mineral’ issue that has been 
shaping the perceptions and initiatives of the stakeholders presented in the 
subsequent sections (6.2. to 6.5.), as well as critiques against the ‘conflict 
mineral’ approach.   
 
Previously, the investigations carried out during the second Congo War 
uncovered that the armed groups financed their violence from illegal natural 
resource exploitation with the help of business.171 They prompted activist 
campaigns, such as ‘No blood on my mobile! Stop the plundering of Congo!’ 
by nineteen Belgian NGOs in 2001 (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002a) and, 
                                                          
170 See the UN Security Council Resolution 1857 (UNSC 2008c). 
171 For example, UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b); Cuvelier and Raeymaekers (2002a); 
Raeymaekers (2002); and Tegera et al. (2002). For more details, see the section 5.4.2.. 
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more recently, the ‘makeITfair’ campaign172 and ‘Cell Out’ campaign by the 
Friends of Congo in 2008 (Raphael 2008). Recent studies have revealed that 
the system of natural resource exploitation established during the second 
Congo War (UNSC 2002a) has been continued by the FDLR, CNDP, FARDC 
and international resource companies, particularly of coltan, wolframite and 
cassiterite, or ‘3T’, and gold,173 with the continued conflict in the eastern DRC 
described in the earlier chapter (section 4.7.). While a few studies identified 
other critical issues, such as the inadequate legislation, the lack of central 
government’s control in the eastern DRC (Tegera et al. 2002; Johnson and 
Tegera 2005), grievances and security issues (Spittaels and Hilgert 2008; 
2009b), the majority of studies consider that the ‘conflict coltan’ motivates the 
belligerents (UNSC 2008a; Global Witness 2009c) in the context of 
governance failure (Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 2009b). 
 
Considering that the belligerents receive finance from the ‘conflict coltan’, 
most actions by the UN and NGOs aim to bring to an end the illicit natural 
resource trade. Following the UN Group of Experts’ final report (UNSC 
2008a), the UN Security Council passed two resolutions on the same day. UN 
Security Council Resolution 1856 (UNSC 2008b) of December 2008 
expanded the mandate of MONUC to curtail illegal armed groups to finance 
from illicit natural resource trade174 and called on all states to take appropriate 
measures to cease illicit natural resource trade. The UN Security Council 
Resolution 1857 (UNSC 2008c) extended the existing targeted sanctions175 to 
include individuals or entities assisting the illegal armed groups through illicit 
natural resource trade, and urged member states to ensure all companies 
exercise due diligence  when sourcing their mineral supplies.176 These UN 
resolutions were praised as ‘a big step forward’ (Global Witness 2009a), as 
                                                          
172 See details in http://makeitfair.org/. 
173 For example, UNSC (2008a); Garrett and Mitchell (2009a; 2009b); and Global Witness 
(2009c). See the section 5.4.3. for more details. 
174 MONUC was authorised to use its monitoring and inspection capacities for the first time in 
its operation.  
175 The first arms embargo, the UN Security Council Resolution 1493, was imposed on 23 
July 2003 and modified and strengthened through a successive adoption of resolutions. For 
details, see details in UNSC (n.d.).   
176 The UN Resolution 1857 (UNSC 2008c) requested member states to report their actions to 
implement the measures outlined to the UNSC within 45 days.  
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NGOs such as Global Witness (2008c) have been calling for enhanced due 
diligence and checks on the entire supply chains by mineral using/trading 
companies177 and the ‘Enough Project’ has been demanding the transparency 
and accountability of supply chains (Enough 2009a). The UK National Contact 
Point (NCP) judgement passed on the two UK-based companies (Afrimex and 
DAS Air),178 which accused them of being in breach of the OECD Guidelines 
for Multinational Enterprises for having business dealings with the rebels 
operating in the eastern DRC, has sent a strong signal about reputational 
risks to many companies.     
 
The above findings and actions have resulted in increased awareness of the 
illicit trade in the ‘3T’s and gold from the DRC and the labelling of those 
minerals as ‘conflict minerals’.179 Le Billon provides a definition of conflict 
resources as follows (2003b: 216): 
 
Conflict resources are natural resources whose control, exploitation, 
trade, taxation, or protection contribute to, or benefit from the context 
of, armed conflict. 
 
The ‘conflict mineral’ risk in the supply chains compel mineral using 
companies to act, especially if the companies add value to their brands 
(Conroy 2007). A company is more vulnerable to a corporate campaign if it 
has ‘valuable brand names to protect and sells a non-essential product in a 
market place where alternatives are available’ (Marlin 2006: 63). According to 
the Vice President of Social Risk Consulting at Control Risks (Shtender-
Auerbach 2010), to apply human rights due diligence and ‘conduct robust 
supply chain assessments to ensure their products are conflict-mineral free’ is 
amongst ‘the top five sociopolitical risks that global multinationals must be 
aware of, prepare for, and confront proactively’. Similarly, the Top 10 
Emerging Business and Human Rights Challenges for 2010 by the Institute 
                                                          
177 Global Witness published a guide for companies, ‘DO NO HARM: Excluding conflict 
minerals from the supply chain’ in July 2010, in order to introduce key components of supply 
chain due diligence (Global Witness 2010). 
178 For details see the section 7.5.. 
179 See, for example, Enough (2009a), Open Congress (2009) and Enough and Global 
Witness (2009).  
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for Human Rights and Business (IHRB 2009) includes ‘establishing universal 
criteria for operating in conflict zones’ and ‘developing standards for human 
rights due diligence’. For companies, ‘[r]eputation and image management, 
and a proactive engagement with the challenges of the 21st century, are 
critical to ensure continued success in 2010’ (Shtender-Auerbach 2010).    
 
The concept of human rights due diligence is explained in the business and 
human rights framework proposed by the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary General, John Ruggie.180 The second principle of the framework 
states that the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is the ‘basic 
expectation society has of business’ (Ruggie 2008: 5) and it ‘requires due 
diligence’ (ibid.: 9). Due diligence is defined as ‘a process whereby companies 
not only ensure compliance with national laws but also manage the risk of 
human rights harm with a view to avoiding it’ and hence ‘to do no harm’ (ibid.). 
This definition differs from a traditional definition of ‘the diligence reasonably 
expected from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to satisfy a 
legal requirement or discharge an obligation’ (Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th 
edition 2006, cited Ruggie 2008: 9). 
 
The due diligence concept, therefore, describes: 
 
the steps a company must take to become aware of, prevent and address 
adverse human rights impacts … Companies should consider three sets 
of factors. The first is the country context in which their business activities 
take place, to highlight any specific human rights challenges they may 
pose. The second is what human rights impacts their own activities may 
have within that context – for example, in their capacity as producers, 
service providers, employers, and neighbours. The third is whether they 
might contribute to abuse through the relationships connected to their 
activities, such as with business partners, suppliers, State agencies, and 
                                                          
180 Ruggie states that in order to address ‘governance gaps are at the root of the business 
and human rights predicament’ (2008: 5), and proposes a framework, comprising ‘three core 
principles, the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including 
business; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the need for more 
effective access to remedies’ (ibid: 1). 
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other non-State actors. How far or how deep this process must go will 
depend on circumstances’ (ibid.: 17–19). 
 
The scope of human rights due diligence is hence ‘determined by the context 
in which a company is operating, its activities, and the relationships 
associated with those activities’ (ibid.: 9). 
 
Human rights due diligence is, hence, expected to be applied in the coltan 
supply chains in order to address the ‘conflict coltan’ issues. It is essential to 
provide a definition of supply chains here. In a supply chain, ‘the material and 
informational interchanges in the logistical process stretching from acquisition 
of raw materials to delivery of finished products to the end user’, and all 
vendors, service providers and customers are links in the supply chain 
(CSCMP 2010: 179). Nagurney (2006: 3) contends that ‘any formalism that 
seeks to model supply chains and to provide quantifiable insights and 
measures must be a system-wide one and network-based’, owing to the 
nature of supply chains that is: 
  
the critical infrastructure for the production, distribution, and 
consumption of goods as well as services in our globalized Network 
Economy. Supply chains, in their most fundamental realization, consist 
of manufacturers and suppliers, distributors, retailers, and consumers 
at the demand markets. Today, supply chains may span thousands of 
miles across the globe, involve numerous suppliers, retailers, and 
consumers, and be underpinned by multinational transportation and 
telecommunication networks. Changes in the availability of suppliers, 
price shocks, as well as distributions to transportation modes or 
telecommunications may have effects that propagate throughout the 
supply chain … Supply chains are characterized by decentralized 
decision-making associated with the different economic agents but are, 
in fact, complex network systems (ibid.).  
 
To clear supply chains from ‘conflict minerals’, traceability has become critical 
(McMahon 2009). As managing director of Boston Common Asset 
Perspectives and initiatives within the coltan supply chains 
199 
 
Management, Lauren Compere (Kelly 2010) states: ‘From an investment 
perspective, we have been highlighting this issue [on supply chains] as a 
critical risk-management issue for companies. Traceability in the supply chain 
has gone from a nice to have, to a must have.’ Given extensive and complex 
mineral supply chains between mine and end products such as mobile 
phones, it is considered to be difficult to prove products are conflict minerals 
free (Hayes and Burge 2003). A study by DanWatch (2008), however, 
demonstrated conclusively the possibility of identifying the entire supply chain 
from the extractors to the mobile phone companies, in the case of cobalt. 
Meanwhile, Patrick Stratton, North American manager at a prominent 
international metals and minerals research company, Roskill Information 
Services Ltd., states that ‘[u]nless there is a fundamental change in the supply 
base, conflict tantalum will probably still get into the global market for the 
foreseeable future’ (Kelly 2010).  
 
As a consequence of the growing pressure to address the ‘conflict mineral’ 
issues, the US Senate Bill S. 819, the Congo Conflict Minerals Act of 2009 
(Open Congress 2009), was introduced by Senators Brownback, Durbin and 
Feingold in the United States Senate in April 2009.181 The introduction of the 
bill was praised as an important first step by Global Witness and Enough 
(Enough and Global Witness 2009).  
 
This ‘conflict mineral’ approach, however, has been criticised by some 
activists working in and experts on the DRC as it ‘does not fully capture the 
geo-political dynamics at play’ (Friends of the Congo 2009). It is ‘silent on the 
question of resource sovereignty which has been a central question in the 
geo-strategic battle for Congo’s mineral wealth’ without paying attention to the 
looting of Congo’s resources and to the contribution to the perpetuation of the 
conflict by corporations, Rwanda amongst others (Musavuli and Macharia 
2009). The ‘conflict mineral’ approach is, therefore, perceived as one of 
‘myriad Western based “prescriptions” … devoid of social, political, economic 
                                                          
181 The US President passed this bill on 20 July 2010, as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (East African Business Week 2010). The provision 
requires companies to investigate whether they use minerals from the DRC or its 
neighbouring countries and to conduct third-party audits on their supply chains.    
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and historical context and [is] marked by remarkable omissions … serves 
more to perpetuate the root causes of Congo’s challenges than to resolve 
them’ (ibid.). Similarly, an Africanist scholar, Alex De Waal, said ‘advocating 
that the trade in minerals should be choked off, supposedly in the name of 
human rights, is dangerous nonsense’ (De Waal 2009). There is, therefore, a 
concern about the impact of such measures to boycott the so-called ‘conflict 
minerals’, despite it being the most appealing method for public relations for 
companies (Hayes and Burge 2003). Marlin (2006: 61) points out: 
 
One danger of campaigning without regular attention to outcomes is 
that a campaign will be driven to ‘win’ battles with corporations 
regardless of their impact on society. In this case, the outputs may look 
good, but the outcomes may be regrettable.  
 
Congolese activists urge diplomatic and political means, rather than the 
‘conflict mineral’ approach, to bring an end to the conflict quickly (Musavuli 
and Macharia 2009).  
 
Furthermore, recent studies supported by Western donors and institutions 
contend that halting or disrupting the mineral trade would likely do more harm 
than good as around 1 million people depend on the minerals trade for their 
livelihood in the region (Garrett and Mitchell 2009a). They suggest focusing 
on the security sector reform to address issues of insecurity in the eastern 
DRC, though the ‘conflict mineral’ approach can promote the 




End-users of coltan, such as producers of mobile phones and laptops, have 
been targeted by campaigns by NGOs and consumers, as described earlier. 
They are targeted since a ‘consumer brand is more vulnerable to buying 
power than a generic product’ (Marlin 2006: 59). Some end-user companies 
have responded to these calls for responsible supply chains. Mobile phone 
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manufacturers were first targeted by those campaigns, and have been trying 
to address the issues of conflict minerals in their supply chains. 
 
In January 2008, the makeITfair campaign (makeITfair c2008) sent its List of 
Principles for dealing with mining issues182 to all major electronics brand 
companies with a request for a public response. The responses received may 
be summed up as follows: 
 
[Companies face] the difficulty ‘to trace the metal used in a particular 
product to the original source’, the added complexity of metals being 
mined at numerous countries and the proportion of artisanal mining. As 
the companies do not purchase the metals directly, they feel that the 
electronics industry’s ‘ability to address social and environmental 
concerns at raw material level could be strengthened by investigating 
options to work alongside other major end-user sectors’. They are 
concerned about the ‘allegations of poor conditions in the supply chain of 
metals used in electronics products’ and are looking at possible 
collaboration with existing multi-stakeholder initiatives on social and 
environmental conditions in the mining industry (makeITfair c2008). 
 
While Hewlett Packard has demonstrated an outstandingly proactive effort, 
many companies, including Acer, LG, Rim, Palm, Creative and Logitech, 
failed to provide any response. Similarly, Global Witness (2009b) wrote to 
major mobile phone manufacturers during 2009 ‘to ask them what due 
diligence measures they are taking to ensure that their sourcing practices are 
not fuelling the conflict’. Based on responses received, the organisation has 
concluded that the mobile phone industry ‘as a whole lacks sufficient 
measures to guarantee that phones and other electronics are free of conflict 
minerals’, although some companies have increased their supply chain 
control.  
 
                                                          
182 This was developed following the international roundtable with electronics companies and 
the GeSI and EICC in January 2008 (makeITfair c2008). 
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The following section presents initiatives by some major mobile phone 
companies183 and electronics companies. For instance, Nokia provides a 
statement on metals from the DRC in their website. The company states that 
it became aware of the possibility of coltan from the conflict area in the DRC 
being included in their products in 2001 and ‘took action immediately to ban 
Tantalum derived from illegally mined Coltan’ (Nokia 2010). While Nokia does 
not purchase raw materials directly, the company recognises ‘its 
environmental and social responsibility to ensure [raw materials] are 
responsibly sourced by [its] suppliers’ (ibid.). It takes ‘continuous action to 
ensure that metals from the conflict areas do not enter [its] supply chain’ 
through its conflict metal policy (ibid.). Although Nokia primarily focuses on its 
own direct suppliers and believes that ‘each tier of the supply chain must take 
responsibility for managing its own suppliers’, it ‘works deeper down the 
supply chain to investigate and address any concerns’ when ‘concerns arise 
regarding the performance of 2nd/3rd tier suppliers’ (Nokia n.d.).  
 
Nokia, however, admits the challenges of reaching full traceability of coltan, 
owing to the extensive and complex supply chain (Nokia 2010). As 
characteristics of the ore disappear once a mineral is processed, ‘no company 
can give the exact origin of [minerals] used in a particular product or its 
component’ (ibid.). Faced with this challenge, Nokia has been proactively 
engaging in industry-wide cooperation, namely the Global e-Sustainability 
Initiative (GeSI) and the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC),184 to 
enhance ‘transparency and supporting verification of the supply chain of 
metals’ (ibid.).       
 
Motorola (Motorola 2010a) recognises its ‘global supply chain begins with raw 
materials extraction and processing and continues through manufacturing of 
components and final products’. While the company does not procure raw 
materials directly, the ‘mining and processing of raw materials raises serious 
concerns’ for the company (Motorola 2010b). The company ‘first became 
                                                          
183 Five corporations, namely Nokia, Motorola, Samsung, Sony Ericsson and LG, accounted 
for over 80 percent of all mobile phones sold in 2007 (Gartner 2008). 
184 For details of the GeSI and EICC, see the section 7.4. 
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aware of the illegal mining of coltan in early 2001’ and ‘took swift steps to 
cease the use of materials containing tantalum derived from illegally mined 
Congolese coltan’ (ibid.). Motorola ‘require[s] high labor and environmental 
standards in [its] operations’ and ‘expect [its] suppliers to do the same’ 
through its supplier code of conduct (ibid.). Motorola ‘requires all of [its] 
suppliers of tantalum-containing capacitors to verify, in writing, that capacitors 
sold to Motorola do not contain tantalum derived from illegally mined 
Congolese coltan’ (ibid.).  
 
Motorola supports the development of the proposed US bill, the Congo 
Conflict Minerals Act, as the company is ‘very concerned that currently no 
credible independent systems exist … to verify the source of the metals in 
their products’ (ibid.). Given the concern, the company is ‘collaborating with 
others in the industry to tackle the challenges of traceability/tracking and other 
issues’ through the GeSI and EICC (ibid.).    
  
SAMSUNG Electronics (Samsung n.d.) acknowledges that it ‘is known that 
illegally mined coltan from the Congo is contributing to intense political conflict 
in the region and causing significant harm to wildlife’. According to its policy 
on coltan, SAMSUNG’s Telecommunication Business has taken some steps 
‘to endeavour that [its] mobile phones do not contain materials derived from 
illegally mined Congolese coltan’ (ibid.). These steps include: 
 
We do not purchase coltan directly from the Congo nor from any other 
source in the form of raw material. A limited number of our component 
vendors do supply us with tantalum-based components; In the cases 
when SAMSUNG does use tantalum-based components, the company 
requires suppliers to take appropriate measures in order to avoid using 
tantalum sourced from the Congo region; We request that all vendors 
refrain from purchasing tantalum powder mined in the Congo and we 
regularly audit vendors to ensure compliance. Our component vendors 
inform us that they obtain tantalum powder from the U.S.A, Russia and 
Thailand, not from the Congo; [w]e are making efforts to use substitutes 
for tantalum-based components where possible’ (ibid.). 




SAMSUNG, nonetheless, states that it is more likely to employ collective 
action than individual action (makeITfair c2008). 
 
Sony Ericsson states, ‘we do not purchase raw materials such as tin, tantalum, 
tungsten or gold, but we purchase components which may contain small 
amounts of these metals. We have more influence on companies and 
organizations where there is a direct relationship and agreement structure in 
place … the further away from a direct relationship the less impact you have’ 
(Sony Ericsson 2009).  
 
With specific reference to coltan, Sony Ericsson explains that most of its 
phone models have virtually no tantalum content as the company has 
‘significantly reduced the usage of tantalum capacitors and replaced it with 
ceramic capacitors due to the scarcity of the metal’ (Sony Ericsson 2010: 1). 
The company also has requirements on their suppliers as follows: 
 
We have also specifically been in contact with our suppliers of tantalum 
capacitors and require them not to use illegally mined tantalum from 
Congo and the surrounding area. Our suppliers have made 
investigations of their supply chains and have obtained certificates that 
the tantalum used in their products is not originating from Central Africa. 
They have long term contracts with suppliers and do not generally buy 
from the spot market where most of the illegally mined tantalum is 
expected to be sold. It is important to point out that Sony Ericsson buys 
capacitors from suppliers who manage their own tantalum purchases. 
For Sony Ericsson it is not fully possible to control the sources of a raw 
material but we have clear requirements on our suppliers (ibid.). 
 
In addition, Sony Ericsson mentions industry-based efforts through the GeSI 
and EICC.  
 
LG Electronics (LG n.d.), one of the five major mobile phone companies, does 
not state any supply chain management policy on coltan or other minerals.   




Vodafone states that they do not produce mobile phones; however, the 
company ‘maintain[s] [its] responsibility to drive ethical values through the 
supply chain’ (Vodafone n.d.a). It explains its supply chain management 
strategy is ‘to engage directly with [its] first-tier suppliers and assess their 
compliance’ with its Code of Ethical Purchasing, which requires them to 
assess their own supply chain management (ibid.). In addition, the company 
states that its ‘suppliers of telecommunications and IT equipment are mainly 
large multi-nationals (often well-known brands)’ or contract manufacturers to 
produce Vodafone-only branded products, through which it ‘increases 
sustainability risks for Vodafone, including the potential impact on [its] 
reputation given that Vodafone is the only brand label on the product’ (ibid.). 
Given particular concerns regarding mining coltan in the conflict-affected 
areas of the DRC, Vodafone also works ‘to develop a common approach to 
supplier assessments through industry partnerships’ such as the GeSI and 
EICC (Vodafone n.d.b).    
 
Aside from the campaign pressure on the mobile phone manufacturers, other 
sectors have also been targeted. The remaining part provides available 
examples of other sectors. As for SONY, whose PlayStation 2 game console 
launch in the spring of 2000 was considered to have triggered the coltan 
boom in 1999, the company still uses tantalum in its products, according to a 
SONY spokesperson from Japan, Satoshi Fukuoka (Lasker 2008). He said 
the company is ‘satisfied with responses from suppliers the tantalum they use 
is not “illegally mined Congo coltan”’, even for the past purchases of tantalum 
parts. As the PlayStation 2, PSP and PlayStation 3 ‘are manufactured mostly 
from independent parts and components that manufacturers procured 
externally’, its ‘suppliers source their original material from multiple mines in 
various countries’. While it is difficult for the company ‘to know what the 
supply chain mix is’, he said, ‘I am happy to state to you that the best of our 
knowledge, [SONY] is not using the material about which you have expressed 
concern’. 
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The world’s leading semiconductor chip maker, Intel, has started a third-party 
audit programme for the smelters (processing companies) of tantalum in its 
supply chain; however, the company has been criticised for being involved in 
the lobbying to gut the aforementioned US bill, the Congo Conflict Minerals 
Act of 2009 (Foden-Vencil 2010). According to the Intel spokesperson, Chuck 
Malloy, Intel ‘is not trying to gut anything … neither supporting nor opposing 
the act’; however, ‘after working for years across many different countries to 
clean up [its] tantalum supply, Intel has come up with a better fix’ (ibid.). It has 
‘identified a link in that supply chain, at the smelter level, that [it] can insert an 
audit process to ensure that the source of the material isn’t a conflict area’ 
(ibid.). As such, smelters elsewhere ‘would be forced to clean up their 
suppliers’, ‘if enough companies were to be band together to demand conflict-
free minerals’ (ibid.).        
 
A large multinational information technology company, Hewlett Packard (HP), 
is considered to be one of the most proactive electronics companies in 
addressing the challenge of conflict minerals in supply chains (makeITfair 
c2008). The company ‘felt pressure to act from outside groups, including 
enterprise customers, investors, and non-government groups pushing for 
more transparency of suppliers in the IT industry’ (LaMonica 2010). It believes 
that ‘addressing conflict minerals is a natural extension of [its] existing efforts’, 
says Zoe McMahon, Supply Chain Social and Environmental Responsibility 
Manager of HP (McMahon 2010). It started a Supply Chain Social and 
Environmental Responsibility (SER) Program in 2000, to ensure the 
responsible conduct of its suppliers, and HP became the first company to 
disclose its list of suppliers in the IT sector (ibid.).  
 
Furthermore, the company conducted a survey on its suppliers and found out 
that there is a limited traceability to the mines, where minerals are extracted 
(ibid.). McMahon said, ‘[b]ecause our suppliers are not using materials from 
the DRC, that gave us some comfort. But to this day, there is no certification 
mechanism that can assure us wholeheartedly that they are not sourced from 
the DRC … Once metals are with smelters, it’s difficult to know where the 
material comes from’ (LaMonica 2010). HP ‘reduces its chances of bad 
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publicity or seeks to avoid other business risks’ by auditing its suppliers (ibid.). 
However, she admits that ‘the issue of metals’ traceability is very challenging’ 
(ibid.).  
 
In addition, McMahon states: 
 
HP is working to ensure that our products do not contain metals sourced 
from mineral trade financing the armed conflict in the DRC. We will take 
further steps to educate our own supply chain and develop an approach 
to validate the assurances from our suppliers. We will continue to work 
with our sector and other industries using minerals from the region to 
develop an effective, cross-industry solution. In addition, HP will engage 
with groups with firsthand experience of the situation in the Eastern 
DRC to gain further insight into the specifics of the challenges ahead 
(ibid.). 
 
In 2009, HP, together with Dell, Intel, Motorola and Phillips, held a multi-
industry forum on the issues of mining of metals, 3Ts and gold from the DRC 
(McMahon 2010). ‘Tantalum is arguably the most significant metal on the list 
for the electronics sector’ as it ‘is used extensively in the production of 
capacitors for electronic equipment’ (ibid.). The group hopes to ‘define a multi-
industry path to assure that these metals are sourced from mines not 
associated with the conflict in the DRC’ (ibid.). As such, it does not advocate a 
halt in purchasing metals from the DRC or Africa, rather it hopes ‘to establish 
a “clean stream” of metals and promote environmentally and socially 
responsible mining practices there’ (LaMonica 2010). The group believes that 
it ‘will not be successful unless significant users of these metals come 
together to address this issue’ and needs to involve ‘multi-industries and all 
stakeholders to develop an effective system of mineral certification and supply 
chain assurance for metals’ (McMahon 2010). While the group hopes to 
pursue certification by pressuring other industries, McMahon says, ‘[w]e have 
some gaps in or understanding of our products and we want to continue filling 
gaps (from suppliers)’ (LaMonica 2010). She points out, ‘[w]ho isn’t in the 
room [to discuss the issues] are the traders in the DRC, that’s the hard part. In 
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pulling together all parts of the tantalum supply chain, it’s been evident that 
greater action is needed’ (ibid.). 
 
The above efforts by the companies, albeit to varying degrees, indicate that 
‘as the ethical sourcing agenda has moved from primary suppliers further 
down raw material supply chains, companies have found themselves dealing 
with challenges that are simply harder to meet on their own’ (Cooper 2009) to 
protect their brands and manage reputational risks. These challenges are, first, 
a limited influence over the upstream suppliers without direct contacts, while 
their influence over their direct suppliers or the first-tier suppliers can also be 
limited depending on the contracts and relationships they have with their 
suppliers.185 The second challenge is the raw material traceability, as there 
are no verification mechanisms to prove the origin of coltan or techniques to 
identify the source of coltan once processed.  
 
As ‘companies pursue higher social and environmental standards further 
down often complex supply chains’ or ‘ethical standards in raw material 
supply chains’, they need collaboration with other companies and 
stakeholders (Cooper 2009). John Gabriel, chairman of the EICC and supply 
chain responsibility manager at IBM, reiterates that collaboration amongst 
companies and inclusion of external stakeholders with specific insight into the 
issues are the key to pursuing ethical sourcing agendas on raw materials, 
‘[u]nless a brand company has an exclusive pipeline for raw materials’ 
(Cooper 2009). It is, therefore, evident that companies are trying to widen the 
industry-based collaboration, such as the GeSI and EICC, towards multi-
industries and stakeholder collaboration.   
  
6.3. Middle-users   
 
Broadly, middle-users of coltan consist of capacitor manufacturers and 
tantalum processing companies. Some of those companies were listed in the 
Annex III of the final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation 
                                                          
185 Informal conversation with Corporate Responsibility Senior Manager of a mobile phone 
company on 6 February 2009. 
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of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo,186 as ‘parties that, while having only indirect commercial ties to 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, still bore a responsibility to ensure that 
those links did not, albeit inadvertently, contribute to funding and perpetuating 
the conflict’, and hence were in apparent violation of the voluntary OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises187 (UNSC 2003b: 5). As the 
publication of the annexes in this report prompted strong reactions by those 
who were listed therein and ‘raised a great deal of interest in the media and 
among observers of the situation’ in the DRC, companies recognised that 
‘their responsibilities extended further than they had previously acknowledged’ 
and reassessed their activities in the DRC (UNSC 2003b: 6) While the 
companies were given opportunities to respond and discuss with the Panel of 
Experts, under the principle of due process to protect their confidentiality for 
security purposes (UNSC 2003b), the process has been criticised as being 
without transparency and accountability (RAID 2004).        
 
While these middle-users of tantalum have not been direct targets of 
consumer activist campaigns, tantalum processing companies have been 
increasingly targeted as a key pressure point in coltan supply chains. This is 
because tantalum processing companies should be able to verify the origin of 
the minerals before destroying their characteristics, as Intel insisted in the 
previous section (Foden-Vencil 2010). Tantalum processing is also a highly 
specialised industry, in which only three companies in the world consume 70 
percent (Mineweb 2008) to 80 percent of the global tantalum supply (Ruffini 
2008), as explained in Chapter Six. On the contrary, capacitor manufacturers 
are usually small in size, but numerous for their specialised products. During 
July and August 2009, the author contacted some eminent capacitor 
manufacturers in Japan; however, the companies were reluctant to provide 
comments or accept interviews. This section, therefore, focuses on the 
world’s largest tantalum capacitor manufacturer and three primary tantalum 
processing companies that were listed in the abovementioned Annex III of the 
final UN Panel of Experts’ report. 
                                                          
186 S/2002/1146, dated on 16 October 2002. See UNSC (2002b). 
187 See details of the guidelines in the section 7.5..  




6.3.1. Kemet Electronics Corporation 
 
Kemet Electronics Corporation is the world’s largest tantalum capacitor 
manufacturer in the USA. It decided to cease its activities in the eastern DRC, 
following a resolution of the US House of Representatives in September 2001, 
which had suspended coltan imports from the DRC (Cuvelier and 
Raeymaekers 2002b; Tegera et al. 2002). The company responded officially 
to the Panel of Experts and its case was categorised as ‘resolved’ of the 
category I in the panel’s report in 2003 (UNSC 2003b). Kemet currently 
publishes the statement below:  
 
KEMET fully supports the position of the Electronic Industry Citizenship 
Coalition (EICC), the Electronic Components, Assemblies and 
Materials Association (ECA) and the Tantalum-Niobium International 
Study Center (TIC) to avoid the use of tantalum ores which directly or 
indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo or adjoining countries, in line with full compliance to the 
EICC’s Electronic Industry Code of Conduct. KEMET’s tantalum supply 
base has been and continues to be certified to be sourced from conflict 
free zones. All of KEMET’s tantalum material suppliers have complied 
with and issued signed Letters of Certification attesting that KEMET 
Corporation will not receive tantalum powders made from tantalum 
ores illegally mined in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. KEMET 
will immediately discontinue doing business with any supplier found to 
be purchasing materials which directly or indirectly finance or benefit 
armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or adjoining 
countries. KEMET will continue to work through the EICC, ECA and 
TIC towards the goal of greater transparency in the supply chain 
(Kemet n.d.). 
 
6.3.2. Ningxia Non-ferrous Metals Smeltery 
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The ‘big three’ tantalum processors in the world, namely, Germany’s H.C. 
Starck188 as the largest, Cabot Corporation based in the US189 as the second 
largest, and China’s Ningxia Non-ferrous Metals Smeltery (NNMS)190 as the 
third largest, were all buying coltan from a German corporation, Masingiro 
GmbH, managed by a German entrepreneur, Karl-Heinz Albers191 (Cuvelier 
and Raeymaekers 2002a), and named in Annex III (UNSC 2002b). Although 
all three cases were categorised as ‘resolved’ in the Panel of Experts’ report 
in 2003 (UNSC 2003b), H.C. Starck is the only company that had reacted 
publicly to the Panel of Experts (RAID 2004). As illustrated below, H.C. Starck 
and Cabot have explicit policies on tantalum supply from the DRC; however, 
NNMS does not have any comments regarding its tantalum supply on its 
website (NNMS n.d.). NNMS is a state-owned enterprise and research 
institute in China (ibid.), which does not adhere to the OECD Guidelines. 
NNMS’s main products are tantalum powder and wires, which they sell to 
capacitor manufacturers in America, Europe, Israel, Japan and South Korea 
(ibid.). The company states that ‘[e]ffective cost control and continuous quality 
improvement are our commitment to customers all over the world’ (ibid.). In 
2002, the UN Panel of Experts verified that NNMS sourced up to 50 percent 
of its tantalum supply from Central Africa (UNSC 2002b), and NNMS is now 
the primary consumer of DRC’s coltan, according to the combined data from 
the 2007 UN Comtrade data and Paumanok Publications (Ma 2009).      
 
6.3.3. Cabot Corporation 
 
In April 2001, the Cabot Corporation released a press statement stating that 
the company had the highest environmental standards and purchased ores 
mostly from Australia and Canada, however, ‘a small percentage is sourced 
from other locations and, to the best of our knowledge, none of this originates 
from environmentally sensitive areas’ (Hayes and Burge 2003: 36). Contrary 
to this statement, the company came to a decision to stop operations in the 




191 He was also the director of SOMIKIVU and accused of a close relationship with the RCD-
Goma (UNSC 2001a).   
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eastern DRC, following the falling coltan price, beginning in March 2001 
(Raeymaekers 2002b), and the resolution by the US House of 
Representatives in September 2001, likewise Kemet Electronics (Cuvelier and 
Raeymaekers 2002b; Tegera et al. 2002).   
 
Cabot Corporation states its position on tantalum and coltan and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo on its website,192 and it is publicised using 
banner advertisement spots on other websites relevant to coltan, mining and 
the DRC amongst others. The company expresses its awareness of the report 
by the UN Panel of Experts in 2002193 and its rigorous efforts to communicate 
‘to its employees, customers and investors that it does not purchase or mine 
tantalum or coltan from the DRC’ (ibid.). With regards to its tantalum supply, 
Cabot explicitly states that it ‘comes exclusively from [its] own mine in 
Manitoba, Canada, a Talison Minerals owned mine in Wodgina, Australia and 
a Noventa owned mine in Mozambique’ (ibid.). As Cabot is a leading world 
producer of tantalum and niobium products, it has a specific ‘position on the 
purchase, sale or mining of tantalum or coltan in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’ as follows (ibid.): 
 
• We do not and will not mine any material containing Tantalum, 
including coltan in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
• We do not and will not knowingly purchase any material containing 
Tantalum, including coltan, which was mined in the Kahuzi-Biega 
National Park and the Okapi Wildlife Reserve in the Congo.  
• We reject any new offer of ore if there is any possibility that the source  
is the DRC. We have instructed the personnel in our organization 
responsible for acquiring raw materials not to acquire any material 
containing tantalum, including coltan, that they have reason to believe 
was mined in the Kahuzi-Biega National Park and the Okapi Wildlife 
Reserve in the Congo, and not to sell any such material. We employ 
several controls to ensure that we do not purchase ore from the DRC, 
                                                          
192 See Cabot Corporation (2008). 
193 UNSC (2002b). 
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including the requirement of a government issued certificate of origin to 
ensure the ore we purchase is not sourced from the DRC.  
• We do not acquire any material containing tantalum from the following 
countries:  
o Republic of Congo  
o Democratic Republic of Congo  
o Republic of Zambia  
o Republic of Burundi  
o Republic of Rwanda  
In sum, ‘Cabot will not knowingly purchase any tantalum supplies from any 
unlawful source where wildlife or the environment is threatened in any part of 
the world’ (ibid.). 
 
6.3.4. H.C. Starck 
 
H.C. Starck was allegedly purchasing ores through the German entrepreneur, 
Karl-Heinz Albers, who managed companies in the eastern DRC, namely 
Masingiro (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002a; 2002b), SOMIKIVU (UNSC 
2001a) and GBC194 (Johnson and Tegera 2005). When H.C. Starck was 
accused of supporting the RCD rebels through its purchase of coltan in the 
first UN Panel of Experts’ report195 and by the lobbyists and media, it initially 
refused to verify its purchase of coltan from the DRC for several months 
(Tegera et al. 2002). In the press release of April 2001, H.C. Starck stated its 
ores from Africa were from ‘established trading companies that have worked 
in various African countries for a long time and are headquartered in Europe 
or the United States. These trading companies have confirmed that H.C. 
Starck is not being supplied with illegally mined material from Central Africa’ 
(Hayes and Burge 2003: 36). In May 2001, the company announced in its 
press release that in future it would not purchase any materials from Central 
Africa, providing the cut-off point as August 2001 (Raeymaekers 2002; 
Johnson and Tegera 2005). The then CEO, Peter Kählert, commented on the 
                                                          
194 This was one of the main coltan exporters during the coltan boom in 2000, but stopped 
trading in September 2002 (Johnson and Tegera 2005).   
195 See UNSC (2001a). 
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first UN Panel of Experts’ report in November 2002 that ‘we were taken 
completely surprised since, at that point in time, we knew nothing about the 
situation in Eastern Congo’,196 despite having made comments on the 
situation previously (Johnson and Tegera 2005).  
 
H.C. Starck, however, relented in October 2001, after the publication of a 
book (Tegera et al. 2002), Schwarzbuch Markenfirmen – Die Machenschaften 
der Weltkonzerne (Black Book on Brand Companies) in Germany in 
September 2001.197 An undercover investigation for this book revealed that 
H.C. Starck was the most important buyer of coltan from the DRC, as 80 
percent of coltan originated from the DRC was estimated to have ended up in 
H.C. Starck’s plant during the second Congo War (Werner and Weiss 2001 
cited in Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002). H.C. Starck stated that ‘H.C. Starck 
had obviously been misled by with regard to the origin of the material’ in May 
2003, following discussions with the UN Panel of Experts in 2002 (Johnson 
and Tegera 2005), and was categorised as ‘resolved – no further action 
required’ in the UN Panel of Experts’ report in October 2003 (UNSC 2003b). 
The latest statement on 3 August 2009 (H.C. Starck 2009: 1), nonetheless, 
states that ‘[a]t the time, without being requested to do so, we supported the 
panel of experts in the clarification of allegations which were made against our 
company’.  
 
In response to the researcher’s question regarding the way H.C. Starck tried 
to respond to the allegations by the UN Panel of Experts and others, the 
General Manager of Corporate Communications of H.C. Starck, Manfred 
Buetefisch, commented as follows (Buetefisch 2009): 
   
                                                          
196 This was reported in H.C. Starck Newswire, April 2003 (Johnson and Tegera 2005). 
197 This book, Schwarzbuch Markenfirmen - Die Machenschaften der Weltkonzerne, was 
written by Klaus Werner and Hans Weiss in German and was published in September 2001. 
Though this book has been translated into several languages as the book turned into a best-
seller within a few days, the English translation, Black Book on Brand Companies, has not yet 
published (Markenfirmen n.d.). The book ‘tries to go beneath the image of the top brands on 
the market and reveals which of them have the most skeletons in their closet’ and ‘also shows 
the power of consumers in forcing these companies to change their business practices’ by 
providing detailed portraits of 50 companies and product lists (ibid.). One of the two 
exclusively researched chapters, based on undercover research and on-site investigations, 
focuses on coltan and is titled ‘Blood for Mobile Phones’ (ibid.).   
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We got notice of the first report issued by the Panel in April 2001 and 
we were surprised to be named as a customer of a Mrs. Gulamali.198 
We have never heard the name before and we have never had 
relations to Mrs. Gulamali. 
We wrote several letters directed to the Secretary General of the UN, 
the Chairman of the Panel and the Chairman of the US delegation at 
the UN, who headed the Security Council at that time. We never got 
any response to our letters. 
Only with the support of the German Foreign Office we got in contact 
with members of the Panel and we had a meeting with members of the 
Panel in New York in November 2001. 
 
While the company explicitly rejected the relationship with Mrs Gulamali, who 
was directly connected to the RCD rebels, it did not clarify how the allegations 
of the purchase of coltan from the RCD rebel-held area in the eastern DRC 
were perceived by the company and resolved with the panel. Some research 
confirmed the coltan exports to H.C. Starck. In addition to the aforementioned 
book published in Germany, research by the Pole Institute (Johnson and 
Tegera 2005) found that a subsidiary of H.C. Starck in Thailand bought 
tantalum directly from one of the most dubious trading companies, Dara 
Forest, a Ugandan-Thai company in North Kivu. Furthermore, a new coltan 
trading company, Munsad, registered in 2003, was considered to be a 
subsidiary of H.C. Starck and worked with a Belgian trading company, 
Tradmet, which was considered to do business with H.C. Starck (Johnson and 
Tegera 2005). Munsad was one of the largest official cassiterite exporters in 
North Kivu in 2003 and 2004, and it was alleged that coltan was exported as 
cassiterite (ibid.).           
 
Currently, H.C. Starck states that it ‘has committed itself to upholding the 
International Guiding Principles of the OECD for multinational companies and 
follows these principles in all its activities’ and ‘[a]llegations to the contrary, 
which third parties wrongly asserted against the company, were completely 
                                                          
198 Aziza Kulsum alias Mme Gulamali was the head of SOMIGL, through which the RCD 
imposed the trade monopoly from November 2000 to March 2001 (UNSC 2001a).   
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rejected by German courts’ (H.C. Starck 2009: 1). It ‘condemns all activities in 
connection with the illegal or unlawful exploitation of mineral resources … 
does not knowingly purchase any raw materials originating or which could 
originate from such source … in particular does not purchase any raw 
materials from the DRC, not even if we are offered materials with certifications 
proffered as “official” from Congolese state authorities’ (ibid.). The company 
also explains that its ‘supply of tantalous raw materials is currently guaranteed 
by contracts with suppliers from other parts of the world’ which includes ore 
concentrates from Australia and South America, including ‘tantalous tin slag 
and the recycling of tantalum scrap’ (ibid.: 2). In addition, the company has 
‘adequate reserves of raw materials to bridge any possible unexpected loss of 
suppliers’ (ibid.).        
 
Unlike other companies mentioned in this section, H.C. Starck attempted to 
clear its image also through supporting a British conservation NGO, the 
Gorilla Organization.199 This support was based on the company’s concern 
about the ecosystem in the national parks (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002b), 
though H.C. Starck was initially prevented from supporting the Gorilla 
Organization by the German government policy to halt all coltan imports from 
the DRC (Cuvelier and Raeymaekers 2002b). H.C. Starck participated in an 
international conference, the Durban Process, at the Tala Game Lodge in 
Durban, South Africa, organised by the Gorilla Organization between 28 and 
30 July 2003 in order to discuss ‘how raw material extraction and trade can be 
more closely harmonized with the needs of the local population and the 
ecosystem’200 (Johnson and Tegera 2005). It also participated in the second 
meeting at the Tarangire Safari Lodge, Arusha, Tanzania, in April 2004. 
 
H.C. Starck was interested in the idea, proposed by the Gorilla Organization, 
of establishing a pilot mining operation ‘outside of the park and to monitor raw 
material coming out of this mine and to assure that none of the war parties 
have any benefit from such material’, since it perceives it unethical to promote 
                                                          
199 The Gorilla Organization was formally called the Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund, but this thesis 
uses the current organisation’s name.  
200 The process of the Durban Process is analysed in the section 7.1..  
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and implement a total ban on coltan mining in the DRC (D’Souza 2003) and 
thus decided to support it.201 At the second Durban Process meeting in 2004, 
the head of environmental affairs of H.C. Starck, Ernst Joachim Martin, said 
that H.C. Starck would be happy to come back to the DRC; however, coltan 
had to be ‘ethically produced, without polluting or destroying the environment 
or using child labour’, ‘marketed in accordance with international law’ and that, 
‘to this end, his company would always demand some kind of certification’ 
(Durban Process 2004: 18). His comments prompted criticism of the Durban 
Process being a way of securing ‘sources of coltan which are beyond 
criticism’ (Johnson and Tegera 2005: 56).  
 
After participating in the Durban Process meetings of 2003 and 2004, the 
company, however, is ‘no longer pursuing this idea’ (H.C. Starck 2009) since 
‘nothing could be achieved in regard of a mining operation due to the ongoing 
war and the insecurity in the Kivus’, while the company ‘still generally 
support[s] this idea’.202 The company is ‘not planning any other activities for 
the operation of a mine or for the mining or extraction of raw materials in the 
DRC’ (H.C. Starck 2009: 1). It has, however, been involved as the only 
industrial partner in a pilot project (H.C. Starck 2009) to develop a Certified 
Trade Chain (CTC) for mineral resources in Rwanda, by the Rwanda Geology 
and Mines Authority (OGMR) with German support.203 H.C. Starck pursues 
this project ‘because we believe this is a unique solution for developing 
countries and this will allow also western companies to buy raw materials from 
such countries without being criticized to violate local laws or regulations’.204 
 
H.C. Starck is also involved in the CTC pilot project through a company based 
in Rwanda, Natural Resources Development Ltd (NRD), in which H.C. Starck 
took over 85 percent of the shares in 2006.205 An interview with the managing 
                                                          
201 Email communication with Manfred Buetefisch, General Manager Corporate 
Communications of H.C. Starck GmbH on 12/6/2009 (Buetefisch 2009). 
202 Email communication with Manfred Buetefisch, General Manager Corporate 
Communications of H.C. Starck GmbH on 12/6/2009 (Buetefisch 2009). 
203 See details on the CTC pilot project in Rwanda, in the section 7.2..  
204 Email communication with Manfred Buetefisch, General Manager Corporate 
Communications of H.C. Starck GmbH on 12/6/2009 (Buetefisch 2009). 
205 In 2006, Mr. Joachim Zarnack signed a memorandum of understanding to invest USD40 
million over a period of five years in a mineral venture with the Natural Resources 
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director (mining engineer) of the NRD, Dr Gustav Roethe, at the NRD 
Kimihurura office in Kigali, Rwanda, in 2009 revealed some of the 
experiences and perspectives of H.C. Starck, as detailed in the subsequent 
part.206  
 
On 18 June 2009, Dr Roethe appeared to be uncomfortable about being 
approached for an interview by the author on the partnership for coltan 
certification between the NRD and Rwandan government in his office, but 
agreed to be interviewed the following week. He stated that the company is a 
private company and 80 percent of its shares are owned by H.C. Starck and 
15 percent by individuals from Rwanda. On 19 June 2009, he was witnessed 
by the author and a research assistant in Gisenyi, when he was queuing at 
the Rwanda-DRC border to cross the border to Goma, the DRC, by 
coincidence. This event probably forced him to accept the interview to justify 
his travel to the DRC while his company claims to have no operations in the 
DRC. 
 
As such, the author’s visit to his office was welcomed without a further 
appointment. Dr Roethe was transferred to the NRD by H.C. Starck in 2008, 
but worked for SOMIKIVU in the DRC twenty-five years ago, implying his 
familiarity with the region. He started off with an hour-long technical lecture on 
geology and mineralogy without giving the author any chance to ask 
questions. He then explained the need to transform artisanal mining, often 
illegal, with primitive, environmentally disastrous and unsafe methods, to 
semi-industrial mining in Rwanda. While emphasising the nature of the 
company’s operation as being generous in assisting the Rwandan artisanal 
mining sector in terms of environmental protection and formalisation, he 
explained the decision of H.C. Starck a year ago to try to own raw materials, 
although H.C. Starck is not a mining company. The company is, therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Development (NRD) in 2006 Africa-Invest.Net 2006). Mr. Joachim Zarnack owns an 85 
percent stake and Mr. Ben Benzinge owns a 15 percent holding in the NRD. The NRD has 
concessions in Rutsiro, Marasebeya and Giciye in the western province and Nemba in the 
eastern province, and ‘promised modern mining processing facilities and the establishment of 
a refinery to purify minerals’ to be used ‘by countries in east and central Africa to purify 
minerals.’ 
206 Interview with the Managing Director of the NRD in Kigali on 22/6/2009 (Roethe 2009). 
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producing coltan and cassiterite in Nemba and wolfram in Rutsiro in Rwanda. 
Without being asked, Dr Roethe mentioned his visit to Goma on 19 June. He 
justified the purpose of the visit as being to see the situation in the DRC, 
which is ‘not allowing’ (sic) (his company to start operating). The reasons that 
are stopping the company from operating in the DRC are mainly insecurity, 
owing to the lack of government control, the presence of rebels and the 
absence of a MONUC presence outside towns, as well as the extensive need 
to build roads in the areas of operation.   
 
Throughout the interview, Dr Roethe was speaking as an employee of H.C. 
Starck. He specifically mentioned that the company was severely criticised for 
buying ‘blood coltan’ by the UN Panel of Experts’ investigation. From this 
experience, H.C. Starck became ‘shy’ about being exposed and is 
exceptionally concerned to make it clear that it does not get mineral 
concentrates from uncontrolled or illegal mining, including the use of child 
labour or trading. The company fears that it would be driven out of the market 
if it is seen as selling materials from the DRC. As companies being public and 
listed in the international markets are ‘vulnerable’, H.C. Starck does not take 
any risks that may damage its ‘public image’ which ‘outweighs profits’. He also 
mentioned that NGOs are not looking at how the Chinese do their business in 
the DRC, even though he said the Chinese do not care about their public 
image because their clients do not care, without specifying the name of the 
company.207 He expressed his criticism towards NGOs, saying that NGOs 
lack solid knowledge and disciplines unlike those in the mining business, yet 
claim to do charity work, while companies like H.C. Starck assist communities 
in various meaningful ways without any rhetoric.       
 
6.4. International traders 
 
Numerous international coltan trading companies were accused in the UN 
Panel of Experts’ reports of having assisted armed groups through purchasing 
                                                          
207 It is likely that he alluded to the Chinese company, Ningxia Non-ferrous Metals Smeltery 
(NNMS), reviewed in the section 6.2.1. as NNMS is a state-owned company and seems to 
continue purchasing ores from the DRC.   
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minerals and paying taxes (UNSC 2001a; 2002b) similar to middle-user 
companies in the previous section. These reports had resulted in certain 
outcomes. As mentioned earlier, a case of  UK-based Afrimex regarding its 
mineral trade in the eastern DRC was filed by Global Witness in 2007 (Global 
Witness 2007a), and the UK NCP for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises upheld the majority of the allegations against Afrimex in August 
2008.208 In addition, Eagle Wings Resources International had coltan 
exploration and trading operations in the DRC, and was named in the UN 
Panel of Experts’ reports (UNSC 2001a; 2002b). Accusations made against 
the company of using child labour in one of their mines in the eastern DRC as 
well as being linked to the Rwandan ‘elite network’ have bankrupted the 
company (Lasker 2008). According to the CEO of Eagle Wings, when 
customers found out that the company had been accused by the UN of the 
use of child labour they abandoned the company (ibid.). 
 
Pressure on international mineral trading companies was renewed following 
the publication of reports by the UN Group of Experts (UNSC 2008a) and 
Global Witness (2009c), which underscored the continuation of illicit 
exploitation and trade in minerals, and the adoption of the UN Security 
Council Resolutions 1856 (UNSC 2008b) and 1857 (UNSC 2008c) in 
December 2008 in relation to illicit natural resource trade. As the UN and 
human rights groups intensified pressure on international mineral trading 
companies and local authorities to crackdown on the sector, some companies 
suspended purchases of minerals from the DRC (Bavier 2009). This section 
introduces the perspectives of some international companies trading in 
tantalum as well as cassiterite209 that have been expressed recently in light of 
the heightened attention to the sector.  
 
The 2008 UN Group of Experts’ report (UNSC 2008a) established links 
between the Thailand Smelting and Refining Company (THAISARCO) and a 
comptoir, Panju, based in Bukavu. Panju was identified as one of the 
                                                          
208 For details, see the section 7.5.. 
209 This section includes cassiterite (tin) as tantalum is also produced from tin-slag and coltan 
is sometimes traded as cassiterite to undervalue the commodities. 
Perspectives and initiatives within the coltan supply chains 
221 
 
comptoirs in Bukavu directly complicit in pre-financing négociants and as 
working closely with the FDLR.210 Panju is one of the five major exporters of 
coltan, cassiterite and wolframite in South Kivu, based on government 
statistics in 2007. The UN Group of Experts claims that Panju was aware ‘that 
certain mines they buy from are controlled by FDLR’, which was widely known 
amongst mineral trading houses in South Kivu (ibid.: 21). It ‘has also obtained 
documents showing that all of Panju minerals purchases were sold to the 
Thailand Smelting and Refining Company (THAISARCO)’ (ibid.: 22–23). 
 
THAISARCO is a Thailand-based tin smelter and is a principal subsidiary and 
operating unit of UK-based Amalgamated Metal Corporation (AMC),211 which 
was named in the UN Panel of Experts’ report (UNSC 2002b) but categorised 
as ‘resolved’ in the 2003 UN Panel of Experts’ report (UNSC 2003b). A Global 
Witness report published in 2009 (Global Witness 2009c) also named 
THAISARCO as buying minerals from suppliers whose middle men had been 
trading with armed groups, and called for an assets freeze through the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1856. While the report acknowledges the legal 
operation of the company, it pointed out that the company failed to check the 
source of the minerals as its suppliers were laundering minerals originated 
from armed groups. Following the publication of the report, AMC was quoted 
by several media organisations, including the BBC.212 
 
In response to Global Witness on 3 August 2009, AMC contended that 
purchases of coltan and wolframite by THAISARCO were ‘simply incorrect’ as 
THAISARCO ‘is a tin smelter and it does not and never has purchased Coltan 
or Wolframite’ (Global Witness 2009d). Global Witness countered this, stating 
that it has ‘official documents which clearly state that Panju sold coltan to 
Thaisarco in April 2008’ (ibid.). Both AMC and THAISARCO, hence, 
responded to these allegations made against them as they do not operate 
‘directly’ in the DRC (Joshi 2009).  
 
                                                          
210 A UN Group of Experts report, leaked to the press in November 2009, documented that 
THAISARCO, as well as others, continues to trade with the FDLR (Africa Confidential 2009). 
211 AMC owns 75.25 percent shares of the THAISARCO.  
212 See BBC (2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8159977.stm 
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THAISARCO firmly rejected the allegations by claiming that the company is 
part of an industry-based comprehensive due diligence plan for tin minerals 
sourced from the DRC, the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi), started on 
1 July 2009213 (BBC 2009). The company stated that ‘[i]f the UN were to 
decide that a withdrawal from the trade is the most appropriate way forward, 
the Thaisarco would comply absolutely with their requirements’ (ibid.). It 
added, however, ‘it is believed that such an approach would be to the 
detriment of large numbers of artisanal miners and their dependents in the 
DRC’ by quoting the World Bank data estimating that there are up to 10 
million people who are dependent on mining in the DRC (ibid.) and ‘most 
parties and commentators appear to be in agreement that the continued trade 
in minerals from DRC is fundamental to the well being of the artisanal mining 
communities’ (Joshi 2009: 6). THIASARCO, therefore, believes it is ‘providing 
a very valuable service to the DRC economy although [it] recognise[s] that 
improvements in the visibility of the supply chain are both desirable and 
necessary’ (ibid.). 
 
Despite dismissing the allegations made against itself and claiming to have 
participated in the iTSCi, THAISARCO, who was sourcing between 25 percent 
and 50 percent of its tin supply from the DRC, suspended its purchases from 
the DRC in September 2009 (Bavier 2009). The chairman of THAISARCO 
and director of AMC, Giles Robbins, stated: 
 
Although acting entirely lawfully, the threat of misleading and bad 
publicity remains for anyone who participates in the DRC tin trade. 
These pressures have led Thaisarco to suspend its purchases from the 
DRC (ibid.). 
 
He also complained that ‘[n]egative campaigning from advocacy groups and 
adverse coverage in sections of the international media is undermining the 
credibility’ of the iTSCi ‘to combat illicit trading in the mineral’ (ibid.). The 
                                                          
213 The iTSCi scheme is developed by an International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) working 
group, including THAISARCO and Malaysia Smelting Corporation Berhad. See details in ITRI 
(2009). 
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company would restart smelting, provided broader support for the scheme, as 
it believes ‘the mineral trade working with key stakeholders could, given the 
constructive engagement of all advocacy groups, be the catalyst for the return 
of security and economic prosperity to the Congo’ (ibid.).   
 
A Belgium-based mineral trader, Traxys, was also named in the UN Group of 
Experts’ report in 2008 (UNSC 2008a). The group found that in 2007 Traxys 
officially bought 1,631 tonnes of cassiterite and 226 tonnes of coltan through 
four comptoirs, which systematically buy from FDLR-controlled mines (ibid.: 
22). Traxys was also accused of pre-financing those comptoirs, though the 
company denies any pre-financing arrangements, while admitting engaging in 
a buying relationship with them (ibid.: 22–23). In May 2009, Traxys 
suspended the purchase of minerals from the eastern DRC on the grounds of 
reputation, although the company denies any wrongdoing (Bavier 2009). 
 
The UN Group of Experts’ report, leaked to the press in November 2009,214 
named the Hong Kong-based Refractory Metals Mining Company (RMMC) 
(Refractory Metals Mining Company 2009). In response, RMMC published a 
statement ‘to clarify facts discussed in the report that have been the source of 
some confusion’ (ibid.). As the company is part of the ITRI Tin Supply Chain 
Initiative (iTSCi), it ‘abides by ITRI transparency obligations to show the origin 
of ore purchased, and conducts due diligence both in accordance with ITRi 
and UN recommendations to ensure that its cassiterite is not sourced from 
conflict areas’ of the DRC. The company’s due diligence process ‘includes 
oversight of sourced minerals’ origin, review of the licensed exporters’ policy 
and practices, and collection of complete and accurate government 
documents proving legality’.  
 
RMMC states that its cassiterite supplier, African Ventures Ltd215, did not 
source cassiterite from a supplier until this supplier stopped purchasing 
                                                          
214 See Africa Confidential (2009). 
215 According to the leaked UN Group of Experts report in 2009, several foreign mining 
houses, including the African Ventures Ltd., trade with the FDLR (Africa Confidential 2009). 
The Africa Ventures Ltd. is a Samoan-registered company with a Hong Kong address, and is 
‘being used as a front company for the Swiss businessman Chris Huber’ (ibid.). Chris Huber 
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cassiterite from ‘a particular market where cassiterite from a rebel-controlled 
mine was commonly sold’. In the view of the company, it did not support rebel 
groups, as it had avoided ‘purchases from areas controlled by, or benefitting, 
non-government armed groups’. RMMC ‘has followed all recommendations 
and instructions of the 2008 report of the Group of Experts’. RMMC, therefore, 
feels that ‘[t]he situation clearly is confusing’ as the 2009 UN Group of Experts’ 
report ‘suggests that some mines under the control of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo are in fact under the control of rebel groups’. The 
company states that it ‘will not restart purchases in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo until the question of what constitutes conflict resources is 
resolved’. Moreover, the company states that it ‘would greatly welcome UN 
guidance regarding which areas of the eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo are conflict zones at a particular point in time and how to continue to 
improve its supply chain due diligence process’.        
 
6.5. Actors in the DRC and Rwanda 
 
This section introduces challenges and perspectives within the first stage of 
the coltan supply chains, or the upstream side of the supply chains. They 
include actors on the ground, both in the DRC and in Rwanda, namely mineral 
trading houses, middle-men, miners, government officials and NGOs. Scrutiny 
of coltan supply chains has highlighted the crucial roles played by mineral 
trading houses, comptoirs, within the coltan supply chains. They ‘operate as 
the interface between the local and the international mineral business … act 
as intermediaries between Congolese négociants and international traders 
who sell the minerals to different parts of the world’ (Custers et al. 2009: 11). 
As they are informed both on the change of the global commodity market and 
the local political and economic situation (ibid.), they are expected to be able 
to know the exact mines that minerals are from and tell whether the minerals 
are conflict minerals or not.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
‘was involved in the conflict coltan business during the 1998-2003 war’ in the eastern DRC 
and is ‘sourcing materials from companies with close ties to FARDC officers’ from the former 
CNDP as well as ‘companies buying from FDLR zones’ (ibid.).    
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Contrary to expectations, comptoirs in Kivus did not provide information to the 
Group of Experts on ‘which negociants they buy from, and from which 
geographical zones these negociants trade from, as well as information on 
quantities of minerals purchased over the past year’, when asked during the 
meetings in 2008 (UNSC 2008a: 32). The group accuses both the head of the 
comptoirs association in North Kivu, John Kanyoni, and the head of the 
comptoirs association in South Kivu, Mudekereza Namegabe, of having 
‘falsely proclaimed that they are working with the United Nations to increase 
transparency in the sector’ (ibid.). In view of the Group of Experts, ‘[t]oo many 
comptoirs are exploiting the legal distinction between themselves and 
negociants to claim they do not know the origin of the minerals they purchase, 
when clearly they often do, and, if they do not, it would be fairly easy to find 
out’ (ibid.). 
 
John Kanyoni has been articulating the view of Congolese mineral traders 
through media coverage, but whether his voice is truly representing the 
majority of the mineral traders is unknown. According to a BBC HARDtalk 
presenter, who interviewed him in 2009 (Sackur 2009), he is ‘a designer-
suited, BMW driving comptoir and an ethnic Tutsi’. During the interview, he 
acknowledged that the Hutu extremists in the eastern DRC finance their 
military operations through controlling local mines, some of whom killed 
members of his family (ibid.). In response to the question posed concerning 
whether he is trading blood minerals, he said, ‘No … That’s a Western 
exaggeration’ (HARDtalk 2009). Furthermore, he claims that it is a moral 
business by explaining, ‘If you go to Walikale, you will see that the impact of 
the FDLR in mining is not so big, compared to the normal artisanal miners 
who are in the business’ (ibid.).  
 
The problem of the mineral trade in the DRC according to John Kanyoni is 
that, ‘[w]e are more suffering because of the lack of authority of our own 
government of the DRC in those areas’ (ibid.). He insists that they are trying 
to help the authority to establish its control and formalise the sector, which is 
more important than halting the trade to stop human rights violation (ibid.). For 
that purpose, his association proposed ‘to sit all of [them] together [to discuss] 
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how [to] establish a mechanism of due diligence which will be helping to get a 
kind of traceability of the ores from the mine, up to the comptoir and even to 
the end user’. This is not in response to the mounting pressure following the 
UN Group of Experts’ report and the UN Security Council resolutions, as their 
approach is based on the understanding that thousands of people depend on 
the sector (ibid.).  
 
Without making clear how their approach differs from other approaches for 
due diligence such as the 2009 US Congo Conflict Mineral Act, Kanyoni 
opposes the act as these approaches can increase the cost of operating in 
the DRC and ‘a cumbersome mineral tracing scheme could kill off the 
industry’.216 He commented, ‘Do they want people to stop working in the Kivus 
too? Do you think that will bring peace? These people in the mines today will 
just join the armed groups tomorrow.’ When THAISARCO announced its 
decision to suspend purchasing from the DRC in September 2009, Kanyoni, 
representing local traders, accused ‘the United Nations and campaigners of 
stifling the sector, the main income sources for thousands of miners and 
dependents in the provinces of North and South Kivu’, of making the sector’s 
survival difficult (Bavier 2009).217  
 
Since the traceability of minerals has become a focus of the conflict mineral 
issue, the key question is whether comptoirs can know the exact mine where 
minerals come from, as the Group of Experts claims.218 Being asked whether 
comptoirs know the origin of minerals, as négotiants claim, and ‘by implication, 
that some of them colluded with the illegal activities of the FDLR’, local 
business leader, Basila Milabyo, in Bukavu answered that they know which 
market or company the minerals are from but not which mine (Fessy and 
Doyle 2009). He also said, however, ‘[w]ell, even in areas controlled by these 
rebels, the diggers are Congolese’ and ‘[w]hat can we do to chase them? We 
                                                          
216 Reuters (2009a) Rights group wants Congo ‘conflict mineral’ tracing. 1st April 2009, 
available from: www.miningweekly.com/print-version/rights-group-wants-congo-conflict-
mineral-tracing [Accessed 2 April 2009]. 
217 Kanyoni based his claim on the fact that the THAISARCO was purchasing more than 70 
percent of production from North and South Kivu, while an industry expert does not think the 
suspension by the THAISARCO would affect the market as ‘any materials they don’t take the 
Chinese would’ (Bavier 2009). 
218 UNSC (2008a). 
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suffer from their presence as well. They rape our women, and people are 
leaving the bush because of them, taking refuge in town. How can we get 
weapons to fight them? We have none’ (ibid.). He declined to answer whether 
bringing a halt to purchasing minerals by his association can stop the 
operations of the FDLR, whom négotiants pay ‘to get in and out mines under 
their control’ and ‘tax for each bag of minerals that they have removed from 
these sites’ (ibid.). 
 
An international NGO worker also recognises the difficulty in identifying the 
origin of ores.219 During his assignment in Fizi, South Kivu, in 2008, he 
observed that small miners and entrepreneurs traded the ores they had mined 
at a basic, traditional market in the area, where people sell vegetables and 
livestock, and that the armed groups were present to collect informal tax ‘in 
order to pay for the upkeep’. In his perception, supply chain due diligence 
process may not be appropriate as ‘the situation on the ground is quite 
complex’ and ‘the mining operations are not … very institutionalised’. Owing 
to the informality of the operation, he envisages that ‘it’s very difficult to 
actually trace where [ores] came from and also to make a firm question about 
how much the harm a particular mining operation has done’.   
 
The above shows that comptoirs depend on middle-men, or négotiants, to 
source minerals from mines and markets in the eastern DRC. While many of 
these sites are controlled by armed groups and the national army, a 
representative of the négotiants, Masumbuko Moari, said, during a BBC 
interview, ‘There is nowhere and no-one we won’t buy from’ (Allen 2009). 
Having been told that ‘they [négotiants] might have blood on their hands as a 
result of buying from the men with guns’, he laughed and said, ‘That’s a 
political issue’ (ibid.).  
 
Those perspectives illuminate the difficulty in distinguishing harmful conflict 
minerals from other minerals in the eastern DRC. Adolphe Muzito, DRC’s 
prime minister, acknowledges that the real issue is the militarisation of the 
                                                          
219 Telephone interview with a former international NGO stuff in South Kivu on 24/3/2009 
(Fletcher 2009). 
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mining sector (Allen 2009). He said, ‘We want people and companies to be 
able to work in good conditions’ and, ‘once the environment improves, the 
army won’t be in a position to exploit the mines’ (ibid.). He explained, ‘It’s an 
abnormal situation at the moment because the government doesn’t have full 
control’ (ibid.).  
 
The aforementioned NGO worker supposes that ‘the issue of whether or not 
mining is fuelling the conflict is not something that can be controlled at the end 
of the market chain’, and where companies buy coltan from ‘doesn’t have a 
very clear impact on whether or not people’s well-being is improved in coltan 
mining areas’.220 His analysis is based on the mixed reality on the ground that 
various people are involved in dangerous mining operations in different ways 
in order to make a living, being desperately poor and lacking public services 
and social infrastructures. What is needed, therefore, is a ‘structure in actual 
mining operations’, which can convert ‘the value of coltan to a local 
improvement in welfare’. Moreover, there is a problem of poor 
communications in ‘the way that life is administered in Congo’ and there is, 
hence, ‘a very weak link between what actually happens on the ground in 
particular villages and particular communities with whatever agreements were 
made by states or by administration of the country or the administration of the 
state, or even by agreements from the militias or military leaders’. 
 
The weak link between the reality on the ground and administration has been 
observed and confirmed by several other actors. The director of a comptoir, 
Olive Depot, says, ‘You can cross the river to Rwanda with coltan in your 
pocket. They offer better prices there. Our legislation encourages fraud’ 
(Dizolele 2007). Higher taxes in the DRC have been one of the reasons for 
the prevalence of the illegal and informal mineral trade, and a new tax hike 
triggered the suspension of purchase of ores in North Kivu in 2009 (Bavier 
2009). Officials of the Rwanda Geology and Mines Authority (OGMR) are 
aware of the smuggling of minerals from the eastern DRC to Rwanda by 
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‘bachorachora’221 in order to add value in Rwanda by purifying the minerals 
before exporting them abroad.222 Though the authority is tracking exports in 
order to control smuggling, ‘tracking the minerals back to the mines is proving 
to be much harder’ as they ‘are sold by third-party buyers … [who] are not 
linking the materials to where it has come from, especially if it has come from 
the FDLR, so that’s why the problem stay’, according to the director of OGMR, 
Dr Michael Biryabarema (SaveRwanda 2009).  
 
Accepting that the conflict has been 100 percent financed from the illegal 
mining activities, a Congolese expert on the DRC’s extractive industry 
criticises the 2002 Mining Code which ‘was drafted by the World Bank without 
taking into consideration the reality on the ground’, such as the issues of 
artisanal mining ‘due to the consequence of war’ and ‘also in favour [of] the 
multinational companies’.223 He considers that the ‘[t]raceability and 
certification of mines from the DRC up to the last point [buyers and users] … 
[s]trong law on mining regulation’ and measures for the cross-border trade 
between the DRC and its neighbours, including ’[c]apacity building of the DRC 
government in charge of mining revenues and taxes’ are necessary (ibid.). 
 
These realities on the ground have been expressed by some players in the 
mining and trade sector. Interviews conducted with the local population in 
North Kivu between December 2000 and August 2001224 showed the 
fundamental changes brought by the coltan boom and the second Congo War 
(Tegera et al. 2002). Coltan mining provided cash income, which is very 
scarce in the area, and solved the unemployment problem even for the 
displaced population from the war. Those who engage in mining spoke of 
coltan mining as ‘hard work’ with problems of landslides and armed groups, 
and they did not accumulate wealth owing to the high cost of living around 
mines (ibid.). They still preferred and engaged in coltan mining because there 
                                                          
221 This is a vernacular in Kinyarwanda, referring to mineral smugglers.  
222 Interview with a Rwandese official at the Rwanda Geology and Mines Authority (OGMR) in 
Kigali on 18/6/2009.  
223 Skype interview with the Project Coordinator – DRC’s Extractive Industries of the African 
Institute of Corporate Citizenship on 22/5/2009 (Losango 2009). 
224 A co-research by the Pole Institute and CREDAP (Tegera et al. 2002) interviewed miners 
and their families, managers of mine, traders, NGOs, church, local administrators and 
traditional authorities. 
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were no other sources of income due to the effects of the war; they hope to 
become rich ‘one day’ and they were not worried about the risks as ‘death is 
everywhere’ (ibid.: 16). Others saw coltan mining as quick and easy money, 
compared to earning income through agriculture or cattle-raising, and that 
produced negative outcomes. Those outcomes include: the decline of 
agriculture and cattle-raising, which was left to women and caused high food 
prices; socio-cultural destruction through prostitution, school dropout, drugs 
and drinking; and environmental destruction. In addition to rising violence in 
the mines being used as a means to settle disputes, some foresaw the risk of 
new land conflicts between individuals or ethnic groups when the previous 
conflicts over pastoral land had not been solved. An NGO director specifically 
pointed out the potential confrontation between the absent landowners that 
were Tutsi and Hutu and their managers from the Hunde tribe who were 
becoming rich through coltan mining, despite the underground land belonging 
to the state.  
 
Interviews for a follow-up study between 2004 and 2005 revealed that coltan 
mining continued under the same conditions, given ‘the lack of viable 
alternatives’ (Johnson and Tegera 2005: 19). While traders or people with 
access to trade made money, miners did not profit and their lives had not 
improved. A mine manager explained, ‘The traders in the market manage to 
take all the miners’ money, so the miners’ life is one of starting all over again 
every day, going back and forth between the mine and the market’ (ibid.).  
 
It is not only miners who do not benefit greatly from coltan mining. Labourers, 
who work on separation processes for minerals at a comptoir in South Kivu, 
are mostly day-labourers without any contracts and they make less than 
USD1 a day (Dizolele 2007). A worker explains, ‘If we did not have this job, 
we will have no work’ (ibid.). Even négotiants are ‘very much at the mercy of’ 
the comptoir (ibid.). A négotiant asks, ‘If I did not do this, then what else?’, 
even though he is often in the red (ibid.). The aforementioned NGO worker 
noted that ‘cash income is very hard to come by’ and people work as a 
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labourer for only USD1–4 a day.225 He also observed that ‘money is quite high 
objective of the people, perhaps because of the shortage. Particularly 
amongst young men, there’s a huge drive to try to earn cash’ so that they can 
manage to do things by giving a bribe (ibid.). 
  
Fieldwork by the author in 2009 also revealed that people who engage in 
mineral extraction and trade are exploited and do not make a great deal of 
profit. A Rwandese demobilised man, who works as a négotiant to buy 
minerals or employ miners to mine on the land he buys in Bukavu for his big 
boss in Cyangugu (Rwanda), said he is not rich since he has been exploited 
like a slave.226 A Rwandese, who was previously mining in North Kivu 
between 2000 and 2004, said he was paid very little per quantity he mined 
and stopped mining when he became ill from respiratory problems.227 Though 
he started supervising the packing of ores for a company in Kigali, he is paid a 
meagre salary. According to him, armed groups send guards to the mines 
they control and charge a small amount of tax, but it is safe and there are no 
problems in these mines. A priest in Bukavu employes a Congolese former 
coltan miner, who has no car and looks just like a worker, as an errand runner 
to deal with a local business, Kotecha,228 in order to avoid drawing attention to 
his business operation.229 The Congolese errand runner assists the priest in 
selling ores, which he buys very cheaply from local miners to Kotecha, and in 
buying drugs from Kotecha. According to him, miners are not in danger in the 
FDLR- or Congolese army-controlled mines, as those groups need miners 
and money from the mines.      
 
The situation for individuals who are employed by established companies 
does not seem to be much better. A Congolese, who works for a mineral 
exporting company owned by a ‘big boss’ (American) in Kigali, has no 
contracts or insurances despite having worked for the company for the past 
                                                          
225 Telephone interview with a former international NGO stuff in South Kivu on 24/3/2009 
(Fletcher 2009). 
226 Interview with a Rwandan négotiant in Kigali on 17/6/2009. 
227 Interview with a former Rwandese miner in Kigali on 23/6/2009. 
228 This prominent local entrepreneur is associated with the British mineral trading company, 
Afrimex, which breached the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by trading 
minerals from the rebel-held eastern DRC. See details of Afrimex case in the section 7.5.   
229 Interview with a former Congolese miner in Kigali on 20/6/2009. 
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ten years.230 Similarly, a Rwandese worker with a university degree in an 
established mineral trading company works six days a week from morning to 
late evening without a proper contract.231 At both Mineral Supply Africa (MSA) 
in Kigali and the Metal Processing Association (MPA) where the author 
observed their compounds, several workers are engaged in purifying minerals 
in blue overalls with no other protective clothing.  
 
There are also individuals who engage in the mineral trade by using their 
connections and access. A Rwandese mineral dealer, who resides both in 
Goma and Gisenyi, smuggles minerals from Goma to Gisenyi in small 
portions with help from the border authority and then sells them to exporters 
based in Kigali.232 He seems to be making a good living through smuggling. 
Organisers of a cooperative initiative to deal with the ‘3Ts’ based in Goma and 
Gisenyi are well connected to Europe, as well as Rwanda and the DRC.233 
They pay very little money to their groups of miners and swap groups when 
those groups start to complain about the payment, thereby becoming rich, and 
managing to build large houses in Goma.         
 
Lastly, actors on the ground seem to have a different perception of the nexus 
between minerals and the conflict in the DRC. Throughout the fieldwork in 
Rwanda in 2009, most interviewees were able to distinguish different conflicts 
that are related to mineral trade or political issues. They acknowledged the 
link between minerals and the conflict and attributed this to some disputes 
over deals.234 Based on their perception, minerals can fuel conflict; however, 
it is beneficial to buy minerals from locals as minerals provide income for 
many. It is also necessary to assist miners’ families and build infrastructures 
such as roads.   
 
                                                          
230 This was revealed when he had a road accident on his way to come to the interview in 
June 2009.   
231 Owing to this working condition, the author was not able to interview him during the 
fieldwork in June 2009. 
232 Informal conversation with a Rwandese mineral dealer in Gisenyi on 19/6/2009.  
233 Interview with a Congolese/Rwandese civil society representative in Gisenyi on 19/6/2009. 
234 The aforementioned Congolese worker for a mineral exporting company in Kigali, a 
Congolese executive secretary for a local NGO and a Rwandese-Congolese informant. 
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In one interview, a miner was asked, ‘Do you understand that the exploitation 
of coltan fuels the conflict in Congo?’ and he replied, ‘If we knew that, we 
would no longer work here’ (Dizolele 2007).  
 
The governor of North Kivu province, Eugene Serufuli,235 spoke on the 
prospects of peace and economic recovery of the DRC in 2004 and stated the 
following concerning the real cause of instability in the area:236 
 
It is a problem that arose out of very poor management. The country 
had been very badly run for several decades. We should not today 
begin to trivialise the Congolese problem down to a political one. How 
many years have civil servants not been paid? How many years have 
passed without inter-ethnic fighting and killings where entire villages 
have been burnt down? You want to tell me that all these villages have 
been burnt because of natural resources? No, we have to be serious 
and sit down at the table, think and seek a lasting solution to the crisis 
in the DRC. [The problem of the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR] has to 
be solved at a much higher level [than the local level as they currently 
are] not only here in North Kivu; they are in the forest of central Africa.  
 
Similarly, the view on the Congolese conflict of the representatives of 
members of the National Parliament in South Kivu was expressed in a letter to 
Hillary Clinton in August 2009: 
 
[A] war of attrition is managed wisely and thoroughly fed through the 
plundering of our resources, the depopulation of areas affected by this 
war, and very soon balkanization [and this] policy has led to the 
strengthening of mono-ethnic powers in Rwanda and Uganda … It is 
important to point out that with the support of the USA and the UK 
primarily, Rwanda released its tribal hatred on the DR Congo where its 
                                                          
235 Eugene Serufuli is a Hutu member of the Banyarwanda community and was an activist in 
the MAGREVI (Jourdan 2005). He was the second vice president of the RCD-Goma and was 
a pro-Rwanda governor, from 31 July 2000 till 2007. 
236 IRIN (2004) ‘DRC: Interview with Eugene Serufuli, governor of North Kivu Province’, 22 
July 2004, available from: www.grandslacs.net/doc/3100.pdf [Accessed 3 July 2009]. 
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support and participation alongside pseudo-insurgent movements are 
undeniable. Indeed, the involvement of multinational corporations in the 
delivery of arms and plundering the wealth of the DR Congo in the 
interest of great powers on one side and on the other, the cases of 
Mutebusi, Nkundabatware, Bosco Ntaganda, and the flagrant presence 
of many Rwandan soldiers in the integrated CNDP troops in support of 
Rwanda confirms our assertion … Rwanda’s history is punctuated by 
cyclical and fratricidal wars driven by a spirit of intolerance and 
retaliation between Hutus and Tutsis … the DR Congo has become 
each time the country of pilgrimage for them. 
 
They, therefore, ‘condemn the guilty silence of the international community, 
particularly the USA’ and demand the ‘international community require of 
President Paul Kagame the organization of an inter-Rwandan dialogue that 
would bring together around one table all the components of the Rwandan 
tribes, both those inside and outside of the country, to find solutions to internal 
problems between them’ (ibid.). They also denounce the ‘contribution of the 
USA in the strict regulation of sale, delivery and purchase of arms and 
munitions to leaders implicated in the conflict in the Great Lakes sub-region, 
essentially Rwanda and Uganda’ and call for ‘[p]lacing under embargo all 
American and Western firms trafficking in mineral resources known as “blood” 
coltan, diamonds, gold, cassiterite etc.’ and ‘punishing all political and 
economic players in the sub-region or elsewhere involved in the war’ amongst 
other things. Lastly, they ‘recommend that the Obama administration deals 
directly with Congolese institutions legally established in place of 
intermediaries or subcontractors’.   
 
6.6. Chapter summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter has, at the outset, explained the enhanced scrutiny and 
mounting pressure on the coltan supply chains, given the adverse impact of 
mining and trade of ‘conflict coltan’ on the conflict in the DRC and the role of 
coltan-using companies. Companies are increasingly being called upon to 
apply enhanced due diligence as part of their corporate responsibility to 
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respect human rights, thereby traceability and accountability of supply chains 
have become critical issues. Within this context, the ‘conflict mineral’ 
approach to clean up coltan, which is implicated in the conflict, from the coltan 
supply chains has become prevalent. However, as mentioned in section 6.1., 
the ‘conflict mineral’ approach has been criticised as it neglects the underlying 
geo-political issues and would negatively impact on the livelihood of the 
population. I believe my research supports this critical perspective.  
 
The examination of challenges and perspectives within the coltan supply 
chains at four different stages has clearly demonstrated a lucid disparity 
amongst actors. End-users of coltan, such as mobile phone companies, are 
vulnerable to NGO and consumer campaigns, and are compelled to source 
coltan responsibly in order to protect their brands. Nonetheless, they are 
faced with the difficult task of achieving full traceability and accountability of 
coltan supply chains, owing to the extensive and complex coltan supply 
chains. They do not purchase raw materials directly, and depend on the lower 
tiers of suppliers to comply with their ethical supply chain policy; however, 
they acknowledge their limited influence on suppliers when not having direct 
contracts. The challenge of traceability is also evident as characteristics of the 
ore disappear once the ore is processed. Consequently, companies face 
significant challenges in pursuing ethical sourcing agendas on raw materials 
in order to protect their brands and manage reputational risks, and find those 
challenges impossible to address alone. End-users of coltan are, therefore, 
pursuing collaboration with other companies and stakeholders to tackle the 
coltan supply chain issues effectively, although local traders are not yet 
included. 
 
Tantalum capacitor manufacturers and tantalum processors, as middle-users 
of coltan, were made aware of their extended responsibilities to the conflict in 
the DRC by the reports of the UN Panel of Experts and Group of Experts. 
Tantalum processors are directed particularly as a key pressure point within 
the coltan supply chains, as the ‘big three’ companies consume 70 to 80 
percent of tantalum in the world. Amongst the ‘big three’, the Cabot 
Corporation and H.C. Starck fervently express that they do not ‘knowingly’ 
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purchase tantalum materials from the DRC or unlawful sources, and that they 
uphold international standards in its operation. Their response is in stark 
contrast to the Chinese state-owned company, Ningxia Non-ferrous Metals 
Smeltery (NNMS), which makes no comment on corporate responsibility or 
responsible supply chains, in spite of it being the primary consumer of the 
DRC’s coltan. Noteworthy is the case of H.C. Starck, which has become 
extremely ‘shy’ and admits its vulnerability to reputational risks as a listed 
company after being severely criticised for buying ‘blood coltan’. While the 
company itself takes its ‘public image’ seriously by taking precedence over 
profits, it points out undisciplined actions by the international community 
without addressing the Chinese company specifically. 
 
Similarly, international traders have been blamed for fuelling the conflict by 
purchasing minerals from the eastern DRC, while operating lawfully. To 
counter the bad publicity caused by negative campaigns against them, some 
insist that their operations provide valuable livelihoods to the large number of 
the population who depend on mining in the DRC. Nevertheless, several 
trading companies have been forced to suspend the purchase of minerals 
from the DRC on reputational grounds. A question of what constitutes conflict 
coltan arose as the key issue for this sector. The sector demands clear 
guidance to determine which areas, when and from whom it is acceptable to 
buy minerals, since the situation on the ground is confusing, as sovereign 
actors also commit grave human rights abuses.      
 
Amongst the actors on the ground, comptoirs, mineral trading houses, have 
been pressed to avoid buying minerals from rebel-controlled mines, on the 
basis that they should be able to know the exact origin of ores. Comptoirs 
oppose this assumption and demonstrate ambivalent perspectives. While they 
advocate due diligence, they criticise it at the same time, as an obstacle to the 
survival of the population and an impractical solution, owing to the complex 
relations on the ground. These perspectives are generally shared by other 
actors at the grass roots level. They distinguish conflicts related to mining and 
trade from the conflicts based on political issues, and reject the blood coltan 
scenario as a Western exaggeration. They identify the issues as being lack of 
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control, structures and livelihood, inappropriate legislation, and poverty. Faced 
with these issues, the population without access to markets engages in 
mining and trades in severe working conditions.               
 
The assessment of these different challenges and perspectives illustrates that 
upstream supply side and demand side are driven by distinctly different 
standpoints and motivations. Actors in the upstream supply chain, including 
miners, middle-men and trading houses, are driven by their need to capitalise 
available resources for livelihood, survival and security, regardless of 
standards. On the contrary, those on the demand side are driven by their 
need to secure the supply of critical minerals. As the DRC became an 
essential supplier of coltan when some major suppliers suspended mining 
operations, the demand side needs to ensure the acquisition of conflict-free 
coltan. This is a critical issue for coltan-using companies in order to avoid 
damaging their public image and reputation through the supply chain due 
diligence.  
 
The mounting pressure for supply chain due diligence has, however, posed a 
critical question as to what really constitutes ‘conflict coltan’. The perspectives 
expressed by actors in the upstream supply side, as well as the analysis on 
the conflict in the DRC in Chapter Four and coltan mining in Chapter Five, 
illustrate the complex and nuanced relation between mining and the conflicts. 
It is essentially impossible to make a firm distinction between legal and illegal, 
or sovereign and non-state, in transactions that involve all aspects of the 
society. The disparity between the two sides highlights the lack of involvement 
of local actors in efforts to achieve the ethical sourcing of coltan. Yet 
involvement would be the only means through which the voice of local actors 




Chapter Seven: Multi-stakeholder partnerships 
 
This chapter aims to assess the efficacy of multi-stakeholder partnerships in 
enhancing governance to prevent armed groups from accessing finance 
through coltan production and trade in the eastern DRC. It analyses empirical 
evidence of the multi-stakeholder partnerships relevant to coltan production in 
the eastern DRC, drawing also from the analysis of the nature of the link 
between coltan exploitation and armed conflicts in the eastern DRC from the 
preceding chapters (Chapters Four, Five and Six). Based on the findings 
above, the chapter also evaluates whether multi-stakeholder partnerships 
contribute to sustainable peace and security by improving governance to end 
and prevent armed conflicts.  
 
The multi-stakeholder partnership approach to enhancing governance in 
natural resource production and trade has become prevalent based on the 
predominant conflict analyses reviewed in Chapter Two. The analysis of 
contemporary armed conflicts largely draws on econometric studies and 
emphasises the economic agendas of belligerents, or a rational choice theory, 
rather than the grievances of rebel groups. These studies find recurring 
evidence that the economic motivations of rebel groups in countries with weak 
governance and natural resource abundance, especially valuable, point 
source and lootable resources, lead to armed conflicts. This dominant 
hypothesis is increasingly shaping policies to strengthen governance in 
addressing resource-related armed conflicts. Given that involve responses 
such as country-based sanctions regimes to prevent armed groups from 
accessing natural resource revenues have proved ineffective, largely owing to 
the growing network of trade, responses have become increasingly global, 
inclusive and participatory. They are often manifested in a framework of multi-
stakeholder partnership or co-regulation in order to enhance governance in 
resource production and trade.  
 
The multi-stakeholder partnership approach also reflects the fact that it is not 




as discussed in the previous chapter, owing to the extensive supply chains 
and complex causalities between coltan exploitation and armed conflicts in 
the eastern DRC. Key elements within the complex causalities include the 
widespread poverty, informal economy and artisanal mining caused by the 
economic decline and institutional collapse, all of which were exacerbated by 
the multi-layered, protracted conflicts and insecurity in the eastern DRC.  
These issues have been analysed in Chapters Four to Six.  
 
This chapter reviews seven multi-stakeholder partnership examples that are 
relevant to coltan production and trade in the DRC. The final section 
summarises and concludes the chapter with an analysis of the efficacy of 
these multi-stakeholder partnerships in preventing armed groups from 
accessing finance through coltan production and trade in the eastern DRC. 
Subsequently the chapter discusses the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
in contributing to sustainable peace and security by bringing to an end in the 
ongoing armed conflicts and preventing future conflicts through improved 
governance. 
 
This research identifies seven examples of multi-stakeholder partnerships that 
are relevant to coltan production and trade in the eastern DRC. For each 
partnership, it considers background, objectives and scope, type, general 
progress and impact and/or implications.237 It has identified the relationships 
amongst these seven multi-stakeholder partnerships, as explained in the 
following description. 
 
Amongst these seven multi-stakeholder partnerships, the Durban Process is 
the only Congolese-owned multi-stakeholder partnership which includes a 
variety of local and international stakeholders, and has tried to implement its 
ideas on the ground. Although it has not fully implemented its ideas to date 
and is dormant at the moment, its main idea of ethically sourced coltan has 
been learnt and inherited by other initiatives, supported by the UN 
                                                          




recommendation in 2005238 and the 2007 G8 summit.239 These initiatives are 
namely: Certified Trading Chains (CTC), International Conference on the 
Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Joint Working Group of Global e-Sustainability 
Initiative (GeSI) and Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC). They are 
all ongoing processes and have not been implemented; thus, it is not possible 
to evaluate their outcomes. The CTC, as the most advanced mechanism, is 
expected to be applied through various initiatives.240 As this is the first 
minerals certification being developed for industrial minerals, such as coltan, 
the lessons learnt from the implementation of the Kimberly Process 
Certification Scheme (KPCS) to prevent conflict diamonds in the DRC are 
considered to identify implications for the coltan certification schemes.  
 
The subsequent sections present findings from the examination of four 
partnerships above in addition to a further three partnerships from which the 
CTC incorporated the standards. These standards-setting partnerships are: 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Voluntary Principles (VPs) on 
Security and Human Rights, and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI).  
 
7.1. The Durban Process 
 
                                                          
238 The Report of the Group of Experts submitted a pursuant to resolution 1596 (UNSC 
2005b: 27) to recommend: ‘Enhanced traceability systems for all important natural resources 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be developed under the direction of the 
Government and with the participation of Uganda, Rwanda, the World Bank and IMF, regional 
participants such as the Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme and the 
Great Lakes Region Conference, along with relevant industry participants and other 
interested parties. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be 
required to report on a regular basis to the sanctions Committee about the development and 
implementation of those systems’. 
239 The 2007 G8 summit in Heiligendamm has created a momentum and commitment to 
address transparency in the extractive sector amongst the governments, heads of state and 
Government. ‘Responsibility for Raw Materials’ was discussed within the ‘Growth and 
Responsibility in Africa’ agenda, in which transparency in the extractive sector, with a focus 
on the certification schemes and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), was 
discussed. In this discussion, improving transparency in the extractive sector is considered to 
be crucial to enhance accountability, good governance and sustainable economic 
development for the resource rich countries and to improve investment environment and the 
security of the supply chain for importers of raw materials.      





The Durban Process241 is ‘a Congolese-led, multi-stakeholder initiative’ 
facilitated by the Gorilla Organization,242 an International NGO (Durban 
Process 2008b: 1). It aims to mitigate the effects of illegal mining, which has 
drastically reduced the population of eastern lowland gorillas in the Kahuzi-
Biega National Park (KBNP) in the eastern DRC (ibid.). It uniquely combines 
artisanal mining and environmental protection based on the understanding 
that any mining activities should be ‘linked to park protection and the 
development of other livelihoods’ (ibid.). The objectives of the Durban Process 
are: ‘[t]o disseminate the mining code243 and raise awareness on 
environmental issues; [t]o develop alternative livelihoods to mining; [t]o 
reinforce [the capacity of the Congolese wildlife authority, Institut Congolaise 
pour la Conservation de la Nature (ICCN)] … [and to] develop and implement 
a comprehensive training programme on ethical mining’ (Durban Process 
2009a).  
 
The Durban Process held three workshops between 2003 and 2005, as 
shown in the table below. Prior to its inception at the first workshop in Durban 
(South Africa) in 2003, a site visit was commissioned to an independent 
artisanal mining expert to observe the current mining practices and their 
consequences (D’Souza 2004). The first workshop sought the expertise of a 
conflict resolution specialist244 to facilitate the discussion between hugely 
diverse stakeholders. The participants included representatives from the 
newly formed DRC government, the Chamber of Commerce in Bukavu, 
various national and international NGOs, local government, local ethnic 
groups, miners, coltan traders and industry (Durban Process 2003). The 
workshop aimed to ‘allow participants to find common ground and begin a 
broader dialogue aimed at finding solutions to the problems causing the 
reduction of the gorillas’ (ibid.: 2). It followed a three-stage process of defining 
and analysing the problem, identifying options and developing action plans to 
find sustainable solutions (ibid.: 3–4). 
                                                          
241 www.gorillas.org/Project!Durban_Process_for_Ethical_Mining 
242 The Gorilla Organization (www.gorillas.org/Home) was formally called the Dian Fossey 
Gorilla Fund Europe (DFGF-E) until its rename in October 2006. To avoid confusion, the 
current name, the Gorilla Organization, is used in this thesis.  
243 For details of the 2002 Mining Code, see the section 5.3.3.. 





From the process above, the participants identified four key issues affecting 
the park (Durban Process 2003: 4): 
 
1. Severe poverty among communities in the area – with the associated 
issues around limited opportunities for income generation and unequal 
access to resources. 
2. Poor social and economic infrastructure – which includes the problems 
of health and hygiene, lack of social support, and inadequate road and 
transport infrastructure to name a few. 
3. Armed groups and their movement within and around the park. 
4. The need for clarity, dissemination and enforcement of a legal 
framework.  
 
The discussion also highlighted the causal relationship between poverty and 
the presence of armed groups within the areas, and the need for collaboration 
of broader stakeholders to address the problem which is ‘too big to be 
managed by one agency alone’ (ibid.). The participants also identified four 
priority steps, which have become the objectives of the Durban Process. They 
also established a monitoring committee, Comité de Suivi du Processus de 
Durban (CSPD), to represent the stakeholders of the Durban Process and 
maintain the dialogue and commitment of the stakeholders. The CSPD 
manages the Durban Process, and implements activities with various local 
partners including the ICCN. Through the CSPD, ‘the Durban Process 
incorporates an unprecedented level of local ownership within the global 
artisanal and small-scale mining sector’ (Durban Process 2008b: 1).  
 
The key priority of the Durban Process was an implementation of ‘best 
practice’ mining in line with the 2002 Mining Code (Durban Process 2009a). 
The plan was to create ‘a model mine to demonstrate ethical mining’ since it 
‘would be unethical to advocate, and impossible to implement, a complete ban 
on coltan mining’ in the region when the artisanal mining ‘has become the 




as their old farms have been destroyed and their livestock confiscated’ 
(D’Souza 2003: 1).  
 
Rather than ‘to help develop a “big-business” large scale mining venture for 
the benefit of business’, suitable mine sites were defined to be ‘low-tech’ 
mines which were combined with poverty alleviation, sustainable livelihoods 
and financial empowerment to help artisans and their communities (Durban 
Process 2004: 9). Specific criteria including geology, security and logistics245 
were established through the second site visit by the expert to ensure the 
selection of the right mine site since it was the key to the success of the whole 
project (Durban Process 2004: 9).  
 
In addition, the elements of the project were defined to be technical 
assistance, with an emphasis on providing simple, low cost, locally 
reproducible and maintainable techniques and equipment, mineral marketing, 
environmental training, and health and safety training (D’Souza 2004). The 
expert (D’Souza 2005) also highlighted the need to ensure a proper and 
informed decision process, especially because there were some ‘negative 
views’ on the model mine concept, as analysed later. The idea of the model 
mine was later elaborated to a Model Community Mine Network to certify 
minerals in terms of origin, value and responsible mining (Durban Process 
2006a), which has been succeeded by other initiatives as mentioned 
earlier.246    
 
Table 2: The Durban Process key events  
Date Event Objective Participants 
                                                          
245 These criteria include: coltan being the primary mineral; proximity to the KBNP and areas 
of ecological importance; the regional and local security concerns; the logistics of site access; 
the ease of access from other mining areas; geological potentials; land tenure and mineral 
rights ownership; the ease of exploitation and mineral beneficiation; the proximity to water 
sources and basic infrastructure; local community issues, concerns and aspirations; socio-
economic and potential impacts; environmental concerns and potential impact; the proximity 
to agricultural land for associated projects; the local government plans for rural economic 
development; and the proximity to and the availability of other potential incentives to lure the 
miners (D’Souza 2004: 5) 
246 See three initiatives: Minerals certification: Certified Trading Chain (CTC) (section 7.2.); 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (section 7.3.); and GeSI and EICC Joint 
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The Durban Process had very limited progress in terms of implementing the 
planned activities, despite its success in bringing diverse stakeholders 
together. It held small workshops during 2007 and 2008 to develop new 




Process, without necessarily having a model mine’.247 Through the strategy 
change, the Durban Process tried to ‘focus on key implementing 
organisations, develop manageable workable proposals, get activities up and 
running so that [it] can achieve small successes on the ground and then [it] 
can report back on those successes’.248 As a substitute to the model mine, 
the Durban Process organised a comprehensive training programme to 
provide ethical mining workshops to some mining sites. It also created 
committees of artisanal miners, which collectively established an 
association,249 and provided micro-credit schemes to the communities. The 
Durban Process, however, did not find sufficient funding to continue with 
these new strategies and has become ‘dormant’ as a result.250 
 
The rest of this section provides an evaluation of the Durban Process, 
drawing on the analysis of the qualitative data of the Durban Process. The 
qualitative data were collected from documents related to the Durban Process 
and the accounts of international participants of the Durban Process. The 
accounts were collected through: email communication with an industry 
participant, General Manager Corporate Communications of H.C. Starck;251 
an interview with the aforementioned artisanal mining consultant, Kevin 
D’Souza; an interview with the former Gorilla Organization regional 
programme officer, Dan Bucknell; and a telephone interview with the former 
CASM252 representative and the former Durban Process coordinator, Estelle 
Levin.  
 
                                                          
247 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
248 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
249 The association is called l’Association des Creuseurs Miniers Artisanaux de Lulingu 
(ACRAL). 
250 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
251 The H.C. Starck is one of the main tantalum processor in the world and was buying coltan 
from the DRC. For details of the company, see the section 6.3.4.. 
252 The Communities and Small-Scale Mining (CASM) is ‘a global networking and 
coordination facility’ to reduce poverty by improving the environmental, social and economic 
performance of artisanal and small-scale mining in developing countries’, mainly supported by 




Overall, the Durban Process did not achieve its objectives and failed to be 
sustainable despite being genuinely multi-stakeholder and Congolese-led and 
maintaining ‘the right focus’ on ‘poverty alleviation for the impoverished 
communities that are basically the ones responsible for mining coltan in the 
first place’ through the involvement of the artisanal mining expert.253 There 
were three key findings from the evaluation. Firstly, external elements 
hindered the development of the Durban Process, in terms of the acquisition 
of a model mine and funding and the ‘negative views’ and suspicions of the 
Durban Process. Secondly, there were internal aspects that affected the 
course of development, such as diverse expectations that are different from 
the objectives of the Durban Process. Thirdly, there were dynamics of the 
Durban Process as a multi-stakeholder process. 
 
The biggest impediment to the progress of the Durban Process was the 
difficulty in establishing a model mine, the focus of the initiative. The Durban 
Process was not able to find an appropriate model mine site because of the 
insecurity and limited infrastructure in the area (D’Souza 2005).254 Moreover, 
it could not receive a legal title for a formal artisanal mining area from the 
Ministry of Mines because of an ‘apparent “suspended” authority … despite 
the full enactment of’ the 2002 Mining Code (ibid.: 6). The DRC government 
was incapable of enforcing the Mining Code and formalising the mining sector 
in the eastern DRC by providing mining rights and artisanal mining zones 
(Durban Process 2005).255 
 
The absence of a formal artisanal mining area hindered the Durban Process 
to seek funding as ‘no donors or funders would want to support something 
that is essentially and theoretically illegal’.256 The Durban Process never 
                                                          
253 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
254 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
255 A comment by a representative of the DRC government body responsible for overseeing 
artisanal mining, Service d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (SAESSCAM, 
the Technical Assistance and Training Service for Small-Scale Mining), at the 2005 Durban 
Process workshop. 
256 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 




attracted funding despite having tried ‘very hard with a lot of will’.257 Other 
possible reasons why the Durban Process was not funded by donors include: 
the risks associated with the security situation in the area;258 a small NGO 
(the Gorilla Organization) having to manage large resources for a hugely 
ambitious project;259260 and the absurdity of a conservation NGO working on 
mining.261262263 There were also operational issues, such as limited time 
allocated for fundraising when the Durban Process had lost a full-time 
coordinator, ‘large, unworkable proposals’ and the absence of something 
tangible ‘to show what the Durban Process was about’.264  
 
The main internal challenge appeared to be the management of disparate 
expectations of the diverse stakeholders as the Durban Process succeeded in 
including them, even local militia groups.265266267 It became difficult to 
incorporate the diverse expectations into one programme and yet to maintain 
‘the right focus’ as described below.   
 
Some local partners heightened their expectations ‘to boost their 
organisation’s capacity and to benefit from’ the Durban Process because they 
thought ‘there’s money in this’ ‘as a result of the large workshops and very 
                                                          
257 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
258 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
259 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
260 Telephone interview with the former Durban Process coordinator on 12/1/2010 (Levin 
2010). 
261 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
262 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
263 Telephone interview with the former Durban Process coordinator on 12/1/2010 (Levin 
2010). 
264 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
265 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
266 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 





high-calibre people attending those workshops’.268 The involvement of the 
business stakeholders also resulted in the loss of the focus on poverty 
alleviation around the KBNP to prevent illegal mining, which was supported by 
the gorilla conservation objective of the Gorilla Organization.269270 One of the 
business stakeholders, H.C. Starck, claims that the company liked the idea of 
ethically sourced coltan;271272 but, because ‘the finger blame was certainly 
pointed at them’ by having purchased coltan from the area, the company 
might have seen ‘an opportunity to maybe legitimise their involvement in 
eastern Congo’.273 Similarly, other business stakeholders might have 
‘imagined that the model mine would be a large commercial enterprise with a 
large output of coltan’ and were attracted to the model mine plan, despite the 
scale of the model mine ‘never [being] fully established’ and the idea of the 
model mine not being about business.274 In addition, the then director of the 
Gorilla Organization had an enthusiasm for the Durban Process, which might 
have set the expectations of the stakeholders higher than necessary.275 
 
Another challenge was to manage ‘negative views’ and suspicion of the 
Durban Process amongst various actors, which became an obstacle to the 
formation of good relationships and partnerships with other potential partners 
at the start. While having the business stakeholders, as possible buyers of 
ethically sourced coltan from the model mine, on board was crucial for the 
multi-stakeholder dialogue, the commercial aspects of the model mine and 
involvement of the business stakeholders caused the ‘negative views’ of the 
                                                          
268 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
269 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
270 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
271 Email communication with the H.C. Starck representative on 12/6/2009 (Buetefisch 2009). 
272 According to Levin (2010), H.C. Starck was genuinely interested in the Durban Process 
and ‘they were absolutely, in totally willing to buy [our] gorilla friendly coltan at a slightly 
higher price than market rate’ as a guaranteed buyer, and this was crucial for the operation of 
a model mine (bold letters by the author as there was an emphasis by Levin).   
273 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
274 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
275 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 




Durban Process.276 The model mine concept was strongly opposed by some 
actors on the ground, particularly by ‘some of the more opinionated and 
conservative NGOs’ (D’Souza 2005: 5). It was seen as ‘an attempt to gain 
access to coltan without going through the proper environmental procedures 
of the government, and could prove disastrous as it increases the 
attractiveness of coltan again by holding out the prospect of renewed H.C. 
Starck purchases’ (Johnson and Tegera 2005: 57). These conservation 
organisations did not understand that the commercial aspiration of the model 
mine to become financially viable was a way to make the model mine 
‘sustainable and generate sufficient income for reinvestment in real, local 
socio-economic development’ (D’Souza 2005: 5). They did not recognise the 
link between poverty and mining since many conservation organisations ‘are 
unfortunately still living in a slightly fantastical world’ and do not understand 
that ‘the pressure on protected areas is just going to get bigger’ and ‘at the 
end of the day you have to engage with the miners because if you don’t, they 
are gonna destroy the rest of the forests’.277  
 
There were also other facts that affected ‘negative views’ and suspicions 
about the Durban Process. For example, the slow progress and the focus of 
the Durban Process on coltan (Johnson and Tegera 2005) created suspicions, 
although the focus on coltan was simply because coltan was the initial cause 
of destruction of the park.278 One bilateral aid agency was ‘quite anti-Durban 
Process’ partly because of the differences in personalities279 and because of 
its critical view that the Durban Process did not try to collaborate collectively 
with the existing initiative on the ground (Johnson and Tegera 2005: 57). The 
Durban Process was also regarded as a Gorilla Organization project by other 
actors.280 
                                                          
276 Telephone interview with the former Durban Process coordinator on 12/1/2010 (Levin 
2010). 
277 Telephone interview with the former Durban Process coordinator on 12/1/2010 (Levin 
2010). 
278 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
279 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
280 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 





More critically, external actors considered that the idea of working with 
artisanal miners for conservation was ‘a risky undertaking’.281 The Durban 
Process was aware of the risk of ‘a returned illegal artisanal mining’ in the 
park by improving artisanal miners’ ability.282 Also, the large international 
NGOs in the Kivus were concerned that the Durban Process lacked ‘the donor 
mandate to engage with the [artisanal mining] sector’, and that the direct 
engagement with the artisanal mining sector ‘will “do more harm than good” 
because of the link with the conflict’ (Garrett 2007: 43).  
 
Amongst the internal elements above, the relationship with the aid agency 
was improved by the personnel change on the ground. The issue of managing 
different expectations amongst the stakeholders was also solved through the 
aforementioned strategy change during 2007 and 2008. As this strategy 
change meant a departure from the model mine project, ‘naturally, people with 
higher ambitions and expectations fell by the way and came down to those 
that were interested in the whole objectives from the start, about livelihood 
and about conservation’.283 
 
The Durban Process was significant, at least for the international facilitators 
being interviewed in this research, though it did not achieve its objectives or 
sustain itself. It was exceptional by being genuinely multi-stakeholder and 
locally owned. It truly achieved a multi-stakeholder dialogue by bringing the 
right selection of stakeholder representatives together284285 who ‘had an ability 
to affect the process’, including the militias and warlords,286287 in order to 
                                                          
281 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
282 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
283 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
284 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
285 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
286 Telephone interview with the former Durban Process coordinator on 12/1/2010 (Levin 
2010). 
287 A UNHCR representative confirms that the militias are key actors on the ground and it is 




address the problems that cannot be solved by one actor.288289290 The multi-
stakeholder dialogue ‘was quite amazing … in terms of bringing very different 
people together to talk … It was just one of those situations where people put 
aside their differences and actually talked about the way forward’.291 For the 
international facilitators, the Durban Process has been a ‘really thrilling’ 
experience,292 ‘one of the most exciting projects to have worked on’293 and 
something they wish to be involved in again.294 
 
There was strong emphasis on and enthusiasm for the local ownership of the 
Durban Process as it was owned ‘virtually all by Congolese’ who are from the 
area.295 The local ownership was explained as: 
 
It’s the Congolese, it’s the local Congolese organisations that are driving it 
… It’s their initiative and … it’s the Congolese saying this is what’s needed 
and this is what can be done, and it’s them putting a plan together, putting 
the budgets together.296 
 
While the Durban Process ‘exists independent of the Gorilla Organization’, the 
role of the Gorilla Organization as a facilitating organisation appeared to be 
more crucial than the original design.297 The Gorilla Organization has been 
behind the Durban Process and driving it ‘from the funding perspective … to 
                                                          
288 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
289 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
290 Telephone interview with the former Durban Process coordinator on 12/1/2010 (Levin 
2010). 
291 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
292 Telephone interview with the former Durban Process coordinator on 12/1/2010 (Levin 
2010). 
293 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
294 Telephone interview with the former Durban Process coordinator on 12/1/2010 (Levin 
2010). 
295 Interview with the artisanal mining expert for the Durban Process in Stoke-on-Trent on 
25/9/2009 (D’Souza 2009). 
296 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
297 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 




link with the funders’ and to provide international perspectives.298 The 
stakeholders ‘weren’t gonna come together otherwise’ and the Gorilla 
Organization ‘has always provided the glue [which is the funding] to keep the 
Durban Process together … because otherwise it breaks down’.299 The Gorilla 
Organization, however, appeared to be too small to facilitate the Durban 
Process in terms of the capacity to fundraise.300301  
 
As mentioned earlier, the idea of the Durban Process assuring the ethical 
quality of coltan has been taken further in developing the Certified Trading 
Chain (CTC), detailed in the following section. 
 
7.2. Minerals certification: Certified Trading Chain (CTC) 
 
Certification has taken off the ground with the emergence of third-party 
independent verification systems in the mid-1990s, responding to advocacy 
campaigns criticising the inappropriateness of first- and second-party 
verifications (Baue 2008). Conroy (2007) calls it ‘Certification Revolution’ 
because ‘for the first time in almost a hundred years, citizens are taking back 
the ability to force companies to become more socially and environmentally 
responsible, and particularly accountable’ (Baue 2008). The ‘Certification 
Revolution’ is possible by finding out ‘the sweet spot in corporations’ (ibid.), i.e. 
the vulnerability of corporations created by adding value to their brands 
(Conroy 2007). The emergence of certification also meant that the relationship 
between companies and advocacy campaigns had transformed from hostility 
to strong collaboration in developing and implementing certification schemes 
together, as the engagement of external stakeholders is the key to effective 
certification schemes (ibid.)  
 
                                                          
298 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
299 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 
300 Interview with the previous Regional Programme Manager of the Gorilla Organization in 
London on 18/11/2009 (Bucknell 2009). 





The development of certification has expanded to mining and mineral-using 
industries, and various minerals certifications have emerged in the past 
decade.302 Minerals certification is ‘used to guarantee to consumers that a 
product meets certain standards’ (Levin 2008b: 1). There are two broad 
categories of minerals certifications. One is certification of origin, which 
assures that ‘minerals do not originate from places where they may have 
been implicated in war or human rights abuses’, and the other is certification 
of ethical quality, which assures that ‘minerals have been mined, processed, 
and traded in ways that do not compromise defined ethical standards’ (ibid.). 
Whilst minerals certification is driven by conscientious consumption, it can be 
applied to artisanal small-scale mining in order to ‘give legitimacy to [artisanal 
small-scale mining] through certification of responsible practice’ as well as 
facilitating local development and sustainability of supply chains, and meeting 
the needs of conscientious consumers (Levin 2008a; 2008b).  
 
To date, certifications applied to artisanal small-scale mining products have 
been targeting jeweller-relevant minerals303 because they create ‘added 
luxury value’ to individual consumers (Levin 2008b: 14). Certifications for 
industrial minerals,304 such as coltan, were not developed before because the 
market for industrial minerals is usually other companies, within long and 
complex supply chains. This has, however, changed through the emergent 
‘conflict mineral’ agenda discussed in the previous chapter (section 6.1.), and 
has led to some coltan certification schemes.  
 
This section first evaluates the progress of the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme (KPCS), which is the only operational mineral certification scheme to 
certify a mineral’s origin in the DRC (CASM 2008) at the time of writing, with 
the aim being to seek implications for the development and implementation of 
the CTC in the DRC. It then reviews the development of the CTC. 
                                                          
302 For detailed information on various minerals certification, see Levin (2008a; 2008b; 2008c).  
303 Jeweller-relevant minerals are: precious metals such as gold, silver, and platinum; 
diamond; precious stones such as sapphire, ruby, emerald amongst others; semi-precious 
stones such as amethyst, beryl, citrine, aquamarine amongst others; alloys metals such as 
copper, nickel, palladium, silvers amongst others (Levin 2008b).  
304 Industrial minerals and materials include coltan, copper, cobalt, cassiterite, lead, tantalum, 





Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) 
 
The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS)305 was launched in 
January 2003, as a joint initiative of governments, industry and civil society, to 
cease production of and trade in diamonds from conflict zones so that the 
diamond trade does not finance violence and conflict. The KPCS is global in 
its operation because the country-based diamond sanctions in Angola, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone were largely ineffective (Fatal Transactions 2008), and 
received strong international support, especially from the UN.306 The KPCS 
members comprise approximately 99.8 percent of the global production of 
rough diamonds. With this scheme, international shipments of rough 
diamonds must have a Kimberley Process certificate to certify that they are 
not from conflict areas.   
 
The KPCS is a significant agreement in considering the previously secretive 
diamond industry and the difficulties in agreeing on the system at the initial 
inter-governmental meetings (Smillie 2002; 2003), also owing to the total 
consensus system within the KPCS (Even-Zohar 2009).307 According to the 
KPCS,308 the scheme has not only been successful in controlling the flow of 
‘conflict diamonds’, but has also raised poor governments’ income by bringing 
large amounts of diamonds onto the legal market. Moreover, the KPCS offers 
an opportunity to discuss issues around diamonds and conflict minerals. 
 
The KPCS has, however, been criticised for three broad areas of problems. 
Firstly, the KPCS faces a serious implementation problem: the scheme has no 
provisions for regular independent monitoring of internal controls (Smillie 
2003; Global Witness and PAC 2004b; 2005; 2008; Burbank 2006); the 
scheme is a voluntary initiative and does not provide incentives to comply 
                                                          
305 www.kimberleyprocess.com/ 
306 UN Resolution 1459 (UNSC 2003a: 2) states ‘strongly supports the Kimberley Process 
certification Scheme.’     
307 Reuters (2009b) ‘Kimberley Process failing Africa – campaigners’, 18 October 2009, 






(Smillie 2003; Burbank 2006); and there are technical obstacles such as 
widespread informal artisanal alluvial diamond mining in the producing 
countries (Dietrich 2002; Global Witness and PAC 2004a; 2008; Global 
Witness 2006) although the KPCS encourages a licensing programme for 
artisanal miners to formalise the complex artisanal small-scale mining sector 
and trade of its products. Secondly, the scheme cannot guarantee the origin 
of diamonds without having analytical proof of origin (Gardner and Schmitz 
2008). Thirdly, the scheme does not cover the issues essential for conflict 
prevention, such as human rights abuse or development (Fatal Transactions 
2008; Bell 2010). As a result of the continuous inaction of the KPCS members, 
the scheme is considered to be ineffective and is losing its credibility (Smillie 
2003; Global Witness and PAC 2004b; 2005; 2008; Burbank 2006). 
 
With regard to the KPCS implementation in the DRC, the country joined the 
KPCS at its launch in 2003 following the KPCS negotiation meetings in 2001. 
The DRC is the world’s second largest diamond producer, producing about 20 
percent of the world’s diamonds (PAC 2009), and receives about 70 percent 
of its total export earnings from diamonds (PAC and CENADEP 2005). An 
independent government body, the Centre d’Evaluation, d’Expertise et de 
Certification (CEEC), is in charge of valuation and certification of diamonds 
before export, collection of export tax at 3.75 percent and confiscation of any 
conflict diamonds (PAC and CENADEP 2007).  
 
In 2004 and 2009, the DRC had KPCS reviews which identified a number of 
weaknesses, including smuggling, under-valuations to evade tax, secrecy, a 
high degree of corruption and an inability to analyse the problem of 
implementing the KPCS (PAC and CENADEP 2004; 2005; PAC 2009). While 
participating in the KPCS initially increased official diamond exports, the 
official exports have declined again due to the widespread smuggling of 
conflict and illicit diamonds caused by weak internal controls within the 
country (PAC and CENADEP 2005; Burbank 2006; Global Witness 2006; 
2007c; Global Witness and PAC 2008). The aforementioned CEEC has not 
made any systematic attempts to monitor the flow of diamonds whilst 





The problems of implementing internal controls for the KPCS are analysed to 
be: the complexity of the diamond industry; the size of the country; 
uncontrolled artisanal alluvial diamond mining across provinces (Dietrich 
2002; Global Witness and PAC 2004a; PAC and CENADEP 2004; 2005; 
2007; Burbank 2006); the absence of government control over the mining 
areas and borders (Burbank 2006);309 and the lack of incentives (Burbank 
2006). Besides, it is relatively easy to sell diamonds to Antwerp and Dubai 
without certificates (PAC and CENADEP 2007). More importantly, the 
mechanism in the DRC needs international cooperation support to provide the 
necessary resources for the KPCS implementation, whilst the KPCS certainly 
helped increase the government income from diamond exports.310  
 
The continuous inaction of the KPCS and the DRC resulted in almost half of 
the exported diamonds being untraceable in 2008 (PAC 2009). The situation 
is summarised in the following: 
 
Year after year, the KP has been advised of the essential weakness of 
the Congo’s internal controls by Partnership Africa Canada, other 
NGOs, the United Nations and its own monitors. Year after year, the 
KP has chosen to do nothing, and to allow the Congo to do nothing. As 
a result, the DRC’s network of comptoirs is the world’s most effective 
system for laundering conflict, illicit and clandestine diamonds (PAC 
2009: 9). 
  
The DRC has become symbolic of the problems afflicting the KPCS,311 which 
has made Ian Smillie, a driving force of the KPCS, to resign from Partnership 
Africa Canada (PAC), an influential conflict diamond NGO, and depart from 
participation in the KPCS governing body, commenting that ‘I can no longer in 
                                                          
309 Email communication with the DRC National Coordinator for the ICGLR on 20/3/2010 
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310 Email communication with the DRC National Coordinator for the ICGLR on 20/3/2010 
(Hamuli 2010). 
311 Reuters (2009b) ‘Kimberley Process failing Africa – campaigners’, 18 October 2009, 





good faith contribute to a pretense that failure is success, or to the kind of 
debates we have been reduced to’ (Even-Zohar 2009). 
 
Certified Trading Chains (CTC)  
 
The Certified Trading Chain (CTC) concept has been developed by the 
German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR)312 
and is the most advanced certification scheme for coltan at the time of writing. 
The idea to certify coltan was inherited from the Durban Process as explained 
in the previous section (7.1.) and recommended by the UN Group of Experts 
to develop advanced traceability systems of minerals (UNSC 2005b) and in 
the discussion on transparency in the extractive sector at the 2007 G8 
Summit. This section reviews the development of the CTC concept and the 
CTC schemes that are under development for Rwanda and the DRC. 
 
In 2006, the BGR started two research projects to provide assurance of the 
origin of coltan. The first research project was to test the feasibility of 
developing a ‘mineral fingerprint’ of coltan samples based on the 
mineralogical characteristics of specific ore bodies, in order to verify the origin 
of coltan ores (BGR 2009b). While it is possible to identify coltan from conflict 
areas by the forensic proof of origin (BGR 2009a),313 it is time and cost 
consuming, and requires the skills of laboratory staff (BGR 2009b). The 
second research project was to develop the CTC, an assurance system, to 
guarantee transparent, traceable and ethical trading chains with an explicit 
focus on artisanal and small-scale mining (BGR 2009b).   
 
The German government introduced the above CTC model as a new initiative 
at the G8 summit in Germany in 2007,314 which discussed transparency and 
good governance as responsibility for raw materials and agreed that a 
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certification scheme would be an appropriate instrument.315 The 2007 G8 
summit was significant in recognising the importance of the artisanal small-
scale mining sector316 and encouraged the improvement of the sector through 
certification schemes.317 Following the summit, the German government took 
an initiative to support and develop a scheme to certify the ethical quality of 
artisanally mined coltan, cassiterite (tin) and wolfram (tungsten), in line with 
internationally recognised standards for mining and trade, particularly with the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (Levin 2008b). The certification 
scheme aims to certify local producers and international buyers within a CTC, 
combined with an analytical ‘finger print’ to verify the origin of ores (ibid.).   
 
Given the heightened attention paid to artisanal mining in 2007, there was a 
further discussion on the CTC in an international conference.318 The 
discussion (Gardner and Schmitz 2008) highlighted some potentials and 
challenges of minerals certification schemes. Whilst the CTC aims to integrate 
existing regimes and restrict illegal trading of minerals, there was a wide 
acknowledgement that a certification scheme does not solve all the problems. 
Particular challenges include addressing the issues of corruption, preventing 
the mining of minerals from driving violence and conflict, proving the origin of 
ores from the artisanal mining sector, coordinating and combining with other 
initiatives, and involving various stakeholders. Certification schemes, however, 
have potential in addressing the issues of artisanal mining because they are 
simple to use, realistic and pragmatic.   
 
The BGR defined the general problem as being that ‘illegal mining and trade 
of mineral resources is a source of finance for violent groups and contributes 
to regional instability’ (Franken 2009: 3). It set dual policy objectives of the 
CTC as being to ‘utilize mineral potentials in developing countries for the 
alleviation of poverty and the strengthening of regional stability’, and to ‘create 
open and fair access to the worldwide potential of strategic raw materials 
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indispensable to the industrial value chain through creation of a level playing 
field’ (ibid.).  
 
The BGR drafted the original set of CTC standards with a focus on 
transparency along the trading chain, by incorporating standards from the 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,319 the Risk Awareness Tool 
for Multinational Enterprises in Weak Governance Zones of 2006,320 the 
International Finance Corporation’s Performance Standards321 and the 
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.322 Multi-stakeholder 
consultation processes were held to discuss the content of the draft standards. 
Firstly, in October 2008,323 five basic principles were established around 
themes, and standards on gender issues and handling influx migration were 
included based on the feedback (BGR 2009b). Feedback from the participants 
included: whether to have certification schemes in artisanal mining work; a 
risk of ‘whitewashing’ tainted minerals from the DRC; and constraints such as 
the limited capacity of host governments, financial resources, the lack of 
security and peace in the areas, vested interest by the auditor without 
independent auditing and the absence of incentives for informal artisanal 
mining operations (Garrett 2008b).  
 
Secondly, the revised CTC standards were discussed with civil society at a 
follow-up consultation workshop in November 2008324 (BGR 2009b). The 
workshop received extensive feedback including the need to consider 
customary law, responsibility for infrastructural and community development, 
security around mines, incentives for stakeholder participation, indigenous 
                                                          
319 See the section on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (7.5.). 
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321 International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards ‘define clients’ roles and 
responsibilities for managing their projects and the requirements for receiving and retaining 
IFC support. The standards include requirements to disclose information.’ Details are found at 
www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/PerformanceStandards 
322 See the section on the Voluntary Principles (VPs) on Security and Human Rights (7.6.).  
323 This consultation took place at the Pre-Conference Technical and Collaborative Sessions 
Workshop 7: ‘Update on the BGR Pilot Certification Programme’, the 8th CASM Annual 
Conference, 7 October 2008. The details of the consultation process are in its workshop 
report (Garrett 2008b).  
324 Fatal Transactions and Bonn International Centre for Convention’s Conference “Digging 
for Peace – Private Companies and Emerging Economies in Zones of Conflict” in Bonn, 21 - 




issues and the management of displacement and HIV/Aids (Guesnet et al. 
2008).  
 
Following these consultations, the CTC principles and standards are defined 
in the table below. The CTC covers five principles in traceability and 
transparency, labour and working conditions, security, community 
development, and environment, and includes a number of specific standards 
in each principle. The analytical fingerprint is used as the indicator of origin in 
the traceability and transparency principle. A simple system for audit has also 
been created to measure company adherence to each of the standards by an 
independent certifier by choosing from five levels of compliance (BGR 2009b: 
5).   
 












The key features of the CTC include: a focus on industrial, high value 
minerals; direct links with business partners; certification of specific mine 
sites; minimum standards by voluntary certification adapted to the local 
context; and implementation at a regional/multinational level (Franken 2009).  
 
The CTC is expected to provide some benefits as follows. Firstly, the CTC 
can serve as an alternative to export bans on natural resources, which are 
costly and difficult to implement (BGR 2008; 2009b). Secondly, the CTC can 
transform and formalise the artisanal mining sector through positive changes 
from constructive engagement of companies (BGR 2009b), thereby filling the 
gap between the ideal and reality of governance of the mineral sector in 
developing countries with limited law enforcement and institutional capacity 
(ibid.: 4). Thirdly, this improved governance is expected to reduce conflicts 
associated with mineral resources (Garrett 2007; BGR 2009b) and increase 
state revenues (Johnson and Tegera 2005; Garrett 2007) as well as producer 
benefits, fair returns, and environmental and social performance of the mining 
sector (Garrett 2007). Lastly, the implementation of the CTC, driven both by 




the reputational risks for companies and, hence, increase ‘investments 
required for an efficient exploitation of mineral resources’ (BGR 2008: 6).             
 
The analyses of issues around the CTC implementation are limited; however, 
the implementation of the CTC is expected to encounter several constraints. 
Some examples include: the CTC does not address structural governance 
problems; it is focused on short-term benefits; it could cause bottleneck 
problems; it could create inequality amongst the local populations which could 
be a source of conflict; it is not owned by the local populations; political will 
and commitment can be weak (Garrett 2007); and there may be potential 
implementation problems owing to insufficient resources and institutional 
capacity.325 More generally, there is a concern that the processes of 
certification can affect the local population ‘in unforeseen ways, depending on 
the local political reality’ (Pole Institute and International Alert 2004: 18–19). 
The populations in the eastern DRC are likely to resist the control by the 
central government as the eastern DRC ‘has no history of positive 
experiences with a political system centralised around Kinshasa’ (ibid.).326 
 
The CTC is considerably more comprehensive than the KPCS as it includes 
the complete set of standards and mineral fingerprint; however, the 
implementation problems faced by the KPCS will affect the CTC 
implementation without these problems being reflected in the CTC process. In 
answering the question of the author as to why the CTC will be better 
implemented than the KPCS in the conflict-prone eastern DRC where the 
government control is limited,327 the BGR professional explained that heavy 
minerals such as coltan are not easily moved without transportation, unlike 
diamonds, hence the CTC is possible.328 To the same question, a Congolese 
mining sector expert answered that minerals certification must be done as it is 
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326 Comments from a report of the seminar on Resource Exploitation and Human Security in 
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327 Email communication with the DRC National Coordinator for the ICGLR on 20/3/2010 
(Hamuli 2010). 




supported by the UN and donors and decided by the heads of states in the 
region.329      
 
The implementation of the CTC is just about to start and so it is not yet 
possible to evaluate the outcomes of the CTC. There have been two CTC 
projects agreed so far: a CTC pilot project for mineral resources in Rwanda 
and a state certification system for coltan in the DRC. The rest of the section 
provides a summary of these two projects. 
 
The pilot project ‘Certified Trading Chains (CTC) for Mineral Resources’ in 
Rwanda  
 
The pilot project ‘Certified Trading Chains (CTC) for Mineral Resources’ in 
Rwanda was agreed at the 2007 G8 Summit. The BGR has been developing 
this CTC pilot project jointly with the Rwanda Geology and Mines Authority 
(OGMR), within a framework of a technical cooperation programme to 
strengthen the competitiveness of the Rwandan mineral sector for the 
duration of eighteen months.330 Lessons learned from this pilot project in 
Rwanda are expected to be reflected in the development of other schemes 
and help implementation in the DRC (Garrett 2008a). 
 
The aim of the CTC pilot project in Rwanda was ‘to establish a third party 
certification system to assure the origin and ethical quality of stanniferous 
metal production and trade in Central Africa’, by taking a pragmatic approach  
of moving from voluntary participation towards assurance to a third party 
verification, and then to possible government regulation (Garrett 2008a: 14).  
The most important procedures of the CTC are verification of origin and 
assessing the trading volume (BMZ 2010). This pilot project is in line with the 
national policy of Rwanda to build good practice in the mining sector, as well 
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as the request from a regional mechanism, International Conference on the 
Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), detailed in the next section.  
 
The most important aim for Rwanda, however, appears in the words of 
Minister of State in charge of Minerals and Natural Resources, Vincent 
Karega:331  
 
We need to create more confidence in our partners about the 
availability of minerals in Rwanda highlighting their origin; this will clear 
the air about the ongoing contest on whether we have minerals or not 
(Gahigi 2009).   
 
The aim of Rwanda to prove the long-contested availability of mineral 
resources in Rwanda is also repeated by Dr Michael Biryabarema, the OGMR 
director, and supported by Dr Gurdrun Franken of the BGR, who explained 
that there have been accusations that mineral resources exported from 
Rwanda have been linked to the conflict in the Great Lakes Region based on 
the belief that there are no mineral resources in Rwanda (Gahigi 2009). This 
contention is partly owing to the unclear Rwandan statistics in which 
producers merely declare the production figures to the Ministry of Land, 
Environment, Forestry, Water and Natural Resources and the export figures 
from the Banque Nationale du Rwanda, which include re-export of imported 
minerals, resulting in larger figures for mineral export than domestic 
production (Garret 2008a).  
 
The pilot project implementation takes steps to elaborate a set of standards 
and adaptation, a baseline audit for individual operators and 
recommendations, expert monitoring and technical advice to the implementing 
companies, consultation with relevant national authorities and stakeholder 
groups, final third party auditing and documentation of results, and 
dissemination (Biryabarema and Franken 2009). It is still under development 
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as of March 2010.332 Based on the planning workshop in March 2009, the 
CTC standards were specifically revised for Rwandan conditions (BGR 
2009b).  
 
Following the first initial baseline assessment of the participating companies 
and their concessions and trading chains by an independent auditor, the BGR 
is assisting these companies to improve their management systems and 
performance and to create an organisational framework for the certification.333 
The first results of the certification process by the participating companies will 
not be available until the end of 2010.  
 
The participating companies include the aforementioned German tantalum 
processor H.C. Starck and three local companies, which received licences 
from the state-owned company REDEMI in 2006 (BGR 2009a)334 and 
produced the majority of tantalum, tin and tungsten in Rwanda (Biryabarema 
and Franken 2009). The Natural Resources Development Ltd (NRD), one of 
the participating companies, is a subsidiary of H.C. Starck and has been 
engaging with artisanal mining in Rwanda with a view to transforming it into 
small-scale industrial mining.335  
 
According to the managing director of the NRD,336 there are some concerns 
for the implementation of the CTC. The company has given up the idea of a 
mineral fingerprint since it is costly and takes months to get the results, and is 
hence not practical. It supports the idea of self-assessing its compliance with 
the social and environmental standards and having a certificate of origin. The 
concern over the costs is shared by other companies as well, and there is a 
question as to who bears the costs of certification since the implementation 
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costs of a certification scheme are often pushed down to local producers and 
traders (Ellis and Keane 2008a; 2008b).337 
 
The BGR (2008) contends, from its initial findings, that the high value of 
tantalum, tin and tungsten produced and exported from Rwanda can help to 
address poverty alleviation, prevent conflict and supply security. The pilot 
project also aims to develop support for participating companies, establish 
mechanisms with national institutions, engage national civil society and local 
stakeholders in the process, and use lessons learned for the regional process 
(Biryabarema and Franken 2009). The Bureau of Standards in Rwanda 
(Office Rwandais de Normalisation) has been identified as a potential 
government agency to host the national CTC process and to certify minerals 
(Garrett 2008a). 
 
State certification system for coltan in the DRC 
 
In December 2008, following the agreement on the CTC pilot project in 
Rwanda, the BGR and the DRC government agreed on the development of a 
certification scheme in the DRC within a framework of the Programme for 
Transparency and Monitoring in the Raw Materials Sector. The programme 
intends to support the development of a state certification system for coltan in 
the first phase, and eventually for cassiterite (tin), wolframite (tungsten) and 
gold, and to implement them in selected mining operations. It also aims to 
build the necessary institutional framework and capacity within the sector 
institutions to expand certification and control mining. The mineral analytical 
fingerprint developed by the BGR is planned to be used for the DRC 
certification scheme.  
 
The aims of the DRC state certification scheme are to increase state 
revenues and achieve peace and stability by putting licences, centralised 
control and certification in place, as controlling coltan will enable the 
government to control the territory (Bavier 2008). The development of a 
                                                          





national certification scheme is also in line with the ICGLR, discussed in the 
following section.              
 
It is expected that the CTC will promote the transition from artisanal mining to 
small-scale mining, the organisation of artisanal miners and the engagement 
of companies with artisanal miners on their concessions (Garrett 2008b). 
There is a business case for mining companies to constructively and safely 
engage with artisanal mining, rather than confront the whole artisanal mining 
sector (Garrett 2008c).338  
 
In addition to the time needed for using the mineral fingerprint, there are other 
operational issues such as the capacity to monitor widespread artisanal and 
small-scale mining and the capacity of local governments (Garrett 2008a). 
Given the huge vested interests amongst the stakeholders, which largely 
affect how the mineral sector is organised (Garrett 2008a), whether artisanal 
mining communities, which are not well organised or democratically 
represented, can be organised and participate in the initiative meaningfully 
(Garrett 2008c) and whether civil society can be involved in the initiative freely 
and constructively is questionable (Garrett 2008a).  
 
There is also a concern over how implementation costs of the certification are 
shared as they are often borne by developing country producers without them 
having any guarantees of financial benefits and of meeting the required 
standards, thereby excluding poor producers (Ellis and Keane 2008a; 2008b) 
and discourage compliance (Wessells et al. 2001). Besides, there are liability 
issues for companies in engaging with artisanal mining as the sector is not 
regulated and is hence illegal (Garrett 2008a).  
 
7.3. International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) 
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This section describes a minerals certification scheme requested by the 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR),339 a regional 
approach to security, stability and development, following an overview of the 
ICGLR.  
 
This intergovernmental mechanism of eleven member countries340 is 
considered to be necessary in addressing the security and stability situation in 
the region affected by the 1994 Rwanda genocide. The effect is most evident 
in the eastern DRC where the presence of Rwandan refugees has been 
causing the instability. Following the complex consultation processes for 
preparation, in which bureaucracy and politicisation hampered the progress 
and meaningful participation by civil society (Berwouts 2009), the ICGLR was 
finally launched in 2003 under the auspices of the UN and the African Union 
(AU). The eleven ICGLR member countries made a declaration at the first 
summit in Dar-Es-Salaam (Tanzania) in 2004341 to demonstrate their strong 
commitment to peace, and set four priorities in: peace and security; 
democracy and good governance; economic development and regional 
integration; and humanitarian and social issues.342343  
 
Subsequently, the ICGLR adopted the Pact on Security, Stability and 
Development in the Great Lakes Region344 at the second summit in 2006.345 
                                                          
339 www.icglr.org/home.html 
340 The member countries include Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Republic of 
Congo, the DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia. 
341 At the Summit of the Heads of the State and Government in Dar-Es-Salaam on 19 and 20 
November 2004, ‘Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration on peace, security, democracy and 
development in the Great Lakes Region’ (ICGLR 2004) was announced.  
342 It states that ‘[their] collective determination to transform the Great Lakes Region into a 
space of sustainable peace and security for States and peoples, political and social stability, 
shared growth and development, a space of cooperation based on the strategies and policies 
of convergence within the framework of a common destiny which they are determined to 
build, in line with the aspirations of their peoples, in conformity also with the AU Vision 
and  Mission, with the full participation of all their peoples, and in partnership with the United 
Nations, the African Union, and the International Community as a whole’ (ICGLR 2010a).  
343 Despite the declaration made, following events on the ground cast doubt on the 
commitment expressed in the declaration, as Rwanda was accused of being involved in the 
fighting in Kanyabayonga, North Kivu, and supporting rebel factions in the DRC in December 
2006 (Berwouts 2009) 
344 The Pact consists of the Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration, 10 Protocols, 4 Programmes of 
Action with 33 Priority projects in Peace and Security, Democracy and Governance, 




The pact was ratified by nine member countries in May 2007346 and came into 
effect on 21 June 2008. A secretariat was established in Bujumbura (Burundi) 
to coordinate the implementation of the pact in May 2007. The objectives of 
the pact include providing a legal framework governing relations between the 
member states, implementing the content of the pact, and creating conditions 
for security, stability and sustainable development between the member 
states (ICGLR 2010b).    
 
The ICGLR secretariat claims that the ICGLR is a unique and crucial initiative 
of the region that has facilitated an important political dialogue amongst the 
states (Mulamula 2009), and the pact’s inclusive agenda presents a potential 
to make a difference. The ICGLR, however, ‘spent much of its activity on 
establishing itself’, given conflicting political and economic interests within the 
region, yet still set a very ambitious agenda in the pact. Besides, there was 
disagreement between the member states supporting a broad development 
agenda and development partners and financial supporters focusing on a 
political, peace and security agenda (Bøås et al. 2009).  
 
The ICGLR is therefore expected to face a number of questions and 
challenges. They are: the capacity of the ICGLR Secretariat to implement all 
the initiatives effectively (Bøås et al. 2009; Mulamula 2009); ‘how to sustain 
the game and keep the international community’s attention’ (Mulamula 2009) 
for institutional and financial sustainability of the ICGLR (Bøås et al. 2009); 
managing conflicting interests of the member states (Singo 2009); and 
harmonising with other initiatives in Africa (Gaita 2009). There is a risk of the 
ICGLR becoming ‘another externally-financed donor driven institution’ without 
securing its own funding (Berwouts 2009), member states’ ownership 
(Mulamula 2009), and internal leadership and commitment (Berwouts 2009; 
Bøås et al. 2009; Singo 2009).  
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December 2006. 
346 According to the Executive Secretary of the ICGLR (Mulamula 2009), the reason for those 
two member countries not having ratified the Pact is a technical nature, such as the absence 





The Pact on Security, Stability and Development acknowledges that illegal 
exploitation of natural resources ‘constitutes a violation of the States’ right of 
permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and represents a serious 
source of insecurity, instability, tension and conflicts’.347 It specifies how the 
ICGLR intends to address the issues of the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources (ICGLR 2006a) and includes the Protocol Against the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources (ICGLR 2006b).   
   
The protocol specifies three broad measures to be taken by the member 
states (ibid.). Firstly, it requests member states to harmonise their national 
legislations by each reviewing ‘its national legislations on the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources to insure that such legislations comply with 
the provisions of this Protocol and the relevant international instruments and 
legal norms’.348 It also urges member countries to select and send one 
person349 and to provide sufficient resources to the committee against illegal 
exploitation of natural resources,350 which is intended to prevent the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources.351 It calls for a certification mechanism as ‘a 
tool for combating the illegal exploitation of natural resources’. The 
certification mechanism ‘shall institute accredited standards as regards 
natural resource exploitation and shall include provisions on certification of 
origin including labelling, monitoring, supervision, verification and 
implementation, and as appropriate, capacity development and capacity 
building, with a view to ensuring the efficiency of such a mechanism’.352 
  
The ICGLR has two planned projects to address the issue of illegal 
exploitation of natural resources. Firstly, the Democracy and Good 
Governance Programme includes the Regional Initiative Against the Illegal 
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Exploitation of Natural Resources353 with key partners.354 This project 
‘proposes to establish a framework for dialogue and consultation to facilitate 
exchange of information, harmonisation of strategies and policies of 
cooperation, and elaborate new and more pertinent tools. It will contribute 
essentially to strengthen the capacities of the national institutions and to 
promote sensitisation strategies so that all social actors, including the 
populations, may be actively involved in the fight against the illegal 
exploitation of natural resources’ (ICGLR 2006c). 
 
Secondly, the Economic Development and Regional Integration Programme 
comprises a project of a regional mechanism for natural resources 
certification.355 The project aims are explained as being to: 
 
• Curb the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Great Lakes 
Region; 
• Eliminate the historical role played by the natural resources in fuelling 
conflict; 
• Design a Regional Mechanism for the Certification of the origin of 
Natural Resources; 
• Promote a culture of an equitable use of natural resources (ICGLR 
2006d: 10). 
 
Certification schemes will be implemented and enforced incrementally from a 
national level to a regional level (ICGLR 2006d). It is expected that national 
                                                          
353 ICGLR (2006c) ‘Regional Programme of Action for the Promotion of Democracy and Good 
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Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA). 
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level certification schemes will be similar amongst the member countries, 
following policy harmonisation (SaveRwanda 2009).  
 
The above project proposal (ICGLR 2006d) recognises the need for adequate 
policies, legislation and capacities to implement a certification mechanism 
efficiently, which poses a considerable challenge for implementing countries. 
It also highlights four preconditions for a successful implementation of the 
certification mechanism: locally driven certification mechanisms with a 
strategy to enhance local knowledge and skills; greater benefits of certification 
than costs of implementation; changes in natural resources management 
favourable for certification; and a clear commitment of all the stakeholders. It 
therefore envisages a huge groundwork to be carried out prior to the 
implementation of the certification mechanism. Bearing in mind the enormous 
challenges that will be faced in developing and implementing the certification 
scheme, the proposal recommends focusing on the most important resources, 
namely high-value mineral resources and timber, which have contributed to or 
may contribute to conflict.  
 
The project acknowledges a risk of failure if any of the member states do not 
comply (ICGLR 2006d). Equally, the lack of political will and/or adequate 
financial resources, conflict within the region, and a failure of data collection, 
reporting and information exchange can all pose threats to the successful 
project implementation (ibid.). Whilst the DRC state recognises that the DRC 
alone cannot address the issues of illegal exploitation of natural resources 
(Hamuli 2009),356 the progress and success of this regional initiative greatly 
depends on the commitment of all the stakeholders, who have different 
political and economic interests. The DRC ICGLR coordinator states that it is 
a long-term process which has just started, and cannot stop.357  
 
With regard to the progress of the project, the committee against illegal 
exploitation of natural resources agreed on a draft action plan to prioritise 
                                                          
356 Email communication with the DRC national coordinator for the ICGLR on 20/3/2010 
(Hamuli 2010). 





development of the certification scheme in October 2009 (SaveRwanda 2009). 
The progress of the CTC development in Rwanda and the DRC certification 
system was introduced to the committee in order to contribute to the 
discussion on a regional certification mechanism.358  
 
7.4. Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) and Electronic Industry 
Citizenship Coalition (EICC) Joint Working Group  
 
Initiatives to develop minerals certification are also emerging within the 
electronics and information and communication technology (ICT) industries as 
end-users of coltan, in addition to the aforementioned schemes by the BGR 
and ICGLR. As described in the previous chapter, the growing ‘conflict 
mineral’ agenda calls for the application of ‘human rights due diligence’ in 
coltan supply chains (6.1.) and end-user companies, electronics and ICT 
companies in particular, have been under increasing pressure to take action 
(6.2.). While many end-user companies try to manage their supply chains by 
achieving traceability and accountability for reputational risks, they face 
significant challenges owing to the extensive and complex coltan supply 
chains. Given the limitations as to what an individual company can achieve, 
these companies are seeking to collaborate at an industry level to develop a 
certification scheme for coltan. This section introduces two such industry-
based partnerships, the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) and Electronic 
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), and the collaboration between them. 
 
Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) 
 
The Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI)359 was established as a voluntary 
industry initiative in 2001, supported by the UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). The GeSI is 
‘uniquely dedicated to information and communication technologies (ICT) 
sustainability through innovation’, as an ICT sector response to the Millennium 
                                                          





Development Goals (MDGs)360 in 2000 (GeSI 2010a). It aims ‘to further 
sustainable development in the ICT sector’ by bringing together leading ICT 
companies and NGOs that are committed to achieving sustainability 
objectives through innovative technology. The GeSI became an international 
non-profit association in June 2008 and its full members include NOKIA, 
CISCO, AT&T, GSMA, Microsoft, Ericsson, HP, Motorola, Vodafone and BT 
amongst others.  
 
The GeSI’s initiatives include climate change, supply chain, energy efficiency-
waste and public policy. Poor labour and environmental standards within the 
ICT supply chains, such as mining raw materials in conflict zones, are 
highlighted in the recent media and NGO campaigns and pose huge concerns 
and challenges for the ICT industry (GeSI 2010b). The GeSI recognises the 
need to address this challenging issue at an industry level because ‘there are 
limits to what individual companies can achieve’ (ibid.). In order to test 
whether it is possible to develop a controlled trading system for coltan rather 
than responding by banning coltan mined in the DRC, the GeSI formed a 
Supply Chain Working Group.361 It also provides training and materials to 
increase awareness of social and environmental issues within the supply 
chains.   
 
Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) 
 
The Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC)362 was created in 2004, 
as a result of discussions on business for social responsibility amongst a 
small number of technology-sector companies. They identified that supply 
chain social responsibility is a top priority, and that there is a need to have a 
consistent system throughout the industry (EICC 2008). The aim of the EICC 
is ‘to improve social, economic, and environmental conditions in the global 
                                                          
360 The eight Millennium Development Goals, which include end poverty and hunger, 
universal education, gender equality, child health, maternal health, combat HIV/AIDS, 
environmental sustainability and global partnership, by the target date of 2015, were agreed 
by all the world’s countries and all the world’s leading development institutions in 2000. See 
Millennium Development Goals in UN (2008). 
361 The GeSI commissioned a study to the Fauna and Flora International (FFI). See foreword 





electronics supply chain through use of a standardized code of conduct’ 
(EICC 2009b: 1). The EICC became incorporated as an association in 2007 
and its members have grown to over forty global electronics and ICT 
companies. It promotes a standardised code of conduct, provides supplier 
training and guidance and develops programmes and tools through its 
working groups.        
 
The standardised code of conduct, the Electronic Industry Code of 
Conduct,363 is formulated to guide companies in five key CSR areas, namely 
labour, health and safety, environment, management system, and ethics. The 
code can be applied by a wide range of companies in the electronics industry, 
including their supply chains and subcontractors. Participation is voluntary; 
however, participants must use the code as a total supply chain initiative by 
requiring their next tier suppliers, as a minimum, to accept and implement the 
code. The EICC is dedicated to developing the code further by receiving 
regular inputs from its stakeholders and encouraging participants to go 
beyond legal compliance in order to increase social and environmental 
responsibilities.  
 
The EICC recognises the challenges for responsible supply chain 
management, due to rapidly shifting sourcing locations within the industry. It 
therefore stresses a need to develop a culture of responsible facilities 
management within its members and supplier companies, and also to keep 
supplier tools and processes flexible to be applied to new regional contexts. 
The EICC admits that it is still at an early stage towards achieving its goals 
while it progresses its implementation of the Code of Conduct in the supply 
chain and improves the use of shared audit (EICC 2008).  
  
The renewed conflict in the eastern DRC in 2008 highlighted the potential 
negative impact on the upstream supply chains, which represents one of the 
key and emerging corporate responsibility issues for the electronics industry 
and has led to the creation of the Extractives Working Group (ibid.). The EICC 
                                                          




recognises that significant portions of tin, tantalum and cobalt are used in the 
electronics industry and that the electronics industry has a potential to impact 
the upstream supply chains, such as the mining industry (ibid.). The distance 
between the upstream suppliers and the electronics companies as end-users 
means, however, that there is little interaction between the two and limited 
traceability of minerals, which is the greatest challenge for the industry in 
addressing ‘conflict minerals’ (EICC 2009b). The achievement of traceability is 
also hampered by commercial agreements with mineral suppliers and mixed 
sources of minerals (ibid.). Since 2009, the EICC has been trying to approach 
the issue of ‘conflict minerals’ through provision of better information to the 
participants, stakeholder engagement to understand the issues and to create 
collective solutions, and supply chain transparency focusing on cobalt, 
cassiterite (tin) and tantalum (ibid.).         
 
GeSI and EICC Joint Working Group 
 
In March 2005, the GeSI and EICC formed a strategic alliance in order to 
deliver a single corporate responsibility supply chain solution to the industry. 
This has increased participation in the initiative because of ‘the value 
proposition of working together to efficiently and effectively improve social and 
environmental conditions throughout the electronics supply chain’ (EICC 
2008: 1).   
  
The key area of collaboration has been a joint working group between the 
GeSI Supply Chain Working Group and the EICC Extractives Working Group. 
The joint working group works in two broad areas. Firstly, it aims to enhance 
the effectiveness and efficiency of the initiatives by avoiding duplication and 
inconsistency to reduce time and costs using common tools such as a web-
based self-assessment tool for suppliers and a shared auditing programme 
(GeSI 2010b).364 These common approaches intend to facilitate learning and 
                                                          
364 The common tools developed are the web-based self-assessment tool for suppliers, E-
TASC (Electronics – Tool for Accountable Supply Chains), in four languages in 2007, and the 
shared auditing programme, Validated audit programme, to accompany the E-TASC (GeSI 




build the capacity of suppliers across the complex multi-layered supply 
chains.  
 
Secondly, the joint working group also seeks to understand the industries’ 
metal supply chains to establish how the industries can improve their impact 
collectively (EICC 2008). It therefore commissioned an independent research 
on six key metals (aluminium, cobalt, copper, gold, palladium and cassiterite 
(tin)) in 2008.365 This study (Young 2008) highlighted the challenges of 
tracking metals throughout the supply chains including the mixed sources of 
the metals at various stages and artisanal and small-scale production of 
metals. Based on the study, the joint working group has been trying to 
facilitate the entire supply chain to work together for responsible mining and 
organised stakeholder forums (EICC 2008).  
 
The joint working group plans to create supply chain transparency models for 
cassiterite, tantalum and cobalt which do not identify ‘their commercial 
relationships’ through enhanced multi-stakeholder engagement (ibid.: 26). 
The group held a meeting with representatives from the entire tantalum supply 
chain in September 2009 to discuss the issue of responsible tantalum 
sourcing, traceability in particular (EICC 2009c). In the subsequent meeting in 
November 2009, the group discussed an idea of a certification programme to 
ensure socially and environmentally responsible sourcing of tantalum, and 
agreed to develop a process to certify smelters that obtain tantalum from 
responsible sources, initially in the DRC and then surrounding countries 
(EICC 2009d).  
 
7.5. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
keep relationships between buyers and suppliers confidential and prevent anti-competitive 
behaviour’ (ibid.). 
365 Young, S. B. (2008) Social and Environmental Responsibility in Metals Supply to the 
Electronic Industry, June 20 2008 [online] available from 




The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises366 are voluntary principles and 
standards for business activities with regard to human rights, disclosure and 
combating bribery, some of which have been incorporated into the 
aforementioned CTC standards. The guidelines were last updated in 2000 
and a ‘specific instance’ complaints system as a complementary regulatory 
procedure was established in order to avoid the cost and complexity of 
developing another extensive set of standards and systems for monitoring, 
verification and reporting (Utting 2005). The ‘specific instance’ complaints 
system provides a limited accountability mechanism, in which a National 
Contact Point (NCP) in signatory countries367 receives complaints over 
‘specific instances’ of breaches of the guidelines and helps to solve them 
through confidential proceedings.   
 
The structure and performance of NCPs largely vary amongst the signatory 
countries (OECD 2008); however, this section focuses on the case of the UK 
NCP because of its progress in terms of the treatment of two cases from the 
DRC.368  
 
Initially, the UK NCP was criticised for its treatment of eighteen British or 
British-based companies whose operations in the DRC were considered to be 
in breach of the OECD Guidelines by the UN Panel of Experts369 (APPG 
2005). There were issues around integrity and impartiality, capacity to 
investigate such complex cases, the contents of recommendations (ibid.) and 
the narrow interpretation of the guidelines on supply chain issues to limit 
responsibilities of companies to actions that clearly link with investment rather 
than with trade relationships (Christian Aid et al. 2005; RAID 2008b; IBA 
2009; 2010). In general, the UK NCP was criticised for its limited 
accountability mechanism, bias and the lack of transparency in the process 
(Christian Aid et al. 2005; Global Witness 2007b).  
                                                          
366 www.oecd.org/daf/investment/guidelines 
367 There are thirty OECD member countries and twelve non-member countries adhere to the 
Guidelines as of 2009 (OECD 2010). 
368 The NCPs in Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Israel, Netherlands, Switzerland and the 
United Sates have received specific instances in the DRC. See OECD (2009). 





The UK NCP, however, went through major reforms following a consultation in 
2006370 and made significant progress in judging two companies to be in 
breach of the guidelines (RAID 2009). One example is Afrimex, a UK-based 
mineral trading company, which has been trading in the eastern DRC since 
1984. In 2007, Global Witness (2007a), an NGO, made a complaint to the UK 
NCP under the Specific Instance Procedure of the OECD Guidelines, 
regarding Afrimex’s trading in coltan and cassiterite with the rebels operating 
in the eastern DRC. In August 2008, the UK NCP made a judgement to 
support the allegation made against Afrimex (Global Witness 2008; RAID 
2008b; UK NCP 2008b). Another case is DAS Air, a British air cargo company, 
which was accused of transporting minerals from rebel-held areas in the 
eastern DRC. The complaint was made by RAID, a UK-based NGO, and the 
UK NCP confirmed the allegation in July 2008 (RAID 2008a; 2008b; UK NCP 
2008a).  
 
The decisions for the two cases above have been praised for applying the 
guidelines correctly to ‘contractual relationships at all level of the supply chain’, 
rather than focusing on investment relationships (RAID 2008b; IBA 2009; 
2010). It is also consistent with the Business and Human Rights Framework 
proposed by the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General to 
include all levels of the supply chain371 (ibid.). These cases are, therefore, 
significant in setting ‘an important precedent in making companies … 
answerable for their actions abroad’ through the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, as the only corporate accountability instrument with 
a complaint mechanism (RAID 2009: 9). They demonstrate an important 
development in the field of corporate responsibility for human rights (RAID 
                                                          
370 In response to the recommendations been made to enhance the function of the UK NCP 
(APPG 2005), the UK attempted to restructure the NCP by creating the inter-departmental 
structure with the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), and by establishing the Steering Board to oversee the work of 
the NCP (OECD 2008; RAID 2008b). Whilst this move was considered to be innovative and to 
improve the accountability of the UK NCP (OECD 2008; RAID 2008b), the DFID decided to 
reduce its involvement with the UK NCP and the FCO has withdrawn completely (RAID 
2008b). In addition, the Steering Board, including a large number of civil servants, turned out 
to be less effective owing to the rigid and unmanageable procedures (RAID 2008b). 




2008b; Cernic 2009). The NCP accountability mechanism, however, displayed 
a critical weakness in its enforcement (Cernic 2009). For example, Afrimex did 
not inform the NCP about whether or how the company was implementing the 
NCP recommendations (IBA 2010).   
 
The OECD Guidelines, despite being an important corporate accountability 
mechanism and contributing to the development of other standards such as 
the CTC, display ineffectiveness in addressing or preventing irresponsible 
corporate behaviour (OECD Watch 2009). There is a need to enhance critical 
areas such as human rights, supply chain responsibility and the function of 
the NCP by incorporating the perspectives of stakeholders in developing 
countries (ibid.). Moreover, the guidelines must ensure compliance through 
improved enforcement mechanisms for redress (RAID 2008b; Cernic 2009; 
OECD Watch 2009).  
 
7.6. Voluntary Principles (VPs) on Security and Human Rights  
 
In March 2000, the US Department of State and UK Foreign Office initiated 
the Voluntary Principles (VPs) on Security and Human Rights,372 a tri-sector 
multi-stakeholder initiative, through engaging with some leading companies 
from the extractive industries and human rights and corporate responsibility 
organisations. Its principles373 were included in the CTC standards. The VPs 
provide ‘guidance to extractives companies on maintaining the safety and 
security of their operations within an operating framework that ensures 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Voluntary Principles 
2009). The VPs are ‘the only human rights guidelines designed specifically for 
oil, gas, and mining companies’ (ibid.).  
 
There was a disagreement between NGOs and some companies during the 
process about establishing governance and reporting standards (Human 
Rights Watch 2007). The discussion leading up to the development of the VPs 
                                                          
372 www.voluntaryprinciples.org/ 
373 After some consultations, the Principles were established and announced by the US 





and the continued dialogue are expected to serve as models of collaboration 
in sharing implementation experiences and reviewing the principles (CNCA 
2006). In fact, elements of the VPs are increasingly included in the lending 
policies of banks and financial institutions for extractive companies (ibid.). 
Although their lack of clear criteria for evaluation, external monitoring 
mechanism on implementation and legal enforcement as ‘soft law’ have been 
criticised (CNCA 2006; Global Witness 2007b), the VPs have improved the 
practices of those companies that have embraced the principles (Global 
Witness 2007b). More importantly though, developing countries were not 
involved in the process of agreeing the principles, despite the fact that 
security and human rights issues tend to chiefly affect developing countries 
(CNCA 2006). 
 
7.7. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)  
 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)374 was launched by 
the UK in 2002 and adopted in 2003. The EITI supports ‘improved 
governance in resource-rich countries through the verification and full 
publication of company payments and government revenues from oil, gas and 
mining’, and is a coalition of governments, companies and civil society (EITI 
2010). The EITI is based on a principle that transparency is a means of 
ensuring that revenues from extractive industries contribute to sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, and this principle is incorporated in the 
CTC standards. As the DRC state joined the EITI in March 2005, this section 
reviews the EITI with a focus on the progress and implications for the DRC 
mining sector. 
 
The EITI is generally perceived as a success and has managed to attract 
broad endorsement within a short period of time (CNCA 2006; Aaronson 
2009). It is, however, a voluntary initiative and lacks monitoring mechanisms 





for implementation (CNCA 2006). As a result, its progress has been slow375  
(ibid.) in terms of the validation status achieved by participating countries as a 
measure of compliance; hence, there is a concern around efficacy (Rainbow 
Insight 2009). There is also a risk of failure if there are any companies that do 
not accept or respect the standards (Gardner and Schmitz 2008).   
 
With regard to the mining sector, the EITI implementation has been slow 
owing to the unclear EITI policy on reporting of payments and revenues 
(Darby and Lempa c.2008; Darby 2009).376 Moreover, there is a question as 
to whether or how the EITI process can include the huge artisanal and small-
scale mining sector (Garrett 2007; Darby and Lempa c.2008) particularly in 
Africa.377 So far, the EITI process has not been implemented in the artisanal 
and small-scale mining sector (Garrett 2007). 
 
The DRC officially announced its endorsement of the EITI in March 2005, and 
started implementing the process in 2006.378 The country was accepted as an 
EITI Candidate Country in February 2008, and has to undertake validation by 
9 March 2010. It achieved some major tasks, including the creation of a multi-
stakeholder committee with a high degree of civil society representation in 
2005 and publication of the work programme (Revenue Watch c2009). In line 
with the decentralisation policy of the country, the DRC plans to establish a 
decentralised EITI process at a provincial level (Garrett 2007; Revenue Watch 
c2009).  
 
                                                          
375 Amongst the twenty-four participating countries, which account for 50% of all resource-rich 
developing countries, only Azerbaijan took all steps in the process, as of December 2008 
(Aaronson 2009). 
376 There are two specific issues. Firstly, the EITI policy has not clarified the materiality point 
from which companies should be reporting within the EITI process (Darby and Lempa c.2008), 
or whether an aggregated or disaggregated (company‐by‐company) approach to disclosure 
should be used (Darby 2009). The disaggregated reporting provides greater transparency 
over payments/revenues, improves perceptions of companies, makes mining agreements 
more equitable and hence, is more beneficial to the EITI stakeholders (ibid.). Secondly, the 
EITI policy is not explicit as to whether non-cash payments and payments received by sub-
national governments should be reported (Darby and Lempa c.2008). 






The impact of the EITI implementation in the DRC is at an early stage and yet 
to be known; there is, nevertheless, an expectation that successful 
implementation of the EITI process will promote good practices in the DRC 
extractive industries. Participation in the EITI is, therefore, a condition 
whereby the DRC state can improve its international standing with foreign 
investors and international financial institutions (Garrett 2007), based on the 
belief of the international community that ‘the failure to open government 
revenues and spending to public scrutiny undermines the growth of a 
transparent and accountable mineral sector’ (Revenue Watch c2009).  
 
In contrast to the expectations of adherents of the EITI above, observers raise 
numerous concerns over the EITI implementation in the DRC. First and 
foremost, achieving transparency in revenues does not simply improve public 
expenditures as the EITI promotes (ICMM 2003; Gardner and Schmitz 2008). 
Secondly, there is not enough political support in the DRC (Garrett 2007) and 
the decentralised EITI process may hamper the EITI implementation in the 
country given the highly political issues surrounding the decentralisation 
(Garrett 2007; Revenue Watch c2009). Thirdly, there is also a concern over 
the limited institutional and human capacity to achieve the intended 
transparency and accountability (Revenue Watch c2009). As approximately 
90 percent of the minerals in the DRC are produced by the artisanal and 
small-scale mining sector (World Bank 2008), incorporating this largely 
informal sector into the EITI process379 will pose a huge challenge as it 
requires formalisation of the sector and a more responsible conduct of 
international mineral trading companies (Garrett 2007). Global Witness 
(2007c: 7) calls for ‘other, more wide-ranging and legally enforceable 
measures … in parallel with EITI’ since the EITI process, as a voluntary 
initiative, cannot be a single solution in considering the degree of the 
problems within the country.  
 
                                                          
379 Garrett (2007) considers that it is possible to include the artisanal and small-scale mining 
sector in the EITI process at the licensed mineral traders (comptoirs) level by reporting export 





7.8. Chapter summary and conclusions 
 
This chapter was tasked to assess the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
in strengthening governance to prevent armed groups from accessing finance 
through coltan production and trade in the eastern DRC, in order to evaluate 
whether multi-stakeholder partnerships contribute to sustainable peace and 
security.  
 
The examination of the seven partnerships has uncovered that the Durban 
Process is the only Congolese-owned multi-stakeholder partnership which 
includes various local and international stakeholders. The Durban Process 
identified issues resonant with the core issues identified from the analysis in 
the previous chapters (Chapters Four, Five and Six), such as poverty, the 
absence of infrastructure, insecurity, inequality and the legislative 
environment for the artisanal mining sector. It also recognised the 
relationships of poverty with armed groups as well as artisanal mining, and 
tried to focus on poverty alleviation and ethical coltan mining in its 
programme. Despite having the right focus, the Durban Process did not 
achieve its objectives, largely due to the lack of funding without receiving 
donors’ support or mandates. Moreover, while business stakeholders’ 
participation in the process was crucial, it generated different agendas and 
expectations within the Durban Process and slowed the progress.  
 
The idea of ethically mined coltan of the Durban Process was taken over to 
develop minerals certification schemes for coltan by three other partnerships: 
the German-led CTC; the regional mechanism of the ICGLR; and the industry-
based Joint Working Group of GeSI and EICC. While it is not possible to 
evaluate the implementation of these certification schemes as they are all 
under development, it is anticipated that they will use the CTC model. The 
CTC aims to verify the origin of ores using mineral fingerprints and certify 
mines that meet the required standards in the five principles of traceability and 
transparency, labour and working conditions, security, community 




other standards, namely, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
the VPs on Security and Human Rights and the EITI.  
 
The examination of these three minerals certification schemes has revealed 
the externally driven processes of the schemes, which are clearly 
demonstrated in the ways they define the problem and objectives. The 
German-led CTC states its objectives as being: 1) poverty alleviation and 
regional stability using mineral resources; and 2) open and fair access to 
strategic raw materials, based on its definition of the problem being the illegal 
mining and trade of mineral resources as a source of violence and regional 
instability (Franken 2009: 3). Similarly, the industry-based Joint Working 
Group of GeSI and EICC is driven by its need to source tantalum responsibly. 
While the ICGLR is a regional approach, the disagreement between the 
member states and the international and donor communities as supporters on 
the focus of the programmes exposes the risk of undermining member states’ 
ownership (Mulamula 2009). The risk for the ICGLR of becoming ‘another 
externally-financed donor driven institution’ (Berwouts 2009) seems to be high 
as the ICGLR needs institutional and financial support from the donor 
communities (ibid.; Bøås et al. 2009).    
 
Regarding the three standard setting partnerships, the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and the VPs on Security and Human Rights are 
driven by a corporate social responsibility agenda, whereas the EITI is guided 
by the transparency agenda as a means to promote poverty reduction and 
sustainable development, though there is no clear link (ICMM 2003; Gardner 
and Schmitz 2008). All three partnerships are initiatives of industrialised 
countries, Western governments in particular. They display weaknesses in 
enforcement, monitoring and accountability as they are voluntary initiatives, 
and hence appear to be largely ineffective and inefficient.  
 
Furthermore, these above partnerships have not sufficiently incorporated 




affected by the issues,380 and have normative obligations to address the 
issues (Reed 2002: 167), despite the claim that these partnerships have 
promoted discussions and learning. Similarly, three mineral certification 
schemes did not include perspectives from the local stakeholders in their 
processes, which could provide insights and knowledge on the local reality 
and crucial issues and help design the certification schemes. A meaningful 
participation by the local stakeholders, however, entails a huge challenge, as 
artisanal mining communities are not well organised or democratically 
represented and civil society may lack the capacity to become involved in the 
initiative freely and constructively. 
 
Assessing the efficacy of these multi-stakeholder partnerships in blocking 
finance for armed groups from coltan production and trade was the objective 
of this chapter. As the certification schemes for coltan are at an early stage for 
evaluation, this chapter considers the potentials and challenges of the coltan 
certifications, drawing on the evaluation of the KPCS to prevent conflict 
diamonds and the core issues identified in the preceding chapters (Four, Five 
and Six). The KPCS implementation in the DRC appeared to be a large failure 
due to weak internal controls, and smuggling of conflict and illicit diamonds is 
widespread in the country. The weak internal controls are largely caused by 
the difficulty in monitoring pervasive, uncontrolled artisanal mining in the large 
country, which lacks government control in many mining areas and borders, 
and has limited resources.              
   
The coltan certification schemes can possibly help companies to secure 
coltan supply without being accused of financing armed groups which is what 
drives the German-led CTC and the industry-based Joint Working Group of 
GeSI and EICC.  
 
The analysis shows that the potential of the coltan certification schemes to 
prevent armed groups accessing finance from coltan production and trade in 
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the eastern DRC and the challenges for the implementation is, however, 
limited. The same drawbacks suffered by the KPCS are likely to hinder 
effective implementation of the coltan certifications. Some likely 
implementation constraints for the coltan certifications are: the lack of 
government control in the eastern DRC (Chapters Four and Five); the 
extensive artisanal mining sector and informal economy (Chapter Five); 
insufficient resources and institutional capacity; the laboratory time and skills 
needed for the mineral fingerprint; the implementation costs of the certification 
schemes; and the political and commercial interests, both within and outside 
the DRC, involved in the coltan production and trade sector and the complex 
way in which the sector is organised (Chapter Five).  
 
Given the obstacles noted above, implementation of the coltan certification 
schemes is not likely to be effective in preventing armed groups from 
accessing finance from coltan. Besides, they may impact adversely on the 
ground by exacerbating tensions amongst the local population by certifying 
certain mines without addressing structural problems such as poverty and 
inequality. They may not reduce illicit exploitation and trade as political will 
and commitment can be weak when the schemes are not owned by the 
population and there are buyers for the illicit minerals (Bavier 2009). More 
importantly, my analysis on the DRC conflict in Chapter Four suggests that 
the distinction between armed groups and sovereign actors is not always 
clear as some armed groups have been integrated into the DRC national 
army. Also, armed groups have diversified funding (Chapter Five) and may be 
able to finance their violence as long as their grievances are not resolved.        
 
Based on the findings above, the following part discusses whether multi-
stakeholder partnerships contribute to sustainable peace and security by 
preventing armed conflicts through enhanced governance. My research has 
identified that the participation of local stakeholders is hugely lacking in the 
multi-stakeholder processes in view of improving solution-finding and 
decision-making, despite the claim that multi-stakeholder partnerships, as 
participatory governance, can enhance governance through increased 





The current focus of the multi-stakeholder partnerships on limiting finance for 
armed groups through coltan production and trade, or the ‘conflict coltan’ 
approach, has been shaped without including the perspectives of the local 
stakeholders, who may affect and be affected by the ways in which coltan 
exploitation is organised or armed conflicts are triggered. It is not likely that 
the multi-stakeholder partnerships can improve governance or make access 
to resources equitable to promote sustainable peace and security on the 
ground.     
 
The lack of local stakeholder participation appears to be a major weakness of 
the multi-stakeholder partnerships that were examined in this research. This 
limitation, however, highlights the difficulty in realising genuine multi-
stakeholder partnerships by including a wide range of stakeholders in order to 
address the problem in question, relating to informal, illegal, clandestine and 
illicit exploitation of coltan and armed conflicts. There is also a question as to 
whether meaningful participation can be achieved by local stakeholders such 
as artisanal miners who are not organised or may not have the resources or 
capacity to articulate their perspectives constructively and freely during the 
processes.          
 
Without significant local stakeholder participation, the multi-stakeholder 
partnership cases have clearly demonstrated that they are largely driven by 
the ‘conflict coltan’ approach, which is an agenda external to local 
stakeholders. In other words, they are greatly shaped by agendas in corporate 
social responsibility and ethical sourcing of raw materials of industrialised 
countries in addition to the humanitarian concerns of the international and 
donor communities. The huge disparity of perspectives between local 
stakeholders and external stakeholders is evident in my analysis of 
perspectives from the coltan supply chains in Chapter Six.  
 
In these multi-stakeholder processes, the problem has been largely defined 
as coltan being a financial source for armed groups, hence the ‘conflict coltan’ 




finance through coltan production and trade, without adequately taking into 
account the conflict motivations of belligerents or other factors. Given the 
complex causalities of the conflicts in the eastern DRC, uncovered through 
my analysis in the previous chapters (Chapter Four, Five and Six), the 
resolution to limit access to resources amongst the populations, rather than 
distributing resource access more fairly, may backfire. Provided that the 
unequal access to local resources had initially produced marginalisation, 
inequality and insecurity in the eastern DRC, which were exacerbated by the 
effect of the economic decline and successive conflicts, controlling access to 
coltan extraction and trade may provoke a strong resistance and produce 
grievances amongst the local populations. 
 
A case study of the fair trade coffee from Bolivia can support the above 
points; the findings of the study suggest that fair trade could prevent conflict 
when poverty reduction has been achieved and horizontal inequality has been 
reduced (Imhof and Lee 2007). The Durban Process should be mentioned in 
this respect, as this Congolese multi-stakeholder partnership defined the 
problem as poverty and insecurity in the area and focused on poverty 
alleviation through providing alternative livelihoods and ethical coltan mining 
training, though it failed to deliver the objectives due to insufficient funding.   
 
Furthermore, a fundamental problem of the ‘conflict coltan’ approach lies in its 
bias in trying to curtail financial resources for armed groups, the argument 
which was presented regarding sanction regimes in Chapter Two. The 
resolution based on the ‘conflict mineral’ agenda can be a partial approach as 
it may shift military balance in favour of the government. It also criminalises 
armed groups by dismissing their political grievances, whether legitimate or 
not, and at the same time legitimates state actors no matter what roles they 
play. Furthermore, the resolution is also coercive as it eliminates opportunities 
for diplomatic negotiation. 
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Chapter Eight: Summary and conclusions 
 
This research was conducted to examine how and why multi-stakeholder 
partnerships can help in enhancing governance to promote sustainable peace 
and security, with a focus on the role of the multi-stakeholder partnerships in 
curtailing revenues for the belligerents from coltan production and trade in the 
eastern DRC, i.e. the ‘conflict coltan’ approach. In order to achieve the above 
research aim, this research employed the case study method, supported by 
qualitative data, and aimed to analyse the following: the background and other 
causes of the conflict in the DRC; the ways and to what extent coltan 
production and trade finance and drive the conflict in the eastern DRC; the 
perspectives of various stakeholders within the coltan supply chains on issues 
around the coltan mining and trade in the eastern DRC as well as on the 
‘conflict coltan’ approach; and the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships 
relevant to coltan mining and trade in the DRC. This chapter summarises the 
key findings of this research and evaluates the achievement of the research to 
conclude the thesis.    
 
The analysis of the DRC conflict in Chapter Four demonstrated the 
importance of the domestic context in which the two wars took place, which 
induced regional insecurity and militarisation in turn from the regional security 
imperative.  
 
The first and second Congo Wars unfolded in the domestic context of a 
significant economic decline, an apparent institutional collapse and a loss of 
political legitimacy, which were induced by a combination of the 
nationalisation of foreign-owned businesses in 1973, the 1974 price decrease 
for copper, which had provided the main export revenue to the country, and 
the end of the Cold War superpowers’ support in the early 1990s. The effect 
of the economic decline was considerable: the population was living at 
subsistence level as the country’s infrastructure became disintegrated; the 
informal economy expanded significantly, which gave rise to regional 
strongmen; and the state capacity was further diminished. While these 
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domestic conditions provoked increasing pressure for a democratic transition 
both domestically and internationally, there was no viable political opposition 
to be able to respond to such demand, largely owing to the lack of leadership 
in political opposition and the interference by the international community. 
 
Another essential context lies in the fact that both wars were instigated from 
the eastern DRC, where waves of migration including refugees from political 
violence in Rwanda and Burundi arrived throughout history, and ethnicity was 
politicised by the manipulation of citizenship and land access, causing 
marginalisation, inequality and insecurity. Within this context, the laws 
governing land tenure and citizenship were the key instruments. The 1973 
land law commodified land, which is the most important local asset in the 
densely populated and land scarce region, and allowed the purchase of land 
by the Banyarwanda who did not have access to land through customary 
rights as they were seen as ‘non-indigenous’. The commodification of land 
changed the social structure radically and brought about marginalisation and 
inequality. Similarly, citizenship was politically manoeuvred through the 
introduction of the consecutive citizenship laws in 1972, 1981 and 1991 in 
order to control the Banyarwanda ethnic minority. The insecurity created 
through marginalisation and inequality above had led to an ethnic crisis in the 
eastern DRC before Hutu refugees, including génocidaires from Rwanda, 
arrived there in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The formation 
of armed Hutu refugee camps with the support of Zaïre and France in the 
area intensified the militarisation of the area and the ethnic tensions, which 
caused security threats for both Rwanda and the Tutsi Banyarwanda and 
triggered the first Congo War in 1996. The manipulation of the anti-Tutsi 
feelings within the DRC and attacks on Rwanda by the Hutu refugees again 
led to the second Congo War in 1998.  
 
In both wars, neighbour states had security imperatives to intervene in the 
DRC, whether directly or indirectly, thereby signifying the impact of the conflict 
and resulting in a military stalemate, leading to the partition of the country 
controlled by different armed groups.      
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Given the multi-layered nature of the wars at local, national and regional 
levels, the negotiated peace settlements through power-sharing at a national 
level, the DDR process and the democratic elections were not able to address 
marginalisation, inequality, insecurity and poverty in the eastern DRC. The 
protracted conflict in the area hence largely involves the CNDP against the 
FDLR. The CNDP emerged when the Banyamulenge representatives had lost 
political significance during the 2006 elections, and claims to protect the 
ethnic minority Banyamulenge. The Banyamulenge appear to face political 
exclusion in a majority-vote representative democratic system as well as a 
great rift with the rest of the local population created throughout the wars. 
With regard to the FDLR, which largely consists of the Hutu refugees or 
génocidaires from Rwanda, it demands political dialogue with Rwanda 
although there seems to be no political space within Rwanda, which enjoys 
the international community’s support. The FDLR is, therefore, left with no 
option but to be demobilised and repatriated as it is categorised as a ‘negative 
force’. Nonetheless, the local Mayi Mayi militia and the FARDC often support 
the FDLR in their fight against the CNDP.      
 
In Chapter Five, the examination of how coltan production and trade finance 
and drive the conflicts in the eastern DRC illustrated that the belligerents 
exploited various natural resources in order to finance their military campaigns 
during the two wars, to deprive their opponents as well as for self-enrichment. 
The exploitation of coltan was particularly lucrative as there was a ‘coltan 
boom’ generated by the acute supply shortage in the midst of the ‘IT tech 
bubble’ during the second Congo War; and the Rwandan forces established a 
politico-military structure to control coltan exploitation, which transformed the 
existing informal cross-border trade system in the eastern DRC. While the 
current scholarly knowledge of conflict analyses emphasise the economic 
agendas of war in the light of the end of the Cold War sponsorships such as 
‘military commercialism’ with very limited analysis on the conflict motivations, 
the informal exploitation of minerals should be located within the broader 
informal economy, which expanded considerably following the economic crisis 
in the 1980s mentioned earlier.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
294 
 
The economic crisis in the 1980s had significant impacts on the DRC mining 
sector: industrial mining operations were forced to close, and artisanal mining 
grew in the 1980s and 1990s, especially following the official permission for 
artisanal mining in 1983 and the decline of the state capacity to control mining 
operations within the informal economy. Informal artisanal mining and cross-
border trade have been providing a means of survival for a large number of 
populations amid poverty, the lack of alternative livelihoods, destruction of the 
infrastructures, and insecurity caused by the conflicts. At the same time, the 
state of informal, unregulated artisanal mining appears to have contributed to 
the conflicts by creating confusions and disputes over mine ownership. The 
disputes over mine ownership were provoked by a number of problems: the 
inconsistent legislation governing surface land and mining rights; a parallel 
authorities ruling land access and ownership by the state land law and 
customary law; inadequate provisions and enforcement of the Mining Code; 
and the duplicated authorities of the central government and the armed 
groups controlling the territories. While the state is not able to provide 
effective judicial recourse to solve confusions and disputes over mine 
ownership, resolution through violent means has become important.  
 
The peace process and reconstruction instruments did not address the new 
structure established within this widespread informal economy, and 
differentiating the war economy from the existing informal economy has 
become incredibly difficult as the actors have been integrated into the same 
institution. Moreover, the huge vested interest within the informal economy 
prevents reforms and decreases the state capacity. However, it is too 
simplistic to attribute the vested interest to economic motivations without a 
thorough analysis of the conflict motivations. The analysis in Chapter Five 
underscores that, while ensuring means of survival can be interpreted as an 
economic motivation, it is also about addressing the existing grievance and 
insecurity in a significantly militarised environment. Based on the difficulty of 
distinguishing different motivations and between the legal and illegal 
operations within the informal economy, it is not possible to evaluate exactly 
to what extent the coltan exploitation finances and drives the conflicts in the 
eastern DRC. Therefore, how and whether curtailing revenues for the 
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belligerents from coltan production and trade can end and prevent conflict is 
not clear. Without having established understanding of these nexuses, the 
impact of such action cannot be predicted.       
 
The perspectives expressed by some local actors in Chapter Six support the 
above complex causalities and interactions. The local actors distinguished 
political struggles from disputes over various deals around mining and trade of 
coltan. Similarly, the local actors and the traders operating in the DRC 
expressed the difficulty of clearly identifying coltan that has not financed the 
armed groups and of making a firm distinction between legal and illegal or 
formal and informal transactions in the eastern DRC, where it is almost 
impossible to conduct fully formal and legal operations. In addition, the local 
perspectives have demonstrated the need to capitalise available resources for 
livelihood, survival and security, which is not limited to the belligerents.  
 
In the ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC, all the armed groups therefore 
continue to benefit from the mineral exploitation as well as from their 
diversified sources of funding. While there seems to be an agreement that 
mineral resources such as coltan finance the armed groups operating in the 
eastern DRC, the examination of the link between coltan exploitation and 
armed conflict has highlighted that the empirical analysis of the conflict 
motivations of the belligerents is extremely limited. Despite the limited 
analysis of the conflict motivations, some research contends that the mineral 
resources are the key driver for the continuing conflict, or have become the 
primary motivation for the conflict, whereas others view that the mineral 
resources perpetuate the conflict or the link between mineral resources and 
conflict is a consequence of insecurity and governance failure in the DRC. 
With reference to the scholarly knowledge of the economic agendas of war, 
reviewed in Chapter Two, the economic agendas do not appear to constitute 
the prime cause behind most of armed conflicts, although it is difficult to 
clearly distinguish economic reasons from other factors, partly owing to the 
fact that conflict dynamics change over time. Without reaching an agreement 
on a set of conflict motivations, opportunities created by the availability of 
abundant natural resources and the effect of weak governance are largely 
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considered as triggering armed conflicts, both by the rebel greed hypothesis 
and the economic agendas of war.  
 
The above view has been influential and shaping the responses, leading to 
the ‘conflict mineral’ approach in particular. The responses therefore 
concentrate on the task of limiting finance for rebel groups with the aim of 
ending and preventing violent conflict. They also seek to improve governance 
as the resource curse hypothesis views that weak governance is a crucial 
variable in triggering armed conflict in resource-abundant countries. They are 
echoed in the mounting pressure on and perspectives of coltan-using 
companies examined in Chapter Six. The coltan-using companies are 
increasingly pressured to apply enhanced human rights due diligence to their 
supply chains and to achieve traceability and accountability in order to secure 
the supply of ethically sourced coltan, or they face reputational risk. The 
analysis of the perspectives within the coltan supply chains elucidates the 
very different perspectives between the supplier community and demand side. 
 
Provided with the analysis of the nature of the link between coltan exploitation 
and conflicts and the different perspectives within the coltan supply chains 
above, Chapter Seven evaluated the role of multi-stakeholder partnerships in 
curtailing revenues for belligerents through coltan production and trade by 
reviewing seven multi-stakeholder partnerships. Three standards-setting 
partnerships have displayed weaknesses in enforcement, monitoring and 
accountability as they are voluntary initiatives. Other partnerships that intend 
to apply minerals certification schemes for coltan to verify the origin of the 
ores and to assure the ethical standards of production have become central in 
the effort to curtail revenues for armed groups through coltan production and 
trade. Although they are yet to be fully implemented, they are not likely to be 
effective, owing to a lack of local commitment and ownership and a number of 
inherent implementation constraints.         
 
While the idea of ethically sourced coltan was originally from the Durban 
Process, a Congolese initiative based on multi-stakeholder dialogues, my 
analysis has demonstrated that the certification schemes have been largely 
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driven by the ethical sourcing agenda of raw materials in industrialised 
countries, as the DRC has become an essential supplier of coltan. They differ 
from the original idea of the ethically sourced coltan in the Durban Process, 
which was based on a livelihood approach and the dialogues among a wide 
range of local and international stakeholders, and had a focus on poverty 
alleviation through providing alternative livelihoods, especially through 
agriculture. 
 
Chapter Seven also reviewed the implementation of the Kimberley Process 
Certification Scheme (KPCS), which aimed to prevent trade in conflict 
diamonds in the DRC, in order to consider implications for the coltan 
certification schemes in the eastern DRC, and identified the implementation 
constraints. Overall, the issues that could hinder the implementation of the 
coltan certification schemes include: the lack of government control in the 
eastern DRC; extensive artisanal mining and informal economy; insufficient 
resources and institutional capacity; laboratory time and skills needed for the 
mineral fingerprint; implementation costs of the certification schemes; the 
political and commercial interests, both within and outside the DRC, in the 
coltan production and trade; and the complex ways in which the sector is 
organised. Moreover, there is no local ownership or political will, and 
commitment could be weak as the schemes are largely externally driven 
without sufficiently including the local perspectives.  
 
As regards the three standards-setting partnerships that have contributed to 
developing the standards for the coltan certification schemes, they are driven 
by the corporate social responsibility agenda and transparency agenda from 
industrialised countries. They have been weak in enforcement, monitoring and 
accountability as they are voluntary initiatives, and appear to be largely 
ineffective and inefficient. They also lack the perspectives of stakeholders 
from developing countries in their processes.  
  
Drawing on the above examination of the nexus between coltan and conflict in 
the eastern DRC and the multi-stakeholder partnership cases, I analysed how 
multi-stakeholder partnerships can contribute to sustainable peace and 
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security in the eastern DRC. While multi-stakeholder partnerships, as a new 
form of global governance, are seen to improve governance through more 
inclusive, transparent and accountable decision-making processes with higher 
stakeholder participation, my research has identified the limited participation 
of local stakeholders in most of the partnership cases. Without having 
included local perspectives, these partnerships have been largely driven by 
the agendas of external stakeholders, namely the corporate social 
responsibility and ethical sourcing of raw materials in the industrialised 
countries, leading to the resolution based on the ‘conflict coltan’ approach.  
 
However, the ‘conflict coltan’ approach has not been able to determine exactly 
what constitutes the ‘conflict coltan’ or to what extent the coltan produced in 
the eastern DRC actually causes any harm in terms of violent conflict. This is 
because the war economy is deeply integrated in or has transformed the 
existing extensive informal economy, which is expressed in the nuanced 
perspectives of the local stakeholders. The multi-stakeholder partnerships 
therefore do not significantly improve governance without understanding the 
informality in the DRC, or contribute to end or prevent the conflicts in the 
absence of other measures.  
 
Based on the complex causalities of the conflicts in the eastern DRC, in which 
unequal access to local resources played a role in creating marginalisation, 
inequality and insecurity, limiting resource access amongst the populations, 
rather than distributing it more fairly, may provoke grievance and conflict. 
There is no concrete evidence as to what would prevent armed groups from 
accessing revenues from coltan. Moreover, the ‘conflict coltan’ approach, with 
its focus on curtailing financial resources for armed groups, is a partial and 
coercive tactic. It may shift military balance in favour of the government, 
criminalise armed groups by dismissing any political grievances regardless of 
their legitimacy, legitimate state actors despite their role in violence, and 
eliminate opportunities for diplomatic negotiation.  
 
The limited local participation, a major shortcoming of the multi-stakeholder 
partnerships examined in this research, highlights the difficulty in realising 
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genuine multi-stakeholder partnerships by including a wide range of 
stakeholders, owing to the nature of the problem in question. The 
stakeholders within the informal economy may not be organised or have the 
resources or capacity to be able to participate meaningfully in the processes 
and, more importantly, those actors who are involved in violent conflict are not 
likely to be included in the partnerships. This is the point in which I seek to 
contribute to knowledge by illuminating the theoretical contention of applying 
multi-stakeholder partnerships as a means of participatory governance in a 
place marked with violent conflict and weak governance. The concept of 
participatory governance requires re-assessment in terms of necessary 
environments to which the concept can be applied and a clarification of the 
extent to which inclusiveness and participation should be sought.    
 
In addition to the above point, the arguments presented in my thesis have 
contributed to ongoing academic discussions on conflict analyses, the 
resource curse hypothesis and the economic agendas of civil war in 
particular. I have highlighted the limitations of country-based reductionist 
approaches and their over-emphasis on the economic dimensions of armed 
conflict through my analysis of the conflicts in the eastern DRC. The analysis 
not only uncovered the multi-layered complex nature of the conflicts but also 
the difficulty in isolating economic motivation as the economic motivation can 
be a symptom of underlying insecurity and grievance.   
 
My research has also offered empirical analysis and data on the coltan 
industry and partnership initiatives in relation to armed conflicts in the eastern 
DRC. It has demonstrated how the global demand for resources such as 
coltan impacts on the place of supply and how the partnership initiatives, 
which aspire for more inclusive and accountable governance, are largely 
driven by the need to secure ‘conflict-free’ resources and neglect the complex 
relations on the ground.   
 
I have achieved the objectives of the research set out in the introduction as 
presented in the table below.  
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Table 4: Achievement of the research objectives 
Objectives Evaluation of achievements 
Chapter Four 
To identify the background and 
causes rather than the economic 
motivations for the continuing conflict 
in the eastern DRC. 
The analysis of the secondary data 
elucidates the complex causalities including 
the domestic context prior to the wars, the 
issues around ethnicity, citizenship and land, 
regional security agendas, and the failures of 
the peace process and reconstruction.   
Chapter Five 
To analyse how coltan production and 
trade finance and drive the conflict in 
the eastern DRC based on the 
following:  
• The current knowledge of the 
link between the conflict and 
coltan; 
• How the coltan market and 
industry are structured and 
linked to the DRC conflict; 
• How coltan is produced and 
traded in the DRC; and 
• The involvement of the armed 
groups in coltan production 
and trade.  
The examination, mostly based on secondary 
data, illustrates that the largely informal 
systems of coltan production and trade in the 
eastern DRC are connected to the global 
market through complex supply chains.  
 
It identifies that coltan production and trade 
finance the armed groups and that the 
inappropriate legislation and peace 
settlements cause conflict in the mining 
areas. 
 
It was not able to determine whether coltan 
production and trade drive the conflict, owing 
to the limited data as well as the various 
motivations being intertwined.          
Chapter Six 
To examine different perspectives of 
stakeholders within the coltan supply 
chains on: 
• Whether revenues from 
coltan drive and finance the 
conflict; 
• Whether it is possible to 
identify ‘conflict coltan’; 
• The idea of halting the 
purchase of ‘conflict coltan’; 
• The issues and challenges 
relating to coltan production 
and trade; and 
• How best to address these 
issues and challenges. 
 
The analysis of the primary and secondary 
data demonstrates clearly how the 
perspectives between the supply and 
demand sides within the coltan supply chains 
differ. 
 
It also explains the difficulty of establishing a 
clear definition of ‘conflict coltan’. 




To analyse the role of the multi-
stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) in 
enhancing governance, limiting the 
finance for the belligerents, and 
improving people’s lives in the 
eastern DRC by examining the 
following: 
• The background, objectives 
and scope, type, and progress 
of the multi-stakeholder 
partnerships; 
• Whether they are inclusive, 
participatory, transparent and 
accountable; and 
• Their opportunities and 
challenges. 
The evaluation of the multi-stakeholder 
partnerships demonstrates that the multi-
stakeholder partnerships largely lack 
inclusive participation of the local 
stakeholders and their viewpoints.  
 
It is too early to assess the outcomes of the 
ongoing processes of the multi-stakeholder 
partnerships. 
 
However, I have illustrated the potential 
opportunities and challenges. 
 
I conclude that the multi-stakeholder 
partnerships are not likely to enhance the 
governance to limit the finance for the armed 
groups from the revenues from mineral 
resources.      
 
My research hypotheses were: 
1. Multi-stakeholder partnerships have not significantly improved 
governance in the region 
2. Multi-stakeholder partnerships have not demonstrated any positive 
impact in conflict prevention or conflict resolution 
3. Multi-stakeholder partnerships are inherently inadequate to address 
deep-rooted violent conflicts which have underlying political causes 
The data and arguments have, I believe, confirmed these and shown that 
there is no evidence to support that curtailing financial resources derived from 
mineral resources for the belligerents will end and prevent the conflict, and the 
distinctly different perspectives amongst the local stakeholders are not 
included in the multi-stakeholder processes. While it provided insight into how 
and why the multi-stakeholder partnerships do not concretely contribute to 
end and prevent the armed conflicts in the eastern DRC, the research has a 
limitation, as shown below.  
 
The research topic is an ongoing endeavour and it is not possible to evaluate 
the outcomes of the multi-stakeholder partnerships at present. Some of the 
research findings are therefore not conclusive. This was evident from the start 
of the research; however, I still decided to conduct this research because the 
topic is extremely important. Firstly, the topic is a serious example of the 
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complicity of the developed world in chronic conflict and poverty; secondly, it 
requires an urgent response for the population in the eastern DRC. 
 
I close these conclusions by highlighting that a number of Congolese 
populations have started to raise concerns about decisions and policies made 
on the issues of natural resource exploitation and human rights ‘at such a 
distance from [their] daily reality’381 and to demand that their voices be heard 
during the processes (Pole Institute 2010), and by suggesting future research 
agendas. The above demand serves to support the main finding of my 
research – that the views and ideas of a wide range of local stakeholders are 
currently not included in the multi-stakeholder processes.  
 
I therefore suggest that future research should analyse those local views that 
are not currently being voiced or included in various decisions and policies. 
The research should not be limited to analysing the nexus between the 
conflict and mineral resources but should start by identifying the issues and 
needs faced by the local stakeholders as this research has suggested that the 
local actors face broader issues, including the lack of alternative livelihoods 
and infrastructures, poverty, and insecurity. It also needs to collect ideas 
about how these issues and needs can be addressed, and what has been 
preventing the improvement of the situations on the ground. Such research 
envisages improving policies and decisions for conflict resolutions leading to 
sustainable peace and security by incorporating these issues and the views of 
critical local stakeholders who are not organised or able to voice their 
concerns and perspectives. This further research also entails an 
anthropological approach through longer term observations of the informal 
economy to supplement the scarcity of statistics in the eastern DRC, and 
requires a holistic analytical approach to analyse these data from the ground 
that could be offered by a livelihood approach or the concept of human 
security.  
 
                                                          
381 A letter to Professor John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
transnational and other business enterprises, from the Collectif of NGOs, 29 August 2010 
(Collectif 2010). 
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Furthermore, for the future research above to be able to improve decisions 
and policies, another set of research needs to be carried out to seek how best 
these local views can be communicated to the ongoing multi-stakeholder 
processes. The future research should consider how and why the 
stakeholders in these multi-stakeholder partnerships change their perceptions. 
For this research, an applied research study, facilitating dialogue with wider 
stakeholders, local stakeholders in particular, in the multi-stakeholder 
processes would be desirable.    
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Annex 1: Chronology of key events 
 
Post-independence turmoil 
1960 June - Congo becomes independent with Patrice Lumumba as prime 
minister and Joseph Kasavubu as president.  
1960 July - Congolese army mutinies; Moise Tshombe declares Katanga 
independent; Belgian troops sent in ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens and 
mining interests; UN Security Council votes to send in troops to help establish 
order, but the troops are not allowed to intervene in internal affairs.  
1960 September - Kasavubu dismisses Lumumba as prime minister.  
1960 December - Lumumba arrested.  
1961 February - Lumumba murdered, reportedly with US and Belgian 
complicity.  
1961 August - UN troops begin disarming Katangese soldiers.  
1963 - Tshombe agrees to end Katanga's secession.  
1964 - President Kasavubu appoints Tshombe prime minister.  
 
Mobutu years 
1965 - Kasavubu and Tshombe ousted in a coup led by Joseph Mobutu.  
1971 - Joseph Mobutu renames the country Zaire and himself Mobutu Sese 
Seko; also Katanga becomes Shaba and the river Congo becomes the river 
Zaire.  
1973-74 - Mobutu nationalises many foreign-owned firms and forces 
European investors out of the country.  
1977 - Mobutu invites foreign investors back, without much success; French, 
Belgian and Moroccan troops help repulse attack on Katanga by Angolan-
based rebels.  
1989 - Zaire defaults on loans from Belgium, resulting in a cancellation of 
development programmes and increased deterioration of the economy.  
1990 - Mobutu agrees to end the ban on multiparty politics and appoints a 
transitional government, but retains substantial powers.  
1991 - Following riots in Kinshasa by unpaid soldiers, Mobutu agrees to a 
coalition government with opposition leaders, but retains control of the 
security apparatus and important ministries.  
1993 - Rival pro- and anti-Mobutu governments created.  
1994 - Mobutu agrees to the appointment of Kengo Wa Dondo, an advocate 
of austerity and free-market reforms, as prime minister.  
1996-97 - Tutsi rebels capture much of eastern Zaire while Mobutu is abroad 
for medical treatment.  
 
Aftermath of Mobutu 
1997 May - Tutsi and other anti-Mobutu rebels, aided principally by Rwanda, 
capture the capital, Kinshasa; Zaire is renamed the Democratic Republic of 
Congo; Laurent-Desire Kabila installed as president.  
1998 August - Rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda rise up against Kabila 




Angolan troops also side with Kabila. The rebels take control of much of the 
east of DRC.  
1999 - Rifts emerge between Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) rebels 
supported by Uganda and Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) rebels 
backed by Rwanda.  
 
Lusaka peace accord signed 
1999 July - The six African countries involved in the war sign a ceasefire 
accord in Lusaka. The following month the MLC and RCD rebel groups sign 
the accord.  
2000 - UN Security Council authorises a 5,500-strong UN force to monitor the 
ceasefire but fighting continues between rebels and government forces, and 
between Rwandan and Ugandan forces.  
2001 January - President Laurent Kabila is shot dead by a bodyguard. Joseph 
Kabila succeeds his father.  
2001 February - Kabila meets Rwandan President Paul Kagame in 
Washington. Rwanda, Uganda and the rebels agree to a UN pull-out plan. 
Uganda and Rwanda begin pulling troops back from the frontline.  
2001 May - US refugee agency says the war has killed 2.5 million people, 
directly or indirectly, since August 1998. Later, a UN panel says the warring 
parties are deliberately prolonging the conflict to plunder gold, diamonds, 
timber and coltan, used in the making of mobile phones.  
2002 January - Eruption of Mount Nyiragongo devastates much of the city of 
Goma.  
 
Search for peace 
2002 April - Peace talks in South Africa: Kinshasa signs a power-sharing deal 
with Ugandan-backed rebels, under which the MLC leader would be premier. 
Rwandan-backed RCD rebels reject the deal.  
2002 July - Presidents of DRC and Rwanda sign a peace deal under which 
Rwanda will withdraw troops from the east and DRC will disarm and arrest 
Rwandan Hutu gunmen blamed for the killing of the Tutsi minority in 
Rwanda's 1994 genocide.  
2002 September - Presidents of DRC and Uganda sign peace accord under 
which Ugandan troops will leave DRC.  
2002 September/October - Uganda, Rwanda say they have withdrawn most 
of their forces from the east. UN-sponsored power-sharing talks begin in 
South Africa.  
2002 December - Peace deal signed in South Africa between Kinshasa 
government and main rebel groups. Under the deal rebels and opposition 
members are to be given portfolios in an interim government.  
 
Interim government 
2003 April - President Kabila signs a transitional constitution, under which an 
interim government will rule pending elections.  
2003 May - Last Ugandan troops leave eastern DRC.  
2003 June - French soldiers arrive in Bunia, spearheading a UN-mandated 





President Kabila names a transitional government to lead until elections in two 
years time. Leaders of main former rebel groups are sworn in as vice-
presidents in July.  
2003 August - Interim parliament inaugurated.  
2004 March - Gunmen attack military bases in Kinshasa in an apparent coup 
attempt.  
2004 June - Reported coup attempt by rebel guards is said to have been 
neutralised.  
2004 December - Fighting in the east between the Congolese army and 
renegade soldiers from a former pro-Rwanda rebel group. Rwanda denies 
being behind the mutiny.  
2005 March - UN peacekeepers say they have killed more than 50 militia 
members in an offensive, days after nine Bangladeshi soldiers serving with 
the UN are killed in the north-east.  
 
New constitution 
2005 May - New constitution, with text agreed by former warring factions, is 
adopted by parliament.  
2005 September - Uganda warns that its troops may re-enter DRC after a 
group of Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army rebels enter via Sudan.  
2005 November - A first wave of soldiers from the former Zairian army returns 
after almost eight years of exile in the neighbouring Republic of Congo.  
2005 December - Voters back a new constitution, already approved by 
parliament, paving the way for elections in 2006.  
International Court of Justice rules that Uganda must compensate DRC for 
rights abuses and the plundering of resources in the five years up to 2003.  
2006 February - New constitution comes into force; new national flag is 
adopted. 
2006 March - Warlord Thomas Lubanga becomes first war crimes suspect to 
face charges at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. He is accused 
of forcing children into active combat.  
2006 May - Thousands are displaced in the north-east as the army and UN 




2006 July - Presidential and parliamentary polls are held - the first free 
elections in four decades. With no clear winner in the presidential vote, 
incumbent leader Joseph Kabila and opposition candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba 
prepare to contest a run-off poll on 29 October. Forces loyal to the two 
candidates clash in the capital.  
2006 November - Joseph Kabila is declared winner of October's run-off 
presidential election. The poll has the general approval of international 
monitors.  
2006 December - Forces of renegade General Laurent Nkunda and the UN-
backed army clash in North Kivu province, prompting some 50,000 people to 
flee. The UN Security Council expresses concern about the fighting.  
2007 March - Government troops and forces loyal to opposition leader Jean-





2007 April - DRC, Rwanda and Burundi relaunch the regional economic bloc 
Great lakes Countries Economic Community, known under its French 
acronym CEPGL.  
2007 April - Jean-Pierre Bemba leaves for Portugal, ending a three-week 
political stalemate in Kinshasa, during which he sheltered in the South African 
embassy.  
2007 May - The UN investigates allegations of gold and arms trafficking by 
UN peacekeepers in Ituri region.  
2007 June - War could break out again in the east, warns the Archbishop of 
Bukavu, Monsignor Francois-Xavier Maroy.  
2007 June - Radio Okapi broadcaster Serge Maheshe is shot dead in Bukavu, 
the third journalist killed in the country since 2005.  
2007 August - Uganda and DRC agree to try to defuse a border dispute.  
Aid agencies report a big increase in refugees fleeing instability in North Kivu 
which is blamed on dissident general Nkunda.  
2007 September - Major outbreak of the deadly Ebola virus.  
2008 January - The government and rebel militia, including renegade Gen 
Nkunda, sign a peace pact aimed at ending years of conflict in the east.  
 
Renewed clashes 
2008 April - Army troops clash with Rwandan Hutu militias with whom they 
were formerly allied in eastern Congo, leaving thousands of people 
displaced.  
2008 August - Heavy clashes erupt in the east of the country between army 
troops and fighters loyal to rebel leader Laurent Nkunda.  
2008 October - Rebel forces capture major army base of Rumangabo; the 
Congolese government accuses Rwanda of backing General Nkunda, a claim 
Rwanda denies.  
Thousands of people, including Congolese troops, flee as clashes in eastern 
DRC intensify. Chaos grips the provincial capital Goma as rebel forces 
advance. UN peacekeepers engage the rebels in an attempt to support 
Congolese troops.  
2008 November - Campaign by Tutsi rebel leader Laurent Nkunda to 
consolidate control over east prompts new wave of refugees.  
UN Security Council approves temporary increase of troops to bolster the 
strained UN peacekeeping effort.  
2008 December - Uganda, South Sudan and DRC launch joint assault on 
Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army bases in north-east DRC. Hundreds of 
civilians are killed in backlash attacks.  
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